Tag Archives: Sentencing

Amelioration, Sentencing

Case: 000366

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court erred by: (1) refusing to strike a prior serious felony enhancement attached to the defendant’s conviction for one count of possession of a firearm after an associated gang enhancement was dismissed; and (2) maintaining an indeterminate sentence on that same count. Accordingly, we will vacate the sentence for that count, strike one of the associated serious felony enhancements, and remand for resentencing consistent with Penal Code section 667(e)(1).

First Holding:

The defendant was sentenced to a Three Strikes indeterminate sentence and the sentence was enhanced for a prior serious felony conviction. During the appeal from that conviction, AB 333 was enacted to change the elements of section 186.22 regarding the crime and enhancements for gang criminal activity. As a result of the opinion in Valencia we reversed the conviction for violation of section 186.22 in count 5, and the jury’s finding that defendant committed the attempted shooting at an occupied vehicle (count 1) and possessed a firearm (count 7) for the benefit of a criminal street gang.

We remanded to give the prosecution an opportunity to retry count 5 and the gang enhancement allegations on counts 1 and 7 under amended section 186.22. The trial court granted the prosecution’s motion to dismiss count 5 and the gang enhancement allegations as to counts 1 and 7. The court denied the defendant’s request to sentence the defendant to a determinate term and rejected his argument that the basis of the count 7’s status as serious felony had been undermined by AB 333, and it was no longer a serious felony to support either the five-year enhancement for his prior serious felony or as a third strike. The court erred. Count 7 was only considered a serious felony by reason of the jury’s true finding on the gang enhancement. With the gang enhancement out of the picture, count 7 could no longer be considered a serious felony.

Authority:

PEN 186.22

PEN 667

PEN 1192.7(c)(28)

People v. Valencia (2021) 11 Cal.5th 818

Second Holding:

Count 7 was only a serious felony by reason of the gang enhancement, which had been stricken. Therefore, he was not convicted in the current case of a third strike, and was subject to only a doubling of his sentence, not a life term.

Authority:

PEN 667

Sentencing, Sixth Amendment, Standard of review

Case: 000365

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We affirm the conviction. The defendant is entitled to remand for resentencing under AB 518 because of the amendment to section 654, which formerly required the trial court to select as the principal term the offense with the longest potential sentence; and under SB 567 because the trial court imposed an upper term for the attempted murder of the victim based on unpleaded and unproven aggravating factors.

First Holding:

In addressing a claim of insufficient evidence to support a conviction, this court reviews the entire record in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether it contains evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value, from which a rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We presume every fact in support of the judgment the trier of fact could have reasonably deduced from the evidence. If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, reversal of the judgment is not warranted simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.

Although it is the jury’s duty to acquit a defendant if it finds the circumstantial evidence susceptible of two reasonable interpretations, one of which suggests guilt and the other innocence, it is the jury, not the appellate court that must be convinced of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Reversal for insufficiency of the evidence is unwarranted unless it appears that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support the conviction. We review the sufficiency of the evidence to support a firearm enhancement using the same standard we apply to a conviction.

Authority:

People v. Jackson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 269, 345

People v. Campbell (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 463, 484

People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 577

People v. Bryant (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1472

Second Holding:

The ameliorative changes effected by AB 518 and SB 567 apply retroactively to defendant’s nonfinal judgment on appeal.

Authority:

People v. Fugit (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 981, 995-996

People v. Mani (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 343, 379

Third Holding:

Effective January 1, 2022, AB 518 amended section 654 to authorize trial courts to punish an act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law under either of such provisions. Before the enactment of Assembly Bill No. 518, and when the trial court sentenced defendant, section 654 required the court to punish an act that was punishable in different ways by different laws only under the provision that provides for the longest potential term of imprisonment.

Thus, section 654 now provides the trial court with discretion to impose and execute the sentence of either term, which could result in the trial court imposing and executing the shorter sentence rather than the longer sentence. Because the court imposed the sentence on count three on the basis that it had a longer maximum exposure than that of count four, as was required by section 654 at the time of sentencing, we will vacate the sentence and remand for a full resentencing hearing based on current law.

Authority:

People v. Mani (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 343, 379

Fourth Holding:

Effective January 1, 2022, section 1170(b) was amended by SB 567. The amended statute created a presumption in favor of a low prison term when a defendant is under 26 years of age at the time of the offense. Section 1170(b)(6) provides that unless the court finds that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances that imposition of the lower term would be contrary to the interests of justice, the court shall order imposition of the lower term if any of specified factors was a contributing factor in the commission of the offense, including that the person is a youth, or was a youth as defined under section 1016.7(b) at the time of the commission of the offense.

