Category Archives: Effective assistance of counsel

Duty of counsel, Effective assistance of counsel, Sentencing

Case 000616

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The judgment is affirmed as to all verdicts and findings made at trial, but the sentence is vacated and the cause is remanded for a new sentencing hearing. The defendant’s attorney’s assistance was ineffective by counsel’s failure to argue a statutory mitigatory factor at the sentencing hearing.

First Holding:

When an enhancement is pleaded and proven, the sentencing court is ordinarily presented with a binary choice: impose the additional punishment or strike/dismiss the enhancement.

Section 1385(c) provides, in pertinent part, that notwithstanding any other law, the court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so, except if dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited by any initiative statute.

In exercising that discretion, section 1385 lays out nine factors in mitigation for the court to consider and afford great weight to. Proof of one or more of the listed circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, in the absence of a finding that dismissal would endanger public safety.

One of the listed circumstances (1385(c)(2)(B)) is “Multiple enhancements are alleged in a single case. In this instance, all enhancements beyond a single enhancement shall be dismissed.” Rules of Court, rule 4.423(b)(1) mirrors that mitigation factor.

Authority:

PEN 1385(c)

People v. Lopez (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 355, 364

Second Holding:

If the sentencing court does not conclude that dismissal would endanger public safety, then mitigating circumstances strongly favor dismissing the enhancement. This means that, absent a danger to public safety, the presence of an enumerated mitigating circumstance will generally result in the dismissal of an enhancement unless the sentencing court finds substantial, credible evidence of countervailing factors that may nonetheless neutralize even the great weight of the mitigating circumstance, such that dismissal of the enhancement is not in furtherance of justice.

Authority:

People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1036

Third Holding:

A defense attorney who fails to adequately understand the available sentencing alternatives, promote their proper application, or pursue the most advantageous disposition for his client may be found incompetent.

Authority:

People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 350

Fourth Holding:

To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that (1) counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, and (2) counsel’s deficient performance was prejudicial.

Reviewing courts must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance because it is all too easy to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable in the harsh light of hindsight.

Because the presumption of counsel’s competence can typically be rebutted only with evidence outside the record, ineffective assistance claims are normally raised in habeas corpus proceedings where such evidence can be presented. Defendants who present IAC claims on direct appeal bear a heavy burden. If the record on appeal sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged, the claim must be rejected unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or there simply could be no satisfactory explanation.

Put differently, where counsel’s trial tactics or strategic reasons for challenged decisions do not appear on the record, we will not find ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal unless there could be no conceivable reason for counsel’s acts or omissions.

Authority:

People v. Scott (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1188, 1211

Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687–688, 691–692

In re Scott (2003) 29 Cal.4th 783, 811–812

People v. Arce (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 924, 930

People v. Garcia (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 887, 900

People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1189

People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 926

Fifth Holding:

Defendant’s trial counsel did not file any sentencing memoranda. Assuming counsel was aware of the relevant sentencing laws concerning multiple enhancements, counsel nevertheless failed to promote their proper application and pursue the most advantageous disposition for his client. Counsel also failed to object to the erroneous contention in the probation report, and in the prosecutor’s argument at sentencing, that there were no mitigating circumstances. There is no conceivable strategic or tactical explanation for counsel’s omissions.

Authority:

People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 351

Sixth Holding:

When a stay of punishment is required under section 654, a trial court has discretion to choose which count will serve as the principal term without regard to the longest potential term of imprisonment. Here, the court stated its intention to use count 1 as the principal term before defense counsel presented his arguments at the sentencing hearing. The attorney was thus aware defendant’s prison term would be based on the offense that included two enhancement findings.

We are unable to conceive of a rational, tactical reason for counsel’s failure to request the dismissal of at least one enhancement pursuant to section 1385(c)(2)(B).

Authority:

People v. Caparaz (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 669, 688, citing sec. 654(a), as amended by AB 518 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.)

Seventh Holding:

Counsel alluded to the defendant’s childhood trauma, but only in a passing reference to the diagnosis mentioned in the probation report. He made no effort to link that potential mitigating circumstance to the offense. As made plain by the statutory text, the mere fact a defendant has suffered past trauma is insufficient—such trauma must be a contributing factor in the commission of the offense for the low term presumption to apply.

Authority:

People v. Knowles (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 757, 765

Eighth Holding:

In the context of appellate representation, where appellate counsel fails to raise a significant and obvious issue, the failure will generally be considered deficient performance under Strickland if the missed issue is clearly stronger than those presented. Similar reasoning can be applied to the performance of defendant’s trial counsel at sentencing. Advocating for dismissal of an enhancement under section 1385(c)(2)(B) would have been an objectively stronger argument, by a wide margin, than the generalized request for leniency based on defendant’s educational achievements.

Authority:

In re Hampton (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 463, 477

Ninth Holding:

Objections can be made during and even after the formal pronouncement of judgment. Once it became clear the court was imposing the middle term, defense counsel had nothing to lose by pointing out the applicability of section 1385(c)(2)(B). At the very least, doing so would have preserved the issue for appellate review.

Failure to present any objections or argument regarding section 1385 fell below the minimum standards of performance required of a defense attorney.

