Tag Archives: Sentencing

Amelioration, Sentencing, Vicarious liability

Case 000644

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court denied the defendant’s petition for recall of sentence under section 1172.6 without an evidentiary hearing, concluding that the transcript of trhe preliminary examination showed that he was prosecuted as the direct perpetrator. Defendant contends the record of conviction does not conclusively foreclose relief. Alternatively, he requests a conditional reversal that would allow him to dispute hearsay statements testified to at the preliminary hearing. We will therefore remand the matter and direct the trial court to consider such an amended petition, should defendant elect to file one.

First Holding:

In 2018, the Legislature enacted SB 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.), which amended sections 188 and 189 to eliminate several theories of liability based on imputed malice in homicide cases. The Legislature has also offered relief to those convicted under certain homicide theories, such as murder or attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, whose convictions are now tainted.

As relevant here, a defendant convicted of manslaughter may petition to have that conviction vacated if (a) the pleading allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder, murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime, or attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine; (b) the petitioner accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which the petitioner could have been convicted of murder or attempted murder; and (c) the petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of changes to section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.

An order to show cause must issue if a petitioner makes a prima facie case for relief. At an evidentiary hearing on the order to show cause, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty under current law.

Authority:

People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971

People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 565, 568

Second Holding:

Some cases may be so straightforward as to prompt a concession of a prima facie showing and if the record contains any indication the petitioner had an accomplice who may have been the killer, a prima facie case ordinarily would be readily established, even by conclusory assertions in a form petition.

Authority:

People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 560, fn. 4

Third Holding:

Section 1172.6(d)(3) expressly provides that hearsay evidence that was admitted in a preliminary hearing pursuant to section 872(b) shall be excluded from the resentencing evidentiary hearing as hearsay, unless the evidence is admissible pursuant to another exception to the hearsay rule. [Section 872(b), applicable to preliminary examinations, provides that the finding of probable cause to hold the defendant to answer in superior court on the felony may be based in whole or in part upon the sworn testimony of a qualified law enforcement officer relating the statements of declarants made out of court offered for the truth of the matter asserted.]

Thus, at an evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6(d)(3), the officer’s statements would be excluded unless admissible under an Evidence Code exception to the hearsay rule. One appellate court has held that it was not error to deny a section 1172.6 petition at the prima facie stage based in part on hearsay testimony given by police officers at the preliminary hearing.

Authority:

People v. Rodriguez (2026) 117 Cal.App.5th 1179, 1185

Fourth Holding:

In light of Patton, the defendant should be provided an opportunity to argue the factual landscape of the preliminary hearing and be provided the opportunity to present testimony or other evidence to show he was not the actual killer. The trial court should also have the opportunity to consider any additional facts pled by defendant in support of a prima facie case for relief under section 1172.6.

Authority:

People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 565, 569-570

Abstracts and Minutes, Amelioration, Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case 000643

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The defendant was resentenced under section 1172.75. The restitution fine must be vacated, as it is more than 10 years old. The abstract of judgment must be corrected to reflect the oral pronouncement of judgment accurately.

First Holding:

Effective January 1, 2025, the Legislature amended section 1465.9 to add subdivision (d), which states: “Upon the expiration of 10 years after the date of imposition of a restitution fine pursuant to Section 1202.4, the balance, including any collection fees, shall be unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a judgment imposing those fines shall be vacated.” The fine in this case appears to have been imposed at the original sentencing in 1994, and must be vacated.

Authority:

PEN 1469.5

Second Holding:

Though the abstract of judgment from 1994 does not reflect whether the trial court imposed the mandatory minimum restitution fine under section 1202.4(b), we presume, as the People argue, the court did. Thus, the superior court’s order imposing the restitution fine at the defendant’s resentencing in 2024 essentially reimposed the fine imposed in 1994, which section 1465.9 has now made unenforceable and uncollectible. We construe the superior court’s order as simply reimposing the original restitution fine, and the 10-year clock did not start anew.

