Case 001192

Error and/or relief

It was improper for the court to select the upper based on aggravating factors that were not admitted or submitted to a jury for proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

First Holding:

Any fact that exposes a defendant to a greater potential sentence must be found by a jury, not a judge, and established beyond a reasonable doubt. Tracking that standard, section 1170(b)(2) prohibits a trial court from imposing a sentence exceeding the middle term unless (1) circumstances in aggravation justify imposition of an upper term sentence and (2) the facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or found true beyond a reasonable doubt by the jury or by the judge in a court trial. Similar principles apply to enhancement sentences.

Authority:

PEN 1170

Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270, 281

Second Holding:

A defendant is entitled to a jury trial on all aggravating facts, other than the bare fact of a prior conviction and its elements, that expose the defendant to the imposition of a sentence more serious than the statutorily provided midterm. In particular, a jury must determine whether the particular details of a defendant’s criminal history demonstrate convictions of increasing seriousness before a trial court can rely on that fact to justify an upper term sentence.

Here, the trial court found defendant’s prior record of convictions was of increasing seriousness (the increasing seriousness factor) and then imposed and stayed certain upper terms after weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors. By not limiting itself to the aggravating factors the jury found true, the trial court erred.

Authority:

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1078, 1086

Third Holding:

When a defendant is deprived of a jury trial on aggravating facts used to justify imposition of an upper term sentence, the reviewing court must apply the Chapman standard of review.

Under that standard, a sentenced imposed under section 1170(b) must be reversed and remanded unless the reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury, applying that same standard, would have found true all of the aggravating facts upon which the court relied to conclude the upper term was justified.

When assessing prejudice under Chapman, the proper inquiry is whether any rational fact finder could have come to the opposite conclusion. If a rational juror could have reached the opposite conclusion, the error is not harmless under Chapman.

The increasing seriousness factor requires a comparison and evaluation of the relationship among a defendant’s prior convictions, and a determination as to their relative seriousness. Because the inquiry is a comparative and qualitative one, it is difficult for a reviewing court to conclude with confidence that, had the issue been submitted to the jury, the jury would have assessed the facts in the same manner as the trial court.

Here, defendant has a single prior conviction – a misdemeanor (more than 12 years earlier) for driving under the influence. Based on the Wiley standards, we agree with the parties that we cannot conclude the jury would have found the increasing seriousness factor true beyond a reasonable doubt. We remand for full resentencing, thereby mooting defendant’s other sentencing claims.

Authority:

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1082, 1087, 1090