Author Archives: Gary McCurdy

Appellate Principles, Elements of crime, Statutory interpretation

Case 000078

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The defendant was improperly prosecuted under Penal Code section 594, rather than Penal Code section 4600, for damaging two safety cells while on special watch. Section 594 generally prohibits malicious damage to property not one’s own in cases other than those specified by state law. In contrast, section 4600 specifically addresses the destruction or injury of jail or prison property by an inmate. Accordingly, we reverse the conviction and remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, including any retrial the People may elect to pursue.

First Holding:

The defendant’s conviction for felony vandalism under section 594 was improper, as a more specific statute was available.

Authority:

PEN 594

PEN 4600

Second Holding:

When a general statute includes conduct covered by a more specific statute, prosecution must proceed under the specific statute. This principle, known as the Williamson rule, prevents the government from circumventing legislative intent by charging a defendant under a broader statute carrying a harsher penalty.

Authority:

In re Williamson (1954) 43 Cal.2d 651, 654

People v. Murphy (2011) 52 Cal.4th 81, 86

Third Holding:

The Legislature’s intent was to exclude from section 594’s scope conduct addressed by other, more specific statutes, such as section 4600’s prohibition against damaging jail property. Reading the two provisions together gives effect to both and avoids rendering section 4600 superfluous, consistent with well-settled rules of statutory construction.

Authority:

Imperial Merchant Services Inc. v. Hunt (2009) 47 Cal.4th 381, 390 [statutes must be interpreted, if possible, to give each word some operative effect, meaning that we should not construe statutory provisions so as to render them superfluous]

Shoemaker v. Myers (1990) 52 Cal.3d 1, 22 [We do not presume that the Legislature performs idle acts, nor do construe statutory provisions so as to render them superfluous]

River’s Side at Washington Square Homeowners Assn. v. Superior Court (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1209, 1228

Appellate Principles, Jurisdiction, Sentencing

Case 000077

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

[Gary note: this is an unusual case because the defendant was allowed to appeal from a denial of his request to be resentenced under section 1172.1, a statute that specifically states “A defendant is not entitled to file a petition seeking relief from the court under this section. If a defendant requests consideration for relief under this section, the court is not required to respond.” But there was an unusual scenario in the trial court that turned it into an appealable order.]

The appellate court affirmed the denial of the request for resentencing. The defendant appealed from the trial court’s denial of his petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.1. For the reasons discussed in the opinion, the appellate court found that the trial court’s order was appealable in this instance. However, it concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to recall and resentence the defendant and affirm the order denying the defendants petition.

First Holding:

The steps taken by the court in this instance, mirroring those it would take had the petition been submitted by an entity with the right to submit a petition for recall (appointment of counsel, holding of a contested hearing, and the merits-based comments denying the request), affected the defendant’s substantial rights, and in this instance, the order is appealable.

Authority:

People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 375 [noting that even if a defendant does not have the right to petition for relief, he does have the right to invite the court to exercise its power to do so and may raise a trial court’s failure to do so on appeal]

Second Holding:

The right to appeal is statutory only, and a party may not appeal a trial court’s judgment, order or ruling unless such is expressly made appealable by statute.

Authority:

People v. Loper (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1155, 1159

Third Holding:

Ordinarily, the defendant has no right to appeal from either inaction by the court on or its denial of a defendant’s invitation to recall the sentence under section 1172.1.

Authority:

People v. Hodge (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 985

People v. Faustinos (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 687

People v. Raoy (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 991

People v. Brinson (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 1040

Fourth Holding:

While a defendant may invite the court to recall the sentence under PC 1170.1, the defendant has no right to petition for recall under section 1170.1, and the court is not required to respond to such an invitation or to consider the request at all.

Authority:

PEN 1172.1(c)

People v. Hodge (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 985

Fifth Holding:

An appellate court has an independent obligation to assure itself of its own jurisdiction.

Authority:

Doe v. Regents of University of California (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 282, 291

Defenses, Sentencing

Case 000076

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The charge for violating a protective order was barred by the statute of limitations. We therefore vacate defendant’s conviction for violating a criminal protective order but otherwise affirm the judgment.

Holding:

The misdemeanor violating a criminal protective order (sec. 166(c)(1)) must be vacated because it is barred by the applicable one-year statute of limitations.

Authority:

PEN 166(c)(1)

PEN 802

People v. Williams (1999) 21 Cal.4th 335, 338, 341

Abstracts and Minutes

Case 000075

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

For the reasons set forth below, we affirm with instructions to modify the abstract of judgment. The trial court clerk shall prepare an amended abstract of judgment to reflect appellant’s conviction of second degree murder and forward a copy to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. In all other aspects, the judgment is affirmed.

