Tag Archives: Sentencing

Juveniles, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 000987

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We affirm the juvenile court’s restitution order as modified to reduce the amount of restitution by $110.

First Holding:

In calculating restitution a court need not ascertain the exact amount of loss, and a restitution award based upon estimates and averages. A court retains broad discretion to estimate costs incurred by a party seeking restitution.

Authority:

Luis M. v. Superior Court (2014) 59 Cal.4th 300, 309-310

Second Holding:

A restitution order is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. The court’s factual findings supporting restitution are reviewed for substantial evidence and a restitution order that is based upon an error in law constitutes an abuse of discretion. A victim’s restitution right to restitution is to be construed broadly and liberally.

Authority:

In re J.L. (2026) 121 Cal.App.5th 355, 361

In re K.F. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 655, 661

Third Holding:

A juvenile court does not abuse its discretion if there is a factual and rational basis for the amount of restitution ordered. The court may use any rational method of fixing the amount of restitution, provided it is reasonably calculated to make the victim whole, and provided it is consistent with the purpose of rehabilitation.

There is no requirement the restitution order be limited to the exact amount of the loss in which the defendant is actually found culpable, nor is there any requirement the order reflect the amount of damages that might be recoverable in a civil action. Nonetheless, a juvenile court must use a rational method of calculation and must rely on facts found by a preponderance of the evidence to make the victim whole.

Authority:

In re J.L. (2026) 121 Cal.App.5th 355, 361

In re Alexander A. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 847, 853, 855-856

In re S.O. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1094, 1102

Fourth Holding:

Restitution hearings are intended to be informal, and Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.6 does not, by its terms, require any particular kind of proof. A prima facie showing of loss may be based on the victim’s testimony. Once the victim makes a prima facie showing of economic losses incurred as a result of the minor’s delinquent acts, the burden shifts to the minor to disprove the amount of the losses claimed by the victim.

Authority:

People v. Weatherton (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 676, 684

In re J.L. (2026) 121 Cal.App.5th 355, 362

In re S.O. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1094, 1102

People v. Millard (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 7, 26

Fifth Holding:

Conflicts and even testimony that is subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal of a judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the trier of fact to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination depends. The minor argues that the victim’s testimony was sometimes internally inconsistent; however, inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence go to credibility of witnesses and weight of the evidence, which are matters for the trial court.

Authority:

People v. Mumin (2023) 15 Cal.5th 176, 202

In re S.A. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1149

Amelioration, Elements of crime, Sentencing

Case 000986

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We reverse the denial of the defendant’s petition for recall under section 1172.6 at the prima facie stage, and remand for further proceedings because the record of conviction does not conclusively establish as a matter of law that defendant is ineligible for relief as required at the prima facie stage of section 1172.6.

First Holding:

Effective January 1, 2019, SB 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) was enacted to amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.

SB 1437 amended the natural and probable consequences doctrine by adding subdivision (a)(3) to section 188, which states that malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime. This language eliminated the use of the natural and probable consequences doctrine in second degree murder prosecutions.

SB 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) expanded the scope of those changes to encompass, among other things, murder convictions under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime.

Authority:

PEN 1172.6

People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 51

People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 846

People v. Langi (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 972, 978

Second Holding:

Section 1172.6 creates a petition process for an eligible defendant to seek to be resentenced. Section 1172.6(b) and (c) create the process for evaluating the petition. First, the trial court must determine whether the petition is facially sufficient under section 1172.6(b). If the petition is facially sufficient, the court must appoint counsel (if requested) and follow the briefing schedule set forth in the statute. Following the completion of this briefing, the trial court must hold a hearing to determine whether the petition has made a prima facie showing that the petitioner is entitled to relief.

Authority:

People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 960-962, 966

Third Holding:

While the trial court may look at the record of conviction after the appointment of counsel to determine whether a petitioner has made a prima facie case for section 1172.6 relief, the prima facie inquiry under subdivision (c) is limited. Like the analogous prima facie inquiry in habeas corpus proceedings, the court takes petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary assessment regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if his or her factual allegations were proved. If so, the court must issue an order to show cause.

A court should not reject the petitioner’s factual allegations on credibility grounds without first conducting an evidentiary hearing. However, if the record, including the court’s own documents, contains facts refuting the allegations made in the petition, then the court is justified in making a credibility determination adverse to the petitioner.

