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Case Summaries

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Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case 000742

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The crime that the defendant pleaded guilty to is not one to which Health and Safety Code section 11372.5 applies to, so the $50 fee must be stricken.

First Holding:

Health and Safety Code section 11372.5(a) states that every person who is convicted of enumerated offenses must pay a criminal laboratory analysis fee of $50 for each separate offense. The fee only applies to the offenses listed or enumerated in section 11372.5(a).

Authority:

HSC 11372.5

People v. Myles (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 1158, 1160

Second Holding:

Defendant pleaded no contest to an offense not listed in section 11372.5(a). Thus the trial court could not legally impose the $50 criminal laboratory analysis fee as a probation condition and the fee is, therefore, unauthorized. We therefore strike the fee.

Authority:

People v. Myles (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 1158, 1160

People v. Dotson (1997) 16 Cal.4th 547, 554, fn. 6 [claim that a sentence is unauthorized may be raised for the first time on appeal and corrected whenever error comes to the attention of the reviewing court]

People v. Soto (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1219, 1231-1233 [striking unauthorized fee on appeal]

Sentencing, Statutory interpretation

Case 000741

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The court erred in not conducting a full resentencing on the defendant’s petition for recall under section 1172.75. Remanded for full resentencing.

First Holding:

When a defendant raises both statutory and constitutional bases for their appeal, we do not reach the constitutional grounds if the case can be resolved on statutory grounds. When a defendant appeals the denial of a Marsden motion, the core inquiry is whether the trial court’s ruling violated the defendant’s constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel.

Authority:

Swart Enterprises, Inc. v. Franchise Tax Bd. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 497, 513 [a reviewing court should consider a constitutional question only where essential to the disposition of a case]

People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118, 123

People v. Smith (1993) 6 Cal.4th 684, 696

Second Holding:

On the other hand, the scope of a trial court’s application of section 1172.75 is a question of statutory interpretation, which is subject to our de novo review. If that review resolves the appeal, it is dispositive.

Authority:

People v. Renteria (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 1276, 1281–1282

Santa Clara County Local Transportation Authority v. Guardino (1995) 11 Cal.4th 220, 230–231 [finding that where statutory and constitutional claims are at issue and resolution of the statutory ground is adequate to resolve the matter, doing so is dispositive]

Third Holding:

The parties disagree about whether defendant forfeited his argument that the trial court erred by failing to conduct a full resentencing under section 1172.75. In the interests of judicial economy, to forestall an ineffective assistance of counsel habeas petition, and to avoid the constitutional issues raised by defendant regarding the performance of his trial counsel, we decline to enforce any forfeiture under the circumstances of this case.

Authority:

People v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 400

Fourth Holding:

In general, we review a trial court’s sentencing decisions for abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion is found where the court relies upon circumstances that are not relevant to the decision or that otherwise constitute an improper basis for decision.

Authority:

People v. Gonzalez (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 312, 323

Fifth Holding:

Defendants are entitled to sentencing decisions made in the exercise of the informed discretion of the sentencing court. A court that is unaware of the scope of its discretionary powers can no more exercise that informed discretion than one whose sentence is or may have been based on misinformation regarding a material aspect of a defendant’s record. In such circumstances, we have held that the appropriate remedy is to remand for resentencing unless the record clearly indicates that the trial court would have reached the same conclusion even if it had been aware that it had such discretion.

Authority:

People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391

Sixth Holding:

Where an issue on appeal requires that we determine the meaning of a statute, we review the trial court’s decision de novo. In any case involving statutory interpretation, our fundamental task is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose. We begin by examining the statute’s words, giving them a plain and commonsense meaning. When the language of a statute is clear, we need go no further.

Authority:

People v. Gonzalez (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 312, 323

People v. Scott (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1415, 1421

People v. Blackburn (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1113, 1123 [If no ambiguity appears in the statutory language, we presume that the Legislature meant what it said, and the plain meaning of the statute controls]

Seventh Holding:

Section 1172.75 makes any sentence enhancement imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to 667.5(b) legally invalid unless it was imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent offense as defined in section 6600(b) of the Welfare and Institutions Code. If the court determines (through the process set forth in the statute) that the defendant’s sentence includes an invalid enhancement, it is required to recall the sentence and resentence the defendant. An eligible defendant under section 1172.75 is entitled to a full resentencing.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75

People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050, 1067, fn. 3 [Where section 1172.75 applies, it requires full resentencing, not simply striking the now-invalidated priors]

People v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 402 [By its plain terms, section 1172.75 requires a full resentencing, not merely that the trial court strike the newly invalid enhancements]

Duty of counsel, Sixth Amendment, Standard of review

Case 000740

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court erred in concluding the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel.

First Holding:

A defendant in a criminal case possesses two constitutional rights with respect to representation that are mutually exclusive. The Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant a right to counsel but also allows him to waive this right and to represent himself without counsel.

