Category Archives: Fines and fees

Equal protection, Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case 000571

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The court erred in imposing fees regardless of the defendant’s inability to pay. We strike the fees.

Holding:

In Kopp, our Supreme Court recently held that, if a defendant requests, a trial court must consider the defendant’s inability to pay before imposing a court operations assessment under section 1465.8(a)(1), or a court facilities assessment under Government Code section 70373(a)(1). Here, defendant argued he had not been working and was therefore unable to pay any fines and fees, and the trial court agreed as to the court operations and court facilities assessments.

However, instead of waiving these fees as a court would do for an indigent civil litigant, the trial court imposed and stayed the ancillary costs. Given that the Legislature has provided fee waivers to indigent civil litigants, equal protection principles require a court, upon request, to consider a criminal defendant’s inability to pay before imposing either assessment. No similar differences justify denying criminal defendants the right to seek a waiver of certain ancillary costs when civil litigants facing the same costs may receive such a waiver. While the trial court did not have the benefit of our Supreme Court’s recent decision in Kopp at the time it imposed fines and fees, the order nonetheless violated defendant’s equal protection rights, and we must strike the fees.

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 30

Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case 000547

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

On resentencing the defendant under section 1172.75, the balance of the restitution fine must be struck, as it was imposed more than 10 years ago.

Holding:

Effective January 1, 2025, AB 1186 (Stats. 2024, ch. 805, sec. 1) amended section 1465.9 to add subdivision (d), providing that any portion of a restitution fine under section 1465.9 that is not paid within 10 years cannot be collected upon. The restitution fine here more than 10 years ago. We therefore vacate the fine.

Authority:

PEN 1465.9(d)

In re Mattison (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 1062, 1066

Elements of crime, Evidence, Fifth Amendment, Fines and fees, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence

Case 000546

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

In this trial that resulted in a conviction of two counts of felony vandalism, the trial court erred under state law by admitting the victim’s hearsay testimony about the costs to repair her vehicle. The admission of the hearsay testimony was prejudicial under state law. We reverse the vandalism convictions and remand for the People to elect whether to retry them as felonies or accept their reduction to misdemeanors.

First Holding:

Other than the deductible, an insurance company paid for the repair of the damages. The victims testified to what she was told was the cost of the repairs. No repair bill was introduced into evidence. The trial court erroneously overruled defendant’s objections to the victim’s hearsay statements regarding the cost of repairs. State-law errors are reviewed for harmlessness under Watson. Under Watson, reversal is required if there is a reasonable probability that the defendant would have achieved a more favorable result absent the out-of-court statements.

Authority:

People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836

People v. Seumanu (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1293, 1308

People v. Lozano (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 366, 381–382

Second Holding:

The vandalism convictions must be reduced to misdemeanors because of the error in admitting the victim’s hearsay testimony. The only further relief the defendant could obtain from prevailing on his substantial-evidence claim is a bar to retrying him on the damage-value element. To resolve this claim, we consider whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the verdict—i.e., evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying this test, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the jury could reasonably have deduced from the evidence. Conflicts and even testimony that is subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal of a judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination depends.

Authority:

People v. Eroshevich (2014) 60 Cal.4th 583, 591

People v. Manibusan (2013) 58 Cal.4th 40, 87

Third Holding:

Evidence erroneously admitted is properly considered in weighing the sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction, notwithstanding its erroneous admission. The reason for this is that a reversal based solely on evidentiary insufficiency has fundamentally different implications, for double jeopardy purposes, than a reversal based on such ordinary trial errors as the incorrect receipt or rejection of evidence. While the former is in effect a finding that the government has failed to prove its case against the defendant, the latter implies nothing with respect to the guilt or innocence of the defendant, but is simply a determination that the defendant has been convicted through a judicial process that is defective in some fundamental respect.

Authority:

People v. Jasso (2025) 17 Cal.5th 646, 684

Abstracts and Minutes, Appellate Principles, Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case 000538

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The abstract of judgment must be corrected because it contains several errors, including a representation that the court imposed a $300 restitution, contrary to the actual order.

First Holding:

The abstract of judgment reflects a $300 restitution fine under section 1202.4(b) and a $300 parole revocation fine under section 1202.45 that were not orally imposed during the sentencing hearing. Under section 1202.4(b), the court shall impose a separate and additional restitution fine, unless it finds compelling and extraordinary reasons for not doing so and states those reasons on the record.