Authority:

People v. Gonzalez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 745, 755

People v. Steele (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 212, 226 [finding forfeiture where defendant did not object either before or after pronouncement of sentence, despite the opportunity to do so]

Tenth Holding:

Prejudice flowing from ineffective assistance is established by showing there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. The burden requires more than speculation as to the effect of the errors or omissions of counsel. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.

Authority:

Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 694

People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 883, 937

Effective assistance of counsel, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 000573

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

A remand for resentencing is required because the defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel by reason of defense counsel’s failure to raise his mental health issues as a mitigating factor at the time of sentencing, despite there having been considerable evidence introduced during pretrial proceedings that the defendant had mental health issues, including a finding under section 1372 that he was incompetent to stand trial, whereupon he was committed to a state hospital until his competency was deemed restored three months later.

First Holding:

Defense counsel should have pointed out that there was evidence suggesting that, at least at the time of the offense, he was struggling with mental health issues. Under rule 4.423, mental illness is a mitigating factor at sentencing. Section 1385(c)(5) defines mental illness as a mental disorder as identified in the most recent edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.

That subdivision further provides that a court may conclude that a defendant’s mental illness was connected to the offense if, after reviewing any relevant and credible evidence, including, but not limited to, police reports, preliminary hearing transcripts, witness statements, statements by the defendant’s mental health treatment provider, medical records, records or reports by qualified medical experts, or evidence that the defendant displayed symptoms consistent with the relevant mental disorder at or near the time of the offense, the court concludes that the defendant’s mental illness substantially contributed to the defendant’s involvement in the commission of the offense.

The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th ed. text rev. 2022) defines an overarching new category of substance use disorders—with the specific substance used defining the specific disorders. It states that the essential feature of a substance use disorder is a cluster of cognitive, behavioral, and physiological symptoms indicating that the individual continues using the substance despite significant substance-related problems.

Authority:

Rules of Court, rule 4.423

PEN 1385(c)(5)

Second Holding:

Despite considerable evidence, defense counsel remained silent at the sentencing hearing when the trial court remarked that no mitigating circumstances had been presented.

To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show counsel’s performance was deficient and resulting prejudice, i.e., a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.

We can conceive of no reasonable tactical purpose for defense counsel’s failure to argue rule 4.423(b)(2) and (b)(4) applied in this case. We further conclude defense counsel’s omission was prejudicial. For the trial court to impose the upper term the court was required to find that there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term.

Had defense counsel raised the applicability of rule 4.423(b)(2) and (b)(4), there is a reasonable probability the court would have balanced the mitigating factors against those in aggravation and would not have imposed the upper term.

Authority:

People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009

People v. Centeno (2014) 60 Cal.4th 659, 675–676 [where there was no conceivable reasonable tactical purpose for defense counsel’s omission, defense counsel’s failure to object to prosecutorial misconduct was ineffective]

Third Holding:

Defense counsel inexplicably made no arguments regarding any mitigating factors” when arguing the Romero motion to strike his prior convictions. On remand, the defendant is free to make the arguments he believes counsel should have made.

Authority:

People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497

People v. Dryden (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 1007, 1029 [both aggravating and mitigating circumstances are relevant considerations in determining whether to strike a prior strike conviction]

People v. Jones (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 37, 46 [on remand for resentencing, full resentencing is appropriate]

People v. Ramirez (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 55, 64 [When a case is remanded for resentencing by an appellate court, the trial court is entitled to consider the entire sentencing scheme]

Discretion, Effective assistance of counsel, Elements of crime, Sentencing

Case 000558

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The restitution amount is wrong, and the protective order is unauthorized.

First Holding:

Appellant contends changes to section 1001.36 that went into effect after she was denied pretrial diversion apply to her case. We agree. Appellant further contends this matter should be conditionally reversed and remanded so the trial court can exercise its discretion to determine her motion for pretrial diversion in light of the amendment. We disagree.

Appellant has forfeited this claim. Frahs, decided in 2020, made clear that recently enacted section 1001.36 applied in nonfinal cases. Thus, when the law was amended effective January 1, 2023, appellant should have known the amendments applied retroactively. Once the law was amended, appellant had more than three months before she pled and more than seven months before she was sentenced to seek reconsideration of the trial court’s denial of diversion. She did not.

Authority:

People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 631-632

People v. Doron (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1, 6

People v. Trujillo (2015) 60 Cal.4th 850, 856

People v. Brown (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 113, 128 [failure to seek reconsideration excused where amendment to statute effective after entry of plea but only 10 days before sentencing]

Second Holding:

In order to establish a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that his or her counsel’s performance was deficient, and that the defendant suffered prejudice as a result of such deficient performance. The record is silent, however, why defense counsel failed to seek reconsideration under the amended law.

It is possible that counsel was unaware of the newly passed statute. It is also possible, however, that counsel had sound reasons not to pursue the issue. For example, appellant may have changed her mind and decided to refuse to accept the treatment required for participation in the diversion program. Because trial counsel’s reasons for not raising the issue are not readily apparent, the issue is more appropriately considered in a habeas corpus proceeding.

Authority:

People v. Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th 181, 198

Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687-692

People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266-267

People v. Wilson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 926, 936

Third Holding:

We review the trial court’s restitution order for abuse of discretion. We apply the substantial evidence standard in a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence to support a factual finding necessary for a victim restitution order. Sentencing judges are given virtually unlimited discretion as to the kind of information they can consider and the source from whence it comes because a hearing to establish the amount of restitution does not require the formalities of other phases of a criminal prosecution. The court may use any rational method of fixing the amount of restitution as long as it is reasonably calculated to make the victim whole. It may make a restitution order based on truncated evidence such as declarations or probation reports, business records, and checks.

