Tag Archives: Recall of sentence or resentencing

Amelioration, Sentencing

Case 000514

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The matter is remanded for the court to consider whether the defendant, serving a Three Strikes life sentence, is entitled to reduction under the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 and other ameliorative provisions at a new hearing under section 1172.75.

First Holding:

SB 483, effective on January 1, 2022, added section 1171.1 to the Penal Code, subsequently renumbered as section 1172.75. This section declares that any sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to section 667.5(b), except for any enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent offense is legally invalid. The Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and the county correctional administrator of each county are directed to identify individuals in custody and “currently serving a term for a judgment that includes an enhancement described in section 1172.75(a) and provide the information to the court who sentenced the individuals identified. The court is directed to review the judgment, and if it included a sentencing enhancement described in section 1172.75(a), recall the sentence and resentence the defendant.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75

Second Holding:

The Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 modified the original Three Strikes law of 1994. Under Three Strikes, a third felony of any nature would draw a term of a minimum of 25 years to life if the defendant had previously suffered convictions for two serious felonies (as defined). Under the Reform Act, with certain exceptions, if the current felony is NOT one of the specified serious felony, the sentence would be treated as a two-strike case, in which the sentence would be a doubled determinate sentence rather than a life term.

When a defendant serving a Three Strikes term is resentenced under section 1172.75, the court must modify the Three Strikes term if the triggering third strike was not a serious or violent felony as defined, unless the resentencing would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to the public as that term has been construed in the context of the Reform Act. Pursuant to the full resentencing rule, the court may also exercise its sentencing discretion in light of any changed circumstances.

Authority:

People v. Superior Court (Guevara) (2025) 18 Cal.5th 838, 850, 878

People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893

Third Holding:

With respect to sentencing error in particular, the statutory power of appellate courts to disqualify sentencing judges should be used sparingly and only where the interests of justice require it. The interests of justice require it, for example, where a reasonable person might doubt whether the trial judge was impartial, or where the court’s rulings suggest the ‘whimsical disregard’ of a statutory scheme. Erroneous rulings, without more, are not enough to justify the removal of a trial judge from further proceedings in a case.

Authority:

Peracchi v. Superior Court (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1245, 1256

Hernandez v. Superior Court (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 285, 303

Blakemore v. Superior Court (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 36, 59–60

Abstracts and Minutes, Effective assistance of counsel, Sentencing

Case 000510

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The abstract of judgment must be corrected to reflect the correct sentence to 27 years rather than the 27 years two months as shown, and to reflect that the term imposed for one count is one-third the middle term.

First Holding:

A reviewing court may order correction of an abstract of judgment that does not accurately reflect the oral pronouncement of judgment by the sentencing court.

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

Second Holding:

As a general rule, only claims properly raised and preserved by the parties are reviewable on appeal. Our Supreme Court adopted this forfeiture rule to reduce the number of errors committed in the first instance], and the number of costly appeals brought on that basis. In the context of criminal sentencing, this forfeiture rule applies to claims involving the trial court’s failure to properly make or articulate its discretionary sentencing choices. Included in this category are cases in which the stated reasons allegedly do not apply to the particular case, and cases in which the court purportedly erred because it double-counted a particular sentencing factor, misweighed the various factors, or failed to state any reasons or give a sufficient number of valid reasons.

Authority:

People v. Smith (2001) 24 Cal.4th 849, 852

People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354

People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 235

Third Holding:

At resentencing, the defendant did not ask the trial court to strike the prior serious felony enhancements or argue that imposing both the firearm enhancement and the upper term on count 16 would result in an impermissible dual use of facts. The record contains no sentencing brief; and both defense counsel and the defendant himself responded in the negative when the trial court asked if they wished to be heard at the resentencing hearing. To preserve his claims, the defendant was required to object at resentencing. Because he did not do so, his current appellate contentions are forfeited.

Authority:

People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331,353

People v. Coleman (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 709, 723-725

Fourth Holding:

If the defendant believes that evidence outside the record would support his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the proper remedy would be a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

Authority:

People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 111

Appellate Principles, Sentencing

Case 000507

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The defendant was entitled to full resentencing under section 1172.75, even though the now-invalid prior prison enhancement was stayed at the original sentencing.

First Holding:

When a prior conviction pursuant to section 667.5(b) is stricken pursuant to the procedures in section 1172.75, a defendant is entitled to full resentencing under section 1172.75(d).