Authority:

People v. Sullivan (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 524, 545

Second Holding:

In any case in which a Faretta request for self-representation has been made, the court must evaluate two countervailing considerations: on one hand, the defendant’s absolute right to counsel, which must be assiduously protected; on the other hand, the defendant’s unqualified constitutional right to discharge counsel if he pleases and represent himself.

The right to representation by counsel persists until a defendant affirmatively waives it, and courts indulge every reasonable inference against such waiver.

The waiver of counsel must be knowing and voluntary—that is, the defendant must actually understand the significance and consequences of the decision, and the decision must be uncoerced. The purpose of the knowing and voluntary inquiry is to determine whether the defendant actually does understand the significance and consequences of a particular decision and whether the decision is uncoerced.

Authority:

Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806

People v. Sullivan (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 524, 545

People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 20 [Courts must indulge every reasonable inference against waiver of the right to counsel]

Third Holding:

When confronted with a request for self-representation, a trial court must make the defendant aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.

Nevertheless, no particular form of words is required in admonishing a defendant who seeks to forgo the right to counsel and engage in self-representation. The test of a valid waiver of counsel is not whether specific warnings or advisements were given but whether the record as a whole demonstrates that the defendant understood the disadvantages of self-representation, including the risks and complexities of the particular case.

Authority:

People v. Dent (2003) 30 Cal.4th 213, 217–218

Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806,. 835

People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 140

Fourth Holding:

On appeal, a reviewing court independently examines the entire record to determine whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently invoked his right to self-representation. The defendant bears the burden of affirmatively demonstrating the waiver was invalid.

Authority:

People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 453

People v. Sullivan (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 524, 549

Fifth Holding:

In Jackio, the court held that trial courts are required to advise a defendant desiring to represent himself at trial of the maximum punishment that could be imposed if the defendant is found guilty of the crimes, with enhancements, alleged at the time the defendant moves to represent himself.

In Bush, the court distinguished Jackio and held that, while the better practice would be to inform the accused, on the record, of the maximum sentence, including any maximum monetary fine that could be imposed on a conviction, we have not found any case specifically concluding that an advisement on this point is a constitutional minimum in every case.

Authority:

People v. Jackio (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 445, 454

People v. Bush (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 457, 473

Sixth Holding:

It is not entirely clear whether the invalid waiver is structural error that is reversible per se or whether the error should be reviewed for prejudice under the standard of Chapman, under which error is reversible unless harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

We need not resolve that question because, even if the error was not structural, respondent has not shown the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence against appellant was overwhelming. There is certainly a reasonable possibility that, faced with a sentence three times longer than he initially had in mind and with no plausible defense to the charges, appellant would have opted to forgo self-representation. And there is also a reasonable possibility appointed counsel could have negotiated a plea agreement with the prosecution that would have resulted in a sentence less than that appellant received.

Authority:

People v. Burgener (2009) 46 Cal.4th 231, 244 [acknowledging but not resolving split of authority]

People v. Ruffin (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 536, 549

Abstracts and Minutes, Fines and fees

Case 000739

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

At the resentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a $300 restitution fine under section 1202.4, but because defendant is serving terms of LWOP, the court did not impose a parole revocation restitution fine under section 1202.45. The minute order and abstract of judgment, however, reflect a parole revocation restitution fine was imposed and suspended. They must be corrected.

Holding:

Where there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of judgment and the abstract of judgment, the oral pronouncement controls, and we may correct a clerical error in recording the judgment at any time. Consequently, we will direct the trial court to correct the minute order and abstract of judgment to omit reference to imposition of a parole revocation restitution fine under section 1202.45.

Authority:

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

Fourth Amendment

Case 000738

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We reverse the denial of the motion to suppress the evidence. A security guard noticed that car in the parking lot had shooting targets and loose ammunition–both legal–in the car, and the car’s trunk was open. No one was inside or near the car, which was locked. The guard called the police. The officer saw what appeared to be a tactical vest in the partly opened trunk. The officer then fully opened the trunk and could then see the butt of a pistol in the vest.

Because the officer could not see the gun and magazines until after he had seized the tactical vest, he had no probable cause to open the trunk further to conduct the search the trunk or of the vest he removed from the trunk.

First Holding:

In reviewing an order on a suppression motion, we rely on the trial court’s express and implied factual findings, provided they are supported by substantial evidence, to independently determine whether the search was constitutional.

Thus, while we ultimately exercise our independent judgment to determine the constitutional propriety of a search or seizure, we do so within the context of historical facts determined by the trial court construed in the light most favorable to the court’s order. It is the trial court’s role to evaluate witness credibility, resolve conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence, and draw factual inferences.