Authority:

People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 663

People v. Jessee (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 501, 507

People v. Hove (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1266, 1275

People v. Plains All American Pipeline L.P. (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 872, 898-899

Fourth Holding:

The total restitution awarded to the victim includes two computational errors. The court erroneously included a $4,520 attorney fees bill twice and included $880 for an unknown reason. We will correct those errors.

Authority:

People v. Smith (2001) 24 Cal.4th 849, 854

Fifth Holding:

Section 136.2(i) authorizes a court to issue an order restraining a defendant for up to 10 years when the defendant has been convicted of a qualifying crime. Appellant’s conviction for assault with a deadly weapon under section 245 is not a qualifying crime under section 136(i). The court did not have statutory authority to issue the protective order, therefore, the order must be stricken.

Authority:

People v. Garcia (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 887, 901

Duty of the court, Effective assistance of counsel, Plea bargains, Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing

Case 000544

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

When the court set the probation term at three years instead of the agreed-on two years, the court erred in not complying with the plea bargain without permitting the defendant to withdraw from the plea agreement.

First Holding:

The standard for evaluating claims that counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance is set forth in Strickland. This standard provides that to secure reversal upon the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel under either the state or federal Constitution, an appellant must establish (1) that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, i.e., that counsel’s performance did not meet the standard to be expected of a reasonably competent attorney, and (2) that there is a reasonable probability that appellant would have obtained a more favorable result absent counsel’s shortcomings.

On direct appeal, a conviction will be reversed for ineffective assistance only if (1) the record affirmatively discloses counsel had no rational tactical purpose for the challenged act or omission, (2) counsel was asked for a reason and failed to provide one, or (3) there simply could be no satisfactory explanation. All other claims of ineffective assistance are more appropriately resolved in a habeas corpus proceeding.

Authority:

Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687–694

People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1003

People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009

Second Holding:

It is the appellant’s burden to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that his or her counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Unless an appellant establishes the contrary, we shall presume that counsel’s performance fell within the wide range of professional competence and that counsel’s actions and inactions can be explained as a matter of sound trial strategy. Further, failure to raise a meritless objection is not ineffective assistance of counsel.

Authority:

In re Thomas (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1249, 1257

People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 746

People v. Bradley (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 64, 90

Third Holding:

The defendant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to object when the trial court placed on a three-year grant of probation instead of the two-year probation term contemplated by the plea agreement. However, the order of probation is an unauthorized sentence, on which basis we reverse, rendering moot the question of ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Legislature enacted AB 1950, effective January 1, 2021, which significantly changed the law governing probation, including section 1203.1. Under the amended version of section 1203.1, the maximum term of probation a trial court may impose for most felony offenses is a period of time not exceeding two years. Whereas previous law had authorized courts to grant a period of probation not exceeding the maximum term for which the person could be imprisoned, AB 1950 instead authorizes a court to impose a term of probation not longer than 2 years, except as otherwise specified. As a general matter, the amendments of AB 1950 apply retroactively to the benefit of a person whose judgment is not yet final on appeal.

Authority:

PEN 1203.1

People v. Arreguin (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 787, 793

People v. Faial (2025) 18 Cal.5th 199, 207

People v. Prudholme (2023) 14 Cal.5th 961, 963 [modifying term of probation to conform with new law while preserving remainder of plea agreement]

Fourth Holding:

Generally, a court may not accept an unauthorized plea. Where a trial court is asked to approve an illegal plea bargain—illegal because it violates a policy condition established by the Legislature or the people through the initiative process—the proper course of action for the court is clear. It should decline to act in excess of its authority and should refuse to approve an arrangement under which it is called upon to do so. Faced with an unlawful plea bargain, a trial court should withhold approval of the bargain.

Thus, if a court has approved a plea bargain containing an illegal term, ordinarily, the recourse for a court would not be to reform the bargain to make it legal; it would be to withdraw its prior approval of the agreement. Whether by withdrawal of its prior approval or the granting of a withdrawal/rescission request by one or both of the parties, the trial court must restore the parties to the status quo ante. The parties may then enter into a new plea agreement, which will be subject to the trial court’s approval, or they may proceed to trial on the reinstated charges.

Authority:

People v. Prudholme (2023) 14 Cal.5th 961, 974

People v. Stamps (2020) 9 Cal.5th 685, 707

People v. Aragon (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 749, 756–757 [When a guilty plea is invalidated the parties are generally restored to the positions they occupied before the plea bargain was entered]

People v. Barton (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 1145, 1159

[Gary Note:

Gary note: This unpublished opinion recognizes that section 1171, effective 1/1/2025, provides that a resentencing under any ameliorative provisions cannot result in an order to set aside a plea bargain in which the sentence was specified. In other words, section 1171 appears to have overturned the Stamps decision with respect to allowing the lower court or the prosecution to set aside a plea bargain if the ameliorative provisions apply to change the sentence in a way that the prosecutor or court do not like.

