Category Archives: Fines and fees

Case 000703

Error and/or relief

The court erred in imposing two $30 criminal conviction assessment fees and two $40 court operations assessment fees without first determining whether the defendant had the ability to pay those fees.

First Holding:

The imposition of ancillary payments raises equal protection issues. Upon request, a court must consider a defendant’s inability to pay before imposing a court operations assessment (Pen. Code, sec. 1465.8(a)(1)) or a court facilities assessment (Gov. Code, sec. 70373(a)(1)).

In making this determination, a court must allow the parties to present any relevant evidence or argument on the matter. For these reasons, we vacate the $80 court operations assessment fees and $60 criminal conviction assessment fees and remand the matter to afford the trial court an opportunity to determine in the first instance whether the defendant has the ability to pay those costs.

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1

Second Holding:

To avoid passing upon whether the defendant’s trial attorney failed to provide constitutionally adequate assistance, we exercise our discretion to excuse the defendant’s forfeiture of his challenge to the imposition of the ancillary costs.

Authority:

People v. Torres (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 88, 92 [noting that a reviewing court may reach the merits of a forfeited claim t forestall a defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel]

Case 000690

Error and/or relief

The defendant cannot be convicted of both the robbery and the petty theft it resulted in, and the conviction and sentence for petty theft, along with associated fines and fees, must be reversed.

First Holding:

A defendant cannot be convicted of both robbery and petty theft based on the same conduct because theft is a lesser necessarily included offense of robbery.

Authority:

People v. Ortega (1998) 19 Cal.4th 686, 699

Second Holding:

While section 654 prohibits multiple punishment, it is generally permissible to convict a defendant of multiple charges arising from a single act or course of conduct.

However, a judicially created exception to this rule prohibits multiple convictions based on necessarily included offenses. When a defendant is found guilty of both a greater and a necessarily lesser included offense arising out of the same act or course of conduct, and the evidence supports the verdict on the greater offense, that conviction is controlling, and the conviction of the lesser offense must be reversed.

Authority:

PEN 654

PEN 954

People v. Ortega (1998) 19 Cal.4th 686, 692

People v. Montoya (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1031, 1034

People v. Sanders (2012) 55 Cal.4th 731, 736

Third Holding:

This is true even though the defendant first took items from the store and then took the same items from the loss prevention officer by force. The taking of the items from the loss prevention officer was the same as taking items from the store since the loss prevention officer was acting as an agent of the store.

Authority:

People v. Villa (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1429, 1434–1435

People v. Estes (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 23, 29

Fourth Holding:

The People contend the defendant forfeited his right to raise this issue on appeal because he did not object to his separate convictions before the trial court. We consider the merits of the argument because a defendant may challenge an unauthorized sentence even if he or she failed to object below.

Authority:

People v. Hester (2000) 22 Cal.4th 290, 295

Fifth Holding:

Section 1465.8(a)(1) requires a court to impose a $40 court operations assessment for every conviction of a criminal offense. Similarly, Government Code section 70373(a)(1), requires a $30 conviction assessment for each misdemeanor or felony conviction. The court also imposed a fine of $41 under section 1202.5 along with a restitution fine of $600 and a $600 parole revocation restitution fine, which was suspended unless parole is revoked.

Because we reverse the conviction for petty theft, we remand the matter for the superior court to vacate any portion of the fines and fees imposed for petty theft.

Authority:

PEN 1202.5

PEN 1202.4

PEN 1465.8(a)(1)

GOV 70373

Case 000689

Error and/or relief

The restitution fine is more than 10 years old and must be vacated. The abstract of judgment does not correctly reflect the trial court’s oral pronouncement of judgment and must be corrected.

First Holding:

The abstract of judgment does not correctly reflect the trial court’s oral pronouncement of judgment. At resentencing, the trial court found defendant indigent and waived any non-mandatory fines and fees. Once the trial court found defendant indigent, the court operations and conviction assessments were no longer mandatory. They were, therefore, waived by the court.

The abstract of judgment nevertheless includes a court operations assessment (sec. 1465.8) totaling $560 and a conviction assessment (Gov. Code, sec. 70373) totaling $420. Because the abstract of judgment does not accurately reflect the court’s oral pronouncement of judgment, we will order it corrected.

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 14-15

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

Second Holding:

The restitution fine was imposed more than 10 years ago and must be vacated.

Authority:

PEN 1465.9

Case 000685

Error and/or relief

When resentencing defendant under section 1172.75, the court reimposed the $400 restitution fine and a $400 suspended parole revocation fine originally imposed in 1999. The restitution fine must be vacated.