Stated another way, a petition for resentencing may be denied at the prima facie stage where the record of conviction, including items such as the jury instructions and associated findings, establishes a defendant’s ineligibility for relief as a matter of law.

Authority:

People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971

People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 459-461

Fourth Holding:

Defendant’s jury in 2013 was given the murder instruction under CALCRIM No. 520 and aider and abettor instructions under CALCRIM Nos. 400 and 401. The jury ultimately found defendant guilty of second degree murder.

Under these instructions, the perpetrator’s purpose need not have been to kill the victim; the aider and abettor’s knowledge of that purpose similarly need not have been knowledge that the perpetrator aimed to kill. If the perpetrator need not have had murderous intent, certainly the aider and abettor need not have had such an intent.

Although the definition of second degree murder in CALCRIM No. 520 states that the perpetrator must have acted with conscious disregard for human life, the definition of an aider and abettor in CALCRIM No. 401 does not include the same requirement. Thus, under the instructions that were given, the jury was entitled to conclude that, to be guilty as an aider and abettor of second degree murder, the defendant need only have intended to encourage the perpetrator’s intentional act—in this case, assaulting the victim—whether or not the defendant intended to aid or encourage the victim’s killing, and whether or not he personally knew of and disregarded the risk of such a killing.

This possible application of defendant’s instructions establishes a prima facie case for a section 1172.6 petition.

Authority:

People v. Langi (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 972, 984

Fifth Holding:

In reviewing any part of the record of conviction at this preliminary juncture, a trial court should not engage in factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion. The prima facie bar was intentionally and correctly set very low.

Authority:

People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 972

Sixth Holding:

The record of conviction therefore does not establish defendant is ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of law. In order to conclude defendant is ineligible for relief as a matter of law, we would have to weigh the evidence and find defendant to have been the actual killer, which would be impermissible at this stage. The trial court consequently erred by denying defendant’s section 1172.6 petition at the prima facie stage.

Authority:

People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1, 20

People v. Maldonado (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1257, 1269

Amelioration, Discretion, Elements of crime, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 000984

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

On resentencing under section 1172.75, the court erred in imposing the firearm enhancement on count 2.

First Holding:

In affirming the trial court’s decision to deny the defendant’s request for dismissal of the firearm enhancement attached to count 1, we review the trial court’s sentencing decision at a section 1172.75 resentencing for an abuse of discretion, including a court’s determination of dangerousness. Section 1172.75(d) vests the superior court with broad discretion based on an inherently factual inquiry.

Under an abuse of discretion standard, we ask whether the trial court’s findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, whether its rulings of law are correct, and whether its application of the law to the facts was neither arbitrary nor capricious.

A court also abuses its discretion if the decision is made without the sentencing court’s informed discretion or if the court is unaware of the scope of its discretionary powers.

The burden is on the party attacking the sentence to clearly show that the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary.

A defendant’s citation to a silent record is insufficient to meet his burden to demonstrate an abuse of discretion. We assume the trial court was aware of and followed applicable law.

Authority:

People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215, 225

People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 298

People v. Garcia (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 848, 856–857

People v. Fredrickson (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 984, 988

People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 376

People v. Coleman (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 709, 725

People v. Calhoun (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 117, 126 [a court’s sentencing decision implies requisite subsidiary findings]

Second Holding:

On count 2, the defendant had been convicted of section 246 (shooting at an occupied vehicle), enhanced under section 12022.53(d) for an additional 25 years to life. (In the prior appeal from the conviction, the appellate court struck the enhancements on count 2 under sections 12022.53(b) and (c), because section 246 is not one of the crimes listed in 12022.53(a) that subdivisions (b) and (c) can apply to.) At the 1172.75 resentencing hearing, the court imposed the lesser enhancement on count 2, under section 12022.53(c), for an enhancement of a determinate term of 20 years instead of the indeterminate 25 years to life he was serving under section 12022.53(d).

Because section 246 is not a crime listed under section 12022.53(a) to which subdivisions (b) and (c) can be applied, it was error to reduce the section 12022.53(d) enhancement to 12022.53(c).