Authority:

EVID 664 [It is presumed that official duty has been regularly performed]

People v. Ramirez (2021) 10 Cal.5th 983, 1042 [we presume that the trial court knew the law and followed it in imposing a restitution fine under section 1202.4]

People v. Stowell (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1107, 1114 [a trial court is presumed to have been aware of and followed the applicable law]

People v. Salstrom (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 596, review granted on another point, March 11, 2026, S295038

Third Holding:

After imposing the $300 restitution fine, the superior court stated: “$300 parole revocation fine, that is stayed pending successful—Well, I am going to strike that. There is no parole that’s going to be granted in this case.” As noted, the minute order and abstract of judgment indicate the court (1) imposed and stayed execution of a parole revocation fine under section 1202.45 and (2) imposed and struck “all financial obligations, excluding any actual victim restitution.” The reporter’s transcript of the resentencing hearing does not state the court made these rulings. The superior court must correct the minute order and abstract of judgment to reflect the oral pronouncement of judgment.

Authority:

People v. Burke (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 237, 244 [Ordinarily, where there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of judgment and the abstract of judgment, the oral pronouncement controls]

People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2 [The record of the oral pronouncement of the court controls over the clerk’s minute order]

People v. Portillo (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 577, 603 [the oral pronouncement of sentence controls over a subsequently entered minute order]

Fourth Holding:

Courts may correct clerical errors at any time, and appellate courts . . . have ordered correction of abstracts of judgment that did not accurately reflect the oral judgments of sentencing courts.

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1, 89

People v. Garcia (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 848, 859

People v. Gobert (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 676, 689 [we must correct the discrepancy by ordering the trial court to modify the minute order]

Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case 000642

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

On resentencing under section 1172.75, the trial court erred by awarding fewer presentence conduct credits than ordered at the original sentencing, and the restitution fine must be vacated as it is now more than 10 years old.

First Holding:

Erroneous computation of presentence credits are subject to correction by the trial court or the appellate court when presented.

Authority:

People v. Guillen (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 756, 764

Second Holding:

The restitution fine was imposed at the time of the original sentencing in 1995. Section 1465.9(d) now provides that, upon the expiration of 10 years after the date of imposition of a restitution fine pursuant to section 1202.4, the balance, including any collection fees, shall be unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a judgment imposing those fines shall be vacated,

Authority:

PEN 1465.9(d)

Discretion, Sentencing, Sixth Amendment, Standard of review

Case 000641

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial improperly relied on factors in aggravation that were not submitted to the jury for proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

First Holding:

In general, we review a trial court’s sentencing decisions for abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion is found where the court relies upon circumstances that are not relevant to the decision or that otherwise constitute an improper basis for decision.

Authority:

People v. Gonzalez (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 312, 323

Second Holding:

In 2022, section 1170(b) was amended to prohibit imposition of an upper term sentence unless aggravating circumstances justify that term and the facts underlying any such circumstance, other than a prior conviction, have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial. In Erlinger, the United States Supreme Court rejected an argument that the jury trial exception regarding prior convictions also permits a judge to find perhaps any fact related to a defendant’s past offenses, including whether he committed them on different occasions within the meaning of the federal sentencing statute at issue. Instead, the Court held that a judge may do no more, consistent with the Sixth Amendment, than determine what crime, with what elements, the defendant was convicted of.

Authority:

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 742

Erlinger v. United States (2024) 602 U.S. 821, 837, 838

Mathis v. United States (2016) 579 U.S. 500, 511–512

Third Holding:

Any fact, beyond the bare fact of a prior conviction, that exposes a defendant to harsher punishment, must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, unless the defendant stipulates to its truth or waives a jury trial. This jury trial guarantee retains its vitality even if the inquiry is straightforward. There is no efficiency exception to the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.

Only when aggravating facts have been proven as the Constitution requires may the court then rely on them to conclude, in its discretion, that those facts justify an upper term. A jury–not the judge, absent a jury waiver or stipulation–must determine whether the particular details of a defendant’s criminal history establish an unsatisfactory probation performance or demonstrate convictions of increasing seriousness, before a trial court can rely on those facts to justify an upper term sentence.

A defendant is entitled to a jury trial on all aggravating facts, other than the bare fact of a prior conviction and its elements, that expose the defendant to imposition of a sentence more serious than the statutorily provided midterm.

Authority:

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1078, 1083–1084, 1086

Fourth Holding:

A Sixth Amendment violation occurs when the trial court relies on unproven aggravating facts to impose an upper term sentence, even if some other aggravating facts relied on have been properly established. The violation is prejudicial unless an appellate court can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have found true all of the aggravating facts relied upon by the trial court to justify an upper term sentence, or that those facts were otherwise proved true in compliance with the current statutory requirements. If the reviewing court cannot so determine, applying the Chapman standard of review, the defendant is entitled to a remand for resentencing.