Under section 1202.45, if a defendant’s sentence includes a period of parole or the defendant is subject to post-release community supervision or mandatory supervision, the court shall impose an additional fine in the same amount as the section 1202.4 fine.

The People did not object to the court’s failure to orally impose these fines. Because such fines are discretionary given the court’s ability to not impose them if it makes certain findings on the record, the People forfeited the imposition of the fines by not objecting. Accordingly, we direct those fines to be stricken.

Authority:

People v. Tillman (2000) 22 Cal.4th 300, 303

Second Holding:

The abstract of judgment reflects that the restitution fine was imposed, but it was not. The oral pronouncement controls, so we amend the abstract of judgment accordingly.

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185, 188

Appellate Principles, Effective assistance of counsel, Fifth Amendment, Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case 000524

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

On resentencing, it was error to increase the originally-imposed $300 restitution fine to $10,000.00. It was also error to fail to recalculate the defendant’s credit for time served.

First Holding:

Although defendant arguably has forfeited the claim of error because he did not object to the sentence below, we will reach the issue because he also contends his attorney was ineffective.

Authority:

People v. Daniels (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 29, 31

Second Holding:

When a defendant successfully appeals a criminal conviction, California’s constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy precludes the imposition of more severe punishment on resentencing. Statutorily mandated restitution fines constitute punishment and there is no principled basis for excluding them from the rationale of Henderson. The restitution fine imposed pursuant to section 1202.4(b) cannot exceed the $300 originally imposed. Therefore, we remand the matter and direct the trial court to reduce the restitution fine to $300, as originally assessed.

Authority:

 

People v. Henderson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 482

People v. Jones (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1780, 1783, 1785

People v. Hanson (2000) 23 Cal.4th 355, 357

People v. Daniels (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 29, 31-32

People v. Thompson (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1276 [court directed trial court to reduce increased section 1202.4 fine to amount originally assessed]

Third Holding:

A restitution fine under section 1202.4 constitutes punishment. It is required in every case where a person is convicted of a crime unless the court finds compelling and extraordinary reasons for not doing so and states those reasons on the record. For felony convictions, the required fine is not less than $300 and not more than $10,000.

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 13

Fourth Holding:

When a trial court resentences a defendant on remand, it must credit him with all actual days he spent in custody up to that time, including his time in custody after the original sentencing. As the trial court failed to recalculate the credit for time served, the matter must be remanded for the custody credits to be recalculated.

Authority:

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 37 [the trial court, having modified defendant’s sentence on remand, was obliged, in its new abstract of judgment, to credit him with all actual days he had spent in custody]

Abstracts and Minutes, Fines and fees

Case 000523

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The minute order incorrectly states the court ordered defendant to pay various fines and fees, whereas the court actually struck all applicable fines and fees. It must be corrected.

Holding:

After defendant entered the plea agreement and the court placed him on probation, it ordered the applicable fines and fees stricken. The minute order from the plea hearing incorrectly reflects that the court imposed various fines and fees. Respondent agrees with defendant that the minute order should be corrected to show the fines and fees were stricken. This appears to be a clerical error, which we will direct the superior court clerk to correct.

Authority:

People v. Schultz (1965) 238 Cal.App.2d 804, 80

In re Candelario (1970) 3 Cal.3d

Fines and fees, Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing

Case 000521

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The court improperly imposed a domestic violence fee, because that only applies to those granted probation, which the defendant was not, as he was sentenced to prison.

First Holding:

The requirement to make a $500 domestic violence payment is not authorized by section 1203.097, because the trial court denied probation. The judgment is modified to strike the $500 domestic violence payment.

Authority:

PEN 1203.097

Fines and fees, Sentencing, Standard of review, Statutory interpretation

Case: 000495

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

On recalling the sentence under section 1172.75, the court should have stricken the balance due on the restitution fine ordered more than 10 years previously.

First Holding:

Effective January 1, 2025, Assembly Bill No. 1186 amended section 1465.9 to add subdivision (d), which provides: “Upon the expiration of 10 years after the date of imposition of a restitution fine pursuant to Section 1202.4, the balance, including any collection fees, shall be unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a judgment imposing those fines shall be vacated.” Here, the trial court imposed a restitution fine of $10,000 when it sentenced defendant in 2001. Because more than 10 years have elapsed since the date of imposition, we order the restitution fine vacated.

