Tag Archives: Briefing

Amelioration, Sentencing, Standard of review, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence

Case 000481

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Denial of the petition for recall of sentence under section 1172.6 is reversed, and the matter is remanded for the court to redetermine whether petitioner acted with reckless indifference to human life, taking into consideration his youth at the time of the offense. We also conclude substantial evidence does not support the court’s finding that petitioner aided and abetted the murder with intent to kill and the denial of the petition therefore cannot be upheld on this alternative ground.

First Holding:

Although petitioner briefly argued in the superior court that his youth should be considered in the court’s analysis of whether he was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, the superior court did not address this argument. Indeed, the superior court may have felt compelled to conclude, based on the state of the law at the time, that petitioner’s youth was not a relevant factor, given that petitioner was a young adult at the time he committed the offense and not a juvenile.

We continue to find there was substantial evidence for the trial court to conclude that the defendant acted with indifference of human life, but pending this appeal, there have been cases that squarely hold that the court should consider youth of a nonjuvenile in that determination.

If we do not address this issue, petitioner may be able to file a second petition for resentencing in the superior court to have the court consider his youth as part of the totality of circumstances bearing on whether he acted with reckless indifference to human life. In the interests of justice and for the sake of judicial economy, we address this argument on the merits. We conclude that petitioner is entitled to a new evidentiary hearing to apply new law relating to the effect, if any, of his youth on the court’s reckless indifference finding.

Authority:

People v. Jimenez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 994, 1008

Second Holding:

We review the court’s findings for substantial evidence. Under this standard, we review the record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner acted with reckless indifference.

Authority:

People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 988

People v. Emanuel (2025) 17 Cal.5th 867, 885

Third Holding:

In the first stage of this appeal–before review was granted and the matter was transferred back to this court–petitioner raised the argument (that the court should take into consideration the defendant’s youth) in his reply brief for the first time. Ordinarily, we do not consider issues raised for the first time in a reply brief. As such, this argument was not addressed in our prior opinion.

Authority:

In re Luke H. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1082, 1090

Fourth Holding:

During the pendency of this appeal, the appellate court in Jones addressed the relevance of youth to the reckless indifference finding in a case involving a young adult who was 20 years old at the time of the offense.

Authority:

People v. Jones (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1076, 1091–1093

Fifth Holding:

In Oliver, the appellate court assumed, without deciding, that the trial court was required to consider the petitioner’s youth (23 years of age) in reference to the petitioner’s mental state, but held that its failure to do so was harmless under the standard of Watson

Authority:

People v. Oliver (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 466, 488–489 and fn. 8

People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836

Sixth Holding:

In Pittman, the court applied the Watson standard and concluded there was a reasonable possibility the failure to consider the petitioner’s youth impacted the trial court’s decision. The court noted inferences of immaturity could be drawn from the fact that the petitioner was 21 years old when he participated in the attack with two peers who were 16 and 17 years old. Additionally, the crime suggested the participants acted impulsively, under the influence of rashness, and while intoxicated. Thus, the court determined the interests of justice were best served by remanding for the court to consider whether youth impacted the petitioner’s ability to form the requisite mental state for second degree murder.

Authority:

People v. Pittman (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 400, 417-418

Seventh Holding:

In Jiminez, the appellate court agreed that there had been a significant change in the law governing young adult offenders since the ruling on the first petition, and therefore the doctrines of collateral estoppel and law of the case did not apply. In this regard, the court noted that early cases addressing this issue of a petitioner’s youth applied only to juvenile offenders under the age of 18, and only to the major participant and reckless indifference findings.

Thereafter, however, the law was expanded to hold that youth was a consideration for other mental state requirements, including implied malice, and additionally expanded to include young adults who were in their late teens and early 20’s when they committed the crimes. Additionally, the Legislature had enacted similar changes to a variety of statutes to expand youth-related considerations to persons 25 years of age and younger. The court also determined that the error in failing to consider the petitioner’s age was not harmless under the Watson standard.

Authority:

People v. Jimenez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 994, 1001-1004

Appellate Principles, Discretion, Duty of the court, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 000448

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The defendant contends that it was error to proceed to sentencing in the absence of the attorney she retained after counsel was appointed, and that the court abused its discretion when it found that her youth was not a contributing fact. Retained counsel did file a document titled “Limited Scope Substitution of Counsel.” Thereafter, appointed counsel filed a resentencing brief on the defendant’s behalf. The retained attorney did not. At the resentencing hearing, appointed counsel appeared with the defendant. The retained attorney did not appear. We affirm, but the trial court must recalculate the credit for time served.

