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Case Summaries

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Appellate Principles, Elements of crime, Jury instructions, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence

Case 000561

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

There was insufficient evidence to support the conviction of child endangerment where the child was not near the endangering activity (an insecure location where a firearm was stored in the home).

First Holding:

We generally review allegedly improper jury instructions de novo. Resulting error is reviewed under either Chapman, which requires the prosecution to show federal constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, or under the less strenuous standard of Watson, which requires the defendant to demonstrate the reasonable probability of a more favorable result and generally applies to state-law errors. An instructional error involving a single element will be deemed harmless only in unusual circumstances, such as where the element was undisputed, the defense was not prevented from contesting the omitted element, and overwhelming evidence supports the omitted element.

Authority:

People v. Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 218

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24

People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836

People v. Merritt (2017) 2 Cal.5th 819, 828

Second Holding:

In evaluating a claim that a conviction lacks sufficient evidence, we review the whole record to determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the verdict such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying this test, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the jury could reasonably have deduced from the evidence. Such evidence can include not only circumstantial evidence, but also all reasonable inferences drawn from it. We presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence, but we neither reweigh the evidence nor reevaluate the credibility of the witnesses.

Authority:

People v. Wear (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 1007, 1019

People v. Soriano (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 278, 286

People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206

Third Holding:

Failing to deny children access to a loaded firearm is sufficient to constitute circumstances likely to produce great bodily harm and death.

Authority:

People v. Superior Court (Ghilotti) (2002) 27 Cal.4th 888, 91

Appellate Principles, Jurisdiction, Sentencing

Case 000560

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

(Gary note: This appeal was dismissed as from a nonappealable order, but it is summarized for providing numerous principles regarding appealability. It purported to be an appeal from a postconviction motion to strike restitution fines that were imposed more than 10 years earlier. The authority relied on by the appellant was section 1465.9, which states, “Upon the expiration of 10 years after the date of imposition of a restitution fine pursuant to Section 1202.4, the balance, including any collection fees, shall be unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a judgment imposing those fines shall be vacated.”

(The complication in this case is that the fines were imposed in 1989 under Government Code section 13967. The trial court pointed out that the section was repealed in 2003, and concluded that the change reflected in Penal Code section 1465.9 did not apply because no restitution fines were imposed under section 1202.04.)

First Holding:

Before we may consider the merits of the defendant’s appeal, we must first determine whether the trial court’s order denying his postjudgment motion to vacate his restitution fines is appealable. The right to appeal is statutory only, and a party may not appeal a trial court’s judgment, order or ruling unless such is expressly made appealable by statute. An order made after judgment is appealable if it affects a defendant’s substantial rights.

A trial court order denying relief that the court has no jurisdiction to grant does not affect a defendant’s substantial rights and is therefore not appealable under section 1237(b). Under the general common law rule, a trial court is deprived of jurisdiction to resentence a criminal defendant once execution of the sentence has commenced.

In this case, the defendant was sentenced in 1989 and began serving his sentence that same year. This court affirmed the judgment on appeal, and the remittitur issued by April 1991. Thus, absent an exception to the general common law rule, the trial court lacked jurisdiction in 2025 to grant the defendant’s petition and resentence him by vacating his restitution fines. 

Authority:

People v. Clark (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 248, 254 [Because an appealable judgment or order is essential to appellate jurisdiction, the appellate court must consider the question of appealability sua sponte, and dismiss the appeal if the judgment or order is found to be nonappealable]

People v. Loper (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1155, 1159

People v. E.M. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 1075, 1085

People v. Roy (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 991, 997

Second Holding:

Where a defendant whose conviction is final files a statutorily unauthorized freestanding petition, both the court below and this court lack jurisdiction to consider the arguments raised therein. In that circumstance, the appeal must be dismissed.
.

