AppellateAdvisor Law Library Background

Case 000767

Error and/or relief

We find that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for discharging a firearm for the benefit of a criminal street gang.

However, the defendant cannot be convicted of both discharging a firearm at a motor vehicle and grossly negligent discharge of a firearm at a motor vehicle, and the abstract of judgment must be corrected to list the enhancements found true.

First Holding:

In reviewing the sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction, we examine the entire record and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in favor of the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial credible evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

The focus of the substantial evidence test is on the whole record of evidence presented to the trier of fact, rather than on isolated bits of evidence. Resolving conflicts and inconsistencies in the testimony is the jury’s exclusive province.

We do not redetermine the weight of the evidence or the credibility of witnesses. Moreover, unless the testimony is physically impossible or inherently improbable, testimony of a single witness is sufficient to support a conviction.

Authority:

People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 57

People v. Cuevas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 252, 261

People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181

People v. Albillar (2010) 51 Cal.4th 47, 60

Second Holding:

We must accept logical inferences that the trier of fact might have drawn from the evidence even if we would have concluded otherwise. If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, reversal of the judgment is not warranted simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.

The reviewing court need not address assertions of conflicts in the evidence or alternative theories regarding the inferences that should have been drawn from the evidence. A reversal for insufficient evidence is unwarranted unless it appears that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support the jury’s verdict. This is true for both direct and circumstantial evidence.

In this case, a reasonable jury could have found that the actions of the defendant were gang related and for the benefit of a gang.

Authority:

People v. Streeter (2012) 54 Cal.4th 205, 241, overruled on other grounds as stated in People v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 804, 834

People v. Albillar (2010) 51 Cal.4th 47, 60

People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 162

People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357

People v. Manibusan (2013) 58 Cal.4th 40, 87

People v. Thompson (2010) 49 Cal.4th 79, 113

Third Holding:

The crime of grossly negligent discharge of a firearm which could result in injury or death (sec. 246.3(a)) is a lesser included offense of discharging a firearm at a motor vehicle (sec. 246).

Although section 954 provides that a single act or course of conduct can lead to convictions of any number of the offenses charged, the courts have created an exception to this rule where multiple convictions are based on necessarily included offenses.

In Ramirez, our Supreme Court reviewed the elements of both offenses and concluded that the only difference between the two crimes, and the basis for the more serious treatment of a section 246 offense, is that the greater offense requires that an inhabited dwelling or other specified object be within the defendant’s firing range.

All the elements of section 246.3(a) are necessarily included in the more stringent requirements of section 246. Therefore, we shall reverse defendant’s conviction on the count alleging grossly negligent discharge of a firearm.

Authority:

PEN 954

People v. Ramirez (2009) 45 Cal.4th 980, 984–985

Fourth Holding:

The abstract of judgment fails to accurately reflect the sentence orally pronounced by the trial court. Courts may correct clerical errors at any time, and appellate courts (including this one) that have properly assumed jurisdiction of cases have ordered correction of abstracts of judgment that did not accurately reflect the oral judgments of sentencing courts.

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

Case 000766

Error and/or relief

The court miscalculated the credit for time served. The matter is remanded for recaculation. The court also failed to specify whether it was imposing consecutive or concurrent sentences for the three conviction offenses. On remand, it must specify that the terms are to be served concurrently.

First Holding:

The trial court’s oral pronouncement of judgment did not specify whether the sentences for the three counts were to run concurrently or consecutively with respect to one another. This means that by default they all run concurrently.

Authority:

PEN 669(b)

People v. Downey (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 899, 915

Second Holding:

The court erred in its calculation of credit for time served, and it must recalculate the credits on remand.

(Gary note: the court cited no authority, likely because the error and solution are obvious. I have listed the code section for your convenience.)

Authority:

PEN 2900.5

Case 000765

Error and/or relief

This was a grant of a petition for habeas corpus to compel the trial court to set bail in this murder case. The appellate court granted the petition and directed the court to hold a new bail hearing consistent with the opinion.

First Holding:

Our state constitution entitles arrestees to bail unless one of a limited number of exceptions applies. The exception at issue here provides that a trial judge may deny bail when a defendant is charged with a felony offense involving acts of violence on another person when the facts are evident or the presumption great and the judge finds based upon clear and convincing evidence that there is a substantial likelihood the person’s release would result in great bodily harm to others.