First Holding:

The trial court did not recalculate the defendant’s custody credits and ordered the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to do the calculation. A trial court must calculate a defendant’s custody credits when resentencing.

Authority:

PEN 2900.1

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 37 [when a trial court resentences a defendant on remand, it must credit him with all actual days he spent in custody, whether in jail or prison, up to that time]

Second Holding:

We review the defendants’s contentions regarding counsel of choice and selection of sentence term under the deferential abuse of discretion standard. A defendant who desires to retain his own counsel is required to act with diligence and may not demand a continuance if he is unjustifiably dilatory or if he arbitrarily desires to substitute counsel at the time of trial.

Authority:

People v. O’Malley (2016) 62 Cal.4th 944, 1004 [trial court has discretion to deny substitution of counsel where it would prejudice the defendant or disrupt the orderly processes of justice]

People v. Blake (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 619, 623-624

People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 435 [appellate review of asserted evidentiary error forfeited where defendant failed to make a timely, specific objection]

Third Holding:

Section 1170(b)(6) does not mandate a presumption in favor of the lower term in every case in which the defendant was under age 26 at the time the crime was committed. Instead, the presumption applies only if the defendant’s youth was a contributing factor in his or her commission of the offense.

Authority:

PEN 1170(b)(6)

People v. Fredrickson (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 984, 991-992

People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 376-377 [trial court’s sentencing choices reviewed for abuse of discretion]

Fourth Holding:

At oral argument, the defendant contended that the trial court erred in conducting the resentencing hearing without her physical presence. But the defendant failed to raise this contention in her opening brief. Thus, it is forfeited. Forfeiture aside, any error would have been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt based on the record before us.

Authority:

People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793 [Every brief should contain a legal argument with citation of authorities on the points made. If none is furnished on a particular point, the court may treat it as waived, and pass it without consideration]

People v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 527, 550, fn. 9 [claims not raised in the opening brief are waived]

People v. Velasco (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 663, 674

People v. Cutting (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 344, 348

Abstracts and Minutes, Amelioration, Appellate Principles, Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case: 000301

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Though affirming the trial court’s reimposition of the original sentence (minus the now-invalid enhancements for prior prison terms), it remanded the matter to the trial court to expressly state which fines and fees it was imposing, as it was not clear from the record.

First Holding:

The abstract of judgment lists several fines and fees, some of which are mandatory. The trial court, however, imposed only direct restitution (which is also listed in the abstract). A superior court’s failure to orally impose mandatory fines or assessments results in an unauthorized sentence that the appellate court may correct on appeal. But we do not believe the superior court sufficiently addressed ability to pay. It mentioned ability to pay only in the context of the direct restitution. It sidestepped the issue of ability to pay, treating it as irrelevant to the issue of direct victim restitution. As the court did not orally impose any additional fines or fees, the defendant had no meaningful opportunity to raise his ability to pay with respect to them.

Authority:

People v. Talibdeen (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1151, 1153–1157

People v. Pack-Ramirez (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 851, 859 [ability-to-pay principles have not been extended to a victim restitution payment under section 1202.4(f)]

People v. Abrahamian (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 314, 338

People v. Evans (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 771, 777

Second Holding:

By statute, restitution fines and probation restitution fines under section 1202.4(b) and section 1202.45 that exceed the $300 minimum shall account for ability to pay. And because of equal protection principles, a court must consider ability to pay before imposing ancillary assessments under section 1465.8(a)(1) and Government Code section 70373. As to the remaining fine in the defendant’s case, under section 1202.5, the parties do not dispute the fine must be set with ability to pay in mind, but is mandatory if affordable. Given this, we will order a limited remand for the superior court to consider the mandatory fines and assessments omitted from its oral sentencing pronouncements in connection with defendant’s ability to pay.

Authority:

PEN 1202.5

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 30

Third Holding:

Regarding restitution fines, section 1465.9 has recently been amended to provide that, upon the expiration of 10 years after the date of imposition of a restitution fine pursuant to Section 1202.4, the balance, including any collection fees, shall be unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a judgment imposing those fines shall be vacated. At least one Court of Appeal has held a court conducting a section 1172.75 resentencing cannot reimpose a restitution fine that is more than 10 years old and has held, instead, the fine should be stricken. As no restitution fine has been properly imposed, we are in no position to consider striking it, and the superior court can consider these developments on remand.