Holding:

Since the court originally imposed the restitution fine more than 10 years ago, section 1465.9(d) makes it now uncollectible and legally unenforceable.

Authority:

PEN 1465.9(d)

People v. Salstrom (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 596, 600-601 [resentencing does not restart 10-year clock], review granted Mar. 11, 2026, S29503 on a different issue

Case 000678

Error and/or relief

The defendant was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP). It was therefore improper to impose a parole revocation fine, which applies only to non-LWOP sentences.

First Holding:

The trial court erred in imposing and staying a parole revocation fine under section 1202.45(a), because the defendant’s sentence did not include a period of parole.

Authority:

People v. Battle (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 50, 63 [parole revocation fine improperly imposed upon defendant sentenced to indeterminate term on one count and LWOP on another]

Second Holding:

The defendant also contends for the first time on appeal that the court violated his constitutional rights, by ordering him to pay a $10,000 restitution fine under Penal Code section 1202.4(b), a court operations surcharge under Government Code section 69926(a), and court facilities and court operations assessments under Government Code section 70373 and Penal Code 1465.8(a)(1)), without first determining his ability to pay. Because these contentions were not raised below, they are forfeited.

Authority:

People v. Trujillo (2015) 60 Cal.4th 850, 856–859

People v. McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589, 597–598

People v. Frandsen (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 1126, 1153–1155

People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157, overruled in part by People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 23

Case 000675

Error and/or relief

When resentencing defendant, the court reimposed the $400 restitution fine and a $400 suspended parole revocation fine originally imposed in 1999. The restitution fine must be vacated.

Holding:

Restitution fines more than 10 years old are not collectible and must be vacated. Resentencing does not restart the clock.

Authority:

PEN 1465.9

People v. Salstrom (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 596, 600-601 [resentencing does not restart 10-year clock], review granted Mar. 11, 2026, S295038 on a different issue

Case 000667

Error and/or relief

On resentencing under section 1172.75, it was error to reimpose the restitution fine (as it was more than 10 years old) and to impose various fees that were not enacted until after the defendant was originally sentenced.

First Holding:

A restitution fine cannot be re-imposed more than 10 years after initially imposed.

Authority:

PEN 1465.9(d) [setting a 10-year limit as to the date of imposition of a restitution fine pursuant to section 1202.4]

People v. Salstrom (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 596, 601, review granted Mar. 11, 2026, S295038, on another issue

Second Holding:

The assessment and fee did not become law until after defendant’s 1996 sentencing, and thus cannot be imposed.

Authority:

People v. Alford (2007) 42 Cal.4th 749, 754 [applying section 1465.8 only to convictions imposed after its operative date of August 17, 2003]

People v. Davis (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 998, 1000-1001 [applying Government Code section 70373 only to convictions after its effective date of January 1, 2009]

Case 000658

Error and/or relief

It was an improper delegation of authority to impose a condition of probation that left it up to the probation officer to decide whether treatment should be residential or outpatient. There was also error regarding imposition of fees.

First Holding:

Though the defendant did not object to the condition at the time, the issue is not forfeited on appeal. His claim is cognizable because it is a facial constitutional challenge presenting a pure question of law that does not depend on the underlying factual record. We thus address defendant’s constitutional challenge on the merits, which we review de novo.

Authority:

People v. Smith (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 897, 901 [a facial constitutional challenge may be considered for the first time on appeal because it does not depend on the underlying factual record]

In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 884–886

Second Holding:

Under the separation of powers doctrine, judicial powers may not be delegated to nonjudicial officers. While the probation officer may properly specify the details necessary to effectuate the court’s probation conditions, it is the court’s duty to determine the nature of the requirements imposed on the probationer.

A court may dictate the basic policy of a condition of probation, leaving specification of details to the probation officer, but the court’s order cannot be entirely open-ended. It is for the court to determine the nature of the prohibition placed on a defendant as a condition of probation. By leaving key determinations to be decided ad hoc, a vague probation condition may result in an impermissible delegation of authority to the probation officer.

Authority:

Cal. Const., art. III, sec. 3

People v. Smith (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 897, 902

In Victor L. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902, 919

Third Holding:

A condition requiring the defendant to enter a residential drug treatment program but authorizing probation to select which residential program may be upheld. We remand for the trial court to either strike the condition, or modify it to specify the type of treatment program in which defendant is directed to participate, including whether it requires defendant to undergo residential treatment. The court’s decision may be informed by the results of any assessment and additional information provided by the parties.