This question was granted review in a published opinion in 2024 (100 Cal.App.5th 768), where it defined the issue as “Is the prosecution entitled to rescind a plea agreement when a defendant receives a full resentencing pursuant to Senate Bill No. 483 (Stats. 2021, ch. 728) and the trial court intends to reduce the sentence beyond eliminating the prior prison term enhancements?” On 12/18/2024, the Supreme Court transferred the case back to the Court of Appeal on the People’s motion for the Court of Appeal to vacate its earlier decision [which, in fact, concluded that the prosecutor could NOT rescind the agreement] and reconsider its opinion in light of the passage of AB 2483, which enacted section 1171. It also ordered the Court of Appeal’s original opinion to be depublished.

On remand, the Court of Appeal set aside its earlier opinion and issued a new opinion in which it said, “At the hearing, Montgomery may seek relief under any provision of section 1172.75, and neither the prosecutor nor the court may rescind the plea agreement due to a resulting sentence reduction.” The original Court of Appeal opinion was published, and it provides an analysis of why a review of the legislative history of AB 483 (which enacted section 1172.75)–including uncodified portions of AB 483– compelled it to conclude that Stamps did not apply. But the subsequent opinion following the Supreme Court’s transfer relied solely on section 1171, and the opinion was not published.

But Wait! There’s More!

On May 18, 2026, the Supreme Court decided People v. Mitchell (2026) 19 Cal.5th 729. It was an appeal directly from the original sentencing under section 1170, and did not arise out of a ruling on the application of any other ameliorative statutes. The question was “Does Senate Bill No. 567 (Stats. 2021, ch. 731), which limits a trial court’s discretion to impose upper term sentences, apply retroactively to defendants sentenced pursuant to stipulated plea agreements?”

The court concluded that it does apply (section 1170 as amended by SB 567), but it remanded with the Stamps remedy–that if the defendant opts to claim the benefits of section 1170 and the resulting sentence is something the DA or the court are not happy with, the plea will be set aside and the parties restored to their pre-plea bargain status.

But it contained a very important footnote:

“Shortly before oral argument, counsel for Mitchell filed a letter with this court identifying section 1171 as a new authority. Section 1171, effective January 1, 2025 (Stats. 2024, ch. 964, § 2) sets forth procedures governing a “ ‘postconviction proceeding,’ ” which the statute defines as “a proceeding to modify a sentence or conviction pursuant to an ameliorative statute. Ameliorative statutes include, but are not limited to, Sections 1170.18, 1172.1, 1172.6, 1172.7, and 1172.75.” (§ 1171, subd. (a).) At oral argument, counsel for Mitchell urged that this statutory definition broadly encompasses a remand to the trial court in the context of a direct appeal under the authority of section 1170(b) and Estrada. We decline to consider this argument because we have concluded that Mitchell is entitled to a remand under our established precedent in Stamps. We express no view on the applicability of section 1171 to this case or how it might affect the options described above. Mitchell may raise this issue in the Court of Appeal or the trial court in the first instance.”

On remand, the Court of Appeal issued its new opinion–this time unpublished–in which it further remanded the case to the trial court for resolution in light of the Supreme Court decision. And in that unpublished opinion, it stated, “We now find that Mitchell’s section 1171 arguments should be resolved first by the trial court. Accordingly, we remand this action to that court for further proceedings consistent with Mitchell II [the Supreme Court decision]. On remand, Mitchell may raise her contentions regarding section 1171.”]

Appellate Principles, Effective assistance of counsel, Fifth Amendment, Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case 000524

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

On resentencing, it was error to increase the originally-imposed $300 restitution fine to $10,000.00. It was also error to fail to recalculate the defendant’s credit for time served.

First Holding:

Although defendant arguably has forfeited the claim of error because he did not object to the sentence below, we will reach the issue because he also contends his attorney was ineffective.

Authority:

People v. Daniels (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 29, 31

Second Holding:

When a defendant successfully appeals a criminal conviction, California’s constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy precludes the imposition of more severe punishment on resentencing. Statutorily mandated restitution fines constitute punishment and there is no principled basis for excluding them from the rationale of Henderson. The restitution fine imposed pursuant to section 1202.4(b) cannot exceed the $300 originally imposed. Therefore, we remand the matter and direct the trial court to reduce the restitution fine to $300, as originally assessed.

Authority:

 

People v. Henderson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 482

People v. Jones (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1780, 1783, 1785

People v. Hanson (2000) 23 Cal.4th 355, 357

People v. Daniels (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 29, 31-32

People v. Thompson (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1276 [court directed trial court to reduce increased section 1202.4 fine to amount originally assessed]

Third Holding:

A restitution fine under section 1202.4 constitutes punishment. It is required in every case where a person is convicted of a crime unless the court finds compelling and extraordinary reasons for not doing so and states those reasons on the record. For felony convictions, the required fine is not less than $300 and not more than $10,000.

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 13

Fourth Holding:

When a trial court resentences a defendant on remand, it must credit him with all actual days he spent in custody up to that time, including his time in custody after the original sentencing. As the trial court failed to recalculate the credit for time served, the matter must be remanded for the custody credits to be recalculated.

Authority:

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 37 [the trial court, having modified defendant’s sentence on remand, was obliged, in its new abstract of judgment, to credit him with all actual days he had spent in custody]

Appellate Principles, Effective assistance of counsel, Evidence, Fifth Amendment, Sentencing

Case 000517

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

It was error to include in the restitution order reimbursement for expenses incurred by the victim that were not caused by the defendant’s criminal conduct.