Holding:

The abstract of judgment incorrectly states that the conviction was for murder in the first degree, whereas it was actually for murder in the section degree. The People agree that an error in the classification of appellant’s conviction exists and that we have the authority to correct this error.

Authority:

People v. Taylor (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 628, 647

 

Amelioration, Sentencing

Case 000074

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

As in Patton, we grant appellant’s request to remand the matter for the opportunity to file a supplemental petition under Penal Code section 1172.6.

First Holding:

When the court makes the prima facie determination, it may rely on unchallenged, relief-foreclosing facts within a preliminary hearing transcript to refute conclusory, checkbox allegations made in a form section 1172.6 petition.

Authority:

People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549

Second Holding:

Petitioners confronting a record of conviction that demonstrates relief is unavailable have the burden of coming forward with nonconclusory allegations to alert the prosecution and the court to what issues an evidentiary hearing would entail. It follows from what we have said already that should a trial court encounter a material fact dispute, the court may not resolve that dispute at the prima facie stage and should instead grant petitioner an evidentiary hearing, assuming relief is not otherwise foreclosed.

Authority:

People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 566-567

Third Holding:

While it may be that a record can refute the allegations made in the petition, it would be somewhat imprecise to say that evidence in a preliminary hearing transcript, offered at the prima facie stage, irrefutably establishes any particular fact to any particular standard of proof. A conclusion that a record refutes an allegation at the prima facie stage is not, moreover, a conclusion about the strength of evidence in the record.

Authority:

People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 567, fn. 10

Amelioration, Sentencing, Sixth Amendment

Case 000073

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court improperly imposed upper term sentences on Counts 1 and 3, and the matter must therefore be remanded for resentencing. We agree that the defendant’s trial rights notwithstanding, the court’s reliance on his prior criminal history to impose aggravated terms was prejudicial error.

First Holding:

Section 1170(b) was amended to prohibit imposition of an upper term sentence unless aggravating circumstances justify that term and the facts underlying any such circumstance, other than a prior conviction, have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.

Authority:

PEN 1170(b)

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 742

Second Holding:

Allegations of prior convictions may be tried by the court alone and proven by certified records of conviction. Thus, the court may consider the defendant’s prior convictions in determining sentencing based on a certified record of conviction without submitting the prior convictions to a jury.

Authority:

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 742, 748

Third Holding:

Except for properly proven prior convictions or a defense stipulation, a jury finding is now required for all facts actually relied on to impose an upper term. In Erlinger, the United States Supreme Court rejected an argument that the jury trial exception to prior convictions permits a judge to find perhaps any fact related to a defendant’s past offenses, including whether he committed them on different occasions, within the meaning of the federal sentencing statute at issue. Instead, a judge may do no more, consistent with the Sixth Amendment, than determine what crime, with what elements, the defendant was convicted of. In doing so, the court reaffirmed the basic rationale of Apprendi and rejected the arguments made by the dissent and amicus curiae that, historically, when exercising their sentencing authority, judges were also presumed to have the power to find and consider nearly any fact deemed relevant to the penalty.

Authority:

Erlinger v. United States (2024) 602 U.S. 821, 843

Mathis v. United States (2016) 579 U.S. 500, 511–512

Fourth Holding:

Since Erlinger, the California Supreme Court has gone further to make it clear that Erlinger requires that any fact, beyond the bare fact of a prior conviction, that exposes a defendant to harsher punishment, must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, unless the defendant stipulates to its truth or waives a jury trial. This jury trial guarantee retains its vitality even if the inquiry is straightforward. There is no efficiency exception to the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Only when aggravating facts have been proven as the Constitution requires may the court then rely on them to conclude, in its discretion, that those facts justify an upper term.

Authority:

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1083–1084 [absent an admission or a jury trial waiver, a trial court cannot determine whether a defendant’s prior convictions were of increasing seriousness or that his probation or parole performance was poor]

Abstracts and Minutes, Discretion, Duty of the court, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 00072

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court erred in imposing the great bodily injury enhancement on count 2 because it did not afford great weight to the mitigating circumstance of the defendant’s prior victimization. The trial court applied the wrong legal standard in declining to dismiss the great bodily injury enhancement. We therefore vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing. Also, the abstract of judgment incorrectly shows murder as in the first degree and must be corrected to show that the conviction was for murder in the second degree.

First Holding:

The trial court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so. In exercising its discretion in this regard, the court shall consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove certain enumerated mitigating circumstances, and proof of the presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety. One of the listed mitigating circumstances is the current offense is connected to prior victimization or childhood trauma.

