Tag Archives: Sentencing

Appellate Principles, Discretion, Due process, Elements of crime, Pleading, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 000654

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The court imposed the wrong sentence for the consecutive term.

First Holding:

In one count, the defendant was convicted of second degree robbery (sec. 211). At sentencing, the trial court imposed an aggravated term of five years, which was ordered to be served consecutively at a subordinate term of one year four months. Because the robbery was a second degree felony, the middle term is three years in prison. As such, the consecutive subordinate term must be one-third the middle term, or one year. Thus, the sentence on that count must be reduced from 16 months to one year. We may correct this unauthorized sentence on appeal without remanding for a full resentencing.

Authority:

PEN 1170.1(a)

PEN 1260

People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 171–172

Second Holding:

The defendant argues that he should have been charged with only one count of attempting to dissuade a witness rather than the 10 charged and found true. The ten calls all occurred on the same day over a span of six hours. The issue is whether appellant may be lawfully subject to multiple convictions. We review this claim de novo.

Authority:

PEN 954

People v. Duffy (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 257, 261

Third Holding:

Section 954 defines what charges can be joined in one action. This statute does not permit multiple convictions for the same offense based on the same act or course of conduct. However, section 954 authorizes multiple convictions for different or distinct offenses. As a result, a defendant may be convicted of multiple counts of the same crime, such as grand theft, based on separate and distinct criminal acts, even if the acts were all part of a single overarching scheme.

Authority:

PEN 954

People v. Vidana (2016) 1 Cal.5th 632, 650

People v. Whitmer (2014) 59 Cal.4th 733, 74

Fourth Holding:

Determining whether a defendant has committed one or more criminal acts requires identifying what the Legislature intended to punish as a single offense under the relevant statute. Courts refer to this inquiry as determining the statute’s unit of prosecution. Courts should look to the characteristics of the crime, including both (1) the factual circumstances of the defendant’s criminal conduct and (2) the elements of the crime as defined by the Legislature in the relevant statute.

Authority:

Moore v. Superior Court (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 441, 461

People v. Wilson (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 193, 199-200

People v. Whitmer (2014) 59 Cal.4th 733, 744 (conc. opn. of Liu, J.)

Fifth Holding:

Section 136.1(a)(2) makes it a crime to knowingly and maliciously attempt to prevent or dissuade a witness from attending or giving testimony at a trial, proceeding or inquiry authorized by law. In relevant part, malice is defined under this statute as an intent to thwart or interfere in any manner with the orderly administration of justice. This crime is completed upon any attempt.

Authority:

PEN 136.1

People v. Kirvin (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1507, 1519

Sixth Holding:

A trial court’s decision whether to impose consecutive or concurrent sentences is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. A defendant bears the burden to clearly show that the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary. In the absence of such a showing, a reviewing court presumes the trial court acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its discretionary determination to impose a particular sentence will not be set aside on appeal. Moreover, a decision will not be reversed merely because reasonable people might disagree. Instead, the decision must be so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.

Authority:

PEN 669(a)

People v. Giminez (1975) 14 Cal.3d 68, 71–72

People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 376–377

Seventh Holding:

Once a trial court lawfully decides to impose consecutive sentences on convictions for violating section 136.1, section 1170.15 applies. If a person is convicted of a felony, and of an additional felony that is a violation of section 136.1 or 137 and that was committed against the victim of, or a witness or potential witness with respect to, or a person who was about to give material information pertaining to, the first felony the Penal Code provides that those subordinate terms shall consist of the full middle term.

Authority:

PEN 1170.15

Eighth Holding:

In relevant part, the rule against the dual use of facts prohibits a trial court from relying on the same fact “to impose both the upper term and a consecutive sentence. Only a single factor in aggravation is needed to support imposition of an upper term. Likewise, only one relevant and sustainable fact may explain a series of consecutive sentences. We presume the trial court acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives

Authority:

People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 350, fn. 12

People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 730

People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 376-377

Ninth Holding:

There is a developing split of authority regarding application of the forfeiture doctrine regarding the low term presumption under section 1170(b)(6). We need not decide that issue. Although the court did not specifically mention subdivision (b)(6), we presume it knew of that provision.

Authority:

People v. Achane (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 1037, 1039, 1044 [forfeiture doctrine applied when defendant failed to raise in the trial court the presumption in favor of a lower term]

People v. Fredrickson (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 984, 994, fn. 8 [sec. 1170 mandates application of the lower term presumption and is not subject to forfeiture]People v. Caparrotta (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 874, 905

Tenth Holding:

Under the cumulative error doctrine, errors that are individually harmless may nevertheless have cumulative prejudice. A claim of cumulative error is essentially a due process challenge. The issue is whether the defendant received a fair trial. Here, appellant’s claim of cumulative prejudice is without merit because we have rejected the individual claims. After reviewing the entire record, we are confident that appellant received due process throughout the entire proceeding, including sentencing.

