Category Archives: Statutory interpretation

Discretion, Jury trial, Sixth Amendment, Statutory interpretation

Case: 000407

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Although the defendant initially decided not to testify at his trial, he changed his mind just before oral argument, after the court granted the prosecution’s motion to dismiss one of the counts and denied the defense motion for acquittal. As the People concede, it was error for the court to deny his request.

First Holding:

It cannot be doubted that a defendant in a criminal case has the right to take the witness stand and to testify in his or her own defense.

Authority:

Rock v. Arkansas (1987) 483 U.S. 44, 49

Second Holding:

After a litigant rests their case, the trial court has wide discretion to reopen a criminal matter to receive additional evidence. When this court reviews a trial court’s decision to preclude the defense from reopening the case to present additional evidence, we must consider four factors: (1) The stage the proceedings had reached when the motion was made; (2) the defendant’s diligence (or lack thereof) in presenting the new evidence; (3) the prospect that the jury would accord the new evidence undue emphasis; and (4) the significance of the evidence. The trial court’s denial of the defendant’s request to testify is subject to the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard enunciated in Chapman.

Authority:

People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1, 66

People v. Masters (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1019, 1069

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24

People v. Allen (2008) 44 Cal.4th 843, 871–872

Third Holding:

With respect to the first factor, the state of the proceeding, when the defendant has recently rested his case, closing argument has not begun, and the jury has not been instructed, granting defendant’s request does not entail any great inconvenience. Only 25 minutes passed between when the defense rested and when the defendant expressed that he wished to testify.

Authority:

People v. Carter (1957) 48 Cal.2d 737, 757

Fourth Holding:

As to the defendant’s diligence, the trial court asserted it could not reopen the case because the defense had moved for acquittal, and the prosecution had dismissed count 2. This rationale is not supported by the law. Section 1118.1 provides, in relevant part, that if a motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the evidence offered by the prosecution is not granted, the defendant may offer evidence without first having reserved that right. Here, the court took the defendant’s waiver and allowed the defense to rest before hearing its motion for acquittal. Thus, when the defendant decided to testify, the defense had to make a motion to reopen, which the court denied. Under section 1118.1, the court should have ruled on both the motion for acquittal and the prosecutor’s motion to dismiss before inquiring about the defendant’s decision to testify. Had this procedure been followed, the defendant would have had the opportunity to offer evidence after the denial of the motion for judgment of acquittal.

Authority:

PEN 1118.1

Fifth Holding:

The third factor is whether reopening the case will cause the jury to give undue emphasis to the new evidence. A jury may accord undue weight to evidence which is admitted close to the time deliberations begin. Here, at the time the defendant changed his mind, the jury had not been told whether he intended to testify. Further, although the court had advised the jury that the presentation of evidence was complete, that advisement occurred only shortly before the defendant changed his mind. For these reasons, we have no reason to believe that the jury would have afforded undue weight to his testimony if the court had reopened the defense case and this factor also shows an abuse of discretion.

Authority:

People v. Funes (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1506, 1521

Sixth Holding:

The final factor, the significance of the evidence, also shows error by the trial court. The most important witness for the defense in many criminal cases is the defendant himself. This was not a lopsided case with overwhelming and incontrovertible evidence of guilt, as demonstrated by the jury’s acquittal on count 1. Courts must evaluate whether the interests served by restricting a defendant’s right to testify justify the limitation imposed on this most basic right of a defendant in a criminal case—to present his own version of events in his own words. Here, the trial was relatively short and involved a single defendant, and the jury instructions and closing arguments had not yet occurred at the time Mendoza made his request. The defendant’s testimony may have been highly significant and could have altered the outcome of the case. Under this four-factor test, the court’s decision constituted an abuse of its discretion.

Authority:

Rock v. Arkansas (1987) 483 U.S. 44, 51-52, 56

Seventh Holding:

Finally, as the parties agree, the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury deliberated for over three hours and acquitted the defendant of count 1, suggesting it entertained doubts about at least certain aspects of the prosecution’s case. It cannot be said that the jury necessarily would have reached the same result if the court had permitted the defendant to testify.

