Error and/or relief:
The trial court erred when it imposed upper term sentences based upon an aggravating factor not proven true beyond a reasonable doubt to the jury. This error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. As such, we will vacate defendant’s sentence and remand for full resentencing.
First Holding:
Rule 4.421 of the Rules of Court sets forth aggravating circumstances a court may consider when sentencing a defendant. One such aggravating circumstance is that the defendant’s prior convictions as an adult or sustained petitions in juvenile delinquency proceedings are numerous or of increasing seriousness.
Authority:
Cal. Rules of Court, rule 421(b)(2)
Second Holding:
Section 1170(b)(2) provides that, in selecting a term of imprisonment, a trial court may impose a sentence exceeding the middle term only when there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term and the facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.
Notwithstanding this rule, a court may consider the defendant’s prior convictions in determining sentencing based on a certified record of conviction without submitting the prior convictions to a jury.
Authority:
PEN 1170(b)(2), (b)(3)
Third Holding:
With the exception of prior conviction allegations, under the Sixth Amendment, any fact that exposes a defendant to a greater potential sentence must be found by a jury and established beyond a reasonable doubt. Under section 1170(b), a Sixth Amendment violation occurs when the trial court relies on unproven aggravating facts to impose an upper term sentence, even if some other aggravating facts relied on have been properly established.
Authority:
People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 747, 768
Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270, 281
Fourth Holding:
In Erlinger, the United States Supreme Court rejected the argument that the prior conviction exception to the Sixth Amendment permits a judge to find perhaps any fact related to a defendant’s past offenses. Rather, a judge may do no more, consistent with the Sixth Amendment, than determine what crime, with what elements, the defendant was convicted of.
Authority:
Erlinger v. United States (2024) 602 U.S. 821, 837
Fifth Holding:
The defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial was violated when the court found that his convictions were numerous and increasingly serious within the meaning of rule 4.421(b)(2). The trial court imposed upper term sentences even though this aggravating factor had not been proven in accordance with section 1170(b)(2), and even though the prior conviction exception would not apply to this aggravating fact.
Authority:
People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1083-1084, and 1085, fn, 9 [Erlinger requires that any fact, beyond the bare fact of a prior conviction, that exposes a defendant to harsher punishment, must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Wiley discussed whether the numerical tally of a defendant’s prior convictions falls within the prior conviction exception but declining to address the issue]
Sixth Holding:
A trial court’s reliance on aggravating circumstances not found in accordance with section 1170(b) is prejudicial unless an appellate court can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have found true all of the aggravating facts relied upon by the trial court to justify an upper term sentence, or that those facts were otherwise proved true in compliance with the current statutory requirements. If the reviewing court cannot so determine, applying the Chapman standard of review, the defendant is entitled to a remand for resentencing.
When assessing prejudice under Chapman, the proper inquiry is whether any rational fact finder could have come to the opposite conclusion. If a rational juror could have reached the opposite conclusion, the error is not harmless under Chapman. The People bear the burden of establishing that the federal constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Authority:
Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18
People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 768
People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1090
People v. Avalos (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 926, 953
Seventh Holding:
Our Supreme Court has cautioned against attempting to determine whether a jury would have found true aggravating circumstances that require an imprecise quantitative or comparative evaluation of the facts, such as whether a defendants prior convictions are numerous. To the extent a potential aggravating circumstance rests on a somewhat vague or subjective standard, it may be difficult for a reviewing court to conclude with confidence that, had the issue been submitted to the jury, the jury would have assessed the facts in the same manner as did the trial court.
Authority:
People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 775-776
Eighth Holding:
As to whether defendant’s prior convictions are of increasing seriousness, the Wiley court explained that the inquiry requires a comparison and evaluation of the relationship among a defendant’s prior convictions, and a determination as to their relative seriousness. A fact finder can assess the increasing seriousness of a defendant’s prior convictions by comparing the range of punishment or the elements of respective offenses.
Authority:
People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1082

