Tag Archives: Sentencing

Equal protection, Sentencing

Case 000597

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

For a crime committed when he was under age 18 and for which he was tried as an adult and sentenced to 46 years to life, the defendant filed a petition under section 1170(d) to recall his sentence and be resentenced, claiming he was sentenced to the functional equivalent of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP). The trial court denied the petition, concluding that the sentence was not the functional equivalent of LWOP. Reversed.

First Holding:

The issue regarding what sentences constitute the functional equivalent of LWOP is one the Supreme Court is set to resolve in Munoz.

Authority:

People v. Munoz (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 499, review granted June 25, 2025, S290828

Second Holding:

Defendant maintained he was eligible for resentencing even though he was not given an LWOP sentence because he was serving a sentence that was the functional equivalent of LWOP and treating him as if he were ineligible for resentencing would accordingly violate equal protection principles. We agree with Heard and other precedent that holds defendants who are serving the functional equivalent of LWOP, not just those serving an actual LWOP sentence, must be eligible for section 1170(d) relief pursuant to equal protection guarantees—and the availability of a youthful offender parole hearing does not undercut this conclusion.

Authority:

People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608, 628-629

People v. Contreras (2018) 4 Cal.5th 349

People v. Sorto (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 435, 440

Abstracts and Minutes, Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case 000596

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

On resentencing under section 1172.75, the court ordered that the original fines and fees imposed nearly 30 years earlier would remain the same. They are ordered stricken.

First Holding:

Effective January 1, 2025, section 1465.9 was amended to provide that, upon the expiration of 10 years after the date of imposition of a restitution fine pursuant to section 1202.4, the balance, including any collection fees, shall be unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a judgment imposing those fines shall be vacated. Accordingly, the portion of the judgment imposing the restitution fine is vacated.

Authority:

PEN 1465.9

Second Holding:

The $70 fee imposed for AIDS education must be vacated. The original sentencing court imposed this fee pursuant to section 264(b), which states in relevant part: The judge may assess a fine not to exceed $70 against a person who violates Section 261 or former Section 262 with the proceeds of this fine to be used in accordance with section 1463.23. Section 1463.23, however, was repealed effective January 1, 2018. The provision authorizing the AIDS education fee (sec. 264, subd. (b)) was impliedly repealed in 2018, when the referenced statute (sec. 1463.23) was actually repealed, since it is no longer possible for the proceeds of this fine to be used in accordance with section 1463.23. Accordingly, the AIDS education fee is vacated.

Authority:

Repeal of PEN 1463.23

Third Holding:

The abstract of judgment filed in 2024 does not reflect the restitution fine or the AIDS education fee. We further note that the sentencing minute order similarly does not refer to any fines and fees imposed. Nevertheless, it is well established that where there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of judgment and the minute order or the abstract of judgment, the oral pronouncement controls. Accordingly, the clerk of the superior court is ordered to prepare an amended abstract of judgment and an amended sentencing minute order reflecting that the previously imposed restitution fine and AIDS education fee are vacated.

Authority:

People v. Clark (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 248, 260–261

Jurisdiction, Sentencing

Case 000594

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

[Gary note: This was NOT a win for the defense, but I include it because it contains a valuable point.] If an inmate is NOT CURRENTLY serving a sentence that has been enhanced by a now-invalid prior prison term conviction, that inmate is NOT ELIGIBLE for resentencing under section 1172.75. Thus, the appellate court reversed the resentencing order of the trial court that dismissed the now-invalid prior, because the defendant was no longer serving a sentence enhanced by it at the time of resentencing.

Holding:

By 2006 at the latest, the defendant had completed his original sentence that was enhanced by a single prior prison term in 1996. However, the defendant committed several new felonies while incarcerated, and was still serving those sentences when he filed his petition for recall of his original sentence in 2023. The superior court struck the original prior prison term enhancement in 2025.

But the defendant was no longer serving a sentence on that judgment. New crimes committed while in prison are treated as separate offenses and begin a new aggregate term. Section 1172.75 requires two things in addition to the judgment including an invalid section 667.5(b) enhancement: (1) that the defendant be in custody and (2) be currently serving a term on the judgment containing the invalid enhancement. Where a defendant remains in prison, the current judgment is the operative judgment pursuant to which they are incarcerated. Because the defendant was no longer in custody on the offense bearing the now-invalid enhancement, the court had no jurisdiction to dismiss it. We therefore reverse the judgment entered following the 2025 resentencing. The 1996 judgment is reinstated.