First Holding:

The defendant concedes he forfeited his Fifth Amendment claim by failing to object during trial on this ground to the admission of the pretext call evidence, the prosecutor’s arguments and questions on his silence, and the adoptive admission jury instruction. We elect to address the issue in order to forestall a petition for writ of habeas corpus based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Authority:

People v. Mora and Rangel (2018) 5 Cal.5th 442, 471 [failure to object to jury instruction forfeits appellate claim of error]

People v. Adanadus (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 496, 512 [requiring timely objection to preserve prosecutorial misconduct claim]

People v. Barnum (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1210, 1224-1225, fn. 2 [claim based on privilege against self-incrimination may be forfeited]

People v. Williams (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1118, 1126

Second Holding:

The police arranged a pretext call between the victim and the defendant, during which the defendant did not deny the victim’s accusations. That evidence was presented at trial as an adoptive admission. The defendant argued that it was a violation of his rights under the Fifth Amendment, because he had previously been advised by counsel to make no statements to the victim. The People’s emphasis on the presence or absence of government coercion fails to account for the rationale underlying adoptive admissions, which is that the natural reaction of an innocent man to an untrue accusation is to enter a prompt denial.

That inference is only justified where the person is accused of having committed a crime, under circumstances which fairly afford him an opportunity to hear, understand, and to reply, and which do not lend themselves to an inference that he was relying on the right of silence guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

But advice of counsel is one form of restraint that might bar a free response by a person accused of a crime and therefore may not give rise to an inference of acquiescence or guilty consciousness as an adoptive admission. An accused’s express invocation of the right to remain silent on the advice of counsel is precisely a circumstance that may lend itself to the inference that the accused’s silence in the face of accusations stems merely from the assertion of that right.

[Gary note on the rest of the story–the appellate court proceeded to conclude that under the actual facts of the case, it was not error to allow the evidence as an adoptive admission.  I have included this holding merely for its educational value, though it did not assist this defendant.]

Authority:

People v. Simmons (1946) 28 Cal.2d 699, 712, 715–716

People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1189

Third Holding:

A victim of crime who incurs an economic loss as a result of the commission of a crime shall receive restitution directly from a defendant convicted of that crime. The trial court’s discretion in setting the amount of restitution is broad, and it may use any rational method of fixing the amount of restitution as long as it is reasonably calculated to make the victim whole. The hearing to establish the amount of restitution does not require the formalities of other phases of a criminal prosecution, and no particular kind of proof evidence is required.

Authority:

PEN 1202.4

People v. Baker (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 463, 470

People v. Lockwood (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 91, 96

Fourth Holding:

The restitution power conferred by section 1202.4 in cases where a criminal defendant is sentenced to prison is not as broad as the court’s power to order restitution as a condition of probation, which need only be reasonably related to the crime of which the defendant was convicted or to future criminality. The victim’s mother’s expense incurred for paying for the defendant’s trip to a foreign country was entirely unrelated to the defendant’s criminal conduct, as was the victim’s rideshare share expenses on the day of the crime. Those portions of the restitution order must be stricken.

Authority:

People v. Martinez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1093, 1101

Abstracts and Minutes, Appellate Principles, Effective assistance of counsel, Elements of crime, Standard of review, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence

Case 000512

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Though we find the evidence was sufficient and we affirm the jury trial convictions, there are errors in the indeterminate abstract of judgment insofar as it incorrectly reflects that two section 12022.53(b) personal use enhancements were found true. The jury found only one to be true. Also, the determinate abstract of judgment reflects the incorrect number of custody credits. There were other errors as well, but the matter must be remanded for further clarity on what should be included in the abstract of judgment.

First Holding:

This court’s role in reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence is limited. When considering a claim of insufficient evidence, we examine the entire record to assess whether any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the jury could reasonably have deduced from the evidence. Conflicts and even testimony that is subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal of a judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination depends.

We resolve neither credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts; we look for substantial evidence. A reversal for insufficient evidence is unwarranted unless it appears that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support the jury’s verdict. Additionally, when undertaking such review, our opinion that the evidence could reasonably be reconciled with a finding of innocence or a lesser degree of crime does not warrant a reversal of the judgment.

Authority:

People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 738

People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357

People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal. 4th 800, 849

Second Holding:

Robbery is the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear. The taking element of robbery itself has two necessary elements, gaining possession of the victim’s property and asporting or carrying away the loot. A thing is in the immediate presence of a person, in respect to robbery, which is so within his reach, inspection, observation or control, that he could, if not overcome by violence or prevented by fear, retain his possession of it.

Authority:

PEN 211

People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1158, 1165

People v. Hayes (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577, 626-627

Third Holding:

An act may be robbery even if the property had been taken after the victim died. While it may be true that one cannot rob a person who is already dead when one first arrives on the scene, one can certainly rob a living person by killing that person and then taking his or her property.

Authority:

People v. Navarette (2003) 30 Cal.4th 458, 499

Fourth Holding:

Defendant’s ineffective assistance claim is forfeited for failure to support his argument with analysis and citation to evidence in the appellate record.