Authority:

PEN 1465.9(d)

People v. Salstrom (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 596, 601, review granted Mar. 11, 2026, S295038

Fourth Holding:

Walker approved Court of Appeal decisions that viewed section 1385 as calling for holistic balancing with special emphasis on the enumerated mitigating factors. Gonzalez did not create a new rule of law, but rather corrected a superior court’s misunderstanding regarding the term endangerment to public safety in section 1385(c)(2). The statute defines the term as a likelihood that the dismissal of the enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious danger to others, which does not contemplate a laser-like focus on dangerousness at the time of sentencing. The superior court in Gonzalez had expressly limited its consideration to the defendant’s current dangerousness despite the call of the statute, a mistake not present here.

Authority:

PEN 1385(c)(2)

People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1036

People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215, 228

Fifth Holding:

We need not, and typically do not, address arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief.

Authority:

People v. Dunn (2025) 18 Cal.5th 129, 183, fn. 13

People v. Adir Internat., LLC (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 275, 298

Gary Musings

That Which Goes Awry 6/11/2026

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

What I Don’t Know Could Fill The Universe.

I recognize that I tend to be somewhat of a snoot when it comes to the English language. I’m not an expert in it, by any means, and frankly, short of probably being able to call something a noun or a verb or a preposition or an article, I do not have a handle on the grammarian’s patois. Restrictive, nonrestrictive, antecedent, dependent, independent,subordinate, appositive, absolute, and so on. I think I generally know how to use English, but I couldn’t tell you (with any confidence) what the names of its parts are. I don’t even qualify for Potter Stewart’s “I know it when I see it.” Maybe I’m more of a “Smoke’em if you got’em” kinda guy. (Though I don’t smoke, whether or not I got’em.) I know that old-fashioned watches kept time by spring-action moving various gears, but I couldn’t tell you the name of any of the parts.

Oxfords or Loafers, Anyone?

But I do recognize that I definitely have some biases on a few of those earth-shaking controversies. I like, for example, to set off by a comma the penultimate item in a series. Who doesn’t love a good Oxford comma, right? “John, Mary and I went to the park.” “John, Mary, and I went to the park.” Those two sentences could mean exactly the same thing, or they could mean two different things. In the first sentence, either two or three people went to the park. Either I told John that Mary and I went to the park, or all three of us went to the park. In the second sentence, most of the time it would mean that all three of us went to the park. (A possible exception: If I’m speaking to John AND Mary, then only I went to the park. But who comes up to two people and say, “John comma Mary comma I went to the park”? More likely, “Hey kids, I went to the park.”)

The REAL Battle of the Century?

Anyway, I know there are raging defenses from both sides on it. I remember a popular trend in the 1950s or 1960s toward dropping that last comma. I resisted. (Fortunately, my English teachers were rather meh about it all, so I wasn’t dinged for going up the flow instead of with it.) Over the years, I have found more instances of ambiguity in sentences without the Oxford comma than in those with it.

I Like To Think I’m Simply, Well, Anchored.

Maybe that’s just a shortcoming of my own thought processes. I admit I tend to cringe when I hear “She graduated high school in 2015.” (A long way from the original usage, “She was graduated from high school in [an 18th or 19th century date].) I confess, though, that I never adopted the “was,” and tend to say “She graduated from high school.” There’s no more justification for me to cringe at the evolution dropping the “from” than there was for my grandparents (or great-grandparents) to cringe at the dropping of the “was.” (I believe the original idea was that the institution bestowed the graduation by conferring a degree, so it did the graduating, and the person was graduated from the school by the institution.)

Why Do They Call The End The Start?

Then again, disclosure here: For a long time, I never really thought about the meaning of “Commencement” at graduation. For years (I won’t say whether it was years after graduating from high school or from law school), I blithely associated “Commencement ceremonies” as meaning the end of the road. I’m not sure what made me realize that nope, it’s the beginning of a new life (or some such positive bromide).

And Now Back To Our Regular Programming.

