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Sentencing, Sixth Amendment

Case 000782

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court erred by imposing the upper term based on circumstances in aggravation that were not stipulated to nor proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.

First Holding:

Section 1170(b)(2), prohibits imposition of an upper-term sentence unless aggravating circumstances justify that term and the facts underlying any such circumstance, other than a prior conviction, have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.

Authority:

PEN 1170(b)(2)

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 742

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1078

Second Holding:

Where the trial court relies on unproven aggravating factors, we assess prejudice under Chapman, which requires us to find prejudice unless we can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have found true all of the aggravating facts relied upon by the trial court to justify an upper term sentence. The Chapman standard applies whenever the court has relied on unproven factors, even if some other aggravating facts relied on have been properly established.

Authority:

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 768

Third Holding:

The trial court erred by imposing the upper-term sentence based on five aggravating factors that were not found true by a jury or stipulated to by the defendant. The jury found not true the allegation that the attempted murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated. We do not know what facts the jury relied on in finding a lack of premeditation and whether those facts would have caused a jury to find not true the allegation that the crime involved planning and professionalism.

The remaining aggravating factors relied on by the court, other than the prior prison term, likewise require factual determinations. As stated in Wiley, even the determination that crimes are of increasing seriousness is comparative and qualitative and must be left to the decision of the jury.

Authority:

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1090

Fourth Amendment, Standard of review

Case 000781

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court erred by denying the defendant’s motion to suppress because the police improperly prolonged his detention to conduct a criminal investigation unrelated to the purpose of the initial traffic stop.

First Holding:

Section 1538.5 affords criminal defendants a procedure by which they may seek suppression of illegally seized evidence. Section 1538.5 provides a comprehensive and exclusive procedure for the final determination of search and seizure issues prior to trial. A motion to suppress may be filed independently or at the preliminary hearing.

Authority:

People v. Romeo (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 931, 940

Second Holding:

When a suppression motion is made before a magistrate in conjunction with a preliminary hearing, as in this case, the magistrate tries the facts, resolving credibility issues and conflicts in the evidence, weighing the evidence, and drawing appropriate inferences.

If the magistrate denies the motion and holds the defendant to answer, the defendant must, as a prerequisite to appellate review, renew his challenge before the trial court by motion to dismiss under section 995 or in a special hearing.

At that stage, the evidence is generally limited to the transcript of the preliminary hearing, testimony by witnesses who testified at the preliminary hearing (who may be recalled by the prosecution), and evidence that could not reasonably have been presented at the preliminary hearing.

Authority:

People v. Romeo (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 931, 941

Third Holding:

Where a suppression motion is made before a magistrate in conjunction with a preliminary hearing and no new evidence is presented in superior court, we are concerned solely with the findings of the magistrate. After submission on the transcript at the special hearing, the appellate court, like the superior court, is bound by the magistrate’s factual findings so long as they are supported by substantial evidence.

On review of the superior court ruling by appeal or writ, a two-step standard of review applies. In the first step of our review, we in effect disregard the ruling of the superior court and directly review the determination of the magistrate.

At this stage, we consider the record in the light most favorable to the People since all factual conflicts must be resolved in the manner most favorable to the superior court’s disposition on the suppression motion.

Authority:

People v. Tacardon (2022) 14 Cal.5th 235, 242

People v. Romeo (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 931, 941

Fourth Holding:

In the second step, accepting as established all implied or express factual findings by the magistrate as are supported by substantial evidence, we then proceed to measure those findings against Fourth Amendment standards articulated by the United States Supreme Court. At this stage, we independently apply the law to the factual findings, determining de novo whether the factual record supports the magistrate’s conclusion that the challenged search met the constitutional standard of reasonableness.

Authority:

People v. Romeo (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 931, 941-942

People v. Macabeo (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1206, 1212 [In California, issues relating to the suppression of evidence derived from governmental searches and seizures are reviewed under federal constitutional standards.]