While the trial court could dismiss the section 12022.53(d), firearm enhancement as to count 2, it could not impose a lesser enhancement under section 12022.53(c). We vacate the sentence as to count 2 and remand for resentencing as to that count only.

(Gary note: The court did not mention it as an option, but the trial court can dismiss the section 12022.53 (as the appellate court stated) and impose an enhancement on a lesser included enhancement, such as section 12022.5.

(Under People v. McDavid (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1015, the Supreme Court extended its holding of Tirado (which held that a court could exercise its discretion to impose a lesser section 12022.53 enhancement to the one that was found true) to expressly permit striking section 12022.53 and imposing a lesser included, uncharged enhancement authorized elsewhere in the Penal Code, outside section 12022.53. Under McDavid, the court in this case could strike the 12022.53(d) enhancement and impose an enhancement under section 12022.5, for example. In other words, the court is not faced with a choice of it’s either all or nothing.)

Authority:

PEN 12022.53(a)

People v. Tirado (2022) 12 Cal.5th 688, 699, fn. 12

(People v. McDavid (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1015)

Appellate Principles, Elements of crime, Sentencing

Case 000983

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The convictions on counts 1 and 2 (domestic violence and assault with a deadly weapon) are based on the same act of striking the victim with his vehicle and therefore he cannot be punished for both.

First Holding:

Under section 654(a), an act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one provision. That the purpose of section 654 is to insure that a defendant’s punishment will be commensurate with the defendant’s culpability.

Authority:

PEN 654

People v. Latimer (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1203, 1211

Second Holding:

A substantial evidence standard of review applies to the trial court’s determination of the applicability of section 654. We review the trial court’s factual findings, express or implicit, in the light most favorable to the respondent and presume the existence of every fact the trial court could reasonably deduce from the evidence.

Authority:

People v. Kurtenbach (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1289

People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 730

People v. Hutchins (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1312–1313

People v. Moseley (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1598, 1603

Third Holding:

When confronted with offenses within the purview of section 654, the proper procedure is to stay execution of sentence on all but one of the offenses subject to this section. A concurrent sentence simply does not satisfy the prohibition against double punishment. We will therefore modify the judgment ourselves to stay the sentence on count 2 in accordance with section 654.

Authority:

People v. Pena (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1294, 1312

People v. Bey (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 144, 167–168

People v. Alford (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1473 [exercising authority under sec. 1260 to modify judgment rather than remand as remedy for trial court’s failure to impose and stay sentence]

Elements of crime, Sentencing

Case 000982

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The defendant was convicted of both carjacking and kidnapping for the purpose of carjacking for the same incident. He argues that the carjacking conviction must be reversed because it is a lesser included offense. We agree and reverse the carjacking conviction.

First Holding:

Carjacking is a necessarily lesser included offense of kidnapping during a carjacking.

Authority:

People v. Montes (2014) 58 Cal.4th 809, 898

In re B.J. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 646, 652

Second Holding:

When a defendant is convicted of a greater and a lesser included offense, reversal of the conviction for the lesser included offense is required.

Authority:

People v. Dowdell (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1388, 1416

Abstracts and Minutes, Amelioration, Duty of the court, Sentencing

Case 000978

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

It was error for the court to impose the normal base term for several of his offenses in addition to the life terms under the Three Strikes law for those same offenses. The court failed to update the credit for time served. And the abstract of judgment misidentifies a second degree robbery as in the first degree, and must be corrected.

First Holding:

Where, as here, a defendant’s current sentence includes prison prior term enhancements rendered invalid under section 1172.75(a), the court shall recall the sentence and resentence the defendant. By its plain terms, section 1172.75 requires a full resentencing, not merely the striking of newly invalid enhancements.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75

People v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 402

Second Holding:

The Three Strikes law is a penalty provision, not an enhancement. It is not an enhancement because it does not add an additional term of imprisonment to the base term. Instead, it provides for an alternate sentence (25 years to life) when it is proven that the defendant has suffered the requisite number of convictions, prior and present. (At least two prior serious felony convictions, and the current offense being a qualifying offense for invocation of Third Strike sentencing.)

Authority:

People v. Williams (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 733, 744

Third Holding:

Defendants are entitled to sentencing decisions made in the exercise of the informed discretion of the sentencing court.

