Error and/or relief
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The defendant must be resentenced in light of enhancement-related errors and that the minute order from the bench trial on the defendant’s prior convictions requires correction. Therefore, we remand for resentencing and direct the minute order to be corrected.
Several of the errors raised involve the trial court’s exercise of discretion and were forfeited by the defendant’s failure to object below. Nonetheless, we have doubts about whether the trial court in fact exercised its discretion in failing to impose certain enhancements and making other sentencing choices, especially given discrepancies between the court’s tentative sentences and its final sentences. There also appears to be at least one error resulting in an unauthorized sentence that the parties do not raise. Under these circumstances, we find it appropriate to remand for both defendants to be fully resentenced so that the court can ensure the sentences reflect its intent in accordance with the law.
People v. McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589, 594
In re G.C. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 1119, 1130
Weapon enhancements must be either imposed consecutively or stricken. Such an enhancement cannot be imposed concurrently.
PEN 1385
PEN 12022
Unless stricken, prior-serious-felony and prior-prison-term enhancements are added once to each count on which an indeterminate term is imposed and once for the combined counts on which an aggregate determinate term has been imposed.
People v. Tua (2018) 18 Cal.App.5th 1136, 1141
People v. Minifie (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1256, 1260
A sentencing court may not impose terms for both a prior-serious-felony enhancement and a prior-prison-term enhancement that are based on the same underlying conviction.
People v. Scully (2021) 11 Cal.5th 542, 612
If a prior-conviction enhancement or punishment for it is stricken in the interest of justice, the enhancement should not also be imposed and stayed under section 654.
People v. Tang (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 1003, 1008–1009
The trial court should ensure that it sufficiently explains its discretionary sentencing choices on the record.
Rules of Court, rule 4.406
There were several errors in the minute order that must be corrected.
[Gary note: The court did not cite any authority for its directive that the abstract be corrected, but the law is very clear that it has that authority. I have cited some cases that the court could have relied on.]People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185
People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1070
People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 855
In re Black (1967) 66 Cal.2d 881, 890
People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385
People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2
The trial court erred in instructing the jury that implied malice murder can be based on an act that was reasonably foreseeable to cause death rather than highly likely to cause death. The prosecutor erred by making arguments to the jury on the same point. The defendant’s convictions on the counts of murder are reversed. The charges may be retried on remand. [The defendant was convicted as a result of the death of three occupants of a vehicle he crashed into while he was driving under the influence.]
Malice may be implied when a defendant does an act with a high probability that it will result in death and does it with a base antisocial motive and with a wanton disregard for human life. The trial court erred here by requiring only that death be a reasonably foreseeable consequence of appellant’s act, rather than a highly probable one. Similarly, the prosecutor erred by arguing to the jury that it need not find that appellant’s act of driving impaired created a strong probability of death.
People v. Dellinger (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1212, 1219
When the trial court misinstructs the jury on an element of a charged crime, we consider prejudice under the standard of Chapman. Under that standard, we reverse the judgment unless the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18
People v. Hendrix (2022) 13 Cal.5th 933, 942
There was insufficient evidence to prove beyond reasonable doubt that defendant’s prior strikes were based on separate criminal acts, and we remand for resentencing on that basis.
If two strike offenses are based on a single act, the court must dismiss one of the strikes. Prior convictions for multiple criminal acts committed in a single course of conduct may be treated as separate strikes, so long as the convictions are not so closely connected that treating them as separate strikes would be contrary to the spirit of the Three Strikes law. Because we conclude that the record does not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s state robbery and federal bank robbery convictions were based on separate criminal acts, the matter must be remanded for retrial on the priors and full resentencing.
People v. Vargas (2014) 59 Cal.4th 635, 638
People v. Benson (1998) 18 Cal.4th 24, 35
People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893 [When part of a sentence is stricken on review, on remand for resentencing a full resentencing as to all counts is appropriate, so the trial court can exercise its sentencing discretion in light of the changed circumstances.]
At the retrial, the People may produce evidence to prove that the second and third prior strike allegations were based on separate criminal acts than the fourth prior strike allegation.