Authority:

Cal. Const., art. I, sec. 12

Yedinak v. Superior Court (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 876, 884

In re Kowalczyk (2026) 19 Cal.5th 593, 630 [a court may order the pretrial detention of a noncapital defendant only in the circumstances specified in subdivisions (b) and (c) of section 12 of article I of the California Constitution]

Second Holding:

California Supreme Court caselaw imposed two more requirements for the so-called violent felony exception to apply. A trial judge must satisfy four legal requirements before issuing a pretrial detention order under section 12(b).

The judge must: (1) find there is sufficient evidence to sustain a guilty verdict against the arrestee on a qualifying felony; (2) find by clear and convincing evidence a substantial likelihood that the arrestee’s release would result in great bodily harm to others; (3) find by clear and convincing evidence that no less restrictive condition than detention can reasonably protect the interests in public or victim safety, and the arrestee’s appearance in court; and (4) set forth the reasons for their decision on the record and include them in the minute order.

Per our order to show cause, only the third and fourth Yedinak factors are at issue here. We hold the trial court did not adequately satisfy either factor.

Authority:

Yedinak v. Superior Court (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 876, 886

In re White (2020) 9 Cal.5th 455

In re Humphrey (2021) 11 Cal.5th 135

Third Holding:

A court entering a pretrial detention order must set forth the reasons for its decision on the record and to include them in the court’s minutes, and the reasons supporting a denial of bail cannot be implied.”

Authority:

In re Harris (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 1085, 1105, reversed in part on other grounds in In re Harris (2024) 16 Cal.5th 292

Case 000764

Error and/or relief

The court erred by not staying punishment for the second count under section 654. Also, the court must recalculate the credit for time served on resentencing. Further, the abstract of judgment erroneously reflects that the defendant stands convicted of a count that was reversed in the prior appeal.

(Gary note: This was mentioned only in a footnote, and there was no express direction for correction. But the court did order resentencing “consistent with this opinion,” which most likely implies a direction that the subsequent abstract of judgment accurately reflect the record.)

First Holding:

Section 654(a) states that an act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one provision.

Authority:

PEN 654(a)

Second Holding:

Whether a defendant may be subjected to multiple punishment under section 654 requires a two-step inquiry, because the statutory reference to an act or omission may include not only a discrete physical act but also a course of conduct encompassing several acts pursued with a single objective.

We first consider if the different crimes were completed by a single physical act. If so, the defendant may not be punished more than once for that act. Only if we conclude that the case involves more than a single act—i.e., a course of conduct—do we then consider whether that course of conduct reflects a single intent and objective or multiple intents and objectives. At step one, courts examine the facts of the case to determine whether multiple convictions are based upon a single physical act.

When those facts are undisputed the application of section 654 raises a question of law we review de novo. However, we review the trial court’s factual findings for substantial evidence.

Authority:

People v. Corpening (2016) 2 Cal.5th 307, 311–312

People v. Washington (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 776, 795

Third Holding:

A review of the record indicates that there was but one act constituting the crime. Accordingly, the sentence on count 2 should have been stayed.

Authority:

PEN 654

Fourth Holding:

While we do not address the trial court’s failure to recalculate the defendant’s actual days of presentence custody credits because it was not raised by the defendant and we are remanding the matter for resentencing, we note that trial courts are required to do so.

Authority:

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 41

Fifth Holding:

(Gary note: the court mentioned in a footnote that the abstract incorrectly lists a conviction of an offense that was reversed in a prior appeal. It made no express direction for correct of the abstract, but there is much authority that would have supported such an order, some of which I set forth below.)

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1070

People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 855

In re Black (1967) 66 Cal.2d 881, 890

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2

Case 000763

Error and/or relief

The court erred in declining to determine the defendant’s ability to pay fines and fees. Its stated basis was the probation office’s strong stance on rejecting the plea, based on the victim. After sentencing, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Kopp.

First Holding:

A defendant may challenge the imposition of a punitive fine under the United States and California Constitutions’ excessive fines provisions. The California Supreme Court The court used the “fine” term to refer to penalties provided by the Legislature to punish a criminal offense and included restitution fines and parole revocation restitution fines within that category. Because its decision was issued after the defendant was sentenced, the defendant should be given the opportunity to develop an excessive fines argument in the first instance on remand.

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 23, 30-31

Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution [Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted]

Article I, section 17 of the California Constitution [Cruel or unusual punishment may not be inflicted or excessive fines imposed.]

Second Holding:

Because the trial court failed to consider the defendant’s ability to pay the the court operations and court facilities assessments despite his request, we must remand for such consideration. Because there is no rational basis for distinguishing criminal defendants from indigent civil litigants—who are afforded waivers for similar assessments—equal protection principles require the trial court to consider a defendant’s inability to pay before imposing these ancillary costs.

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 14-15, 24-31