Error and/or relief
It is unclear whether the court intended to impose as the base term the low term of 16 months or the middle term of two years, we remand for the court to clarify its intended sentence, as well as to correct a clerical error in the abstract of judgment.
First Holding:
At the sentencing hearing, the court stated it was imposing the low term, two years in prison. It doubled that term as it was a two-strikes sentence, and added three years for an injury enhancement, and stated the total sentence was seven years. The low term for the crime, however, carries a triad of 16 months, 2 years, or 3 years. Thus, the low term is 16 months, and two years is the middle term.
The matter must be remanded for the court to clarify whether it intended to impose the low term (in which case the sentence must be recalculated) or the middle term (in which case the sentence will remain the same as orally pronounced as two years doubled plus three years for the enhancement for a total of seven years).
We stress that, if the court indeed intended to impose the seven-year total sentence based on the middle term of two years, doing so was not an abuse of the court’s discretion considering the relevant sentencing factors considered by the court on the record. A sentence based on the low term of 16 months would also not be an abuse of the court’s sentencing discretion.
Authority:
People v. Sarmiento-Zuniga (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 1216, 1226 [trial court does not abuse its discretion by imposing the presumptive middle term rather than the low term where the court sets forth on the record the facts and reasons for choosing the sentence imposed at time of sentencing, and that decision does not fall outside the bounds of reason under applicable law and relevant facts]
Second Holding:
Though the conviction was by plea, no certificate of cause is required for the defendant to raise his challenges to the sentence in this case. Section 1237.5 provides a defendant may not appeal from a guilty or no contest plea without a certificate of probable cause for an appeal based on reasonable constitutional, jurisdictional, or other grounds going to the legality of the proceedings. Even without a certificate of probable cause, a defendant may nonetheless appeal issues related to post-plea matters, such as the sentence, that do not challenge the plea’s validity.
Authority:
People v. Stamps (2020) 9 Cal.5th 685, 694
Third Holding:
However, even when a defendant purports to challenge only the sentence imposed, a certificate is required if the challenge goes to an aspect of the sentence to which the defendant agreed as an integral part of a plea agreement, as such a claim is, in substance, a challenge to the validity of the plea. Thus, where a defendant enters a negotiated plea in which the parties agree the court will impose a specific, agreed-upon sentence, any challenge to that sentence is a challenge to the validity of the plea and requires a certificate of probable cause.
(Gary note: This is a direct appeal from the original sentencing. It should not be confused with an appeal from a resentencing under one of the recent ameliorative provisions, such as 1172.75. Where it is an appeal from such a resentencing, it is important to review section 1171, effective 1/1/2025, which states in subdivision (c)(3) that “Any changes to a sentence shall not be a basis for a prosecutor or court to rescind a plea agreement.” I have not seen any instances in which there was discussion of the need for a certificate of probable cause in appeals from decisions in the ameliorative provisions context, but section 1171(c)(3) seems to me to specifically address (and countermand) those aspects of the Stamps decision regarding setting aside the plea.
(I would argue that Stamps also would not be authority to require a certificate of probable cause to appeal a ruling on the application of ameliorative provisions where there was a stipulated sentence, given the legislation that, in essence, not only doesn’t challenge the plea agreement, it specifically states that application of the ameliorative provisions will not result in the setting aside of the plea itself. As I said, I have not noticed the question of certificates of probable cause in appeals from hearings involving ameliorative sections such as–but not limited to–1170.18, 1172.1, 1172.6, 1172.7, and 1172.75. See my comment in case 000532 for a more extensive discussion on section 1171, including the observation that the Supreme Court transferred a case with a Stamps issue back to the Court of Appeal with instructions to consider the impact of the then-recently added section 1171.)
Authority:
People v. Stamps (2020) 9 Cal.5th 685, 694
People v. Hurlic (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 50, 55
People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 79
Fourth Holding:
By contrast, a certificate of probable cause is not required to challenge the exercise of individualized sentencing discretion within an agreed maximum sentence, absent contrary provisions in the plea agreement, as long as the defendant is not challenging the trial court’s authority to impose a sentence within a negotiated lid or maximum.
Authority:
People v. Buttram (2003) 30 Cal.4th 773, 790
People v. Shelton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 759, 763
Fifth Holding:
No certificate of probable cause is needed to challenge a court’s failure to strike a prior strike where striking a strike would still result in a sentence that falls within the range contemplated by the plea.
Authority:
People v. Cole (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 850, 872
People v. Buttram (2003) 30 Cal.4th 773, 790-791, 777, 786-787
Sixth Holding:
The abstract must also be corrected to remove the notation “YTL” (for “years to life”), as no indeterminate life term was imposed in this case.
(Gary note: The court listed no authority for that correction, but there is plenty it could have relied on, some of which I list below.)
Authority:
People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185
People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1070
People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 855
In re Black (1967) 66 Cal.2d 881, 890
People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385
People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2