Authority:

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 768

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1087

People v. Gonzalez (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 312, 331-333

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18

Duty of the court, Sentencing

Case 000640

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The court erred by staying the sentence on the vandalism and first degree residential burglary counts without first imposing a sentence, and we therefore remand to the court to impose a sentence on these counts.

First Holding:

When a court determines that a conviction falls within the meaning of section 654, it is necessary to impose sentence and to stay the execution of the duplicative sentence. The trial court is required to impose judgment on each count, which involves selecting a term, and then staying execution of the duplicative sentence, the stay to become permanent upon defendant’s service of the portion of the sentence not stayed.

This procedure ensures that the defendant will not receive a windfall of freedom from penal sanction if the conviction on which the sentence has not been stayed is overturned. Thus, it is improper to impose no sentence or to stay imposition of the sentence. Under section 654, a court’s failure to impose a sentence before staying it results in an unauthorized absence of sentence.

Authority:

PEN 654

People v. Mani (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 343, 380

People v. Alford (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1472

Sentencing

Case 000639

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The court ordered restitution to the California Victim Compensation Board pursuant to section 1202.4(f)(4)(B) over the hearsay objection by the defense. Such orders must be based on the type of evidence specified in the code section, which did not occur here. The order is vacated and the matter is remanded for the court to hold a new hearing on restitution.

First Holding:

In every case in which a victim has suffered economic loss as a result of the defendant’s conduct, the court shall require that the defendant make restitution to the victim or victims in an amount established by court order, based on the amount of loss claimed by the victim or victims or any other showing to the court. Section 1202.4 does not, by its terms, require any particular kind of proof.

However, the trial court is entitled to consider the probation report, and, as prima facie evidence of loss, may accept a property owner’s statement made in the probation report about the value of stolen or damaged property.” a hearing to establish the amount of restitution does not require the formalities of other phases of a criminal prosecution. When the probation report includes information on the amount of the victim’s loss and a recommendation as to the amount of restitution, the defendant must come forward with contrary information to challenge that amount.

Authority:

PEN 1202.4

People v. Lockwood (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 91, 96

People v. Holmberg (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1320

Second Holding:

However, section 1202.4(f)(4) includes special provisions that are applicable when, as here, state funds are used to provide assistance to or on behalf of a victim. Section 1202.4(f)(4)(B) provides that the amount of assistance provided by the Restitution Fund shall be established by copies of bills submitted to the California Victim Compensation Board reflecting the amount paid by the board and whether the services for which payment was made were for medical or dental expenses, funeral or burial expenses, mental health counseling, wage or support losses, or rehabilitation.

Certified copies of these bills provided by the board and redacted to protect the privacy and safety of the victim or any legal privilege, together with a statement made under penalty of perjury by the custodian of records that those bills were submitted to and were paid by the board, shall be sufficient to meet this requirement.

Here, the prosecution submitted neither certified copies of bills submitted to the California Victim Compensation Board nor any declaration signed under penalty of perjury by any custodian of records showing the Board paid the bills as required by section 1202.4(f)(4)(B). Thus, it was error to impose restitution on the evidence presented over objection.

Authority:

PEN 1202.4(f)(4)

People v. Lockwood (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 91, 96

Jurisdiction, Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing

Case 000638

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Though the trial court had summarily revoked probation prior to its expiration, for deserting probation, the trial court lacked the authority to find that the defendant violated probation based on his arrest for an offense that allegedly occurred in 2024, after his probation period expired in 2023. That matter is remanded for the court to determine whether there were grounds for revocation based on conduct occurring before probation expired.

Holding:

Summary revocation of probation preserves the trial court’s authority to adjudicate a claim that the defendant violated a condition of probation during the probationary period. A trial court can find a violation of probation and then reinstate and extend the terms of probation if, and only if, probation is reinstated based upon a violation that occurred during the unextended period of probation.

Authority:

People v. Leiva (2013) 56 Cal.4th 498, 515-516

Sentencing, Sixth Amendment

Case 000637

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court erred by finding the aggravating factors true and imposing an upper term sentence without a jury finding on these factors.

First Holding:

Before the jury rendered its verdict, the defendant waived his right to a jury trial on the allegation of a prior strike conviction, but he declined to waive a jury trial on the rule 4.421 aggravating factor allegations. Nevertheless, the trial court stated it would conduct a court trial on the aggravating factor allegations relating to the defendant’s prior convictions increasing in seriousness and his prior prison term because it believed these aggravating factors were not subject to the jury’s consideration.