Fifth Holding:

The Fourth Amendment protects the right of the people to be secure in their persons against unreasonable searches and seizures. A traffic stop for a suspected violation of law is a seizure of the occupants of the vehicle and therefore must be conducted in accordance with the Fourth Amendment. But where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred, the seizure is constitutionally reasonable.

Authority:

U.S. Const., 4th Amend.

Cal. Const., art. I, sec. 13

Heien v. North Carolina (2014) 574 U.S. 54, 60

People v. Gyorgy (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 659, 669

Whren v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 806, 809–810

Sixth Holding:

A seizure for a traffic violation justifies a relatively brief encounter for police investigation of the traffic violation. The tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure’s mission—to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop and attend to related safety concerns. Because addressing the infraction is the purpose of the stop, it may last no longer than is necessary to effectuate that purpose. Authority for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed.

The United States Supreme Court has identified tasks that are part of an officer’s mission during a stop for a traffic violation: Beyond determining whether to issue a traffic ticket, an officer’s mission includes ordinary inquiries incident to the traffic stop. Typically such inquiries involve checking the driver’s license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of insurance.  A temporary detention may sometimes also include a criminal history check, which is done by consulting an incar computer terminal or radioing dispatch.

These tasks are included within the officer’s mission during a traffic stop because they ‘serve the same objective as enforcement of the traffic code: ensuring that vehicles on the road are operated safely and responsibly. An officer may also require a lawfully stopped driver to exit the vehicle for officer safety to complete his traffic stop mission.

Authority:

People v. Gyorgy (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 659, 669-670

Rodriguez v. United States (2015) 575 U.S. 348, 354, 355-356

People v. Lopez (2019) 8 Cal.5th 353, 363, fn. 4

Seventh Holding:

On-scene investigation into other crimes, however, detours from the traffic stop’s mission. So too do safety precautions taken in order to facilitate such detours. Thus, while an officer may conduct certain unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop, the officer may not do so in a way that prolongs the stop, absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an individual.

Authority:

People v. Gyorgy (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 659, 670

Rodriguez v. United States (2015) 575 U.S. 348, 355

Eighth Holding:

An investigative stop can grow out of a traffic stop if the officer has reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to expand the investigation, even if those suspicions were unrelated to the underlying traffic offense. Therefore, a stop may be prolonged if the prolongation itself is supported by independent reasonable suspicion.

Authority:

People v. Espino (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 746, 756–757

People v. Vera (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 1081, 1088

Ninth Holding:

Under the totality of circumstances, we conclude the detention was unjustifiably prolonged beyond the time reasonably needed to write the defendant a traffic ticket. Nor was the prolonged detention independently justified by reasonable suspicion that the defendant was engaged in criminal activity apart from the broken taillight. The traffic stop occurred mid-morning in broad daylight. There was no evidence that it occurred in a high-crime area; indeed, the magistrate was not sure about [the location] and how tough an area that is. And the defendant complied with all officer commands.

On this record, we conclude that although reasonable suspicion justified the initial traffic stop and removal of the defendant from his vehicle for a weapons pat-down, no reasonable suspicion justified prolonging the detention beyond the time necessary to write a traffic ticket so that the officers could further investigate the defendant for drug offenses unrelated to the mission of the traffic stop.

Authority:

Rodriguez v. United States (2015) 575 U.S. 348, 354 [Authority for the seizure ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed.]

People v. Vera (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 1081, 1088 [a stop may be prolonged if the prolongation itself is supported by independent reasonable suspicion]

People v. Flores (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1032, 1038–1039, 1045–1046 [no reasonable suspicion where the defendant ducked behind a car to hide from police in a high-crime area at night]

People v. Pantoja (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 483, 487, 490–491 [no reasonable suspicion for a pat-down where a nervous but cooperative person with a history of weapons arrests was detained on vehicle infractions in a high crime area while wearing baggy clothing]

Rodriguez v. United States (2015) 575 U.S. 348, 357 [Highway and officer safety are interests different in kind from the Government’s endeavor to detect crime in general or drug trafficking in particular.]