Authority:

People v. Langston (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1237, 1242

People v. Washington (2026) 117 Cal.App.5th 1057, 1065-1066

People v. Escobedo (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 440, 447

People v. Amaya (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 379, 386–387 [the trial court’s resentencing was void on the face of the record because the court granted relief that it had no power to grant]

Young v. Tri-City Healthcare Dist. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 35, 53 [when, as here, there is an appeal from a void judgment, the reviewing court’s jurisdiction is limited to reversing the trial court’s void acts]

Sentencing

Case 000592

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court erred in treating three prior serious felonies separately though they were not brought and tried separately. Remanded for full resentencing.

First Holding:

Section 667(a) provides for a separate five-year sentence enhancement for every prior serious felony conviction on charges brought and tried separately. Where multiple charges were not brought separately, but were made in a single complaint, the court can only impose a single five-year enhancement for the multiple charges. The question whether prior convictions were brought and tried separately is for the court to decide, not the jury.

Authority:

In re Harris (1989) 49 Cal.3d 131, 136-137

People v. Jones (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1411, 1415-1416

Second Holding:

Given that the court rested its sentencing decisions on a mistaken understanding of the law, defendant is entitled to a full resentencing.

Authority:

People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893 [when part of a sentence is stricken on review, on remand for resentencing a full resentencing as to all counts is appropriate, so the trial court can exercise its sentencing discretion in light of the changed circumstances]

Amelioration, Retroactivity, Sentencing, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence

Case 000591

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The court erred in finding true the defendant’s two prior strikes. The true findings on appellant’s prior strike conviction allegations are reversed, and the matter is remanded to the trial court. Upon remand, the court is directed to give the People the opportunity to retry the strike allegations.

First Holding:

In 2022, AB 333 went into effect and made changes to the law on gang enhancements, including narrowing the definitions of a criminal street gang, and pattern of criminal activity.

Authority:

People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206

Second Holding:

The defendant’s 2014 prior felony conviction was a strike because it included a gang enhancement under the then-version of section 186.22. Where a defendant has suffered a conviction under the prior version of section 186.22, AB 333 applies to the determination of whether the conviction qualifies as a prior serious felony conviction under section 1192.7(c)(28) for purposes of the Three Strikes law and prior serious felony enhancements. The current law applicable to a nonfinal proceeding includes AB 333’s redefinition of the elements of gang offenses and enhancements under section 186.22.

Authority:

People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576, 583

In re Estrada [(1965) 63 Cal.2d 740

People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169

Third Holding:

There was insufficient evidence for the court to find that the defendant’s 2010 conviction for grossly negligent discharge of a firearm qualified as a strike prior, because no evidence was presented that the defendant personally used the firearm. It is possible to be convicted of grossly negligent discharge of a firearm under section 246.3 without personally using a firearm, e.g., as an aider and abettor. The People in this case presented evidence only of appellant’s conviction, and not any information regarding the conviction’s underlying facts.

Thus, the People proved nothing more than the least adjudicated elements of the prior conviction. Because there was no admission or evidence that appellant personally used a firearm, which would qualify his prior section 246.3 conviction as a serious felony pursuant to section 1192.7(c) the trial court’s true finding was in error. The remedy in such a case is remand for retrial at the prosecution’s election.

Authority:

People v. Golde (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 101, 112-113

People v. Rodriguez (1998) 17 Cal.4th 253, 262

People v. Barragan (2004) 32 Cal.4th 236, 239

Amelioration, Elements of crime, Sentencing, Standard of review, Vicarious liability

Case 000590

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court erred in summarily denying the defendant’s Penal Code section 1172.6 petition for resentencing at the prima facie stage.

First Holding:

Effective January 2019, the Legislature amended the law to eliminate liability for murder based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine or theories of imputed malice predicated solely on one’s participation in a crime. As relevant here, section 1172.6 applies to those who pled guilty to manslaughter after being charged with murder and who would have been subject to prosecution for murder under a felony-murder theory, the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or any other theory of imputed malice.

Authority:

PEN 1172.6

People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959

People v. Gaillard (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1206, 121

Second Holding:

A trial court considering a section 1172.6 petition must first determine whether the petitioner made a prima facie showing he or she could not presently be convicted under the amended laws. In doing so, the court accepts the petitioner’s factual allegations as true. The court may deny the petition at the prima facie stage only if the record of conviction—which includes facts admitted in a guilty plea—conclusively establishes that the petitioner is ineligible for relief as a matter of law.