Authority:

People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391

Fourth Holding:

When a trial court pronounces an unauthorized sentence, the sentence may be set aside and is no bar to the imposition of a proper judgment thereafter, even though it is more severe than the original unauthorized pronouncement.

Authority:

People v. Vizcarra (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 422, 431–432

People v. Govan (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 1015, 1036, fn. 21

Fifth Holding:

The trial court erred in failing to update his presentence credits at the time of resentencing.

Authority:

PEN 2900.1

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 37

Sixth Holding:

The amended abstract of judgment incorrectly lists the defendant’s conviction in count 3 as one for first degree robbery, when in fact the conviction should be identified as one for second degree robbery. The abstract of judgment must be corrected.

(Gary note: Though the court discussed the need for amending the abstract of judgment for various reasons through the opinion, it did not cite authority for its order that it be corrected. There is plenty of authority available, of course. I have set out some cases the court could have drawn from, but there are undoubtedly many others.)

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1070

People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 855

In re Black (1967) 66 Cal.2d 881, 890

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2

Appellate Principles, Jurisdiction, Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing, Statutory interpretation

Case 000977

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The defendant appeals the no-contact and stay-away orders imposed by the trial court as part of his prison sentence and as a condition of his parole following his conviction for petty theft and making criminal threats.

The Attorney General argues the defendant forfeited this issue by failing to object to the orders in the trial court.

We disagree and strike the no-contact and stay-away orders because the trial court lacked authority to issue them and otherwise affirm the judgment.

First Holding:

Normally, only claims properly raised and preserved by the parties are reviewable on appeal. In the sentencing context, we have applied the rule to claims of error asserted by both the People and the defendant.

We have, however, created a narrow exception to the waiver rule for unauthorized sentences or sentences entered in excess of jurisdiction.

Authority:

People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354

People v. Smith (2001) 24 Cal.4th 849, 852

Second Holding:

A claim that a sentence is unauthorized may be raised for the first time on appeal, and is subject to judicial correction whenever the error comes to the attention of the reviewing court. A sentence is generally unauthorized where it could not lawfully be imposed under any circumstance in the particular case. Such error is clear and correctable independent of any factual issues presented by the record at sentencing.

Authority:

People v. Dotson (1997) 16 Cal.4th 547, 554, fn. 6

People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354

Third Holding:

The trial court did not have statutory authority to impose no-contact or stay-away orders in these circumstances. While there are statutory provisions that allow a trial court to impose no-contact and stay-away orders in other circumstances, for example, domestic violence cases, cases involving sexual assault of a minor, stalking cases, as a condition of probation, or during active criminal proceedings, there are no statutes specifically authorizing the trial court here to impose no-contact and stay-away orders as part of the defendant’s prison sentence or as a condition of his parole.

Authority:

PEN 1203.097

PEN 1202.05(a)

PEN 646.9(k)

PEN 1203.1(j)

PEN 136.2

Fourth Holding:

Ponce rejected the argument that that trial courts, independent of statutes, have inherent authority to protect trial participants, citing both California and federal cases. It held that even if the trial court had relied on inherent judicial authority to issue its order, the result would not change.

An existing body of statutory law regulates restraining orders. Inherent powers should never be exercised in such a manner as to nullify existing legislation. Where the Legislature authorizes a specific variety of available procedures, the courts should use them and should normally refrain from exercising their inherent powers to invent alternatives.

The trial court here should have refrained from acting because there is an existing body of statutory law regulating no-contact and stay-away orders.

Authority:

People v. Ponce (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 378, 383-384

Fifth Holding:

The Legislature has adopted specific statutory provisions authorizing parole boards to impose no-contact and stay-away orders as a condition of parole. Under this statutory scheme, the victims here can request the parole board to include no-contact and stay-away orders as a condition of the defendant’s parole.

Additionally, Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6(a) authorizes trial courts to issue orders to protect against any threats or harassment after notice and hearing.

Therefore, because the Legislature already authorizes available procedures for no-contact and stay-away orders for the victims in this case, the trial court was not authorized to impose them under its inherent authority.

Authority:

PEN 3053.2(a) [the parole board must impose a no-contact order as a condition of parole if requested by the victim]

PEN 3053(a) [the parole board may also impose on the parole any conditions that it may deem proper]

CCP 527.6(a)

Appellate Principles, Discretion, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 000975

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We vacate the defendant’s sentence and remand for resentencing because the trial court erroneously believed the law required it to impose consecutive sentences for every count.

