Error and/or relief
The murder occurred before 1990. The defendant was charged and tried after 2020. The court erred in failing to recognize that it had discretion to strike the special circumstances. It erred in imposing a parole revocation restitution fine. It erred in denying the defendant conduct credits. And the abstract of judgment must be corrected to reflect that the conviction was by jury trial, not by plea.
(Gary musings: This case is a classic example of why it is imperative that counsel determine exactly what the laws were that were in effect at the time the crime was committed. Three significant statutes were relied on by the trial court in sentencing, none of which existed at the time of the crime, and their application violated ex post facto principles. Yet there was no objection by counsel, apparently. And this was a murder case that resulted in a sentence of life without the possibility of parole. It was likely not handled by someone who just passed the bar. None of us–including me–should assume we know what the law was at any given point, whether we have had decades of experience or none at all.)
First Holding:
At the time of defendant’s offense, trial courts had the authority under section 1385 to strike a special circumstance so that a sentence of life without the possibility of parole could be modified to allow parole.
Authority:
People v. Williams (1981) 30 Cal.3d 470, 485
Second Holding:
Section 1385.1, enacted in 1990, now provides that, notwithstanding section 1385, the trial court shall not strike or dismiss any special circumstance found by a jury or court. But section 1385.1 may only be applied to prosecutions of crimes committed on or after June 6, 1990, its effective date, because retroactive application of the statute would change the legal consequences of the defendant’s past conduct and likely violate the rule against ex post facto legislation.
Because the crime in this case occurred before section 1385.1’s effective date, the trial court’s statement that it had no discretion regarding the special circumstances was incorrect. It did have the authority to strike or dismiss one or both special circumstances found by the jury.
Authority:
Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282, 298-299
Third Holding:
Defendants are entitled to sentencing decisions made in the exercise of the informed discretion of the sentencing court. A court that is unaware of the scope of its discretionary powers can no more exercise that informed discretion than one whose sentence is or may have been based on misinformation regarding a material aspect of a defendant’s record.
Here, the trial court expressly indicated it was unaware of its discretion to strike a special circumstance.
Under such circumstances, remand is the default unless the record clearly indicates that the trial court would have reached the same conclusion even if it had been aware that it had such discretion.
(Gary note: The court then concluded that it could not determine from the record whether the court would have exercised its discretion to strike the special circumstances had it known that it could.)
Authority:
People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391
People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 431
Fourth Holding:
Under the circumstances, we will remand the matter to permit the trial court to consider its discretion. Our disposition for a full resentencing will require the consideration on remand of an award of presentence credit and the imposition of fines and assessments. We briefly address defendant’s other contentions to provide some guidance.
Authority:
People v. Valenzuela (2019) 7 Cal.5th 415, 424-425
Fifth Holding:
The court did not award any presentence conduct credits, stating that the defendant was not entitled to any because of his murder conviction. Section 4019 permits jail inmates to earn conduct credit prior to being sentenced by performing labor or by good behavior. The purpose of such credit is to foster constructive behavior while a person is incarcerated.
Section 2933.2 denies conduct credit to people convicted of murder, and the trial court apparently relied on that section in denying defendant any conduct credit. However, that statute became effective on June 3, 1998, after the murder herein. By its terms, the statute applies only to murders committed on or after the date on which the section became operative. Thus, it does not justify denial of conduct credits here.
Authority:
PEN 4019
PEN 2933.2
People v. Lara (2012) 54 Cal.4th 896, 906
People v. Chism (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1266, 1336
People v. Ly (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 44, 47
People v. Flores (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1171, 1182 [ex post facto violation to apply sec. 2933.2(c) to someone who committed murder before the enactment of the provision]
Sixth Holding:
It was error to impose the parole revocation restitution fine under section 1202.45, because that statute was enacted after the date of the crime. Imposing that fine violated defendant’s ex post facto rights.
Authority:
People v. Callejas (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 667, 676-678
Seventh Holding:
The abstract of judgment erroneously states that defendant was convicted by plea, despite the fact that he was found guilty by a jury. When the trial court prepares an amended abstract of judgment on remand, it must correctly state that defendant was convicted by a jury.
(Gary note: The court cited no authority directing correction of the abstract, but none was necessary. By remanding for full resentencing–which at the very least would have removed order for the parole revocation restitution fine, and likely would have entailed adding conduct credits that may have been earned while he was in custody before he was sentence–a new abstract of judgment will have to be prepared. This direction by the Court of Appeal serves simply as a reminder that the new abstract must reflect the nature of the conviction. But I have listed some of the cases that the court could cited had it intended its direction to be a specific order.)
Authority:
People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185
People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1070
People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 855
In re Black (1967) 66 Cal.2d 881, 890
People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