Here, as the People concede, the record did not foreclose the possibility that the defendant was convicted under the invalid natural and probable consequences theory. His admissions and factual basis for the guilty plea were generic and did not establish the specific theory of aiding and abetting under which the defendant admitted guilt. Accordingly, they do not establish that he is ineligible for section 1172.6 relief as a matter of law. He pled that he aided and abetted a murder, but the natural and probable consequences doctrine is one theory of aiding and abetting.

Authority:

People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971

People v. Gaillard (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1206, 1211. 1212

Third Holding:

We review de novo the trial court’s resentencing denial at the prima facie stage.

Authority:

People v. Gaillard (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1206, 1211

Duty of the court, Jury instructions, Sentencing, Sixth Amendment, Standard of review

Case 000589

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We affirm the judgment of conviction, but vacate the defendant’s sentence and remand for a new trial on the aggravating factors because it was prejudicial error for the court to impose an upper term sentence based on uninstructed and unproven aggravating factors.

First Holding:

The Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial and the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of due process entitle a criminal defendant to a jury determination that the defendant is guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt. Where enumerated aggravating factors operate as the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense, the Sixth Amendment requires that they be found by a jury.

Authority:

Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 476-477

Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, 609

Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270, 288-289 [under Apprendi, aggravating circumstances supporting upper term sentence must be found by a jury]

Second Holding:

The trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on the essential elements of the charged offense. It is, indeed, very serious constitutional error because it threatens the right to a jury trial that both the United States and California Constitutions guarantee. It is well settled that no objection is required to preserve a claim for appellate review that the jury instructions omitted an essential element of the charge.

Authority:

People v. Merritt (2017) 2 Cal.5th 819, 824

Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 477

People v. Mil (2012) 53 Cal.4th 400, 409 [trial court erred by omitting essential elements of a special circumstance allegation]

Third Holding:

We review constitutional claims and claims of instructional error de novo. We must consider the claim of instructional error in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record. An instructional error that improperly describes or omits an element of an offense generally is not a structural defect in the trial mechanism that defies harmless error review and automatically requires reversal under the federal Constitution, unless the instructional error or omission amounts to the total deprivation of a jury trial.

Rather, where the trial court fails to instruct on necessary elements, generally this error is subject to harmless-error analysis under the test of Chapman, that is, whether it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained. Overwhelming evidence, other properly given jury instructions, or a defendant’s concession of elements for which an instruction was omitted may render an error harmless.

Authority:

People v. Rivera (2019) 7 Cal.5th 306, 326 [instructional error]

In re Taylor (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1019, 1035 [constitutional claims]

People v. Salazar (2016) 63 Cal.4th 214, 248 [The correctness of jury instructions is to be determined from the entire charge of the court]

People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 502-503

People v. Merritt (2017) 2 Cal.5th 819, 830

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18

Neder v. U.S. (1999) 527 U.S. 1, 15

People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 689, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22

Fourth Holding:

Forfeiture does not bar the defendant’s claim because the trial court had a sua sponte duty to instruct on all essential elements of the charge. Further, the failure to instruct the jury on all essential elements is not a matter of discretion but raises a legal claim under the federal constitution subject to de novo review.

Authority:

People v. Mil (2012) 53 Cal.4th 400, 409

People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, 46 [a defendant’s failure to object does not preclude his asserting on appeal that he was denied his constitutional right to a jury trial]

People v. Saunders (1993) 5 Cal.4th 580, 589, fn. 5

People v. Serrano (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 902, 908-909

People v. Lua (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1004, 1013

Fifth Holding:

The trial court failed to instruct properly on essential elements of the aggravating factor under rule 4.421(a)(1) that, to find the aggravating factor true, it must determine that the defendant’s conduct was distinctively worse than what was necessary to commit the crime, an element necessary to a true finding under the rule. The jury instructions omitted any definition of cruelty, viciousness, or callousness within the meaning of rule 4.421(a)(1).

This element of the aggravating factor may not be necessary in every case because “great bodily injury” alone may satisfy the requirements of rule 4.421(a)(1). But here, the defendant was also subject to a sentencing enhancement for inflicting great bodily injury under section 12022.7(a), and the trial court could not aggravate the defendant’s sentence on the same factual basis under section 1170(b)(5).

