Error and/or relief
Consolidation and cross-admission of unrelated charges was improper and prejudicial under the circumstances of this case, and we will therefore reverse the judgment for possible retrial. Due to insufficient evidence of defendant’s guilt under certain murder theories presented to the jury, we will bar the prosecution from pursuing those theories in any retrial.
First Holding:
In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We presume the existence of every fact that the trier of fact could reasonably deduce from the evidence to support the judgment. To overturn a jury’s finding, it must clearly appear that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support it.
Authority:
People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331
People v. Medina (2009) 46 Cal.4th 913, 919
People v. Redmond (1969) 71 Cal.2d 745, 755
Second Holding:
First degree willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder must be committed with express malice—i.e., willfully. The remaining elements of premeditation and deliberation are generally established through the following types of evidence: (1) facts about how and what defendant did prior to the actual killing which show that the defendant was engaged in activity directed toward, and explicable as intended to result in, the killing—what may be characterized as planning activity; (2) facts about the defendant’s prior relationship and/or conduct with the victim from which the jury could reasonably infer a motive to kill the victim, and (3) facts about the nature of the killing from which the jury could infer that the manner of killing was so particular and exacting that the defendant must have intentionally killed according to a preconceived design to take his victim’s life in a particular way for a reason which the jury can reasonably infer from facts of type (1) or (2).
The evidence of premeditation and deliberation is generally sufficient when there is evidence of all three types or at least extremely strong evidence of (1) or evidence of (2) in conjunction with either (1) or (3). These factors discussed in Anderson, while helpful for purposes of review, are not a sine qua non to finding first degree premeditated murder, nor are they exclusive.
Authority:
PEN 188(a)(1)
People v. Concha (2009) 47 Cal.4th 653, 662
People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 26–27
People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1125
Third Holding:
Where, as here, offenses in separate cases meet a statutory basis for consolidation, a defendant bears the burden to make a clear showing of prejudice to establish that the trial court abused its discretion in consolidating the cases. In our review, we examine the record before the trial court when it denied defendant’s severance motion and consider: (1) the cross-admissibility of the evidence in separate trials; (2) whether some of the charges are likely to unusually inflame the jury against the defendant; (3) whether a weak case has been joined with a strong case or another weak case so that the total evidence may alter the outcome of some or all of the charges; and (4) whether one of the charges is a capital offense, or the joinder of the charges converts the matter into a capital case.
Authority:
PEN 954
People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 160-161
Fourth Holding:
We first address the charges’ cross-admissibility, because a finding of cross-admissibility generally negates the possibility of prejudice. Evidence of other crimes can be admitted to prove the offender acted according to a certain plan, or acted with a particular motive, if a degree of similarity exists between the past and present crimes so as to permit a reasonable inference that the offender must have entertained the same intent in both instances
Authority:
People v. Merriman (2014) 60 Cal.4th 1, 38
People v. Jones (2013) 57 Cal.4th 899, 926
Fifth Holding:
There exists a hierarchy, or continuum, with respect to the degree of similarity that is needed for cross-admissibility, depending upon the purpose for which introduction of the evidence is sought. To be admissible to demonstrate a distinctive modus operandi, the evidence must disclose common marks or identifiers, that, considered singly or in combination, support a strong inference that the defendant committed the crimes. To be admissible to show intent, however, the prior conduct and the charged offense need only be sufficiently similar to support the inference that defendant probably harbored the same intent in each instance. To be cross-admissible to establish motive, the offenses need not necessarily be factually similar but must share a direct logical nexus.
Authority:
Alcala v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1205, 1222
People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 392
People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 121
People v. Demetrulias (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1, 15
People v. Scheer (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1018 [the motive for the charged crime arises simply from the commission of the prior offense]
Sixth Holding:
Disputed identity is a factor to be considered in weighing the probative value of allegedly cross-admissible evidence of intent against the likelihood of undue prejudice due to its admission.
Authority:
People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 394, fn. 2
People v. Earle (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 372, 390–391
People v. King (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1301–1303
People v. Thompson (1988) 45 Cal.3d 86, 109 [to be admitted, evidence of other crimes must not contravene other policies limiting admission, such as those contained in Evidence Code section 352]