Authority:

People v. Lee (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 853, 860-861

Second Holding:

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits the police from conducting unreasonable searches and seizures of private property. A defendant challenging the lawfulness of a warrantless search must establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched or the things seized. A successful showing requires the government to respond by identifying an applicable exception to the warrant requirement.

If the government fails to do so, the court must apply an exclusionary rule that forbids the use of improperly obtained evidence at trial and must also preclude the introduction into evidence of materials and testimony that are the products or indirect results of the illegal search.

Authority:

People v. Ramirez (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1464, 1469

People v. Nishi (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 954, 960

People v. Rogers (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1136, 115

People v. Golden (2017) 19 Cal.App.5th 905, 911

Third Holding:

A defendant’s expectation of privacy must be both subjective and objectively reasonable. To meet this second prong of the test, the expectation must have a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society.

Authority:

People v. Nishi (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 954, 960

Byrd v. United States (2018) 584 U.S. 395, 405

Fourth Holding:

The court’s determination that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the trunk of his car is supported by substantial evidence. At the time of the search, the doors to his car were locked and the key was in his pocket. These facts are highly relevant to our inquiry because one of the main rights attaching to property is the right to exclude others, and one who owns or lawfully possesses or controls property will in all likelihood have a legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue of the right to exclude.

Accordingly, one who owns and possesses a car, like one who owns and possesses a house, almost always has a reasonable expectation of privacy in it. The facts indicate that the defendant took precautions customarily taken by those seeking privacy.

Authority:

Byrd v. United States (2018) 584 U.S. 395, 405

Fifth Holding:

It does not violate the Fourth Amendment for an officer to make a warrantless seizure of an incriminating object in plain view if (1) the officer was lawfully in a place where the object could be viewed; (2) the officer had a lawful right of access to the seized item; and (3) the item’s evidentiary value was immediately apparent. This third element requires that there be probable cause to believe that the item in question is evidence of a crime or contraband before it was seized.

Authority:

People v. Caro (2019) 7 Cal.5th 463, 489

People v. Stokes (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 715, 719

Sixth Holding:

Under the substantial evidence standard of review, we defer to a trial court’s credibility finding that is supported by substantial evidence. Generally, this is evidence that, when viewed in light of the entire record, is of solid probative value, maintains its credibility and inspires confidence that the ultimate fact it addresses has been justly determined.

Under this standard, we may reject testimony accepted as credible by the trial court only if it is wholly unacceptable to reasonable minds or unbelievable per se such that no reasonable person could believe the testimony Credibility findings that fail to survive this scrutiny are rare indeed. There must exist either a physical impossibility that they are true, or the statements falsity must be apparent without resorting to inferences or deductions.

This case presents one of these rare occurrences. (The opinion then details the problems it perceived with trial courts conclusions drawn from the officer’s testimony.)

Authority:

People v. Lee (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 853, 860-861

People v. Conner (1983) 34 Cal.3d 141, 149

In re S.A. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1149

DiQuisto v. County of Santa Clara (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 236, 261

Seventh Holding:

Under the plain view doctrine, probable cause that an item of interest to law enforcement is incriminating must exist before the object is seized. The trial court’s logic, by contrast, suggests that this standard can be met by a mere hunch that happens to pan out. That is not how the Fourth Amendment works.

Authority:

People v. Stokes (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 715, 719

People v. Pitts (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 881, 889 [A hunch may provide the basis for solid police work. A hunch, however, is not a substitute for the necessary specific, articulable facts required to justify a Fourth Amendment intrusion]

Eighth Holding:

A law enforcement officer often performs functions that are totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute. As these so-called community caretaking functions relate to vehicles, they include impounding them if they pose threats to public safety—for example, because they are disabled, parked illegally, or blocking traffic or a sidewalk—or stand at risk of theft or vandalism.

When vehicles are impounded, that is, seized, local police departments generally follow a routine practice of securing and inventorying the automobiles’ contents. These inventory searches are “a well-defined exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.

Accordingly, under what is sometimes referred to as the vehicle community caretaking exception, the government may introduce evidence obtained from an inventory search of a lawfully impounded vehicle.

But controlling precedent recognizes the vehicle community caretaking exception applies only in the context of impound procedures, which undisputedly were not used here. No published California case has applied the concept of community caretaking outside the context of a vehicle inventory.

Even assuming that the community caretaking function might in some circumstances permit a warrantless search for suspected firearms in the unsecured trunk of an unoccupied car in a public place, the search here was unreasonable because sheriff’s deputies made no attempt to first locate the driver of the vehicle before opening the trunk

Authority:

Cady v. Dombrowski (1973) 413 U.S. 433, 441

People v. Vodak (1980) 105 Cal.App.3rd 1014

People v. Duong (2020) 10 Cal.5th 36, 52

People v. Lee (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 853, 867

People v. Ovieda (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1034, 1048, 1053