Evidence, Fifth Amendment, Jury trial, Standard of review

Case 000780

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We conclude the detectives subjected defendant to a custodial interrogation. Their failure to advise him of his Miranda rights therefore required the suppression of his confession.

First Holding:

Under Miranda, suspects questioned by law enforcement after being taken into custody must first be informed that they have the right to remain silent, that any statements they make may be used against them, and that they have a right to the presence of an attorney. If police interrogate a suspect in custody without providing these advisements, the suspect’s responses cannot be admitted to establish their guilt.

Authority:

Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436

People v. NavaAdame (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 1, 16

Second Holding:

The duty to advise suspects of their Miranda rights applies only if they are in custody. Custody is a term of art that specifies circumstances that are thought generally to present a serious danger of coercion. In deciding if a person is in custody for Miranda purposes, the question is whether a reasonable person would have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave. To answer this question, the court must examine all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation

Authority:

People v. NavaAdame (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 1, 16

Third Holding:

Relevant considerations include (1) who initiated the contact; (2) whether the person agreed to the interview; (3) whether the person was questioned as a witness or suspect; (4) the interview’s location; (5) whether police said the person was under arrest or in custody (6) conversely, whether they said the person was free to leave at any time; (7) whether the person’s movement was restrained; (7) the length of questioning; (8) the number of officers; (9) the degree of police control over the interrogation; (10) whether officers conveyed a belief in the person’s guilt and suggested they had incriminating evidence; (11) whether the tone was aggressive or accusatory; (12) whether police used interrogation tactics designed to pressure the person; and (13) whether the person was arrested at the end of the interrogation.

Authority:

People v. NavaAdame (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 1, 16-17

Fourth Holding:

The prosecution has the burden of proving a defendant was not in custody. We review the trial court’s factual findings for substantial evidence but independently decide if the interrogation was custodial.

(GARY Note: the court then described the events in detail that led the court to declare “Based on the totality of the circumstances, we conclude defendant was subjected to a custodial interrogation long before he received Miranda advisements.” Because the opinion is unpublished, it is not useful to recite the circumstances, because you cannot cite this case as an example of a finding that Miranda rights should have been given earlier. If an attorney wants to read the full opinion, I can provide it on request.)

Authority:

In re Anthony L. (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 438, 445

Fifth Holding:

A confession held inadmissible by reason of having been obtained in violation of the prophylactic Miranda requirements is subject to a harmless-error standard of review specified in Chapman. Under that standard, we ask whether it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained. To say that an error did not contribute to the verdict is to find that error unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on the issue in question.

Authority:

People v. NavaAdame (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 1, 21-22

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24

Sixth Holding:

The erroneous admission of defendant’s confession cannot be regarded as unimportant. A confession is like no other evidence. Indeed, the defendant’s own confession is probably the most probative and damaging evidence that can be admitted against him. Confessions often operate as a kind of evidentiary bombshell which shatters the defense and are thus much more likely to be prejudicial.

Authority:

Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279, 296

People v. Neal (2003) 31 Cal.4th 63, 86

Seventh Holding:

We decline to consider defendant’s testimony at trial in assessing harmlessness. When an illegally obtained confession is erroneously admitted, the defendant’s testimony will not render the error harmless unless it is shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not take the stand in an attempt to mitigate the explosive impact of a confession which had left his case in ruin.

Authority:

People v. Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 131, 151

Amelioration, Duty of the court, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 000779

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We vacate the trial court’s true finding that defendant’s 2012 conviction qualifies as a serious or violent felony for purposes of the strike prior and prior serious felony enhancements and remand the matter to the trial court for any retrial of this finding.

First Holding:

Under the Three Strikes law, defendants previously convicted of serious or violent felonies are subject to increased prison terms: If a defendant has one prior conviction for a serious or violent felony, the defendant’s term of imprisonment is doubled, and if a defendant has two or more such strike priors, the defendant may receive life imprisonment.