Authority:

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24

Appellate Principles, Fines and fees, Sentencing, Standard of review, Statutory interpretation

Case: 000287

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We modify the judgment to vacate the balance of the $200 restitution fine pursuant to section 1465.9(d).

First Holding:

Effective January 1, 2025, the Legislature amended section 1465.9 to add subdivision (d), which provides that upon the expiration of 10 years after the date of imposition of a restitution fine pursuant to section 1202.4, the balance, including any collection fees, shall be unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a judgment imposing those fines shall be vacated.

Authority:

PEN 1465.9(d)

Second Holding:

We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. If the language of the statute contains no ambiguity, we presume the Legislature meant what it said, and the plain meaning of the statute governs. The 10-year period starts with the original imposition of the fine and does not restart on resentencing. We modify the judgment to vacate the balance of the restitution fine.

Authority:

PEN 1260

People v. Rogers (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 340, 354

People v. The North River Ins. Co. (2025) 18 Cal.5th 1, 13

People v. Salstrom (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 596, 601 review granted 3/11/2026 (S295038)

Appellate Principles, Elements of crime, Statutory interpretation

Case: 000275

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss the two counts of driving a vehicle while under the influence, as he was also changed with operating a motor scooter while under the influence of alcohol. The latter is a more specific statute than the former, and the defendant must therefore be prosecuted under the more specific statute.

First Holding:

A criminal defendant may not be prosecuted under a general statute if the conduct at issue is covered under a more specific statute.

Authority:

In re Williamson (1954) 43 Cal.2d 651

Second Holding:

A motorized scooter is a vehicle under the definition of vehicle under Vehicle Code section 670: A vehicle is a device by which any person or property may be propelled, moved, or drawn upon a highway, excepting a device moved exclusively by human power or used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks.

Authority:

VEH 670

Third Holding:

Under the Williamson rule, if a general statute includes the same conduct as a special statute, the court infers that the Legislature intended that conduct to be prosecuted exclusively under the special statute. In effect, the special statute is interpreted as creating an exception to the general statute for conduct that otherwise could be prosecuted under either statute. Absent some indication of legislative intent to the contrary, the Williamson rule applies when (1) each element of the general statute corresponds to an element on the face of the special statute or (2) when it appears from the statutory context that a violation of the special statute will necessarily or commonly result in a violation of the general statute.

Authority:

People v. Murphy (2011) 52 Cal.4th 81, 86

People v. Henry (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 786, 791-792

Fourth Holding:

It is not correct to assume that the Williamson rule is inapplicable whenever the general statute contains an element not found within the four corners of the special law. Rather, the courts must consider the context in which the statutes are placed. If it appears from the entire context that a violation of the special statute will commonly result in a violation of the general statute, the Williamson rule may apply even though the elements of the general statute are not mirrored on the face of the special statute.

Authority:

People v. Murphy (2011) 52 Cal.4th 81, 8

Discretion, Racial Justice Act, Standard of review, Statutory interpretation

Case: 000271

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The petition for writ of habeas corpus, construed as a petition for mandate, is granted. The defendant filed a petition under the Racial Justice Act (RJA) to challenge his conviction of 25 years earlier. He petition contained statistical data showing that the prosecution charged far more Black defendants for specified offenses than White defendants in that same three-year period. He sought counsel in his petition. The trial court denied it in its entirety.

The trial court erred in ruling that the defendant had to make a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief to secure appointment of counsel. Rather, to obtain counsel, the Racial Justice Act requires habeas petitioners to plead a plausible allegation of a violation of the Act. Second, the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s request for counsel was erroneous because regardless of whether he satisfied the minimal pleading standard governing that request, the court was unaware of its discretion to grant him leave to amend the petition to plead a plausible allegation of a Racial Justice Act violation. Lastly, the trial court erred in invoking the prohibition on successive habeas petitions because the defendant was not required to address procedural bars to relief at this initial stage of the proceedings.