Authority:

People v. Garcia (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 139, 144

Amelioration, Sentencing

Case 000559

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

It was error to deny the defendant’s petition for recall of sentence under section 1172.6 at the prima facie stage, because the record did not conclusively demonstrate ineligibility as a matter of law, even though he admitted the personal use of firearm enhancements as part of his plea bargain. Specifically, in his plea colloquy, the defendant did not admit facts or a specific theory of attempted murder liability that would make him ineligible for relief.

First Holding:

Effective 2019, SB 1437 amended sections 188 and 189 to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life. Under the amended law, malice cannot be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.

In addition to amending sections 188 and 189, SB 1437 created a procedural mechanism, now codified in section 1172.6 for individuals convicted of murder under the former versions of sections 188 and 189 to petition the trial court for resentencing. Two years later, SB 775 expanded section 1172.6 relief to individuals convicted of attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine and manslaughter. Section 1172.6 applies to individuals who pleaded guilty to attempted murder and would have been subject to prosecution for attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.

Authority:

People v. Rivera (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 217, 227

People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 558

People v. Estrada (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 328, 335, 336

Second Holding:

To be eligible for relief under section 1172.6, a defendant must make a prima facie showing that (1) the complaint or information allowed the People to prosecute the defendant for attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine; (2) the defendant was convicted of attempted murder or entered a plea to attempted murder, and (3) the defendant could not presently be convicted of attempted murder under the current versions of sections 188 or 189.

Authority:

People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 558

Third Holding:

The trial court’s prima facie inquiry is limited. The court must accept the defendant’s allegations as true and assess whether the defendant would be entitled to relief if the allegations were true. If the defendant makes a prima facie showing, the court must issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing where the People must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant could be convicted of attempted murder under the current versions of section 188 or 189.

Authority:

People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971

People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 559

Fourth Holding:

A trial court may deny a resentencing petition at the prima facie stage only if the petitioner is ineligible for relief as a matter of law. In making its determination, the court may examine the record of conviction. At this stage, the court should not reject the factual allegations in the defendant’s petition on credibility grounds or engage in factfinding by weighing the evidence or exercising its discretion.

Authority:

People v. Ervin (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 90, 101

People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708

People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 972

Discretion, Effective assistance of counsel, Elements of crime, Sentencing

Case 000558

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The restitution amount is wrong, and the protective order is unauthorized.

First Holding:

Appellant contends changes to section 1001.36 that went into effect after she was denied pretrial diversion apply to her case. We agree. Appellant further contends this matter should be conditionally reversed and remanded so the trial court can exercise its discretion to determine her motion for pretrial diversion in light of the amendment. We disagree.

Appellant has forfeited this claim. Frahs, decided in 2020, made clear that recently enacted section 1001.36 applied in nonfinal cases. Thus, when the law was amended effective January 1, 2023, appellant should have known the amendments applied retroactively. Once the law was amended, appellant had more than three months before she pled and more than seven months before she was sentenced to seek reconsideration of the trial court’s denial of diversion. She did not.

Authority:

People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 631-632

People v. Doron (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1, 6

People v. Trujillo (2015) 60 Cal.4th 850, 856

People v. Brown (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 113, 128 [failure to seek reconsideration excused where amendment to statute effective after entry of plea but only 10 days before sentencing]

Second Holding:

In order to establish a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that his or her counsel’s performance was deficient, and that the defendant suffered prejudice as a result of such deficient performance. The record is silent, however, why defense counsel failed to seek reconsideration under the amended law.

It is possible that counsel was unaware of the newly passed statute. It is also possible, however, that counsel had sound reasons not to pursue the issue. For example, appellant may have changed her mind and decided to refuse to accept the treatment required for participation in the diversion program. Because trial counsel’s reasons for not raising the issue are not readily apparent, the issue is more appropriately considered in a habeas corpus proceeding.

