Tag Archives: Abstract of judgment or minute order

Case 000648

Error and/or relief

The trial court must correct the minute order to accurately reflect that the defendant was committed under section Welfare and Institutions Code section 6500(c)(3) rather than under section 6500(c)(1) as shown in the minute order.

Holding:

A commitment under WIC 6500(c)(1), as erroneously reflected in the minute order, is for one year. A commitment under WIC 6500(c)(3), as ordered by the court, is for six months. Any variance between the oral pronouncement of judgment and the minute order or abstract of judgment is presumed to be clerical error, and the oral pronouncement controls. Courts have the authority to correct such clerical errors at any time.

Authority:

WIC 6500

People v. Mesa (1975) 14 Cal.3d 466, 471

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 186–187

Case 000643

Error and/or relief

The defendant was resentenced under section 1172.75. The restitution fine must be vacated, as it is more than 10 years old. The abstract of judgment must be corrected to reflect the oral pronouncement of judgment accurately.

First Holding:

Effective January 1, 2025, the Legislature amended section 1465.9 to add subdivision (d), which states: “Upon the expiration of 10 years after the date of imposition of a restitution fine pursuant to Section 1202.4, the balance, including any collection fees, shall be unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a judgment imposing those fines shall be vacated.” The fine in this case appears to have been imposed at the original sentencing in 1994, and must be vacated.

Authority:

PEN 1469.5

Second Holding:

Though the abstract of judgment from 1994 does not reflect whether the trial court imposed the mandatory minimum restitution fine under section 1202.4(b), we presume, as the People argue, the court did. Thus, the superior court’s order imposing the restitution fine at the defendant’s resentencing in 2024 essentially reimposed the fine imposed in 1994, which section 1465.9 has now made unenforceable and uncollectible. We construe the superior court’s order as simply reimposing the original restitution fine, and the 10-year clock did not start anew.

Authority:

EVID 664 [It is presumed that official duty has been regularly performed]

People v. Ramirez (2021) 10 Cal.5th 983, 1042 [we presume that the trial court knew the law and followed it in imposing a restitution fine under section 1202.4]

People v. Stowell (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1107, 1114 [a trial court is presumed to have been aware of and followed the applicable law]

People v. Salstrom (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 596, review granted on another point, March 11, 2026, S295038

Third Holding:

After imposing the $300 restitution fine, the superior court stated: “$300 parole revocation fine, that is stayed pending successful—Well, I am going to strike that. There is no parole that’s going to be granted in this case.” As noted, the minute order and abstract of judgment indicate the court (1) imposed and stayed execution of a parole revocation fine under section 1202.45 and (2) imposed and struck “all financial obligations, excluding any actual victim restitution.” The reporter’s transcript of the resentencing hearing does not state the court made these rulings. The superior court must correct the minute order and abstract of judgment to reflect the oral pronouncement of judgment.

Authority:

People v. Burke (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 237, 244 [Ordinarily, where there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of judgment and the abstract of judgment, the oral pronouncement controls]

People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2 [The record of the oral pronouncement of the court controls over the clerk’s minute order]

People v. Portillo (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 577, 603 [the oral pronouncement of sentence controls over a subsequently entered minute order]

Fourth Holding:

Courts may correct clerical errors at any time, and appellate courts . . . have ordered correction of abstracts of judgment that did not accurately reflect the oral judgments of sentencing courts.

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1, 89

People v. Garcia (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 848, 859

People v. Gobert (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 676, 689 [we must correct the discrepancy by ordering the trial court to modify the minute order]

Case 000630

Error and/or relief

It was error for the court to impose a no contact order under section 1202.05, because the victim was an adult. The trial court was required, however, to consider whether to issue a protective order under section 136.2(i)(1). We accordingly remand the matter for the trial court to do so. In addition, the abstract of judgment must be corrected to reflect that the restitution fine was stayed, and to reflect the actual date of sentencing. Also, the minute order fails to reflect the true finding of aggravating circumstances on one of the counts.

First Holding:

Section 1202.05 provides that if a defendant receives a prison sentence for certain sexual offenses against a victim who is a child under the age of 18 years, the court shall prohibit all visitation between the defendant and the child victim. The restrictions on visitation imposed by the provision apply only to victims who are under the age of 18 at the time of the contemplated visitation. Section 136.2(i)(1) does provide authority for the court to impose a protective order.

Although the trial court acknowledged the victim’s status as an adult when it issued the order, there is nothing in the record to show that the trial court contemplated issuing the no-contact order under section 136.2(i)(1). Moreover, the no-contact order issued by the court did not conform to the requirements of section 136.2(i)(1). Section 136.2(i)(1) provides in part that, when a criminal defendant has been convicted of a crime that requires the defendant to register pursuant to section 290(c), the court, at the time of sentencing, shall consider issuing an order restraining the defendant from any contact with a victim of the crime.

Authority:

PEN 1202.05

PEN 136.2(i)(1)

People v. Scott (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1323

Second Holding:

The abstract of judgment contains clerical errors that should be corrected. At sentencing, the court imposed but stayed a $10,000 restitution fine under section 1202.4(b). The abstract of judgment reflects that the fine was imposed but not that it was stayed. I

n addition, the abstract incorrectly indicates that the defendant was sentenced more than a month after the date he was actually sentenced. We accordingly direct the trial court to amend the abstract to make these corrections. In addition, the sentencing minute order should be corrected to accurately reflect the sentence orally pronounced.

The corrected minute order from the bifurcated proceeding at which the trial court found the aggravating circumstances true does not reflect that the court found those circumstances true as to one of the counts.

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185-188

People v. Wynn (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1221

Case 000628

Error and/or relief

GARY note: This is not a winning issue case, but is an example of an error in an abstract of judgment in which the abstract reflected a conviction less serious than actually sustained. While I doubt it was helpful to the defendant in this instance, I think it still provides yet another lesson in the importance of reviewing abstracts of judgment.

Holding:

The trial court’s minutes and abstract of judgment erroneously reflect that the defendant was convicted and sentenced on count 5 for the dismissed charge of false imprisonment by violence. The record indicates that the trial court struck the false imprisonment charge before trial and that the defendant was charged with and convicted of forcible rape in count 5, and that he was sentenced accordingly. The abstract of judgment must be corrected to reflect a conviction of rape by force or fear on count 5.

Authority:

People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1, 89

People v. Mesa (1975) 14 Cal.3d 466, 471

Case 000619

Error and/or relief

The abstract of judgment must be modified to reflect a four-year arson enhancement under section 451.1, subdivision (a)(5)—instead of subdivision (a)(1).

Holding:

The abstract reflects that the four-year arson enhancement was imposed under section 451.1(a)(1). The record demonstrates, however, that this enhancement was charged and proven based on appellant’s use of a device designed to accelerate the fire. That enhancement falls within subdivision (a)(5) of that statute. As such, we agree with appellant’s counsel that it is appropriate to order the abstract of judgment amended to reflect the proper subdivision.

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185 [courts may correct clerical errors at any time]