No aggravating factors were submitted to the jury. The court found true the aggravating factors that the defendant had prior convictions that are numerous and of increasing seriousness. This was error. A defendant is constitutionally entitled to a jury finding as to the increasing seriousness of a defendant’s prior convictions. This is because the inquiry requires a comparison and evaluation of the relationship among a defendant’s prior convictions, and a determination as to their relative seriousness, i.e., something more than a narrow factual finding that the convictions were sustained and what elements were required to prove them.

Authority:

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1082

Second Holding:

The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to a jury trial on any fact that exposes a defendant to a greater potential sentence. Under California’s triad sentencing scheme, a trial court may impose a sentence exceeding the middle term only when there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term.

Accordingly, the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial extends to any aggravating facts justifying an upper term sentence under section 1170(b)(2). If a trial court relies on unproven aggravating facts to impose an upper term sentence, and the defendant has not waived his right to a jury trial or stipulated to the aggravating facts, this is constitutional error.

Authority:

PEN 1170

Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270, 281

Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 760, 768

Third Holding:

Our review is de novo.

Authority:

In re Taylor (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1019, 1035

People v. Frazier (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 858, 864

Fourth Holding:

If constitutional error occurred, we assess prejudice under Chapman, which requires us to find prejudice unless we can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have found true all of the aggravating facts relied upon by the trial court to justify an upper term sentence. This prejudice inquiry does not allow us to uphold the trial court’s imposition of an upper term sentence based on some subset of aggravating facts.

A Sixth Amendment violation occurs when the trial court relies on unproven aggravating facts to impose an upper term sentence, even if some other aggravating facts relied on have been properly established.

Authority:

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 761, 768

Discretion, Sentencing

Case 000636

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The matter was remanded to the lower court following the defendant’s first appeal in this case so that it could exercise its discretion to strike the vicarious gun use enhancements. On resentencing following the defendant’s first appeal in this case, the trial court imposed enhancements for the personal use of a firearm (sec. 12022.53(b), in lieu of the vicarious liability enhancements found true by the jury under subdivisions (d) and (e)(1) of section 12022.53.

The personal use of a firearm enhancements must be vacated because there was no jury finding that the defendant had personally used a firearm during the offense. The vicarious enhancement must be reimposed, and the matter should be remanded back to the trial court so that it may exercise its discretion to strike those enhancements.

First Holding:

A trial court has discretion to strike a section 12022.53(d) firearm enhancement and impose a lesser uncharged enhancement under subdivisions (b) or (c). A trial court is not categorically prohibited from imposing an uncharged, lesser-included enhancement when the prosecution has alleged the greater enhancement and the facts supporting the lesser enhancement have been alleged and found true.

Authority:

People v. Tirado (2022) 12 Cal.5th 688

Second Holding:

In Arellano, our Supreme Court held that a trial court resentencing a petitioner under section 1172.6 lacked authority to impose a firearm enhancement that had never been admitted or found true by a trier of fact. The enhancement had been dismissed as part of a negotiated disposition, and the trial court relied on police reports and other hearsay summaries to conclude that the defendant was armed.

The court rejected this approach and explained that resentencing under section 1172.6 is limited to the target offense or underlying felony. A similar defect occurred here. The jury never found that the defendant personally used a firearm. Instead, the jury returned true findings only under section 12022.53, subdivisions (d) and (e)(1), which required proof that a principal discharged a firearm during a gang-related offense, causing great bodily injury or death.

As in Arellano, the trial court later relied on its own factual findings from a collateral proceeding (a separate hearing on the defendant’s petition for resentencing under section 1172.6) to conclude that the defendant personally used a firearm during the offense. The trial court’s finding in a collateral proceeding was not sufficient to support imposition of the enhancement.

The matter is remanded for resentencing, during which the court shall exercise its discretion under section 1385 and Tirado to determine whether to strike or dismiss the lawfully adjudicated enhancements.

Authority:

People v. Arellano (2024) 16 Cal.5th 457, 464-465

Amelioration, Appellate Principles, Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case 000635

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The matter is remanded for the court to consider the recent decision in Kopp on the imposition of fines and fees, and also to conduct a full resentencing in light of this remand for resentencing.

First Holding:

Kopp clarified the standards applied when a defendant challenges the imposition of certain fines and fees on the grounds that they are unlawful because he cannot afford to pay them. We remand the matter to the trial court to apply those standards regarding its imposition of various fines and fees.