Authority:

PEN 1385

Second Holding:

Absent a finding that dismissal would endanger public safety, a court must assign significant value to the enumerated mitigating circumstances when they are present. In practice, the presence of an enumerated mitigating circumstance will generally result in the dismissal of an enhancement unless the sentencing court finds substantial, credible evidence of countervailing factors that may nonetheless neutralize even the great weight of the mitigating circumstance, such that dismissal of the enhancement is not in furtherance of justice.

Authority:

People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1038

Third Holding:

We review a trial court’s decisions under section 1385 for abuse of discretion. As relevant here, an abuse of discretion arises if the trial court based its decision on an incorrect legal standard.

Authority:

People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 298

People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215, 225

Fourth Holding:

When, as here, a sentencing court was not fully aware of the scope of its discretionary powers, the appropriate remedy is to remand for resentencing unless the record clearly indicates that the trial court would have reached the same conclusion even if it had been aware that it had such discretion.

Authority:

People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 425

Fifth Holding:

The abstract of judgment incorrectly states that the defendant was convicted of first degree murder in count 1. When issuing a new abstract of judgment after resentencing, the trial court shall correctly identify the crime in count 1 as second degree murder. [Gary note: the court did not cite any authority for its order to correct the abstract of judgment, likely because it seems so obvious. But there is authority that the court could have cited, some of which I have listed below, even though not cited in the opinion.]

Authority:

People v. Scott (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1324

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 387–388

People v. Gobert (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 676, 689

People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2

Fifth Amendment, Standard of review

Case 000071

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court should have granted the defendant’s motion to suppress his interrogation statements because he invoked his right to counsel under Miranda. His statements were involuntary and coerced. We conclude the admission of the interrogation was prejudicial. We therefore reverse his convictions and remand for retrial.

First Holding:

A custodial interrogation can come in various forms and does not require questions. The term interrogation under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. The Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent.

Authority:

Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436

Rhode Island v. Innis (1980) 446 U.S. 291, 301

Second Holding:

Miranda’s safeguards do not apply when police ask a suspect routine booking questions to secure the biographical data necessary to complete booking or pretrial services. But there is an exception to that exception: courts have recognized the potential for abuse by law enforcement officers who might, under the guise of seeking objective or neutral information, deliberately elicit an incriminating statement from a suspect.

Authority:

Pennsylvania v. Muniz (1990) 496 U.S. 582, 601

United States v. Zapien (9th Cir. 2017) 861 F.3d 971, 975

E

Third Holding:

When a police officer has reason to know that a suspect’s answer may incriminate him even routine questioning may amount to interrogation.

Authority:

United States v. Williams (9th Cir. 2016) 842 F.3d 1143, 1147

Fourth Holding:

Once a suspect states he wishes to consult with an attorney, the interrogation must stop until an attorney is present or the suspect reinitiates contact. This is a bright-line rule: it requires all questioning cease after a suspect requests counsel. This is a prophylactic rule designed to prevent police from badgering a defendant into waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights. In the absence of such a bright-line prohibition, the authorities through badgering or overreaching—explicit or subtle, deliberate or unintentional—might otherwise wear down the accused and persuade him to incriminate himself notwithstanding his earlier request for counsel’s assistance. Once a suspect invokes the right to counsel, everything changes; that is, the police can no longer engage in efforts to convince the suspect to speak to them.

Authority:

Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477, 484–485

People v. Johnson (2022) 12 Cal.5th 544, 580

Michigan v. Harvey (1990) 494 U.S. 344, 350

People v. Henderson (2020) 9 Cal.5th 1013, 1022

People v. Avalos (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 926, 932

Fifth Holding:

The error requires reversal unless it is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Authority:

People v. Elizalde (2015) 61 Cal.4th 523

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18

Sixth Holding:

We review Miranda claims under federal constitutional standards. We accept the trial court’s determination of disputed facts if supported by substantial evidence, but we independently decide whether the challenged statements were obtained in violation of Miranda. When an interview is recorded, the facts surrounding the admission or confession are undisputed and we may apply independent review.

Authority:

People v. Johnson (2022) 12 Cal.5th 544, 578

People v. Henderson (2020) 9 Cal.5th 1013, 1023

People v. Suarez (2020) 10 Cal.5th 116, 158

Abstracts and Minutes, Gary Musings

The Abstract Is Concrete

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Some Words About Abstracts Of Judgment And Minute Orders

I run across many, many cases where the abstracts of judgment and minute orders are incorrect in ways that could harm the defendants’ interests. CDCR and parole authorities are going to accept what they see on the abstract of judgment as a true and accurate account. Errors might affect an inmate’s housing and job assignments and may even result in denial of the proper calculation for good behavior and work credits, not to mention result in depletion of inmate funds for the repaying of debts no longer or never owed.  And the abstract of judgment is part of the record of conviction, which may be relied on when the prosecution decides to seek enhancements to the range available on the current offense because the defendant has been convicted of certain types of crimes in the past.  As well as when the court or jury decides whether the allegation is true.