Authority:

People v. Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th 181, 198

Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687-692

People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266-267

People v. Wilson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 926, 936

Third Holding:

We review the trial court’s restitution order for abuse of discretion. We apply the substantial evidence standard in a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence to support a factual finding necessary for a victim restitution order. Sentencing judges are given virtually unlimited discretion as to the kind of information they can consider and the source from whence it comes because a hearing to establish the amount of restitution does not require the formalities of other phases of a criminal prosecution. The court may use any rational method of fixing the amount of restitution as long as it is reasonably calculated to make the victim whole. It may make a restitution order based on truncated evidence such as declarations or probation reports, business records, and checks.

Authority:

People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 663

People v. Jessee (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 501, 507

People v. Hove (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1266, 1275

People v. Plains All American Pipeline L.P. (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 872, 898-899

Fourth Holding:

The total restitution awarded to the victim includes two computational errors. The court erroneously included a $4,520 attorney fees bill twice and included $880 for an unknown reason. We will correct those errors.

Authority:

People v. Smith (2001) 24 Cal.4th 849, 854

Fifth Holding:

Section 136.2(i) authorizes a court to issue an order restraining a defendant for up to 10 years when the defendant has been convicted of a qualifying crime. Appellant’s conviction for assault with a deadly weapon under section 245 is not a qualifying crime under section 136(i). The court did not have statutory authority to issue the protective order, therefore, the order must be stricken.

Authority:

People v. Garcia (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 887, 901

Abstracts and Minutes, Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing

Case 000557

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The court erred in placing the defendant on probation for a period of five years, because the maximum allowed in this case is three years. The matter is remanded for resentencing. There are also errors in the abstract of judgment that should be corrected in keeping with the resentencing.

First Holding:

Under the Penal Code, in granting probation, a trial court generally may suspend imposition or execution of sentence “for a period of time not exceeding two years. However, this two-year limit does not apply where an offense includes specific probation lengths within its provisions. Nevertheless, for such offenses, probation may continue for a period of time not exceeding the maximum possible term of the sentence.

Under Vehicle Code section 23600, under which violations of section 23152 are punishable, a period of probation not less than three nor more than five years may be imposed. But the defendant faced a maximum possible term of imprisonment of only three years. Accordingly, under section 1203.1(l)(1), the maximum authorized term of probation was three years, as the People concede.

Authority:

PEN 1203.1(a)

Second Holding:

An unauthorized sentence is subject to correction at any time without objection.

Authority:

People v. Landry (2016) 2 Cal.5th 52, 127, fn. 22

Third Holding:

The minute order contains errors, including a lab fee that was not ordered and transposing the fines to $2905 rather than the $2095 that was actually ordered by the court. Though because we are remanding for resentencing and thus the issue is moot, we point out that the minute order should accurately reflect fines, fees, and assessments pronounced by the trial court.. The clerk cannot supplement the judgment the court actually pronounced by adding a provision to the minute order. In addition, the trial court retains the authority to correct clerical errors.

Authority:

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 387-388

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

Appellate Principles, Discretion, Duty of the court, Sentencing, Standard of review, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence

Case 000556

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The court erred by imposing consecutive terms on counts 1 through 3 because the underlying offenses did not occur on separate occasions under Penal Code section 667.6(d), and the court did not make findings on whether it was exercising its discretion to impose a consecutive sentence. We reverse and remand for resentencing.

First Holding:

Section 669(a) provides that when a person is convicted of two or more crimes, the trial court must determine whether the terms of imprisonment shall run concurrently or consecutively. For certain sex offenses the Penal Code establishes alternative sentencing frameworks, including section 667.6.

Authority:

People v. Catarino (2023) 14 Cal.5th 748, 752

Second Holding:

Under section 667.6(c), a full, separate, and consecutive term may be imposed for each violation of an offense specified in subdivision (e) if the crimes involve the same victim on the same occasion. Section 667.6(d)(1) provides a full, separate, and consecutive term shall be imposed for each violation of an offense specified in subdivision (e) if the crimes involve separate victims or involve the same victim on separate occasions. Although section 269 is not listed in section 667.6(e), section 269(c) provides that the court shall impose a consecutive sentence for each offense that results in a conviction on this section if the crimes involve the same victim on separate occasions as defined in section 667.6(d).