People v. Fielder (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1221, 1234 [Retrial of prior conviction findings is not barred by the state or federal prohibitions on double jeopardy even when a prior conviction finding is reversed on appeal for lack of substantial evidence]
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The trial court imposed an indeterminate sentence of 50 years to life for the murders, plus a determinate sentence of 23 years, 4 months, which included a one-year term for burglary and a 16-month term for attempted robbery. The terms for the burglary and attempted robbery should have been stayed under section 654. The judgment is modified to stay the terms imposed for burglary and attempted robbery.
The terms for the burglary and attempted robbery should have been stayed under section 654, which prohibits punishment for two crimes arising from a single, indivisible course of conduct. This means that if all of the crimes were merely incidental to or were the means of accomplishing or facilitating a single objective, the defendant may receive only one punishment.
PEN 654
People v. Islas (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 116, 129
The abstract of judgment erroneously included the court operations fee and the criminal conviction fee that the trial court waived. The abstract of judgment should be modified to reflect that those fees were waived by the court.
People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185
People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1070
People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 855
In re Black (1967) 66 Cal.2d 881, 890
People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385
People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2
After the defendant was convicted, but before the judgment became final, AB 333 was enacted, and its application in defendant’s case. We vacate the gang enhancement allegation findings under section 186.22(b), and remand the matter to the trial court to permit the People to elect to retry the gang enhancements or, if the People do not so elect, for the trial court to proceed with resentencing petitioner in conformance with this opinion.
AB 333 made substantial changes to the elements of criminal gang activity. These changes apply retroactively to all cases not yet final on the effective date of AB 333, January 1, 2022. A defendant is entitled to relief under AB 333 if an appellate court affirmed the judgment, but sentencing issues were pending upon remand as of its effective date.
People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206–1207
People v. Lopez (2025) 17 Cal.5th 388
The court sentenced the defendant to a term of 15 years to life for the crime of attempted murder with premeditation. The correct sentence for that offense requires the defendant to serve only seven years before parole eligibility. The sentence imposed on count 2 for attempted murder is reversed and the matter is remanded for resentencing only.
When the punishment for attempted murder is a life term, the defendant must be confined for at least seven years before parole eligibility.
[GARY NOTE: The opinion does not specify why attempted murder in this case carries a sentence of life. The crime is described in the opinion simply as attempted murder. However, the normal sentence for attempted murder is a determinate term of five, seven, or nine years, unless it is pleaded and proved that the murder attempted was willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder, per Penal Code section 664(a). Given that the trial court imposed an indeterminate term, I must assume that the attempted murder qualified for a life sentence, in which case section 3046 requires a minimum of seven years, not fifteen years, before parole eligibility.]PEN 3046(a)(1)
We review the length of the defendant’s attempted murder sentence de novo, as it involves an issue of statutory construction.
People v. Jefferson (1999) 21 Cal.4th 86, 94
The trial court is directed to prepare a corrected abstract of judgment to reflect that the defendant received two consecutive five-year enhancements for prior serious felony convictions under section 667(a)(1), rather than one 10-year enhancement. The trial court is further directed to forward a copy of the corrected abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
The abstract of judgment erroneously reflects that the defendant received one 10-year enhancement under section 667(a)(1) for a prior serious felony conviction. We accordingly direct the trial court to prepare a corrected abstract reflecting that the trial court imposed two consecutive five-year serious felony enhancements.
People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185-187
Earlier, the defendant pleaded guilty to the first degree murder and admitted a firearm enhancement, admitting that he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm and proximately caused great bodily injury and death to another person, who is not an accomplice. The trial court denied his petition for resentencing under section 1172.6 at the prima facie stage. He has not, at this juncture, made a prima facie case for relief under section 1172.6 in light of the record of conviction. Out of an abundance of caution, we remand the matter to the trial court with directions for that court to consider an amended petition should the defendant, within 30 days of that remand, seek to file one.
In 2018, the Legislature enacted SB 1437 to modify accomplice liability for murder and the felony-murder rule. It eliminated natural and probable consequences liability for murder as it applies to aiding and abetting, and limited the scope of the felony-murder rule. Section 1172.6 is the new law’s procedure allowing people convicted of murder under the old law to petition for an order vacating their convictions and resentencing them on remaining counts if they could not now be convicted because of the changes made to sections 188 and 189 by SB 1437.