Authority:

PEN 1170(b)(6)

PEN 1016.7

People v. Flores (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1032, 1038-1039

Fifth Holding:

Additionally, SB 567 amended section 1170(b)(2) to provide that a trial court may impose a sentence exceeding the middle term only when there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term and the facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial. With the exception of prior conviction allegations, under the Sixth Amendment, any fact that exposes a defendant to a greater potential sentence must be found by a jury’ and ‘established beyond a reasonable doubt. Under section 1170(b), a Sixth Amendment violation occurs when the trial court relies on unproven aggravating facts to impose an upper term sentence, even if some other aggravating facts relied on have been properly established.

Authority:

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 747

Sixth Holding:

A court may consider the defendant’s prior convictions in determining sentencing based on a certified record of conviction without submitting the prior convictions to a jury, but the prior conviction exception to the Sixth Amendment permits a trial court to do no more than determine of what crime, with what elements, defendant was convicted

Authority:

PEN 1170(b)(3)

Erlinger v. United States (2024) 602 U.S. 821, 837-838

Seventh Holding:

Because the court did not apply the presumption in favor of a low term due to defendant’s youth, and imposed the upper term based on aggravating factors that had not been pleaded or found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury, the court’s imposition of the upper term was improper. As we are already remanding for a full resentencing, we need not and do not consider whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. But reliance on aggravating circumstances not found in accordance with section 1170(b) is prejudicial unless an appellate court can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have found true all of the aggravating facts relied upon by the trial court to justify an upper term sentence, or that those facts were otherwise proved true in compliance with the current statutory requirements.

Authority:

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 768

Eighth Holding:

At resentencing, the trial court must revisit all its sentencing choices in light of all applicable legislation. That includes, but is not limited to, AB 518, SB 567, and SB 81 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), which became effective January 1, 2022, and amended section 1385 to specify factors that the trial court must consider when deciding whether to strike enhancements from a defendant’s sentence in the interest of justice.

Authority:

PEN 654

PEN 1170

PEN 1385

People v. Valenzuela (2019) 7 Cal.5th 415, 424-425

People v. Sek (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 657, 674

Amelioration, Elements of crime, Sentencing

Case: 000362

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The record of conviction does not show as a matter of law that defendant is ineligible for resentencing under section 1172.6 on his murder and attempted murder convictions. The jury was instructed on the natural and probable consequence doctrine, and the record does not show the jury necessarily found all elements of murder and attempted murder under current law. We therefore reverse the trial court’s order denying defendant’s petition.

First Holding:

SB 1437, effective in 2019, the Legislature amended sections 188 and 189 of the Penal Code to eliminate natural and probable consequences liability for murder as it applies to aiding and abetting, and to limit the scope of the felony-murder rule. Amended section 188 provides that except as stated in the amended section 189 governing felony murder, in order to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime shall act with malice aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime. The bill also added what is now section 1172.6, which creates a procedure for convicted murderers who could not be convicted under the law as amended to retroactively seek relief. Relief is potentially available for a person convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime, attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or manslaughter .

Authority:

SB 1437

PEN 1172.6

People v. Lee (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1164, 1173

People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957

Second Holding:

The section 1172.6 petitioning process begins with the filing of a petition containing a declaration that all requirements for eligibility are met, including that the petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of changes to section 188 or 189 . If the petition and record in the case establish conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for relief, the trial court may dismiss the petition. A defendant who petitions for resentencing under section 1172.6 is ineligible for resentencing only if the record conclusively establishes every element of the offense. In making that determination a court may give effect to a jury’s factual finding. If the petition survives the prima facie stage, the court must hold an evidentiary hearing at which the People bear the burden to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder or attempted murder under California law as amended by SB 1437.

Authority:

PEN 1172.6.

People v. Antonelli (2025) 17 Cal.5th 719, 724

People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 463, 465

Third Holding:

Under the jury instructions given at defendant’s trial, the defendant could have been found guilty even if not the slayer, because there was a second person who was the slayer. Additionally, the finding defendant personally discharged a firearm and proximately caused great bodily injury and death does not establish the defendant intended to kill or was aware of the danger to life that his act posed. In sum, the jury verdict does not show as a matter of law defendant harbored malice aforethought. Under the trial court’s instructions, the jury could instead have concluded defendant aided and abetted an assault with a firearm the natural and probable consequences of which was murder. Thus, the entire record of conviction does not foreclose that defendant was convicted based on a now invalid theory of murder.

Authority:

People v. Offley (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 588, 598

People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 463, 465

Fourth Holding:

Under current law, attempted murder requires intent to kill. We cannot conclude, as a matter of law, that the record of conviction shows defendant harbored intent to kill. The jury finding that the attempted murder was committed willfully and with premeditation and deliberation shows only that the slayer harbored this mental state. The jury does not further identify the slayer. Additionally, the fact defendant intended to discharge a firearm does not show the defendant harbored a particular mental state.

Authority:

People v. Morales (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 1120, 1132

People v. Offley (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 588, 598 [explaining that section 12022.53(d) provides that the defendant must have intended to discharge a firearm, but does not refer to an intent to achieve any additional consequence.]