The Three Strikes law defines “serious or violent” felony to include any offense defined as a serious felony under section 1192.7(a). Section 1192.7(c) defines “serious felony” to include, among other things, “any felony offense, which would also constitute a felony violation of section 186.22.”

Authority:

PEN 1192.7(c)(28)

Second Holding:

Assembly Bill 333 amended section 186.22. Effective January 1, 2022, this legislation narrowed the definition of a criminal street gang, the definition of a pattern of criminal activity, and what it means for an offense to have commonly benefitted a street gang.

First, it narrowed the definition of a criminal street gang to require that any gang be an ongoing, organized association or group of three or more persons.

Second, whereas section 186.22, former subdivision (f) required only that a gang’s members individually or collectively engage in a pattern of criminal activity in order to constitute a criminal street gang, AB 333 requires that any such pattern that have been collectively engaged in by members of the gang.

Third, AB 333 also narrowed the definition of a pattern of criminal activity by requiring that (1) the last offense used to show a pattern of criminal gang activity occurred within three years of the date that the currently charged offense is alleged to have been committed; (2) the offenses were committed by two or more gang members, as opposed to just persons; (3) the offenses commonly benefitted a criminal street gang; and (4) the offenses establishing a pattern of gang activity must be ones other than the currently charged offense.

Fourth, AB 333 narrowed what it means for an offense to have commonly benefitted a street gang, requiring that any common benefit be more than reputational. Moreover, because these changes are ameliorative in nature, they apply to nonfinal judgments on appeal.

Authority:

People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206-1207

Third Holding:

On appeal, a reviewing court must examine the record in the light most favorable to the judgment to ascertain whether it is supported by substantial evidence. In other words, the reviewing court determines whether a rational trier of fact could have found the prosecution sustained its burden of proving the elements of the sentence enhancement beyond a reasonable doubt.

The People must prove all elements of an alleged sentence enhancement beyond a reasonable doubt. Where the mere fact of conviction under a particular statute does not prove the offense was a serious felony, otherwise admissible evidence from the entire record of the conviction may be examined to resolve the issue.

If the prior conviction was for an offense that can be committed in multiple ways, and the record of the conviction does not disclose how the offense was committed, a court must presume the conviction was for the least serious form of the offense.

In such a case, if the statute under which the prior conviction occurred could be violated in a way that does not qualify for the alleged enhancement, the evidence is thus insufficient, and the People have failed in their burden.

Authority:

People v. Miles (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1074, 1082, 1083

People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1065, 1067

Fourth Holding:

In Fletcher, our Supreme Court held that where a defendant has suffered a conviction under the prior version of section 186.22, AB 333 applies to the determination of whether the conviction qualifies as a prior serious felony conviction under section 1192.7(c)(28) for purposes of the Three Strikes law and prior serious felony enhancements.

Accordingly, whether a prior conviction was for an offense that constitutes a felony violation of Section 186.22 is determined by applying the current version of section 186.22. The matter must be remanded to the trial court for any retrial of these allegations, and if required, any resentencing.

Authority:

People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576, 583

Amelioration, Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case 000778

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The defendant was originally sentenced in 2011. On resentencing the defendant under section 1172.75, the trial court should not have reimposed the restitution fine, jail classification fee, and booking fee because they are unenforceable and uncollectible.

First Holding:

The trial court originally imposed the restitution fine in July 2011. Since then, the Legislature amended section 1465.9 to provide that restitution fines under section 1202.4 are uncollectible and unenforceable after 10 years and that the part of the judgment imposing the fine must be vacated.

Because the restitution fine was originally imposed more than 10 years before the trial court resentenced defendant, under section 1465.9(d), the trial court should not have reimposed the restitution fine when it resentenced defendant in 2025.

Authority:

PEN 1465.9(d)

Second Holding:

The trial court also should not have reimposed the booking fee and jail classification fee under Government Code section 29550.2, because the Legislature repealed that section effective July 1, 2021. After July 1, 2021, the unpaid balance of court-imposed costs under several statutes, including Government Code section 29550.2, are unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a judgment imposing those costs shall be vacated.

Authority:

GOV 6111