People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 563, 569–570
People v. Mares (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1158, 1164
Regarding the prima facie stage, the court takes petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary assessment regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if the factual allegations were proved. If so, the court must issue an order to show cause. A court should not reject the petitioner’s factual allegations on credibility grounds without first conducting an evidentiary hearing. However, if the record, including the court’s own documents, contains facts refuting the allegations made in the petition, then the court is justified in making a credibility determination adverse to the petitioner.
People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 563
In reviewing any part of the record of conviction at this preliminary juncture, a trial court should not engage in factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion. The preliminary hearing transcript preceding a guilty plea is part of the record of conviction that may be consulted at the prima facie stage. When, as here, the petitioner’s conviction resulted from a guilty plea rather than a trial, the record of conviction includes the facts the defendant admitted as the factual basis for a guilty plea. It also includes the petitioner’s express admissions at the plea colloquy.
People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 564, 568-569
People v. Glass (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 922, 927
We review the denial of a petition at the prima facie stage de novo.
People v. Saavedra (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 444, 447
As in Patton, and out of an abundance of caution, we will grant the defendant’s request to remand the matter to permit him to plead additional facts. We therefore will order a remand to the trial court with directions for that court to consider an amended petition should the defendant, within 30 days of that remand, seek to file one.
People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 569-570
We vacate defendant’s sentence and remand for full resentencing. The trial court abused its discretion when declining to fully strike the firearm enhancement or strike it and impose a lesser firearm enhancement. The trial court errantly focused only on the defendant’s past and present danger to public safety, and not whether striking the enhancement would endanger public safety in the future. The trial court erred in deciding whether striking the enhancement would endanger public safety because, as the record of the sentencing hearing indicates, it focused solely on defendant’s past conduct and the circumstances of the murder. In the context of section 1385, the key question is forward looking—whether striking the enhancement would likely endanger public safety. Thus, even if the trial court struck the enhancement, the defendant would still be serving an indeterminate 15-to-life term with parole eligibility subject to the Parole Board and Governor’s review. The trial court must consider this future-looking issue for purposes of public safety.
A trial court’s decision not to dismiss an enhancement pursuant to section 1385 is reviewed for abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion arises if the trial court based its decision on impermissible factors or on an incorrect legal standard. A court acting while unaware of the scope of its discretion is understood to have abused it.
People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 298
People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215, 225
People v. Tirado (2022) 12 Cal.5th 688, 694 [reminding that a defendant is entitled to sentencing decisions made by a court exercising informed discretion]
Effective January 1, 2022,Penal Code section 1385 was amended to specify factors that the trial court must consider when deciding whether to strike enhancements from a defendant’s sentence in the interest of justice. It reads, in part, “Notwithstanding any other law, the court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so …. In exercising its discretion under this subdivision, the court shall consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove that any of the mitigating circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present. Proof of the presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety. Endanger public safety means there is a likelihood that the dismissal of the enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious danger to others.” Subparagraphs (A) to (I) list nine distinct mitigating circumstances, including, as is relevant here, subparagraph (C) where the application of an enhancement could result in a sentence of over 20 years. Subparagraph (C) states in this instance, the enhancement shall be dismissed.
PEN 1385
People v. Sek (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 657, 674
Although the current dangerousness of the defendant is an appropriate factor to consider, as it will have some bearing on whether dismissing the enhancement would endanger the public, a crucial part of the inquiry is how the dismissal of the enhancement will impact the length of the defendant’s sentence. For a defendant facing a lengthy indeterminate sentence, the inquiry should also take into account that the defendant’s release from prison is contingent on review by the Board of Parole Hearings (and for murder convictions, by the Governor), who will have the opportunity to assess the defendant’s dangerousness at that time. This future review will act as a safety valve against a release that would endanger the public and is relevant to a trial court’s analysis of whether the dismissal of an enhancement imposed on a defendant serving an indeterminate prison term will endanger public safety.
People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215, 228