Authority:

PEN 667.6(c)

PEN 667.6(d)

PEN 269

Third Holding:

The One Strike law in section 667.61 provides an alternative sentencing scheme for certain forcible sex offenses and mandates an indeterminate sentence of 15 or 25 years to life in prison when the jury has convicted the defendant of a specified felony sex crime and has also found certain factual allegations to be true.

Authority:

People v. Carbajal (2013) 56 Cal.4th 521, 534

Fourth Holding:

In determining whether crimes against a single victim were committed on separate occasions under section 667.6(d), the court shall consider whether, between the commission of one sex crime and another, the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to reflect upon the defendant’s actions and nevertheless resumed sexually assaultive behavior. Neither the duration of time between crimes, nor whether or not the defendant lost or abandoned the opportunity to attack, shall be, in and of itself, determinative on the issue of whether the crimes in question occurred on separate occasions.

Further, a finding that a defendant committed sex crimes on separate occasions does not require there be a break of any specific duration or any change in physical location. In applying this standard, courts have held the offenses of placing a finger in the victim’s private area, kissing her private area and then placing his private part in her private area were but a single occasion. In contrast, where the offenses are interrupted by the defendant’s nonsexual activity, courts have found they occur on a separate occasion.

Authority:

PEN 667.6(d)(2)

People v. Jones (2001) 25 Cal.4th 98, 104

People v. King (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1325

People v. Dearborne (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 250, 265-266

People v. Corona (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 13, 15-16, 17-18

Fifth Holding:

Defendants are entitled to sentencing decisions made in the exercise of the informed discretion of the sentencing court. A court that is unaware of the scope of its discretionary powers can no more exercise that informed discretion than one whose sentence is or may have been based on misinformation regarding a material aspect of a defendant’s record. In such circumstances, we have held that the appropriate remedy is to remand for resentencing unless the record clearly indicates that the trial court would have reached the same conclusion even if it had been aware that it had such discretion.

Authority:

People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 419, 424

People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391

Sixth Holding:

The trial court was aware of its discretion. The general rule is that a trial court is presumed to have been aware of and followed the applicable law.

Authority:

People v. Shiga (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 22, 40

People v. Brown (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1213, 1229

Seventh Holding:

When a trial court imposes consecutive sentences based on a finding under section 667.6(d), we may reverse only if there is no substantial evidence that the offenses were committed on separate occasions, that is, only if no reasonable trier of fact could have decided the defendant had a reasonable opportunity for reflection after completing an offense before resuming his assaultive behavior.

Authority:

People v. King (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1325

People v. Garza (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1081, 1092

Eighth Holding:

Regardless of whether section 667.6(c), applies to sentencing for a one strike offense under section 667.61 (which is not clear), under section 669, a trial court has discretion to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences when a defendant is convicted of multiple crimes with indeterminate sentences.

Authority:

PEN 669(a)

People v. Midell (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 1060, 1085

People v. Rodriguez (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1257, 1262

Ninth Holding:

It is well settled that in making sentencing choices pursuant to section 667.6(c), the trial court must state a reason for imposing a consecutive sentence in deciding whether to impose a consecutive or concurrent sentence.

Authority:

People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 729

Amelioration, Elements of crime, Evidence, Jury instructions, Jury trial, Sentencing, Sixth Amendment, Standard of review, Statutory interpretation

Case 000555

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Because we are unable to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the omission of an instruction on the organizational nexus element of the gang allegations did not contribute to the verdict obtained, we reverse all gang enhancements under section 186.22(b), the gang-related firearm enhancement on count 1 under section 12022.53,(d) and (e)(1), and the gang-related indeterminate sentence imposed on count 13 under section 186.22(b)(C)(4). We remand for resentencing and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

First Holding:

All gang-related enhancements must be reversed because the jury was not instructed on the organizational nexus element of the gang enhancement under amended Penal Code section 186.22(b).