Authority:

People v. Sengpadychith (2001) 26 Cal.4th 316, 320

People v. Harvey (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 90, 116-117 [In imposing the upper term . under rule 421(a)(1) [now rule 4.421(a)(1)] the factfinder must convince itself that, when compared to other ways in which such a crime could be committed, the manner of this crime’s commission indicated viciousness and callousness]

People v. Webber (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1146, 1169

People v. Nevill (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 198, 206

People v. Gutierrez (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1729, 1735 [aggravating factor satisfied by finding of “great bodily injury”]

People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 350 [a court generally cannot use a single fact both to aggravate the base term and to impose an enhancement]

People v. Castaneda (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 611, 614-615

People v. Hill (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1566, 1575

People v. La Fargue (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 878, 898

Sixth Holding:

It is the court’s duty to see to it that the jury are adequately informed on the law governing all elements of the case submitted to them to an extent necessary to enable them to perform their function in conformity with the applicable law. Accordingly, the trial court erred by omitting jury instructions on necessary elements of the aggravating factor allegation.

Authority:

People v. Sanchez (1950) 35 Cal.2d 522, 528

Seventh Holding:

In addition, the court imposed an upper term sentence based on untried aggravating facts, discussing aspects purportedly related to public safety. An upper term sentence may be imposed only when circumstances in aggravation justify that term, and only when the facts underlying those justifying circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or found true beyond a reasonable doubt at a jury or court trial.

Here, the court erred by imposing an upper term sentence based on facts not found by the jury or stipulated to by the defendant, including that the defendant used a knife, that the assault occurred in a busy public area, and that his conduct endangered public safety. It was error for the court to consider these additional uncharged and unproven aggravating circumstances to impose an upper term sentence. We are unable to determine with a requisite degree of confidence that a jury would have found those facts to be factors in aggravation. We thus reverse the sentence and remand for resentencing.

Authority:

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 759

People v. Whitten (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1761, 1767 [examination of aggravating factors necessarily involves subjective determinations based upon objectively demonstrated facts]

Fines and fees, Retroactivity, Sentencing

Case 000587

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

On appeal from a hearing under section 1172.75, the appellate court struck the balance of the restitution fine as it was ordered more than 10 years prior to the resentencing.

First Holding:

Effective January 1, 2025, section 1465.9 was amended and now provides that, upon the expiration of 10 years after the date of imposition of a restitution fine pursuant to section 1202.4, the balance, including any collection fees, shall be unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a judgment imposing those fines shall be vacated.

Authority:

PEN 1465.9(d)

Second Holding:

Respondent asserts the trial court did not impose the restitution fine nor parole revocation fine at the time of resentencing and therefore it must be stricken for that reason. Generally, respondent is correct.

Authority:

People v. Tillman (2000) 22 Cal.4th 300, 303

People v. Frederickson (2020) 8 Cal.5th 963, 1027 [striking a restitution fine from the record and the abstract of judgment where the court failed to orally impose the fine during the sentencing hearing]

People v. Nilsson (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1, 34 [resentencing necessarily requires a court to impose a new sentence, including any fines, fees, and assessments]

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185 [the oral pronouncement of judgment controls]

Third Holding:

In this instance, however, the trial court merely reaffirmed the original judgment with the exception of striking the now-invalid prior prison term enhancement. The judgment following the resentencing is not yet final, we conclude appellant is entitled to have the restitution fine stricken. As appellant’s restitution fine was first imposed more than 10 years ago, it is now unenforceable and uncollectible under section 1465.9(d).

Authority:

PEN 1465.9(d)

People v. Salstrom (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 596, 601, review granted on another issue Mar. 11, 2026, S295038

In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 744–745 [absent evidence to the contrary, we presume ameliorative criminal statutes apply retroactively to all nonfinal judgments]

Fourth Holding:

Section 1465.9(d) does not apply to the parole revocation restitution fine under section 1202.45. In Kopp, the court vacated any unpaid portion of the defendant’s restitution fine under section 1465.9(d), but nonetheless remanded the matter because a parole revocation fine is still required and was to be set in the same amount as the restitution fine would have been had the court properly considered the defendant’s ability to pay and stayed.