Which brings me to That Which goes awry. I’ve mentioned elsewhere on this site that I do a lot of copying and pasting from opinions, and that I reorganize and even substitute some of the words. I intend to convey the same principle, but because I am not presenting the entire opinion, sometimes I have to tinker to give some context, or maybe I’ll slap a couple of sentences together because they share a significance but in the opinion they were several paragraphs apart. One of the things I’ve been doing more and more is changing what I perceive to be the use of the word “which” where I think the word “that” is more formally the correct term.

Anyone Darwinian?

I do keep in mind that our language evolves. Thank goodness for that. I remember reciting a passage from Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales as an English assignment. I did not have the luxury of listening to a digital recording of a native 14th century English speaker, so I’m guessing my accent was a tad off, but my goodness, I had to trust my English teacher that it was written in English, because you couldn’t prove it by me. I suppose it’s like speaking any foreign language when you don’t know how, but I’m sure I sprayed a few students in the front row as I spat out the words the best I could. So amen to change, right?

Me, A Culpa? Never!

Keeping in mind my opening confession of snootiness, I do believe that the that/which enigma has not yet been formally accepted by most grammarians to consider that the two words are easily interchangeable and mean the same thing (or signal the same thing to the reader, perhaps).

Ding Dong, The Witch Is … Oh, Wait! Wrong Song!

Generally speaking, “which” will introduce a clause that the sentence could do without and still have meaning. “The manual, which comes in paper and electronic format, tells me how to assemble the chair.” I could write that as “The manual tells me how to assemble the chair,” and that’s a perfectly fine sentence. The “which” clause adds interesting and related information, but it is not the answer to “What should I read to learn how to assemble the chair?”

That That Is, Is; That That Is Not, Is Not That Is. (Or IS That?)

On the other hand, “that” introduces something that is vital to the sentence. “The book that says “This is how to assemble the chair” is the droid you’re looking for.” If I take out the “that” clause, it says, “The book is the droid you are looking for.” If my question is “What should I read to learn how to assemble the chair?” I’m not going to learn much without the “that” clause.

You’ve Got To Punc-Tu-U-Ate The Positive (Oh Wait, Another Wrong Song!)

And normally, a “which” clause is going to be set off by punctuation. (Not to be confused with Santa Claus, who sets off with a team of reindeer.) If it is in the middle of the sentence, a pair of commas will usually do the trick. “The book, which has a yellow cover, is on the table.” Or a period could work, depending on location. “Look on the table for the book, which has a yellow cover.”

Accept Except?

There are, of course, many times when “which” is appropriate in slightly other contexts. “I don’t know which book to pick up.” “That which is the most reliable is often the most overlooked.” Neither of those sentences would sound good substituting “that” for “which.”  There are probably a few other exceptions, too.

Everywhere I Go Egos.

I think it is my ego that instigated the writing of this article. When I see “which” where I think “that” ought to do, I change the language used by the courts in many opinions–in fact, some of the language appears in quotations from cases cited by the opinion as seminal authority–because I don’t want to sound like I don’t know when to use “which” and when to use “that.” Fully recognizing that usage is more of a guideline than an actual law, of course. And I don’t mean to cast disrespect on the courts that have chosen to use “which” where I think “that” is the more correct word. As the declarers of the law, what they say IS the law, right? So who am I to nitpick on a point on which (see, there’s a place where which works and that doesn’t) it’s probably just a matter of time before I’m wrong, or I’m right AND they’re right.

Why Stop With The Teeth?

I do have authority supporting my view, of course. (Never go armed without authority. Especially when sometimes it’s easy to find authority supporting either side of opposing and incompatible views.) From oldest to most recent of the weapons in my writing arsenal:

Guide to Modern English
Corbin, Perrin
Pub by Scott, Foresman and Company
1960

A Dictionary of Modern English Usage
H.H. Fowler, Second edition
Pub by Oxford at the Clarendon Press
1965

Line by Line
Clair Kehrwald Cook
Pub by Houghton Mifflin Company
1985

Woe Is I
Patricia T. O’Conner
Pub by Riverhead Books, New York
1996

A Dictionary of Modern American Usage
Bryan Garner
Pub by Oxford University Press
1998

Garner’s Modern American Usage
Bryan A. Garner, Third Edition
Pub by Oxford University Press
2009

Garner’s Modern English Usage (Kindle Edition)
Brian Garner, Fifth Edition
Pub by Oxford University Press
2022

The Internet
2026 (and counting)

And with that, I’m back to my which hunt!