First Holding:

Under section 667.61(i), consecutive sentences are mandatory only to offenses listed in section 667.61(c), paragraphs (1) through (7). The crime of which the jury found the defendant guilty is described in 667.61(c), paragraph (8).

Thus, consecutive sentencing was not mandatory.

Authority:

PEN 667.61(c)

Second Holding:

Defendants are entitled to sentencing decisions made in the exercise of the informed discretion of the sentencing court, and a court that is unaware of its discretionary authority cannot exercise its informed discretion.

When a sentencing court was not aware of the full scope of its discretionary powers at the time the defendant was sentenced, the appropriate remedy is to remand for resentencing unless the record clearly indicates that the trial court would have reached the same conclusion even if it had been aware that it had such discretion.

Authority:

People v. Belmontes (1983) 34 Cal.3d 335, 348, fn. 8

People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 419

Third Holding:

The Attorney General argues that the defendant forfeited his sentencing contention by failing to object below to the court’s error, and that the defendant cannot show his counsel was ineffective for failing to object because it was not reasonably likely the court would have imposed anything less than the 150-year sentence that it did.

We exercise our discretion to reach the question, notwithstanding forfeiture.

Authority:

People v. Leon (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1003 [the trial court’s erroneous understanding that it had no discretion to impose concurrent sentences may fall within a narrow class of sentencing issues that are reviewable in the absence of a timely objection, and in any event, we would exercise our discretion to resolve the claim in the interests of fairness and judicial economy and to forestall unnecessary ineffective assistance of counsel claims.]

People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 162, fn. 6 [An appellate court is generally not prohibited from reaching a question that has not been preserved for review by a party]

Fourth Holding:

The trial court’s repeated references to section 667.61(i)’s requirement that it impose consecutive sentences leaves no doubt that the court here did not know it retained the discretion to impose concurrent sentences per victim.

The court provided no other reason for imposing consecutive sentences, including no comment that the aggravating factor warranted a maximum sentence or any similar comment.

We therefore cannot conclude that the record clearly indicates the court would have imposed the same sentence if it had understood its full sentencing discretion. We accordingly remand the matter for resentencing.

Authority:

People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 419

Elements of crime, Sentencing, Standard of review, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence

Case 000974

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Punishment for the defendant’s conviction of the false imprisonment count must be stayed under section 654.

First Holding:

Section 654(a) provides that an act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one provision.

Section 654 does not prevent multiple convictions for the same conduct, only multiple punishments for a single, indivisible course of action. A defendant can be punished for multiple offenses where a course of conduct is divisible, giving rise to more than one act.

Authority:

People v. Perez (1979) 23 Cal.3d 545, 551

People v. Corpening (2016) 2 Cal.5th 307, 311

Second Holding:

To determine whether a course of conduct involving more than a single act is divisible for purposes of section 654, we consider whether the course of conduct included multiple intents and objectives.

If the defendant entertained multiple criminal objectives that were independent of and not merely incidental to each other, he may be punished for independent violations committed in pursuit of each objective even though the violations shared common acts or were parts of an otherwise indivisible course of conduct.

If all of the offenses were merely incidental to, or were the means of accomplishing or facilitating one objective, defendant may be found to have harbored a single intent and therefore may be punished only once.

Authority:

People v. Corpening (2016) 2 Cal.5th 307, 311

People v. Beamon (1973) 8 Cal.3d 625, 639

People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 335

Third Holding:

However, even if there is but a single objective for a course of conduct, a temporal break between individual acts may subject them to multiple punishments. This is particularly so where the offenses are temporally separated in such a way as to afford the defendant opportunity to reflect and to renew his or her intent before committing the next one, thereby aggravating the violation of public security or policy already undertaken.

In assessing whether section 654 applies, the court may consider a number of factors, including whether the defendant had multiple sequential intents, as well as whether he had the opportunity to pause and reflect before continuing his course of action.

Authority:

People v. Andra (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 638, 640

People v. Surdi (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 685, 689

Fourth Holding:

The question whether section 654 is factually applicable to a given series of offenses is for the trial court, and the law gives the trial court broad latitude in making this determination. Its findings on this question must be upheld on appeal if there is any substantial evidence to support them.