Authority:

Rules of Court rule 8.204(a)(1)(B)(C)

People v. Harper (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1413, 1419, fn. 4 [an argument is forfeited if it is raised in a perfunctory fashion without any supporting analysis and authority]

Fifth Holding:

[GARY NOTE: The court cited no authority for its order directing correction of the abstract of judgment, likely because the need for correction of material errors is simply obvious. But the court could have cited a number of cases, a few of which I have laid out.]

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1070

People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 855

In re Black (1967) 66 Cal.2d 881, 890

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2

Abstracts and Minutes, Effective assistance of counsel, Sentencing

Case 000510

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The abstract of judgment must be corrected to reflect the correct sentence to 27 years rather than the 27 years two months as shown, and to reflect that the term imposed for one count is one-third the middle term.

First Holding:

A reviewing court may order correction of an abstract of judgment that does not accurately reflect the oral pronouncement of judgment by the sentencing court.

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

Second Holding:

As a general rule, only claims properly raised and preserved by the parties are reviewable on appeal. Our Supreme Court adopted this forfeiture rule to reduce the number of errors committed in the first instance], and the number of costly appeals brought on that basis. In the context of criminal sentencing, this forfeiture rule applies to claims involving the trial court’s failure to properly make or articulate its discretionary sentencing choices. Included in this category are cases in which the stated reasons allegedly do not apply to the particular case, and cases in which the court purportedly erred because it double-counted a particular sentencing factor, misweighed the various factors, or failed to state any reasons or give a sufficient number of valid reasons.

Authority:

People v. Smith (2001) 24 Cal.4th 849, 852

People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354

People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 235

Third Holding:

At resentencing, the defendant did not ask the trial court to strike the prior serious felony enhancements or argue that imposing both the firearm enhancement and the upper term on count 16 would result in an impermissible dual use of facts. The record contains no sentencing brief; and both defense counsel and the defendant himself responded in the negative when the trial court asked if they wished to be heard at the resentencing hearing. To preserve his claims, the defendant was required to object at resentencing. Because he did not do so, his current appellate contentions are forfeited.

Authority:

People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331,353

People v. Coleman (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 709, 723-725

Fourth Holding:

If the defendant believes that evidence outside the record would support his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the proper remedy would be a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

Authority:

People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 111

Appellate Principles, Effective assistance of counsel, Pleading

Case 000506

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Under a convoluted set of circumstances, misdemeanors were alleged in the information that were not shown at the preliminary examination. Conviction on those misdemeanors was reversed.

First Holding:

Section 1009 provides that an indictment or accusation cannot be amended so as to change the offense charged, nor an information so as to charge an offense not shown by the evidence taken at the preliminary examination. No distinction is made between felony offenses and misdemeanor offenses.

Thus, misdemeanors included in an information must be supported by a showing of probable cause at the preliminary hearing. If not, an amendment that results in a conviction of the erroneously added offense is reversible error. Permitting the two misdemeanor counts to proceed to trial as part of a felony information without having been shown at the preliminary hearing was error and requires the reversal of the convictions for counts 1 and 2.

Authority:

PEN 1009

People v. Griffith (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 943, 951

People v. Dominguez (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 858, 867–868 [conviction of improperly added charges is unquestionably prejudicial]

Second Holding:

Both parties agree that the defendant forfeited his claim on appeal by failing to object to the improper amendment before trial, but both ask us to consider the merits to avoid a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. We agree the claim was forfeited but exercise our discretion to decide the impact of the errant amendment.

Authority:

People v. Burnett (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 151, 179, 181 [concluding the issue of prosecution for an offense not shown at the preliminary hearing was waived but reversing for prejudicial ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to object with specificity because a superior court lacks authority to try a defendant for a felony charged by information with an offense not previously subjected to a preliminary hearing]

People v. McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589, 593 [neither forfeiture nor application of the forfeiture rule is automatic, and appellate courts have discretion to review otherwise forfeited challenges]

Effective assistance of counsel, Sixth Amendment, Standard of review

Case 000464

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We conclude the prosecutor prejudicially misstated the law in closing arguments and defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object. We therefore reverse the judgment as to the murder conviction and accompanying sentence. The prosecutor prejudicially misstated the law during closing arguments, andt defense counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s misstatements constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. However, because we additionally conclude that substantial evidence supported the conviction, the defendant may be retried.

First Holding:

The defendant forfeited any objection to the jury instructions by failing to object in the trial court. Generally, failure to object to a jury instruction forfeits a claim of error on appeal. Generally, a defendant may not complain on appeal of prosecutorial misconduct unless in a timely fashion, and on the same ground, the defendant objected to the action and also requested that the jury be admonished to disregard the perceived impropriety. The defendant’s failure to object will be excused if an objection would have been futile or if an admonition would not have cured the harm caused by the misconduct. The defendant’s claims are forfeited.

Authority:

People v. Mora and Rangel (2018) 5 Cal.5th 442, 471

People v. Centeno (2014) 60 Cal.4th 659, 674

Second Holding:

The defendant also asserts that his trial attorney’s failure to object to the instruction or the prosecutor’s argument constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. We therefore address the underlying claims of error in the context of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 15 of the California Constitution guarantee a criminal defendant the right to the effective assistance of counsel at trial. The ultimate purpose of this right is to protect the defendant’s fundamental right to a trial that is both fair in its conduct and reliable in its result.