First Holding:

When the issue on review is purely legal, such as the proper interpretation and application of a statute or constitutional provision, our review is de novo. Our fundamental task in interpreting a statute is to ascertain the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate its purpose. We begin with the text of the statute and give the words their usual meaning while construing them in light of the statutory framework as a whole. If the statutory language is unambiguous, then its plain meaning controls. If the language permits more than one reasonable interpretation, courts may consider other aids, such as the statute’s purpose, legislative history, and public policy. Discretionary decisions by the trial court are generally subject to appellate review under the abuse of discretion standard to determine if they were within the bounds of some applicable legal criteria.

Authority:

In re Lugo (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1535

People v. Carter (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 960, 967

People v. Hodge (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 985, 998

Second Holding:

In 2020, the Legislature enacted the Racial Justice Act. The purpose of the Act is to purge racial discrimination from our criminal justice system, and to ensure that race plays no role at all in seeking or obtaining convictions or in sentencing’. In passing the Act, the Legislature recognized that racial bias persists in our criminal justice system because courts generally only address racial bias in its most extreme and blatant forms. The Act acknowledges that all persons possess implicit biases that impact the criminal justice system, and these biases tend to disfavor people of color. The RJA added section 745, which sets forth legal standards governing a claim for relief under the Act. The Act also amended section 1473, which identifies bases for prosecuting a petition for writ of habeas corpus, to add a subdivision governing the litigation of RJA claims.

Authority:

PEN 745

PEN 1473

McIntosh v. Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 33, 39, 43

People v. Lawson (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 990, 993

Third Holding:

In the legislation amending section 1473(e) effective January 1, 2026, the Legislature emphasized the extremely low showing a petitioner must make to obtain counsel:  “The Act’s threshold to secure counsel is extremely low, and yet courts have denied counsel to litigants raising Racial Justice Act claims far more than they have appointed counsel The Legislature reaffirms that the threshold showing for appointment of counsel does not require a prima facie showing, as correctly held by McIntosh v. Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 33, and should be construed as a minimal pleading requirement.”

Authority:

McIntosh v. Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 33

Fourth Holding:

If the Legislature amends or reenacts the statute without changing the interpretation placed on that statute by the courts, the Legislature is presumed to have been aware of, and acquiesced in, the courts’ construction of that statute.

Authority:

People v. Brown (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1430, 1436

Fifth Holding:

The statute now requires the appointment of counsel for an indigent habeas petitioner if the petition pleads a plausible allegation of a violation of RJA, and obligates the court to determine if the petitioner has made a prima facie showing, instead of a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief.

Authority:

McIntosh v. Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 33, 39, 44

Sixth Holding:

The trial court’s denial of the defendant’s request for appointment of counsel was erroneous because the court was unaware of its discretion to permit him to amend his petition to satisfy the minimal pleading burden governing his request for counsel. If the court’s decision is influenced by an erroneous understanding of applicable law or reflects an unawareness of the full scope of its discretion, the court has not properly exercised its discretion under the law. Therefore, a discretionary order based on an application of improper criteria or incorrect legal assumptions is not an exercise of informed discretion and is subject to reversal. Simply stated, an abuse of discretion arises if the trial court based its decision on impermissible factors or on an incorrect legal standard.

Authority:

People v. K.D. (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 1, 19

Amelioration, Duty of the court, Sentencing, Statutory interpretation

Case: 000266

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

At the hearing on the defendant’s petition for recall of sentence under section 1172.75, the trial court struck some of the enhancements, but resentenced him to a life term on the balance under the Three Strikes Law as before. Under subsequently decided case law, the trial court should have considered imposing a sentence under the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012. The matter must be remanded for resentencing. In addition, the abstract of judgment must be corrected to including the correct custody credits.