Amelioration, Discretion, Sentencing

Case: 000361

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

After the trial court denied the defendant’s request at the section 1172.75 resentencing hearing to resentence him on one of his nonserious felony counts under the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (thus reducing his Three Strikes sentence of 25 years to life on that count to a doubled determinate term), the Supreme Court concluded that the Reform Act does apply, subject to the finding of unreasonable risk to public safety. The matter is remanded for resentencing consideration accordingly.

First Holding:

As a matter of constitutional avoidance, section 1172.75 incorporates section 1170.126’s discretionary public safety override as a condition for nonserious, nonviolent third strike offenders to obtain resentencing under the revised penalty provisions of the Reform Act. The case must be remanded for the superior court to determine whether sentencing the defendant under the revised penalty provisions of the Reform Act would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. If it is so determined, the superior court must reimpose the indeterminate term. If the superior court does not determine that resentencing the defendant would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, and the defendant is otherwise eligible under the Reform Act, the court shall resentence the defendant pursuant to the revised penalty provisions of the Reform Act.

Authority:

People v. Superior Court (Guevara) (2025) 18 Cal.5th 838, 878

Second Holding:

The superior court did not have the benefit of Guevara, meaning that it was not fully aware of the scope of its discretionary powers when it resentenced the defendant. We remand for resentencing because the record does not clearly indicate that the trial court would have reached the same conclusion even if it had been aware that it had such discretion.

Authority:

People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 425

Amelioration, Retroactivity, Sentencing

Case: 000360

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

After the trial court denied the defendant’s request at the section 1172.75 resentencing hearing to resentence him under the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (thus reducing his Three Strikes sentence of 25 years to life to a doubled determinate term), the Supreme Court concluded that the Reform Act does apply, subject to the finding of unreasonable risk to public safety. The matter is remanded for resentencing consideration accordingly.

First Holding:

Section 1172.75 incorporates section 1170.126’s discretionary public safety override as a condition for nonserious, nonviolent third strike offenders to obtain resentencing under the revised penalty provisions of the Reform Act. Because section 1172.75 and section 1170.126, thus interpreted, operate harmoniously, the revised penalty provisions of the Reform Act may constitutionally apply at a resentencing pursuant to section 1172.75.

Authority:

People v. Superior Court (Guevara) (2025) 18 Cal.5th 838, 850

Second Holding:

It is unclear from the record as originally filed how the section 1172.75 proceedings had been initiated. Section 1172.75 does not authorize a defendant to seek resentencing on his or her own motion or petition. Rather the process is triggered by the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation [CDCR] identifying a defendant as a person serving a sentence that includes a prior prison term enhancement. On our own motion, we took judicial notice of a CDCR list, which identifies individuals potentially eligible for section 1172.75 relief; defendant’s name appears on that list.

Authority:

People v. Cota (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 318, 332

People v. Newell (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 265, 268

People v. Burgess (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 375, 382 [Lower and appellate courts lack jurisdiction over a request for section 1172.75 relief brought solely by a defendant)

Third Holding:

Construing the discretionary public safety determination of section 1170.126 as applicable at a section 1172.75 resentencing maintains the integrity of both statutes, such that the two may stand together. The legislative history suggests the voters understood that where a court conducting a resentencing inquiry for Third Strike defendants serving an indeterminate term found relief would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, the defendant would not be entitled to resentencing. Interpreting section 1172.75 as incorporating the discretionary public safety determination of section 1170.126 would honor this concern and thus eliminate constitutional doubt.

Authority:

People v. Superior Court (Guevara) (2025) 18 Cal.5th 838, 865-866

Fourth Holding:

In exercising this discretion, the voters established that the resentencing court may consider: (1) The petitioner’s criminal conviction history, including the type of crimes committed, the extent of injury to victims, the length of prior prison commitments, and the remoteness of the crimes; (2) The petitioner’s disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation while incarcerated; and (3) Any other evidence the court, within its discretion, determines to be relevant in deciding whether a new sentence would result in an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.

Authority:

People v. Superior Court (Guevara) (2025) 18 Cal.5th 838, 866, fn. 9

Fifth Holding:

The resentencing court is not bound by the prior dangerousness determination associated with the defendant’s section 1170.126 petition. Rather, section 1172.75 requires that the resentencing court makes a new determination as to whether a defendant’s resentencing would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety’ as of the present day. A prior finding that a particular defendant poses a risk to public safety under section 1170.126(f) is unquestionably relevant, and will no doubt be given consideration by a court subsequently resolving a resentencing under section 1172.75 involving an indeterminate Three Strikes sentence.

However, given significant passage of time, it is possible that a defendant who once presented a threat to public safety may no longer do so. For instance, not only may defendants present evidence that they have significantly rehabilitated since a prior section 1170.126 proceeding, but serious illness or advanced age may have substantially reduced the danger to public safety they once posed. Realistically assessing such changed circumstances is appropriately left to the trial court on remand.

Authority:

People v. Superior Court (Guevara) (2025) 18 Cal.5th 838, 878, fn. 17