Author Archives: Gary McCurdy

Case 000649

Error and/or relief

In 2025, the trial court resentenced defendant pursuant to section 1172.75—striking the two prior prison term enhancements—and otherwise reimposed the prior judgment from 1996, including a $10,000 restitution fine. The trial court erred by reimposing the restitution fine and it must be vacated.

First Holding:

Section 1465.9(d) provides: “Upon the expiration of 10 years after the date of imposition of a restitution fine pursuant to section 1202.4, the balance, including any collection fees, shall be unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a judgment imposing those fines shall be vacated.” Resentencing does not reset the 10-year expiration of a section 1202.4 restitution fine.

Authority:

PEN 1465.9(d)

People v. Salstrom (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 596, 600-601, review granted on other grounds Mar. 11, 2026, S295038

Case 000648

Error and/or relief

The trial court must correct the minute order to accurately reflect that the defendant was committed under section Welfare and Institutions Code section 6500(c)(3) rather than under section 6500(c)(1) as shown in the minute order.

Holding:

A commitment under WIC 6500(c)(1), as erroneously reflected in the minute order, is for one year. A commitment under WIC 6500(c)(3), as ordered by the court, is for six months. Any variance between the oral pronouncement of judgment and the minute order or abstract of judgment is presumed to be clerical error, and the oral pronouncement controls. Courts have the authority to correct such clerical errors at any time.

Authority:

WIC 6500

People v. Mesa (1975) 14 Cal.3d 466, 471

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 186–187

Case 000647

Error and/or relief

The court should have granted the defendant’s motion to vacate the restitution fine, which was more than 10 years old.

First Holding:

Effective January 1, 2025, AB 1186 (Stats. 2024, ch. 805, sec. 1) amended section 1465.9 to add subdivision (d). The statute now provides: “Upon the expiration of 10 years after the date of imposition of a restitution fine pursuant to section 1202.4, the balance, including any collection fees, shall be unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a judgment imposing those fines shall be vacated.”

Authority:

PEN 1465.9(d)

Second Holding:

Defendant’s restitution fine was effectively vacated when section 1465.9(d) went into effect. The defendant’s motion, however, was filed a few months before the law took effect. For the statute to apply, it is not clear that a motion is even required, as the law declares the fine uncollectible and that any portion of a judgment imposing those fines is to be vacated. In the interests of judicial economy, we will direct the trial court to correct the abstract of judgment to reflect that the restitution fine has been vacated.

Authority:

In re Mattison (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 1062, 1069

Case 000646

Error and/or relief

On resentencing under section 1172.75, the court should have vacated the restitution fine, as it was more than 10 years old.

Holding:

Effective January 1, 2025, AB 1186 (Stats. 2024, ch. 805, sec. 1) amended section 1465.9 to add subdivision (d). The statute now provides: “Upon the expiration of 10 years after the date of imposition of a restitution fine pursuant to section 1202.4, the balance, including any collection fees, shall be unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a judgment imposing those fines shall be vacated.” The resentencing pursuant to section 1172.75 did not restart section 1465.9’s 10-year clock anew.

Authority:

PEN 1465.9(d)

People v. Salstrom (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 596, 600, review granted and briefing deferred on a different issue, March 11, 2026, S295038

Case 000645

Error and/or relief

As to the section 1172.6 petition, the trial court denied the petition. This ruling was in error because the record of conviction does not establish as a matter of law that the defendant is ineligible for relief.

First Holding:

Under Penal Code section 1172.6, a defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing unless the record of conviction at the prima facie stage conclusively refutes—as a matter of law—defendant’s claim that he was convicted of a homicide offense under a now invalid legal theory.

Authority:

People v. Ervin (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 90, 101

Second Holding:

In reviewing any part of the record of conviction at this preliminary juncture, a trial court should not engage in factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.