Authority:

People v. Lopez (2008) 42 Cal.4th 960, 966 [a defendant is entitled to the reasonably competent assistance of an attorney acting as his diligent and conscientious advocate]

In re Lucas (2004) 33 Cal.4th 682, 721

Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687

People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 215

In re Long (2020) 10 Cal.5th 764, 773

Third Holding:

To prevail on his claim, the defendant must show that defense counsel’s omission fell below an objective standard of reasonableness in light of the professional norms prevailing when the representation took place. The defendant must also show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. The defendant need not show that counsel’s deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome in the case. It is enough to show a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.

The standard for judging counsel’s representation is a most deferential one. We must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance because it is all too easy to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable in the harsh light of hindsight. Unlike a later reviewing court, the attorney observed the relevant proceedings, knew of materials outside the record, and interacted with the client, with opposing counsel, and with the judge. Accordingly, we must reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.

Authority:

Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 688, 689, 693-694

In re Long (2020) 10 Cal.5th 764, 773-774

Fourth Holding:

Where the prosecutor is alleged to have misstated the law to the jury, this constitutes error only if (1) the prosecutor misstated the law, and (2) there is a reasonable likelihood the jury understood or applied the prosecutor’s remarks in an improper or erroneous manner. We objectively examine how a reasonable juror would likely interpret the prosecutor’s remarks, bearing in mind that we do not lightly infer that the jury drew the most damaging rather than the least damaging meaning from the prosecutor’s statements.

Authority:

People v. Collins (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 333, 340

Fifth Holding:

Where the prosecutor is alleged to have misstated the law to the jury, this constitutes error only if (1) the prosecutor misstated the law, and (2) there is a reasonable likelihood the jury understood or applied the prosecutor’s remarks in an improper or erroneous manner. We objectively examine how a reasonable juror would likely interpret the prosecutor’s remarks, bearing in mind that we do not lightly infer that the jury drew the most damaging rather than the least damaging meaning from the prosecutor’s statements.

Authority:

People v. Collins (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 333, 340

Sixth Holding:

Defense counsel did not object to the prosecutor’s repeated misstatements of the law. In general, if the record on appeal sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged, unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there simply could be no satisfactory explanation, the claim on appeal must be rejected.

Moreover, because, in general, it is inappropriate for an appellate court to speculate as to the existence or nonexistence of a tactical basis for a defense attorney’s course of conduct when the record on appeal does not illuminate the basis for the attorney’s challenged acts or omissions, a claim of ineffective assistance is more appropriately made in a habeas corpus proceeding, in which the attorney has the opportunity to explain the reasons for his or her conduct. Additionally, the decision facing counsel in the midst of trial over whether to object to comments made by the prosecutor in closing argument is a highly tactical one and a mere failure to object to evidence or argument seldom establishes counsel’s incompetence.

Here, however, we are constrained to conclude that there could be no satisfactory explanation for defense counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s repeated misstatements of the law during closing arguments. The defendant has established that defense counsel’s failure to object fell short of prevailing professional standards of reasonableness. We also conclude that he has demonstrated a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.

Authority:

People v. Wilson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 926, 936

People v. Centeno (2014) 60 Cal.4th 659, 675

People v. Stratton (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 87, 93

Effective assistance of counsel, Juveniles, Retroactivity, Sentencing

Case: 000400

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Where the defendant’s judgment was not final when Proposition 57 was passed (making major changes in the treatment of juvenile offenders as adults), and counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to seek application of Proposition 57 on appeal, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is granted, and the matter is remanded to the juvenile court to consider whether it would have transferred the case to the adult court for prosecution as an adult even under Proposition 57 (in which case, the conviction will be reinstated as of that date) or to instead proceed by juvenile adjudication (in which case the court must conduct a dispositional hearing).

First Holding:

Among other provisions, Proposition 57 amended the Welfare and Institutions Code so as to eliminate direct filing of criminal charges against a juvenile by prosecutors. Certain categories of minors can still be tried in criminal court, but only after a juvenile court judge conducts a transfer hearing to consider various factors such as the minor’s maturity, degree of criminal sophistication, prior delinquent history, and whether the minor can be rehabilitated. The provisions apply to every minor to whom it may constitutionally apply [i.e., it is retroactive to judgments that were not final prior to its passage].

Authority:

People v. Superior Ct. (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, 305-306

Second Holding:

Where a judgment that was final before Proposition 57 was passed is reopened, as when a sentence is vacated under habeas corpus, the judgment is no longer final and is subject to the provisions of Proposition 57.

Authority:

People v. Padilla (2022) 13 Cal.5th 152

Third Holding:

To establish constitutionally inadequate representation, the defendant must show that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. We defer to trial counsel’s reasonable tactical decisions in examining a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. If the record on appeal sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged, an appellate claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be rejected unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or there simply could be no satisfactory explanation. In this instance, however, the defendant’s attorney submitted a declaration that she had no tactical reason for not raising Proposition 57 on direct appeal demonstrates constitutional ineffective assistance of counsel under the standard set forth above. The defendant was prejudiced by the failure to raise the Proposition 57 issue earlier, because it provides ameliorative benefits.