First Holding:

Section 1172.75 provides that once the trial court has confirmed that a defendant’s current judgment includes a prior prison term enhancement that is now legally invalid, the court shall recall the sentence and resentence the defendant. In so doing, the trial court is directed to follow specific instructions while resentencing. For example, it provides that resentencing pursuant to this section shall result in a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed as a result of the elimination of the repealed enhancement, unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public safety. Resentencing pursuant to section 1172.75 shall not result in a longer sentence than the one originally imposed. In addition, when resentencing, the court shall apply any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75

Second Holding:

The court may consider postconviction factors, including, but not limited to, the disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation of the defendant while incarcerated, evidence that reflects whether age, time served, and diminished physical condition, if any, have reduced the defendant’s risk for future violence, and evidence that reflects that circumstances have changed since the original sentencing so that continued incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75

Third Holding:

In 2012, the electorate passed the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (Prop. 36), which amended the law to reduce the punishment prescribed for certain third strike defendants. The electorate additionally authorized persons presently serving an indeterminate term of life imprisonment imposed under the prior version of the Three Strikes law to seek resentencing under the amended penalty scheme by filing a petition for recall of sentence. If the petitioner would have qualified for a shorter sentence under the Reform Act version of the law, taking into consideration the disqualifying factors, section 1170.126 provides that he or she shall be resentenced pursuant to the Reform Act unless the court, in its discretion, determines that resentencing the petitioner would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. The Act, therefore, enacted two kinds of reforms: prospective, by exempting some newly-charged defendants from an indeterminate term, and retrospective, by permitting resentencing for some already convicted

Authority:

PEN 1170.126

People v. Frierson (2017) 4 Cal.5th 225, 231

Fourth Holding:

In Guevara, the California Supreme Court addressed the question of whether a full resentencing under section 1172.75 also permitted the trial court to consider resentencing in accordance with the Reform Act. It held that, as a matter of constitutional avoidance, section 1172.75 must be construed as incorporating the public safety determination under section 1172.126 as a condition for nonserious, nonviolent felony offenders to obtain the benefit of the Reform Act during resentencing.

The court noted that the voters’ intention in passing the Reform Act, particularly by including the requirement of whether resentencing poses an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, was to strike a balance between reform and safety, and such an intention would be honored by interpreting section 1172.75 as incorporating section 1170.126’s public safety override. Therefore, if a defendant demonstrates eligibility under the Reform Act at a section 1172.75 resentencing, the trial court must first determine whether resentencing the defendant under the revised provisions of the Reform Act would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. If no such risk is demonstrated, the court shall resentence the defendant pursuant to the revised penalty provisions of the Reform Act.

[GARY NOTE: Proposition 47 in 2014 included a definition of “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” that was much more specific and more restrictive on what qualified as such than the undefined same language contained in the Proposition 36, the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012. Because Proposition 36 was an initiative, it cannot be amended by the Legislature except as state in Proposition 36. Section 1172.75’s enactment does not qualify to amend Proposition 36. Therefore, the more restrictive definition in PC 1170.18, enacted by Proposition 47, is not the measure for determining whether relief would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. Instead, the standard arising from Proposition 36 applies. Although not in conjunction with section 1172.75, the Supreme Court has previously determined that the more restrictive definition enacted in Proposition 47 did not change the broader standard enacted by Proposition 36 two years earlier. See People v. Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347]

Authority:

People v. Superior Court (Guevara) (2025) 18 Cal.5th 838

People v. Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347

Fifth Holding:

At the conclusion of the resentencing proceedings, the trial court indicated that it did not need credits; as a result, the number of credits on the abstract of judgment was left blank with a note indicating that “CDCR to recalculate credits.” When a trial court resentences a defendant who is currently in custody, it must calculate and credit him with all actual days spent in custody up to that time, including time in custody after the original sentencing, as well as the conduct credits ordered at the original sentencing.

Authority:

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 37

People v. Dean (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 391, 397