Authority:

People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050

Second Holding:

The failure of the People to raise the issue in the trial court forfeits the issue on appeal. The reason for the forfeitur] rule is that it is both unfair and inefficient to permit a claim of error on appeal that, if timely brought to the attention of the trial court, could have been easily corrected or avoided. The forfeiture rule ensures that the opposing party is given an opportunity to address the objection, and it prevents a party from engaging in gamesmanship by choosing not to object, awaiting the outcome, and then claiming error.

Authority:

People v. Sperling (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1094, 1101

People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 433-434

Third Holding:

If the appellate court’s order upon remand requires correction as to one part of a sentence but the remand order limits the scope of resentencing, the trial court must adhere to the limits set forth in the remand order. At the hearing upon remand, the trial court addressed only the section 667(a), prior convictions as directed by disposition in the Opinion. While the trial court could have addressed the section 667.5(b) priors and the stayed sentences at that time of remand based on a change of the law, it did not do so and was never asked to consider resentencing on the prior prison terms.

Authority:

People v. Walker (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 198, 205

People v. Hargis (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 199, 205-207 [where a change in the law becomes effective after the appellate court’s opinion but before the hearing on the limited remand, the trial court could consider the new law despite the limited remand]

Amelioration, Sentencing

Case 000504

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

When a person serving a three strikes sentence is resentenced under section 1172.75, it must apply the ameliorative provisions of the Reform Act of 2012, if applicable, subject to a finding that it would post an unreasonable risk of danger to the public as that has been interpreted in the context of the Reform Act.

First Holding:

SB 483, effective on January 1, 2022, added section 1171.1 to the Penal Code, subsequently renumbered as section 1172.75. This section declares that any sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to ssection 667.5(b), except for any enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent offense is legally invalid. Section 1172.75 establishes a mechanism to provide affected defendants an avenue for relief from now invalid prison prior enhancements.

After the court receives notice from the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and county correctional administrator that the defendant qualifies for resentencing under section 1172.75, the court shall review the judgment and verify that the current judgment includes a sentencing enhancement described in subdivision (a), and if so, recall the sentence and resentence the defendant.

When resentencing a defendant under section 1172.75, the court must apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and apply any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75

Second Holding:

The Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 modified the original Three Strikes law of 1994. Under Three Strikes, a third felony of any nature would draw a term of a minimum of 25 years to life if the defendant had previously suffered convictions for two serious felonies (as defined). Under the Reform Act, with certain exceptions, if the current felony is NOT one of the specified serious felony, the sentence would be treated as a two-strike case, in which the sentence would be a doubled determinate sentence rather than a life term.

When a defendant serving a Three Strikes term is resentenced under section 1172.75, the court must modify the Three Strikes term if the triggering third strike was not a serious or violent felony as defined, unless the resentencing would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to the public as that term has been construed in the context of the Reform Act.

Authority:

People v. Superior Court (Guevara) (2025) 18 Cal.5th 838

Amelioration, Duty of the court, Retroactivity, Sentencing

Case 000499

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court erred in determining that the defendant was ineligible for resentencing under section 1172.75 where the now invalid prior conviction enhancement had been stricken at the original sentencing.

First Holding:

Legislation effective at the beginning of 2020 (SB 136) prospectively abolished most prior prison enhancements that were previously imposed under section 667.5(b). Our Legislature made that abolition retroactive in 2022 through SB 483, which enacted section 1171.1, later renumbered as section 1172.75. The statute declares invalid most prior prison enhancements imposed before the enhancements were abolished, with just one exception (defendants convicted of sexually violent offenses).

Authority:

PEN 1172.75

Second Holding:

Section 1172.75(a) applies to enhancements that were imposed as part of the defendant’s original judgment, regardless of whether the enhancement was stayed or executed. If the enhancement is no longer authorized under the current version of section 667.5(b), section 1172.75(a) renders the enhancement invalid. And the retroactive invalidation of the previously imposed enhancements in turn mandates resentencing under section 1172.75, according to the procedures set forth therein.

Authority:

People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050, 1068

Third Holding:

Upon resentencing, the court will be required to calculate all credits Hernandez has accrued since his initial sentencing and award them against his new sentence.

Authority:

PEN 2900.1

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 37 [the trial court, having modified defendant’s sentence on remand, was obliged, in its new abstract of judgment, to credit him with all actual days he had spent in custody, whether in jail or prison, up to that time.]