Tag Archives: Sentencing

Case 000678

Error and/or relief

The defendant was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP). It was therefore improper to impose a parole revocation fine, which applies only to non-LWOP sentences.

First Holding:

The trial court erred in imposing and staying a parole revocation fine under section 1202.45(a), because the defendant’s sentence did not include a period of parole.

Authority:

People v. Battle (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 50, 63 [parole revocation fine improperly imposed upon defendant sentenced to indeterminate term on one count and LWOP on another]

Second Holding:

The defendant also contends for the first time on appeal that the court violated his constitutional rights, by ordering him to pay a $10,000 restitution fine under Penal Code section 1202.4(b), a court operations surcharge under Government Code section 69926(a), and court facilities and court operations assessments under Government Code section 70373 and Penal Code 1465.8(a)(1)), without first determining his ability to pay. Because these contentions were not raised below, they are forfeited.

Authority:

People v. Trujillo (2015) 60 Cal.4th 850, 856–859

People v. McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589, 597–598

People v. Frandsen (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 1126, 1153–1155

People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157, overruled in part by People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 23

Case 000675

Error and/or relief

When resentencing defendant, the court reimposed the $400 restitution fine and a $400 suspended parole revocation fine originally imposed in 1999. The restitution fine must be vacated.

Holding:

Restitution fines more than 10 years old are not collectible and must be vacated. Resentencing does not restart the clock.

Authority:

PEN 1465.9

People v. Salstrom (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 596, 600-601 [resentencing does not restart 10-year clock], review granted Mar. 11, 2026, S295038 on a different issue

Case 000674

Error and/or relief

The court should have stayed the sentence on count 3 under section 654.

First Holding:

Section 654(a) provides that an act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one provision. The statute is intended to ensure that the defendant is punished commensurate with his culpability. It expressly prohibits separate punishment for two crimes based on the same act, but has been interpreted to also preclude multiple punishment for two or more crimes occurring within the same course of conduct pursuant to a single intent.

Whether a course of criminal conduct is divisible and therefore gives rise to more than one act within the meaning of section 654 depends on the intent and objective of the actor. If all of the offenses were incident to one objective, the defendant may be punished for any one of such offenses but not for more than one.

However, the temporal proximity of the two offenses is insufficient by itself to establish that they were incident to a single objective. If the defendant entertained multiple criminal objectives which were independent of and not merely incidental to each other, he may be punished for independent violations committed in pursuit of each objective even though the violations shared common acts or were parts of an otherwise indivisible course of conduct. Furthermore, multiple crimes are not one transaction where the defendant had a chance to reflect between offenses and each offense created a new risk of harm.

Authority:

People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 335

People v. Vargas (2014) 59 Cal.4th 635, 642

People v. Capistrano (2014) 59 Cal.4th 830, 885

People v. Rodriguez (2009) 47 Cal.4th 501, 507, overruled in part on another ground in People v. Hardy (2018) 5 Cal.5th 56 at pp. 103–104
People v. Jackson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 269, 354

People v. Porter (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 34, 38

People v. Beamon (1973) 8 Cal.3d 625, 639

People v. Tom (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 250, 260

People v. Lopez (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 698, 717

People v. Felix (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 905, 915

Second Holding:

Under the facts of this case, the court should have stayed the sentence on count 3. We may modify the judgment on review to reflect the sentence is stayed. In the absence of any other errors requiring remand, we exercise our discretion to do so.

Authority:

PEN 1260

People v. Alford (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1473

People v. Flores (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 420, 453 [we need not remand a matter when it would be an idle act wasteful of judicial resources]

Case 000670

Error and/or relief

The defendant was convicted of one count of felony vandalism and one count of misdemeanor vandalism. The court purported to sentence the defendant to a total of three years, with appellant ordered to serve 270 days in county jail and the balance of the three years time on mandatory supervision (a “split sentence”). This was error, because the concept of split sentence applies to felonies only, and the misdemeanor was not subject to mandatory supervision.

First Holding:

Under the Realignment Act, qualifying low-level felony offenders no longer serve their sentences in state prison. Instead, such offenders serve their sentences either entirely in county jail or partly in county jail and partly under the mandatory supervision of the county probation officer. Pursuant to section 1170(h)(5)(B), the court has discretion to impose a hybrid sentence consisting of county jail followed by a period of mandatory supervision. This option is only available for felony convictions.

Authority:

PEN 1170(h)

People v. Scott (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1415, 1418-1419

People v. Catalan (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 173, 178

Second Holding:

As reflected in the court’s oral pronouncement and the corresponding minute order, the court “split” the total three-year sentence for both counts, imposing 270 days of jail time and the balance as mandatory supervision.

While respondent points to the subsequent nunc pro tunc order purporting to place appellant on two years of formal probation, a nunc pro tunc order is generally limited to correcting clerical errors and cannot declare that something was done that was not done.

The record indicates that at least some portion of the court’s order imposing mandatory supervision applied to the misdemeanor conviction. As mandatory supervision under section 1170(h)(5)(B) is only applicable to felony convictions, we must remand for resentencing.

Authority:

PEN 1170(h)

People v. Borja (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 481, 485

Johnson & Johnson v. Superior Court (1985) 38 Cal.3d 243, 256

Case 000669

Error and/or relief

The trial court erroneously stated that all of the aggravating factors had been found true by the jury. The only aggravating factor alleged, and found true by the jury was that the victims were particularly vulnerable. The sentence is reversed and the court is directed to consider the sentence in light of the only aggravating factor found true by the jury. Further, the court must consider the defendant’s ability to pay the restitution fines and ancillary fees.

First Holding:

In theory, the aggregate prejudice from several different errors occurring at trial could require reversal even if no single error was prejudicial by itself.

Authority:

In re Reno (2012) 55 Cal.4th 428, 483

Second Holding:

Section 1170(b)(2) states that when imposing a sentence under a statute that allows for a low, middle, and high term, the court shall impose the middle term unless there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term and the facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.

A Sixth Amendment violation occurs when the trial court relies on unproven aggravating facts to impose an upper term sentence, even if some other aggravating facts relied on have been properly established.

The violation is prejudicial unless an appellate court can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have found true all of the aggravating facts relied upon by the trial court to justify an upper term sentence, or that those facts were otherwise proved true in compliance with the current statutory requirements. If the reviewing court cannot so determine, applying the Chapman standard of review, the defendant is entitled to a remand for resentencing.

Authority:

People v. Lynch (2024)16 Cal.5th 730, 768

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18

Third Holding:

To the extent a potential aggravating circumstance at issue in a particular case rests on a somewhat vague or subjective standard, it may be difficult for a reviewing court to conclude with confidence that, had the issue been submitted to the jury, the jury would have assessed the facts in the same manner as did the trial court.

The determination of whether the crime involved sophistication and planning rests on a vague and subjective standard. Accordingly, we cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have found true the two remaining aggravating factors upon which the court relied to conclude the upper term was justified.

We therefore reverse the sentence and remand for the trial court to hold a new sentencing hearing during which it shall only consider aggravating factors that were found true by the jury as part of its analysis of whether to impose an upper term sentence.

Authority:

People v. Lynch (2024)16 Cal.5th 730, 775

Fourth Holding:

Where a trial court imposes fines exceeding the statutory minimum of $300 under section 1202.4(b), and section 1202.45, it must consider the defendant’s ability to pay. Before imposing ancillary costs pursuant to section 1465.8(a)(1) and Government Code section 70373, equal protection principles require the trial court to, on defendant’s request, consider a defendant’s inability to pay such costs.

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 30