Authority:

People v. Clark (2024) 15 Cal.5th 743, 749

Second Holding:

AB 333 substantially narrowed the definition of a criminal street gang and made numerous amendments to the statutory language. The specific amendment relevant here concerns the definition of criminal gang activity. Under the amended language, the prosecution must now present evidence that the members of the gang collectively engaged in a pattern of criminal activity, as opposed to the former language under which individual criminal action by members was sufficient.

While the evidence necessary to establish an organizational nexus might often overlap with the evidence used to demonstrate how a predicate offense commonly benefitted the gang, the inquiries are nonetheless conceptually distinct. The phrase collective engagement calls for an inquiry not just into how the predicate offenses benefited the gang, but also how the gang works together as a gang. It calls for a showing of a connection, or nexus, between an offense committed by one or more gang members and the organization as a whole.

Authority:

PEN 186.22

People v. Clark (2024) 15 Cal.5th 743, 752, 762

People v. Cooper (2023) 14 Cal.5th 735, 738

Third Holding:

Section 186.22 now requires evidence demonstrating a nexus between the individual predicate offenses and the gang as an organized, collective enterprise. This organizational nexus requirement is satisfied by showing a connection between the predicate offenses and the organizational structure, primary activities, or common goals and principles of the gang. Defendant’s trial took place several months before the Supreme Court issued its decision in Clark and before CALCRIM No. 1401 was amended. The jury was therefore not instructed on the organizational nexus element as interpreted in Clark. The pre-Clark instruction given below was adequate.

Authority:

People v. Clark (2024) 15 Cal.5th 743, 749

Fourth Holding:

When a jury instruction omits an element of an offense or special allegation, it impermissibly lessens the prosecution’s burden of proof and implicates the defendant’s federal due process rights. When such an instructional error occurs, we assess prejudice under the federal harmless error standard of Chapman In this context, our review under Chapman requires an examination of the record in its totality. If, at the end of that examination, we cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt the jury verdict would have been the same absent the error, the instructional error was not harmless. Put another way, the error was prejudicial if we determine the record contains evidence that could rationally lead to a contrary finding with respect to the omitted element.

Authority:

People v. Cooper (2023) 14 Cal.5th 735, 742 [concluding Chapman applied in assessing prejudice where instructions omitted new element of gang enhancement that common benefit to gang must be more than reputational]

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18

People v. Mil (2012) 53 Cal.4th 400, 417

Fifth Holding:

Defendant had the right to cross-examine a witness about whether he had been offered inducements to testify, expected benefits from giving his testimony, or otherwise had a motive to lie. Exposing a witness’s potential for bias and fabrication has long been recognized as one of the most important functions of cross-examination.

Authority:

EVID 780(f)

People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 455

Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 678–679

Sixth Holding:

The trial court is vested with broad discretion to impose reasonable limitations on defendant’s cross-examination without offending the constitution. Within the confines of the confrontation clause, the trial court retains wide latitude in restricting cross-examination that is repetitive, prejudicial, confusing of the issues, or of marginal relevance. The Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.

Authority:

People v. Contreras (2013) 58 Cal.4th 123, 152

Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 679

People v. Harris (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1269, 1292

Seventh Holding:

We review the trial court’s evidentiary rulings in this context under the deferential abuse of discretion standard. Moreover, as a general rule, the application of the ordinary rules of evidence do not impermissibly infringe on a defendant’s right to present a defense.

Authority:

People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 9–10 [discretion abused only where exercised in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice]

People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 620

Eighth Holding:

In order to establish a prejudicial abuse of discretion that violated the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation, a defendant is required to affirmatively show the trial court’s order limiting or precluding cross-examination left the jury with a significantly different impression of the witness’ credibility. Otherwise, the trial court’s exercise of its discretion in this regard does not violate the Sixth Amendment.

