Case 001208

Error and/or relief

The court imposed unauthorized sentences for counts 5 and 12. We will correct the unauthorized sentences on appeal.

First Holding:

A sentence is generally unauthorized where it could not lawfully be imposed under any circumstance in the particular case.

Authority:

People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354

Second Holding:

In count 5, the defendant was convicted of violation of Penal Code section 288.7(b) and was sentenced to 25 years to life under section 667.61(j)(2) and (e)(4). Section 667.61(j)(2) mandates a sentence of 25 years to life for defendants who have been convicted of specified crime of a child under the age of 14 when certain specified circumstances are present including, as relevant here, when the crime is committed against more than one victim.

The defendant was not charged with committing the specified crime on more than one victim. He therefore does not qualify for the enhanced sentence of 25 years to life under section 667.61(j)(2) and (e)(4). Accordingly, the sentence of 25 years to life under section 667.61 was unauthorized because it could not be lawfully imposed under any circumstances presented here.

Instead, section 288.7(b) requires the trial court to sentence defendant to 15 years to life for the specified crime.

Authority:

PEN 667.61(j)(2)

PEN 288.7(b)

Third Holding:

Section 647.6(a) prohibits a person from annoying or molesting a child under the age of 18, and subdivision (c)(2) of that section provides for an enhanced sentence of two, four, or six years for defendants who are convicted under section 647.6 if they have previously been convicted under section 311.4.

The defendant was not charged with annoying or molesting a child under section 647.6 in count 12, and therefore could not be sentenced under that statute. He was charged and convicted under section 311.4(c), which does not state a sentencing triad.

Authority:

PEN 647.6(a)

PEN 311.4(c)

Fourth Holding:

An illegal sentence may be corrected whenever the error comes to the attention of the trial court or any reviewing court. This court can correct the sentences on appeal because this issue presents a pure question of law that can be corrected without relying on factual findings made at sentencing or remanding the matter for additional findings. We will therefore correct the sentence to reflect a term of 15 years to life for the conviction in count 5, the penalty for violation of section 288.7(b).

Authority:

People v. Price (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 224, 244

In re G.C. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 1119, 1130

Fifth Holding:

In sentencing the defendant on count 12, the court cited section 647.6(c)(2). But as the defendant was not convicted of that section, and was instead convicted of section 311.4(c), the court must impose a sentence as described in section 18. Where the penalty for a specific crime is not otherwise set forth for a crime, section 18 provides that the triad for a sentence to state prison is 16 months, two years, or three years. Because the trial court sentenced defendant under the wrong sentencing triad, it failed to exercise informed discretion when it imposed the upper term sentence of six years for count 12.

Defendants are entitled to sentencing decisions made in the exercise of the informed discretion of the sentencing court. A court that is unaware of the scope of its discretionary powers can no more exercise that informed discretion than one whose sentence is or may have been based on misinformation regarding a material aspect of a defendant’s record. In such situations, the appropriate remedy is to remand for resentencing unless the record clearly indicates that the trial court would have reached the same conclusion had it been aware of the scope of its discretion.

The record here clearly indicates the trial court would have imposed the upper term of three years had it been aware of the scope of its discretion under section 18. At the bifurcated bench trial, the trial court found all four of the alleged aggravating factors to be true and believing it had discretion to choose between two, four, or six years for count 12, the trial court chose the upper term. Based on this decision, the record clearly indicates that the trial court would again choose to impose the upper term—which is half the amount of time originally imposed—for count 12 had it understood its sentencing discretion under section 18.

We therefore correct the sentence to the upper term of three years for count 12.

Authority:

PEN 18

People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 424

People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391