Authority:

PEN 1465.9

Second Holding:

Section 1465.9 does not contemplate vacating parole revocation fines under section 1202.45. Section 1465.9(d) does not mention section 1202.45. When a statute is silent on a point, the courts resort to statutory interpretation. The proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law we review de novo. When interpreting a statute, our fundamental task is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose. To determine the Legislature’s intent, we must look to the statute’s words and give them their usual and ordinary meaning. If there is no ambiguity in the language, we presume the Legislature meant what it said and the plain meaning of the statute governs.

There is no support in the plain language of the statute for the premise that the Legislature intended section 1465.9 to provide relief from parole revocation fines. If the Legislature intended such a result, it could have so specified. It did not. As such, we conclude that a section 1202.45 parole revocation fine cannot be vacated under section 1465.9.

Authority:

Waterman Convalescent Hospital Inc. v. State Dept. of Health Services (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 1433, 1439

People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 961

People v. Snook (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1210, 1215

People v. Gonzalez (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1118, 1126

People v. Guzman (2005) 35 Cal.4th 577, 587 [inserting additional language into a statute violates the cardinal rule of statutory construction that courts must not add provisions to statutes]

Abstracts and Minutes, Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case 000470

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The abstract of judgment must be amended to make clear the trial court found an inability to pay fees and fines, and to provide the correct number of prejudgment credit days.

First Holding:

At sentencing, the trial court found that the defendant did not have the ability to pay the court fees. The abstract of judgment, however, imposes a court security fee of $200 and a criminal conviction assessment of $150. We will direct the trial court to amend the abstract of judgment accordingly.

Authority:

People v. Costella (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 1, 10

Second Holding:

Based on counsel’s representations, the court awarded credit for actual days served that was 30 days less than he actually served. Therefore, the court’s minute order should be corrected to reflect the proper number of credit days, and the abstract of judgment should be amended accordingly.

[GARY NOTE: The court did not cite any authority for this correction, but there is plenty. I have listed authority the court could have cited.]

Authority:

PEN 2900.5

People v. Chilleli (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 581, 591 [The failure to properly calculate custody and conduct credit is a jurisdictional error that can be corrected at any time]

People v. Taylor (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 628, 647

People v. Acosta (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 411, 428, fn. 8

Appellate Principles, Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case 000467

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court imposed a restitution fine of $400, believing that $400 was the minimum. The appellate court revised the judgment to impose the intended minimum restitution fine of $300.

First Holding:

The minimum restitution fine for a defendant convicted of a felony is $300.

Authority:

PEN 1202.4(b)(1)

Second Holding:

We may review an asserted legal error in sentencing for the first time on appeal even if the defendant did not object in the trial court. When sentencing error does not require additional evidence, further fact finding, or further exercise of discretion, the appellate court may modify the judgment appropriately and affirm it as modified.

Authority:

People v. McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589, 594

People v. Haskin (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1434, 1441

Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case 000456

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

After ten years, the unpaid balance of any restitution fines are no longer collectible and the restitution order must be vacated.

First Holding:

Section 1202.4(b) mandates that in every case where a person is convicted of a crime, the court shall impose a separate and additional restitution fine, unless it finds compelling and extraordinary reasons for not doing so and states those reasons on the record. Section 1465.9 was amended effective January 1, 2025, to add subdivision (d) which requires that, on the expiration of 10 years after the date of imposition of a restitution fine pursuant to section 1202.4, the balance, including any collection fees, shall be unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a judgment imposing those fines shall be vacated.

Authority:

PEN 1202.4(b)

PEN 1465.9

Second Holding:

The trial court’s reimposition of the fine at resentencing in 2025 did not restart the 10-year clock.

Authority:

People v. Salstrom (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 596, 600–601, review granted Mar. 11, 2026, S295038 on a different issue

Appellate Principles, Discretion, Duty of the court, Fines and fees, Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 000454

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Though we find that a condition of probation that requires the defendant participate and complete any counseling, rehabilitation, or treatment program deemed appropriate by the probation officer was not an improper delegation of the court’s authority under the separation of powers doctrine, it was improper to impose as a condition of probation that the defendant participate at his own expense.

The challenged probation condition should be modified to delete the portion of the condition requiring defendant to be responsible for the payment of the costs/fees of any counseling or rehabilitation/treatment program. The court is directed to issue a separate order for the payment of such costs and fees. Before the court may order defendant to pay any or all costs associated with his probation, it must make an inquiry and determination as to his ability to pay and determine the amount of payment.