Authority:

People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 455-456

Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 680

People v. Gonzalez (2021) 12 Cal.5th 367, 406

Ninth Holding:

The record reflects the trial court failed to impose sentence on counts 14 and 15, two of the extortion counts on which the jury found defendant guilty. As defendant concedes in his reply brief, the appropriate course of action in such circumstances is a remand for the purpose of pronouncement of a judgment in accordance with the verdict. In light of the reversal of all gang enhancements, the gang-related firearm enhancement on count 1 and the gang-related indeterminate term on count 13, the superior court, on remand, shall conduct a full resentencing at which it may consider all of its sentencing choices anew.

Authority:

People v. Taylor (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 349, 353

Abstracts and Minutes

Case 000554

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The record contains an abstract of judgment for the indeterminate term, but not an abstract for the determinate terms. Further, there is an error in the abstract of judgment for the indeterminate term that must be corrected.

The trial court sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment for attempted murder. However, the abstract of judgment indicates a sentence of life without the possibility of parole.

We direct the trial court to prepare an amended abstract of judgment that reflects the correct indeterminate term imposed and to ensure there is a separate abstract of judgment for the determinate terms

Holding:

[GARY Note: The court cited no authority for its order directing the trial court to amend the abstract of judgment. Aside from it seeming to be an obvious need, there is much authority for correction of abstracts of judgments and minute orders. Here are a few.]

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1070

People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 855

In re Black (1967) 66 Cal.2d 881, 890

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2

Abstracts and Minutes

Case 000553

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Following resentencing under section 1172.75, the court determined the credit for time served to be the original number of days as of the original sentencing plus additional days by the resentencing date. The abstract of judgment recorded only the the days as of the original sentencing hearing. There were three other errors in the abstract of judgment related the identity of the appropriate code sections for the notations and failure to check the appropriate boxes. We remand so the abstract can be corrected accordingly.

Holding:

The oral imposition of sentence constitutes the judgment in an action, and the court clerk cannot modify the terms of that oral pronouncement when preparing the minutes or the abstract of judgment.

Authority:

People v. El (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 963, 967

Equal protection, Juveniles, Sentencing

Case 000552

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court erred in concluding that a sentence of 45 years to life is not the functional equivalent of a sentence to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole (LWOP), within the context of section 1170(d) for those who committed an offense as a juvenile and were convicted as an adult.

First Holding:

Section 1170(d)(1)(A) provides that when a defendant who was under 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense for which the defendant was sentenced to imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole has been incarcerated for at least 15 years, the defendant may submit to the sentencing court a petition for recall and resentencing. Where the length of a sentence is the functional equivalent of LWOP, it is a denial of equal protection to exclude the defendant from consideration under section 1170(d).

Authority:

PEN 1170

People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608

People v. Contreras (2018) 4 Cal.5th 349 [50 years to life is the functional equivalent of LWOP for a nonhomicide juvenile offender in the Eighth Amendment context]

Second Holding:

The People contend that defendant’s current eligibility for early youth offender parole under section 3051 and future eligibility at age 50 for elderly parole under section 3055 render him ineligible for relief under section 1170(d). However, that question is being considered by the Supreme Court in Munoz. Pending that decision, we agree with the reasoning in Heard that section 3051 eligibility does not defeat defendant’s section 1170(d) petition.

Authority:

People v. Munoz (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 499, review granted June 25, 2025, S290828

People v. Sorto (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 435

People v. Bagsby (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1040

Jury trial

Case 000551

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court erred by overruling his Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7 objection to the prosecutor’s use of a peremptory challenge against a prospective juror who disclosed a negative experience with law enforcement.

First Holding:

Prior to January 1, 2022, trial courts examined peremptory challenges under the three-step inquiry established by Batson and Wheeler. Recognizing the limitations of the Batson/Wheeler inquiry, the Legislature enacted AB 3070 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) to add Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7, which creates new procedures for identifying unlawful discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges. Section 231.7(a) prohibits the use of a peremptory challenge to remove a prospective juror on the basis of the prospective juror’s race, ethnicity, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, national origin, or religious affiliation, or the perceived membership of the prospective juror in any of those groups.