Authority:

People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 972

Third Holding:

On the plea form in 1994, the defendant stated that he was both an aider and abettor and the shooter. These statements are internally inconsistent. A defendant cannot be both an aider and abettor, and a direct perpetrator (the shooter). The defendant’s admission to the personal use of a firearm does not resolve the issue because a defendant can personally use a firearm without shooting it (e.g., brandishing a firearm).

Authority:

PEN 31

People v. Arzate (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 390, 400

Fourth Holding:

While we could reject his statement that he was an aider and abettor and accept his statement that he was the shooter, we cannot engage in judicial discretion at the prima facie stage.

Authority:

People v. Garcia (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1756, 1771 [an exercise of discretion means different courts may reasonably arrive at different decisions, even on the same facts]

Fifth Holding:

We review de novo a trial court’s denial of a section 1172.6 petition at the prima facie stage. Appellate courts also interpret statutes under a de novo standard.

Authority:

People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 52

John v. Superior Court (2016) 63 Cal.4th 91, 95

Sixth Holding:

Generally, a person may be liable for a crime either as a direct perpetrator or as an aider and abettor. A person can be held liable for crimes that were intentionally aided and abetted (target offenses); a person can also be held liable for any crimes that were not intended but were reasonably foreseeable (nontarget offenses). Liability for an intentional, target offense is known as direct aider and abettor liability; liability for an unintentional, nontarget offense is known as the natural and probable consequences doctrine.

Authority:

PEN 31

People v. Laster (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1450, 1462–1463

People v. Montes (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1055

Seventh Holding:

Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature narrowed accomplice liability theories for murder and attempted murder.The Legislature eliminated natural and probable consequences liability for murder as it applies to aiding and abetting, and limited the scope of the felony-murder rule. The Legislature also created a special procedural mechanism for those convicted under the former law to seek retroactive relief under the law as amended.

Authority:

People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957

People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708

Eighth Holding:

Direct aider and liability is still a valid legal theory for homicide offenses after the Legislature amended sections 188 and 189. We have generally described the requisite mens rea for direct aiding and abetting as knowledge of the direct perpetrator’s unlawful intent and an intent to assist in achieving those unlawful ends.

Authority:

People v. Medrano (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 177, 183

People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 468

Ninth Holding:

Under section 1172.6, if the petitioner makes a prima facie showing, the trial court must issue an order to show cause and conduct an evidentiary hearing. At the prima facie stage, the trial court examines the underlying record of conviction, but the court should not engage in factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.

Authority:

People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 972

Tenth Holding:

The trial court accepts the petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary assessment regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if his or her factual allegations were proved. The court may consider jury instructions, jury verdicts, and other documents that are part of the record of conviction to determine whether the petitioner satisfies the conditions for relief.

If the record, including the court’s own documents, contains facts refuting the allegations made in the petition, then the court is justified in making a credibility determination adverse to the petitioner at the prima facie stage. For example, if the record of conviction irrefutably establishes as a matter of law that the jury determined that the petitioner was the actual killer, the trial court may properly deny the petition at the prima facie stage.

Authority:

People v. Flores (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 1164, 1170

People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971

People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 56, 60

Eleventh Holding:

When a petitioner’s conviction results from a guilty plea, the record of conviction includes facts “the defendant admitted as the factual basis for a guilty plea. And when a defendant pleads guilty, he or she admits every element of the charged offense. However, in a section 1172.6 petition at the prima facie stage, the court may ordinarily only consider the facts the defendant has stipulated to as part of the guilty plea to determine the theory under which the defendant was convicted.

Authority:

People v. Gallardo (2017) 4 Cal.5th 120, 136

People v. Rivera (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 217, 234

People v. Davenport (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 476, 484

Twelfth Holding:

The defendant’s ambiguous statement in his felony plea form that he was both an aider and abettor and the shooter does not refute as a matter of law his later averment in his section 1172.6 petition that he was convicted as an aider and abettor under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. In order to resolve the defendant’s factual claim there must be an evidentiary hearing.

Authority:

People v. Ervin (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 90, 101