Authority:

People v. Penoli (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 298, 307–308

People v. Smith (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 897, 903, 905,

People v. O’Neil (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 13

Fourth Holding:

Appellants implicitly concede a respondent’s argument by failing to respond in their reply brief to the respondent’s argument on that point. A court may assume respondent’s claim was correct if the defendant did not dispute respondent’s claim in his reply.

Authority:

Rudick v. State Bd. of Optometry (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 77, 89–90

Reygoza v. Superior Court (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 514, 519 and fn. 4

Fifth Holding:

An order of probation, like an abstract of judgment, must specify the statutory basis of each fine or fee imposed.

Authority:

People v. Eddards (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 712, 716

Sixth Holding:

In general costs of prosecuting and rehabilitating criminals are not recoverable absent express statutory authority to the contrary. The Legislature repealed section 1203.1b (which authorized to court to impose an order for the cost of probation services, depending on ability to pay, and it could not be a condition of probation) and enacted section 1465.9, which states in relevant part, that on after July 1, 2021, the balance of any court-imposed costs pursuant to section 1203.1b [among numerous other statutes] shall be unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a judgment imposing those costs shall be vacated.

Authority:

PEN 1465.9

People v. Baker (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 550, 559–560

Seventh Holding:

The abstract of judgment contains an error. It states that the jury found true the enhancement for great bodily injury under section 12022.7. This conflicts with the actual oral statement of the judge (who conducted a court trial on the enhancement), in which the judge stated “I am not going to find true the allegation of great bodily injury.”

Where, as here, discrepancies exist between the court’s oral pronouncement of judgment and the minute order, the oral pronouncement controls. The trial court should thus modify the probation order to conform to its oral pronouncement.

Authority:

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

Case 000656

Error and/or relief

In this appeal following resentencing under section 1172.75, the restitution fine, now older than 10 years, must be vacated.

Holding:

Under section 1465.9(d), the restitution fine must be vacated, as it was imposed more than 10 years ago.

Authority:

PEN 1465.9(d)

Case 000649

Error and/or relief

In 2025, the trial court resentenced defendant pursuant to section 1172.75—striking the two prior prison term enhancements—and otherwise reimposed the prior judgment from 1996, including a $10,000 restitution fine. The trial court erred by reimposing the restitution fine and it must be vacated.

First Holding:

Section 1465.9(d) provides: “Upon the expiration of 10 years after the date of imposition of a restitution fine pursuant to section 1202.4, the balance, including any collection fees, shall be unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a judgment imposing those fines shall be vacated.” Resentencing does not reset the 10-year expiration of a section 1202.4 restitution fine.

Authority:

PEN 1465.9(d)

People v. Salstrom (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 596, 600-601, review granted on other grounds Mar. 11, 2026, S295038

Case 000647

Error and/or relief

The court should have granted the defendant’s motion to vacate the restitution fine, which was more than 10 years old.

First Holding:

Effective January 1, 2025, AB 1186 (Stats. 2024, ch. 805, sec. 1) amended section 1465.9 to add subdivision (d). The statute now provides: “Upon the expiration of 10 years after the date of imposition of a restitution fine pursuant to section 1202.4, the balance, including any collection fees, shall be unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a judgment imposing those fines shall be vacated.”

Authority:

PEN 1465.9(d)

Second Holding:

Defendant’s restitution fine was effectively vacated when section 1465.9(d) went into effect. The defendant’s motion, however, was filed a few months before the law took effect. For the statute to apply, it is not clear that a motion is even required, as the law declares the fine uncollectible and that any portion of a judgment imposing those fines is to be vacated. In the interests of judicial economy, we will direct the trial court to correct the abstract of judgment to reflect that the restitution fine has been vacated.

Authority:

In re Mattison (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 1062, 1069

Case 000646

Error and/or relief

On resentencing under section 1172.75, the court should have vacated the restitution fine, as it was more than 10 years old.

Holding:

Effective January 1, 2025, AB 1186 (Stats. 2024, ch. 805, sec. 1) amended section 1465.9 to add subdivision (d). The statute now provides: “Upon the expiration of 10 years after the date of imposition of a restitution fine pursuant to section 1202.4, the balance, including any collection fees, shall be unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a judgment imposing those fines shall be vacated.” The resentencing pursuant to section 1172.75 did not restart section 1465.9’s 10-year clock anew.

Authority:

PEN 1465.9(d)

People v. Salstrom (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 596, 600, review granted and briefing deferred on a different issue, March 11, 2026, S295038