The statute is designed to address both purposeful discrimination and implicit unconscious bias in the jury selection process, and the Legislature has instructed that it is to be broadly construed to eliminate both forms of discrimination and the use of group stereotypes and discrimination, whether based on conscious or unconscious bias in the exercise of peremptory challenges.

Authority:

CCP 231.7

Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79,

People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258,

People v. Jaime (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 941, 943,

People v. Ortiz (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 768, 791-792

Second Holding:

A party or the trial court on its own motion may object that a party’s use of a peremptory challenge violates section 231.7(a). The statute does not require any threshold showing by the objecting party. The party seeking to challenge the prospective juror must then state the reasons the peremptory challenge has been exercised. It is then up to the trial court to correctly apply the procedure set forth in section 231.7 when deciding whether to sustain the objection.

The trial court must evaluate the reasons given to justify the peremptory challenge in light of the totality of the circumstances, considering only the reasons actually given and not any other possible justifications. If the court finds a substantial likelihood that an objectively reasonable person would view race, ethnicity, or another prohibited characteristic as a factor in the use of the peremptory challenge, then the objection shall be sustained. A substantial likelihood means more than a mere possibility but less than a standard of more likely than not. The court must explain the reasons for its ruling on the record.

Authority:

CCP 231.7

People v. Ortiz (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 768, 792

People v. Aguilar (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 1, 8–9

Third Holding:

Section 231.7(e) lists 13 reasons that are presumed to be invalid when offered as justifications for a peremptory challenge, including expressing a distrust of or having a negative experience with law enforcement or the criminal legal system. A party that relies on one of those presumptively invalid reasons must show by clear and convincing evidence that an objectively reasonable person would view the rationale as unrelated to a prospective juror’s race or other prohibited factor, and that the reasons articulated bear on the prospective juror’s ability to be fair and impartial in the case.

For purposes of overcoming this presumption of invalidity, clear and convincing evidence exists when the court determines it is highly probable that the reasons given for the exercise of a peremptory challenge are unrelated to conscious or unconscious bias and are instead specific to the juror and bear on the juror’s ability to be fair and impartial in the case.

Authority:

CCP 231.7

People v. Gonzalez (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 1, 14

Fourth Holding:

Section 231.7(g) lists an additional set of three presumptively invalid reasons for exercising a peremptory challenge, all of which relate to a prospective juror’s demeanor, behavior, or manner. These reasons are: The prospective juror was inattentive, or staring or failing to make eye contact; the prospective juror exhibited either a lack of rapport or problematic attitude, body language, or demeanor; and the prospective juror provided unintelligent or confused answers.

These three reasons are presumptively invalid unless the trial court is able to confirm that the asserted behavior occurred, based on the court’s own observations or the observations of counsel for the objecting party. Even with that confirmation, the counsel offering the reason shall explain why the asserted demeanor, behavior, or manner in which the prospective juror answered questions matters to the case to be tried.

Authority:

CCP 231.7

Fifth Holding:

We review the trial court’s denial of an objection under section 231.7 de novo, with the trial court’s express factual findings reviewed for substantial evidence. The reviewing court shall not impute any findings to the trial court that the court did not expressly state on the record. The appellate court is to consider only reasons actually given under subdivision (c) and shall not speculate as to or consider reasons that were not given to explain the party’s use of the peremptory challenge. Section 231.7 precludes a finding of harmless error. If the appellate court concludes that the trial court erred by overruling an objection under the statute, that error shall be deemed prejudicial, the judgment shall be reversed, and the case remanded for a new trial.

Authority:

CCP 231.7

People v. Ortiz (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 768, 795

Sixth Holding:

Section 231.7(e) prescribes how the court must analyze this issue and requires clear and convincing evidence.

Authority:

CCP 231.7

People v. Alston (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 575, 587

Appellate Principles, Duty of the court, Sentencing

Case 000550

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The amount of credit for time served was short by three days. The judgment is modified to include those three days.

Holding:

The appellate court has authority to modify the judgment to correct the credit for time served.

Authority:

People v. Jones (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 485, 493–494 [modifying judgment to correct custody credits]