Thus, we review the record in the light most favorable to the judgment and uphold it if the record contains reasonable, credible evidence of solid value upon which a reasonable trier of fact could have relied in reaching the conclusion in question.

Ultimately, if the trier of fact determines the crimes have different intents and motives, multiple punishments are appropriate.

Authority:

People v. Hutchins (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1312

People v. Armstrong (2016) 1 Cal.5th 432, 450

People v. Saffle (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 434, 439

Fifth Holding:

We agree that defendant cannot be subjected to multiple punishments for the false imprisonment conviction and the second domestic violence conviction. In closing argument, the prosecutor clarified that defendant was charged with false imprisonment for grabbing the victim by her hair as she ran toward the door and pulling her back toward the stairs, where he committed an additional act of domestic violence.

The false imprisonment and second domestic violence offenses were both committed to facilitate one assaultive objective.

Authority:

People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 335

Sixth Holding:

As a result, the facts here are distinguishable from those in the cases relied upon by the Attorney General, where courts determined that section 654 did not require staying sentences for offenses committed after the other offense had already been completed.

Authority:

People v. Coleman (1989) 48 Cal.3d 112, 162-163 [the defendant had essentially completed the robbery before committing assault; court could reasonably conclude that the defendant committed the assault with the intent and objective of preventing the victim from sounding the alarm about the murder]

People v. Foster (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 20, 27 [false imprisonment not necessary or incidental to commission of robbery because the act of locking the victims in a store cooler occurred only after the robbers had obtained all the money]

Seventh Holding:

Therefore, we shall vacate the sentence and remand the matter for a full resentencing.

Authority:

People v. Mani (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 343, 379 [sec. 654 previously required court to impose sentence that provided for longest term of imprisonment, but now provides the trial court with discretion to impose sentence of either term]

People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893 [full resentencing as to all counts is appropriate to allow court to exercise its discretion in light of changed circumstances]

Sentencing

Case 000973

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court sentenced the defendant to 15 years to life for deliberate and premeditated attempted murder. This sentence was incorrect as a matter of law.

First Holding:

Willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder is punishable by life with the possibility of parole. A defendant convicted of attempted murder cannot be paroled until he has served at least seven years of his sentence.

We modify the judgment to reflect a sentence on count 1 of seven years to life.

Authority:

PEN 664(a)

PEN 3045(a)(1)

People v. Jefferson (1999) 21 Cal.4th 86, 96 [Section 3046 sets the minimum term for a defendant convicted of premeditated attempted murder]

Second Holding:

The defendant is entitled to an additional day of custody credit.

Authority:

People v. Smith (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 523, 527 [sec. 2900.5 requires court to award credits for all days in custody up to and including the day of sentencing]

Amelioration, Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case 000972

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The $300 restitution fine the court imposed at the defendant’s resentencing must be vacated pursuant to section 1465.9(d), because more than 10 years have elapsed since the trial court imposed the original fine in 1996.

First Holding:

Effective January 1, 2025, AB 1186 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.) amended section 1465.9 to add subdivision (d), which provides that, upon the expiration of 10 years after the date of imposition of a restitution fine pursuant to section 1202.4, the balance, including any collection fees, shall be unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a judgment imposing those fines shall be vacated.

Authority:

PEN 1465.9(d)

Second Holding:

The restitution fine must be vacated because more than 10 years have elapsed since the original imposition of the fine, and reimposition of the fine in a different amount at a section 1172.75 resentencing does not restart section 1465.9(d)’s 10-year clock.

Authority:

People v. Salstrom (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 596, 600–601 [under language of sec. 1465.9(d), resentencing does not restart the 10-year clock], review granted on different issue on Mar. 11, 2026, S295038

Amelioration, Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case 000971

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The restitution fines imposed more than 10 years prior to the resentencing hearing under section 1172.75 must be vacated.

Holding:

Effective January 1, 2025, section 1465.9 was amended to add subdivision (d), which provides that, upon the expiration of 10 years after the date of imposition of a restitution fine pursuant to section 1202.4, the balance, including any collection fees, shall be unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a judgment imposing those fines shall be vacated.

Authority:

PEN 1465.9