Further, section 1465.9 makes no mention of the parole revocation restitution fine under section 1202.45. We are not to insert a term that was not included in a statute or omit a term that has been included. Although a parole revocation fine is closely related to a restitution fine in that they must be imposed at the same time and in the same amounts, a parole revocation fine serves a different purpose, i.e., to deter a prisoner from violating parole, to incentivize a prisoner’s rehabilitation while on parole, and to recoup costs if parole is violated. That purpose is still relevant where, as here, an inmate might one day be paroled. No principle or authority supports vacating the parole revocation fine.

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 12, 24, 30

People v. Massicot (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 920, 925

People v. Preston (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 415, 427, 429

Fifth Holding:

It was unnecessary for the trial court to recalculate the defendant’s credit for time served. The sentence from which this appeal was taken has not yet begun to be served, because it was ordered to run consecutive to the one he is currently serving from another county. Under other circumstances, a court may be required to calculate custody credits on a sentence imposed by another county. The present case presents does not present such a circumstance.

Authority:

People v. Phoenix (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1126 [in a determinate sentence case, sentencing court’s imposition of a consecutive sentence replaced another county’s sentence; the second county became the sentencing court]

Amelioration, Discretion, Duty of the court, Sentencing

Case 000585

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

On resentencing the defendant under section 1172.75, the trial court declined to consider dismissing a firearm enhancement, citing its desire not to get involved in changing the sentence of the original sentencing court and not to usurp the role of the parole board in assessing when defendant was ready for release. Because these rationales reflect an abdication of the court’s duty to exercise its sentencing discretion, we must reverse and remand for the court to exercise that discretion at a new, full resentencing.

First Holding:

The failure to exercise discretion is an abuse of discretion.

Authority:

People v. Bigelow (1984) 37 Cal.3d 731, 744

Dickson Carlson & Campillo v. Pole (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 436, 449

Second Holding:

Where, as here, a defendant was originally sentenced for a prior prison term enhancement that arose from a conviction that was not a sexually violent offense, that defendant is entitled to a full resentencing where that enhancement is to be stricken and where the trial court is to apply any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.

Authority:

People v. Superior Court (Guevara) (2025) 18 Cal.5th 838, 875

Third Holding:

The law regarding the 25 years-to-life firearm enhancement has changed since defendant’s original sentencing hearing in 2004: At that time, a trial court did not have discretion to dismiss that enhancement; since January 1, 2018, trial courts have had the power to dismiss firearm enhancements under section 12022.53 entirely or to substitute a lesser firearm enhancement in their place.

Authority:

PEN 12022.53

People v. Tirado (2022) 12 Cal.5th 688, 695-696

Fourth Holding:

Although we review a trial court’s discretionary sentencing decisions for an abuse of discretion a trial court abuses its discretion when it refuses to exercise that discretion. That is what happened here: What was supposed to be a full resentencing was merely a reaffirmation of a prior sentence and an abdication of discretionary decision-making to others whom the trial court believed were (or had been) better suited to the task. Section 1172.75 requires trial courts to get involved where, as here, the governing law has changed in a way that makes a lower sentence a possibility. What is more, section 1172.75 also enables a trial court to consider postconviction factors, which would be given no weight were a trial court to defer to the original sentence entered before any postconviction conduct comes to pass.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75

People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 374

People v. Bigelow (1984) 37 Cal.3d 731, 744

People v. Rogers (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 340, 361

Fifth Holding:

The presumption of regularity is rebutted when a trial court affirmatively indicates that it is not following the law.

Authority:

People v. Carter (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 322, 324

People v. Panozo (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 825, 839 [where the record is not silent, but rather is ‘at the very least ambiguous as to whether the court understood its statutory obligation, remand is appropriate]

Sixth Holding:

Upon remand, the court is to conduct the full resentencing mandated by section 1172.75. At that time, the court should calculate defendant’s actual custody credits from the date of arrest through the date of resentencing.

Authority:

PEN 2900.1

PEN 2900.5

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 29 [defendant entitled to all actual custody days since arrest, including date of resentencing]

Abstracts and Minutes, Amelioration, Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case 000584

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

On resentencing under section 1172.75, the restitution fine should not have been reimposed. The abstract of judgment reflects a parole revocation restitution fine that was not imposed. We will modify the judgment to vacate the restitution fine and direct that the trial court prepare an amended abstract of judgment removing the restitution fine and parole revocation restitution fine.