Authority:

In re Avena (1996) 12 Cal.4th 694, 772, fn. 32

People v. Rivas (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1410, 1436

People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1057

People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1009 [a defendant is “entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one”]

Sentencing

Case 000653

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

On remand for full resentencing, it was error for the trial court to impose the upper term on the firearm enhancement where there was no jury determination beyond a reasonable doubt that the factors in aggravation relied on by the court were true.

First Holding:

If an enhancement (such as section 12022.5) is punishable by one of three terms, the court shall, in its sound discretion, order imposition of a sentence not to exceed the middle term, unless there are circumstances in aggravation that justify the imposition of the upper term and the facts underlying those cirucmstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury of by the judge in a court trial.

Authority:

PEN 1170.1

Second Holding:

Where the court imposes the upper term based on factors that have not been stipulated to or found true beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury, the defendant is entitled to a reversal and remand for resentencing unless, after examining the entire cause, including the evidence as to all relevant circumstances, the appellate court can conclude that the omission of a jury trial was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as to every aggravating fact the trial court used to justify an upper term sentence.

In making this determination, we may examine what the jury necessarily did find and ask whether it would be impossible, on the evidence, for the jury to find that without also finding the missing fact as well. In other words, if no reasonable jury would have found in favor of the defendant on the missing fact, given the jury’s actual verdict and the state of the evidence, the error may be found harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We may also find the omission harmless if we can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the omitted fact was uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence.

Authority:

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 775

Third Holding:

Whether the defendant has engaged in violent conduct that indicates a serious danger to society or the crime involved athreat of great bodily harm are subjective factual determinations. To the extent a potential aggravating circumstance at issue in a particular case rests on a somewhat vague or subjective standard, it may be difficult for a reviewing court to conclude with confidence that, had the issue been submitted to the jury, the jury would have assessed the facts in the same manner as did the trial court.

Authority:

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 775

Sentencing

Case 000652

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The court failed to give the defendant credit for time served while in custody on this matter in another state.

First Holding:

The defendant was entitled to credit against his sentence for all actual days of presentence custody, beginning on the day of his arrest and continuing through the day of sentencing. Defendant was taken into custody in another state, where he was held for 13 days before his arrival in California. He is entitled to credit for that time.

Authority:

People v. Rajanayagam (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 42, 48

Sentencing

Case 000651

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

It was error for the court to impose a term of 25 years to life for the murder (doubled to 50 years to life because of a prior strike) and two terms oflife without the possiblity of parole (LWOP) for the murder because of true findings on two separate special circumstance, even though the court stayed the 50 years to life term and one of the LWOP terms.

First Holding:

Once a defendant has been found guilty of first degree murder and an accompanying special circumstance allegation under section 190.2 has been found true, the penalty is death or imprisonment in the state prison for life without the possibility of parole. A special circumstance finding removes the possibility of penalty less than life without parole. Thus, the trial court’s imposition and stay of the 50-years-to-life sentence on the murder count was unauthorized and must be stricken.

Authority:

PEN 190.2(a)

People v. Noble (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 1011, 1016

Second Holding:

Appellate court can correct a legal error resulting in an unauthorized sentence at any time.

Authority:

People v. Sanders (2012) 55 Cal.4th 731, 743, fn. 13

Third Holding:

The defendant should not have received two life without parole sentences based on the two special circumstance findings. Under section 190.2(a), a defendant is sentenced to death or life imprisonment without parole if one or more of the enumerated special circumstances has been found true. Defendants do not receive additional punishment based on additional special circumstance findings.

Authority:

People v. Montes (2014) 58 Cal.4th 809, 874 [a defendant faces no additional punishment merely as a result of additional special circumstance finding]

Amelioration, Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case 000649

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

In 2025, the trial court resentenced defendant pursuant to section 1172.75—striking the two prior prison term enhancements—and otherwise reimposed the prior judgment from 1996, including a $10,000 restitution fine. The trial court erred by reimposing the restitution fine and it must be vacated.

First Holding:

Section 1465.9(d) provides: “Upon the expiration of 10 years after the date of imposition of a restitution fine pursuant to section 1202.4, the balance, including any collection fees, shall be unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a judgment imposing those fines shall be vacated.” Resentencing does not reset the 10-year expiration of a section 1202.4 restitution fine.

Authority:

PEN 1465.9(d)

People v. Salstrom (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 596, 600-601, review granted on other grounds Mar. 11, 2026, S295038