First Holding:

A trial court may order a defendant to pay for reasonable costs of probation; however, such costs are collateral and their payment cannot be made a condition of probation. Instead, the court must issue a separate order for the payment of such costs. Moreover, before ordering a defendant to pay costs of probation, the court must make an inquiry and determination of the defendant’s ability to pay and the amount of payment.

Authority:

PEN 1203.1b(a)

Brown v. Superior Court (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 313, 321-322

Second Holding:

Though we find there was no improper delegation, the defendant’s claim that the condition of probation is an improper delegation of the court’s authority under the separation of powers doctrine has not been forfeited for lack of objection, because it raises a pure question of law.

Authority:

In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 888

People v. Mendez (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1167, 1172

Third Holding:

A trial court has broad discretion to impose probation conditions to foster rehabilitation of the defendant and to protect the public. Further, the court has authority to empower the probation department with authority to supervise the probation conditions. We review a constitutional challenge to a probation condition de novo.

Authority:

PEN 1203.1(j)

People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1120

People v. Kwizera (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1240

In re Shaun R. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1129, 1143

Fourth Holding:

A trial court is governed by the separation of powers doctrine. The powers of state government are legislative, executive, and judicial. Persons charged with the exercise of one power may not exercise either of the others except as permitted by this Constitution. Although the separation of powers doctrine does not prohibit one branch from taking action that might affect another, the doctrine is violated when the actions of one branch defeat or materially impair the inherent functions of another. Separation of powers does not mean an entire or complete separation of powers or functions, which would be impracticable, if not impossible.

Authority:

Cal. Const., art. III, sec. 3

In re D.N. (2022) 14 Cal.5th 202, 212

Fifth Holding:

By leaving key determinations to be decided ad hoc, a vague probation condition may result in an impermissible delegation of authority to the probation officer. Under the separation of powers doctrine, judicial powers may not be delegated to nonjudicial officers. While the probation officer may properly specify the details necessary to effectuate the court’s probation conditions, it is the court’s duty to determine the nature of the requirements imposed on the probationer. The court may leave to the discretion of the probation officer the specification of the many details that invariably are necessary to implement the terms of probation. However, the court’s order cannot be entirely open-ended.

Authority:

People v. Smith (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 897, 902

People v. O’Neil (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1358-1359

Sixth Holding:

A probation condition directing that a defendant participate in any treatment program when considering another condition requiring a defendant complete a drug and alcohol assessment and follow through with treatment as prescribed by the probation officer, passes constitutional muster. This is particularly true where the court’s oral comments reflect that the defendant needs treatment for a substance abuse problem. However, where the condition includes the possibility of participation in a residential treatment program, as directed by the probation officer, it is an improper delegation of judicial authority.

Authority:

People v. Smith (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 897, 902-903

People v. Cruz (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1306, 1310 [Invalidating probation condition that gave the probation officer sole discretion to decide whether the defendant should be subject to GPS monitoring.]

People v. O’Neil (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1355, 1359 [Invalidating condition that provided, “You shall not associate socially, nor be present at any time, at any place, public or private, with any person, as designated by your probation officer.”]

People v. Kwizera (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1238,-1241 [Upholding probation condition that directed defendant to “follow such course of conduct as the probation officer may prescribe”]

People v. Penoli (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 298, 307 [Upholding condition that probation officer may unilaterally select a residential drug rehabilitation program and determine whether defendant successfully completed that program.]

Seventh Holding:

A probation condition should be given the meaning that would appear to a reasonable, objective reader. Following that precept, we read the challenged provision here not as delegating adjudicatory powers to the probation officer but as indicating the court’s advance approval of an agreement that the probation officer might reach with defendant. If a probation officer does interpret the condition in an arbitrary manner, defendant may then file a petition for modification of his probation condition. Thus, the probation condition did not improperly delegate judicial authority to the probation officer.

Authority:

PEN 1203.2(b)(1)

PEN 1203.3

In re D.N. (2022) 14 Cal.5th 202, 211

People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 382

People v. Keele (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 701, 708 [trial court retains jurisdiction to review probation officer’s actions]

People v. Arevalo (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 652, 658 [If probation officer interprets probation condition in an arbitrary way, the defendant can file a petition for modification of his probation condition.]