First Holding:

On resentencing, the court reimposed the original $5000 restitution fine, over the defendant’s objection that he had already paid it. Effective January 1, 2025, section 1465.9(d) provides that upon the expiration of 10 years after the date of imposition of a restitution fine pursuant to Section 1202.4, the balance, including any collection fees, shall be unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a judgment imposing those fines shall be vacated. Here, the trial court reimposed defendant’s original fines, including a $5,000 restitution fine, 30 years after they were originally imposed. Therefore, any unpaid portion remaining on the $5,000 restitution fine must be vacated. The defendant advised the trial court that he had paid it in full, but regardless, any order regarding any remaining unpaid balance shall be vacated.

Authority:

PEN 1465.9(d)

People v. Salstrom (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 596, 600-601, review granted Mar. 11, 2026, S295038 on another point

Second Holding:

The abstract of judgment lists a parole revocation fine of $5,000, but it was not ordered by the court. The abstract must be corrected accordingly.

[GARY note: The court cited no authority for its directive that the abstract of judgment be corrected. Likely because the error and cure seem so obvious. But there is plenty of authority for the court’s order, and I have set out some below.]

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1070

People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 855

In re Black (1967) 66 Cal.2d 881, 890

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2

Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case 000582

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The matter is reversed and remanded for the limited purpose of allowing the trial court, in accordance with this opinion and Kopp, to determine whether the defendant has the ability to pay the various fines, fees, and assessments it previously imposed.

Holding:

While this case was on appeal, the Kopp court concluded that a trial court must conduct an ability-to-pay hearing before imposing a (1) restitution fine above the statutory minimum of $300; or ancillary fees. The Supreme Court also found that, if requested by the defendant, the court must consider the defendant’s inability to pay before imposing a court operations assessment (sec. 1465(a)(1)) or a court facilities assessment (Gov. Code, sec. 70373(a)(1)), allowing the parties on remand to present any relevant evidence or argument on the matter. On remand the defendant shall be afforded the opportunity to assert legal analyses applicable to such a challenge under the excessive fines clauses and argue how the particular facts of this case inform such an inquiry.

Authority:

U.S. Const., 8th Amend.

Cal. Const., art. I, sec. 17

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 23, 31

Second Holding:

Inability to pay may be considered only in increasing the amount of the restitution fine in excess of the minimum fine pursuant to section 1202.4(c).

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 30

Due process, Equal protection, Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case 000580

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Judgment is reversed and remanded for the court to consider the fines and fees imposed with regard to ability to pay and under the excessive fines doctrine.

First Holding:

In Kopp, the Supreme Court addressed how court-ordered payments should be analyzed when a defendant claims inability to pay. There are three categories: fines, ancillary costs, and victim restitution. “Fines” refers to penalties inflicted by the sovereign for commission of offenses. I.e., “fine” refers to a legislatively provided punishment following a criminal conviction.

By contrast, “ancillary costs” refers to payments that are generally not intended to punish for the commission of a crime but instead are funding mechanisms, created by the Legislature to reimburse a government agencies for expenditures or to otherwise fund a broad assortment of services. “Restitution” refers to payments made to compensate crime victims for economic loss caused by an offense.

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 9, 11-12

Second Holding:

Restitution fines under section 1202.4 constitute punishment and therefore fines rather than true restitution and that parole revocation restitution fines under section 1202.45—which are in the same amount as restitution fines—are likewise punitive and therefore fines. Such fines do not need to be structured to reflect each person’s ability and avoid disproportionate burdens. Accordingly, due process does not require courts to consider the ability of defendants to pay fines before imposing them. Instead, excessive fines analysis, which considers ability to pay, is the proper vehicle to challenge punitive fines.

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 13-14, 22-23

Bearden v. Georgia (1983) 461 U.S. 660, 666, fn. 8

San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez (1973) 411 U.S. 1, 22

Third Holding:

Ancillary costs or assessments should be imposed on criminal defendants only if they have the ability to pay the costs, on equal protection grounds. Kopp noted that the Legislature has enacted a robust fee waiver system in civil cases. In addition, because both the civil operations and facilities assessments imposed on the defendant in Kopp were enacted to raise money for the courts and were ultimately deposited into the same fund, the Supreme Court concluded that there appears no rational basis to deny only indigent criminal defendants the ability to avoid those costs.

Accordingly, the court in Kopp directed the trial court on remand to consider the defendant’s ability to pay before imposing a court operations assessment under section 1465.8 or a court facilities assessment under Government Code section 70373.

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 24-30