Authority:

Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687

People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 925

People v. Gray (2005) 37 Cal.4th 168, 207

Discretion, Duty of the court, Effective assistance of counsel, Sentencing, Sixth Amendment

Case: 000353

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights by imposing a sentence based on aggravating circumstances that were neither admitted by him nor tried to a jury. The trial court conducted an inadequate inquiry when the defendant requested that new counsel be substituted.

[GARY NOTE: The unpublished opinion lays out several observations that it characterizes as possibly arguable deficiencies in counsel’s performance that would support a finding that it would be necessary to substitute new counsel as the defendant requested. Many of the specifics have been redacted from the filed opinion itself, as the Marsden hearing is a confidential inquiry conducted outside the presence of the prosecution and the public, and the matters stated by any participants (the defendant, the attorney for the defendant, the court) at the hearing are not subject to public disclosure.]

First Holding:

The defendant is entitled to resentencing because the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment rights by relying on aggravating circumstances based on facts that had not been admitted or tried to a jury. Although the defendant did not preserve this claim in the trial court, his failure to do so does not forfeit his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.

Authority:

People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, 47-48

Second Holding:

In Cunningham, the United States Supreme Court held that, except for prior conviction allegations, the Sixth Amendment requires any fact that exposes a defendant to a greater potential sentence to be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The sentencing scheme in effect in California at the time violated the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial because it allowed a defendant’s prison sentence to be increased beyond the statutory maximum based on facts that had not been found true beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury or admitted by the defendant. The statutory maximum, for Sixth Amendment purposes, is the maximum sentence the court may impose without finding any additional facts beyond those necessary to support the verdict. Cunningham explained that California could comply with the Sixth Amendment either by requiring jury findings for any facts necessary to impose an aggravated sentence or, alternatively, by authorizing sentencing courts to exercise broad discretion within a statutory range.

Authority:

Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270, 281, 294

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 746-747

Third Holding:

California’s current sentencing scheme (in effect at the time of the defendant’s sentencing) adopts the first option Cunningham outlined. Under section 1170(b), when a statute specifies three possible terms, the court must order imposition of a sentence not to exceed the middle term unless there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term and the facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial. After revoking the defendant’s probation, the court found in aggravation that the crime involved great violence, great bodily harm, threats of great bodily harm, and other acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, or callousness. But this aggravating factor was not admitted or otherwise proved to the trier of fact.

Authority:

Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270, 294

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 748

Fourth Holding:

We apply the rigorous Chapman standard of review to determine whether the trial court’s reliance on unproven aggravating circumstances was prejudicial. Under that standard, the violation is prejudicial unless we can conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a jury would have found true all the aggravating facts upon which the challenged sentence was based. The defendant is entitled to a remand for resentencing unless the appellate court can conclude that the omission of a jury trial was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as to every aggravating fact the trial court used to justify an upper term sentence. Put another way, the defendant is entitled to a remand unless no reasonable jury would have found in favor of the defendant as to any of the aggravating facts relied upon by the trial court. In conducting this analysis, moreover, we may not assume that the record contains all the evidence that would have been presented had the aggravating circumstances been tried to a jury.

Authority:

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 768, 775

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1087

Fifth Holding:

Further, because the court imposed an enhancement for great bodily injury under section 12022.7, it was improper to also rely on great bodily injury as a factor in aggravation for purposes of imposing the upper term, although that error is subject to harmless error analysis. The court could, without running afoul of section 1170(b)(5), rely on other aggravating circumstances independent of the great bodily injury enhancement, such as a finding that the offense involved great violence or reflected a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, or callousness.

Authority:

PEN 1170(b)(5) [a court cannot impose an upper term by using the fact of any enhancement upon which sentence is imposed under any provision of law]

Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1)

People v. Gutierrez (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1729, 1735-1736

People v. Castaneda (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 611, 614-615

Sixth Holding:

When a defendant requests that his appointed counsel be relieved and new counsel be appointed under Marsden, the trial court must give the defendant an opportunity to explain his concerns about his counsel’s performance and provide examples of deficiencies. The defendant is entitled to substitute counsel when the record clearly shows that the appointed counsel is not providing adequate representation. The trial court abuses its discretion when the defendant has shown that a failure to replace the appointed attorney would substantially impair the right to assistance of counsel. The trial court also abuses its discretion if it does not conduct an adequate inquiry into the defendant’s motion. When the defendant has identified shortcomings by counsel, the court must obtain counsel’s response and conduct any further inquiry that is needed to determine whether counsel had adequate explanations for all of the defendant’s complaints.

The critical factual inquiry in a Marsden hearing will often involve whether counsel consulted sufficiently with their client, adequately investigated the facts, and properly prepared for the relevant hearing. When the trial court’s inquiry is deficient, we remand the case for a new Marsden hearing. On this record, the trial court lacked an adequate basis to determine whether counsel had properly investigated and prepared the defendant’s mitigation case for the sentencing hearing. Likewise, we lack an adequate record to review the trial court’s denial of Marsden relief. On remand, the trial court should conduct a Marsden hearing to determine whether the defendant is entitled to substitute counsel for purposes of his resentencing.

Authority:

People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118, 123-124

People v. Taylor (2010) 48 Cal.4th 574, 599

People v. Carter (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1092, 1099, 1102-1104

People v. Ng (2022) 13 Cal.5th 448, 500

People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 488

People v. Ivans (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1654, 1666 [stating the trial court must make a careful inquiry before it can intelligently rule on the Marsden motion]