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 31

Second Holding:

Because his conviction is not final on direct review, the defendant may be entitled to the benefit of various intervening changes in the law, including AB 333 (gang allegations) and the Racial Justice Act. AB 333, for example, limits what predicate offenses the People can now use to prove a group is a criminal street gang under Penal Code section 186.22.

On remand, the defendant can ask the trial court to provide relief under relevant intervening ameliorative sentencing laws, including but not limited to SB 81, 483, 567, and 1393; AB 333 and 518, as well as any appropriate challenges under the Racial Justice Act. But this court need not decide which intervening laws apply retroactively and whether their application requires any retrial or change in sentence.

Authority:

People v. Lamb (2024) 16 Cal.5th 400, 448

People v. Lopez (2025) 17 Cal.5th 388, 400

People v. Buza (2018) 4 Cal.5th 658, 693 [courts abide by a cardinal principle of judicial restraint—if it is not necessary to decide more, it is necessary not to decide more]

Amelioration, Sentencing

Case 000634

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court erroneously denied Penal Code section 1172.6 resentencing relief at the prima facie stage. We reverse the trial court’s order denying resentencing relief and direct the trial court to issue an order to show cause.

First Holding:

SB 1437, effective as of January 1, 2019, made ameliorative changes to our state’s homicide law. As part of these ameliorative changes, malice, a key element the People must prove in a murder prosecution, may no longer be imputed to a defendant solely because the defendant participated in another crime. This means, for instance, that a defendant is no longer guilty of murder as an aider and abettor solely because the natural and probable consequences of that other crime included a confederate’s commission of murder.

Authority:

People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 558

Second Holding:

These ameliorative changes apply retroactively through the resentencing process set forth in section 1172.6. Those convicted of murder or attempted murder under certain imputed malice theories may seek resentencing. So may a person convicted of manslaughter who was charged with murder when three conditions apply. First, the charging document allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of murder in which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime. Second, the petitioner accepted a manslaughter plea offer in lieu of a trial on such a murder charge. And third, the petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder because of the changes to homicide law that took effect in 2019.

Authority:

PEN 1172.6

People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 558

Third Holding:

Upon receipt of a facially sufficient petition — along with briefing in opposition or support — the trial court holds a hearing to determine whether a petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief. If so, the court issues an order to show cause and then holds an evidentiary hearing to determine entitlement to relief. If not, the court denies the petition.

Authority:

PEN 1172.6

People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 559, 562

Fourth Holding:

We independently review a trial court’s conclusion that a petitioner failed to make a prima facie case for relief. The record of conviction informs the prima facie determination. And that record includes a preliminary hearing transcript preceding a guilty plea. A court, however, may not engage in factfinding, weigh the evidence, or make credibility determinations at the prima facie stage.

Authority:

People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1, 14

People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971, 972

People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 559, 568

Fifth Holding:

A review of the preliminary hearing transcript in this case reveals that it possible the defendant could have been convicted at trial under a now-invalid theory. There was witness testimony that two unidentified men initiated the attack, which raises at least a triable issue as to whether the defendant was the actual killer, and if he was not, whether he knew of and intended to aid in the criminal purpose of the actual killer as required for direct aiding and abetting. Given this state of the record of conviction, the defendant’s guilty plea to voluntary manslaughter does not prove that he could still be convicted of murder under current law.

Authority:

People v. Gaillard (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1206, 1213

People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 567 [A dispute regarding the basis of a conviction might arise if, for instance, a petitioner points to specific facts that identify someone else as the direct perpetrator.]

Appellate Principles, Duty of the court, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 000633

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court erred in calculating the defendant’s pretrial custody credits and awarded him too few. The judgment is modified accordingly.

Holding:

We independently review whether a trial court has correctly awarded custody credits. A defendant accrues actual custody credits pursuant to section 2900.5 for time spent in custody prior to sentencing. Actual custody credits are calculated by adding together “all days of custody” the defendant has served. The failure to award earned custody credits results in an unauthorized sentence, which we may correct. Because the amount of presentence credits appears from our record, we may modify the award of presentence credits to reflect the correct amount.

Authority:

PEN 2900.5

People v. Arevalo (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 821, 827

People v. Anaya (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 608, 611

People v. Boyd (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 56, 65–71

People v. Jones (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 485, 493