I personally believe attorneys should obtain a copy of the abstract of judgment and minute orders–because minute orders, too, have been seen to contain errors, and they, too, can be used to guide the decisions that affect inmates–and check out their accuracy immediately. Where wrong, it should be brought to the attention of the proper person or court to get the correction.  

I do recognize that the paperwork is prepared after the sentencing hearing, so obtaining it would require a little post-judgment effort.  But errors are not uncommon.  As of the writing of this post, I have collected and summarized just under 860 unpublished opinions that have provided some sort of relief to the defendant.  In nearly 140 of those, the abstract or minute order contained information that not only was incorrect, it made the defendant’s plight appear worse than it was.  Reflecting fines due that in fact the court waived.  Misstating the crime as kidnapping when it was actually false imprisonment.  Adding years to the sentence over what was imposed.  Shorting the amount of credit for time served ordered by the court.

I’m not suggesting these errors were intentional.  They are simply a result of human error in a situation where the clerk must process tons of paperwork, often by marking a checkbox, invariably several hours or maybe days after the event took place, mixed in with several other similar events conducted on the same day.  I also recognize that the 860 “victory” cases represent roughly 38% of the total criminal cases I have looked at as of this writing, but that still reflects that about 6% of the criminal cases have abstracts of judgment or minute orders that were incorrect in a way that adversely impacted the defendant.

As an example of how something can go terribly wrong, suppose a defendant was convicted years ago of violating Penal Code section 245, which (at the time in my hypothetical) could be violated by assaulting a person EITHER by use of a deadly weapon OR by means likely to cause great bodily harm, because the then-wording of section 245 started out, “an assault upon the person of another with a deadly weapon or instrument other than a firearm or by any means of force likely to produce great bodily injury,” rather than having the two methods separated in different parts of the section as the section now reads.

Decades later, the defendant commits a robbery, only his second offense ever. If the abstract of judgment erroneously indicates that his prior violation of section 245 was by use of a deadly weapon–rather than by means of force, as it actually was (in my hypothetical)–it would appear that the defendant would have a strike, resulting in a doubled sentence. Or if the defendant’s record was a bit worse and that old conviction is seen to count toward a total of two prior strikes, he’s possibly looking at a minimum of 25 years to life, depending on the nature of the new offense. All because of an incorrect abstract of judgment “proving” that he had that as a strike. Isn’t avoiding that risk worth securing a correct abstract of judgment and related minute orders? Okay, I see I’ve bent the planks in my soapbox, so I’ll dismount, for now.

Stop the Presses! Back up on the soapbox! Since the original drafting of this  a few months ago (when I was prototyping the website on my own while the real deal was being constructed by my pro), I ran across an unpublished case (Case 000300, so it will be a while before you see that summary) where the abstract of judgment incorrectly stated the defendant had been convicted of a serious or violent felony! The appellate court has ordered its correction, but my, my! That mistake might have resulted in all sorts of problems should the defendant ever be convicted of yet another crime in the future. Sure, I’m certain there are those who think people get what they deserve and shouldn’t complain when their poor judgment results in worse punishment than the law permits. That’s not how I feel, however. There’s enough injustice out there already, and the Legislature has spoken on what the punishment may be. There’s no call for someone to be subjected to beyond what the law permits. Okay, I’m done for now. I’ve worn out the soapbox so much it couldn’t qualify for a derby.  Back to summarizing.

 

Amelioration, Appellate Principles, Duty of counsel, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 000069

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The defendant appeals from the trial court’s order denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6 on the ground he had failed to make a prima facie case for relief. Based on recent California Supreme Court authority, the defendant must be given an opportunity to file an amended petition with additional facts. We remand the matter to allow him to do so. Additionally, at the original sentencing hearing, the trial court stayed or struck the sentence on several of the counts to which he pled guilty, but failed to impose a sentence that could be stayed or struck. We therefore remand the matter to the court for the additional purpose of imposing sentence.

First Holding:

In a proceeding under Penal Code section 1172.6 for recall of sentence based on recent changes in homicide law, the preliminary hearing transcript may be considered in determining whether a prima facie showing has been made.

Authority:

People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549

Second Holding:

We review de novo a trial court’s ruling whether a defendant has made a prima facie showing with respect to a section 1172.6 petition.

Authority:

People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 52

People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549

Third Holding:

A trial court may rely on unchallenged, relief-foreclosing facts within a preliminary hearing transcript to refute conclusory, checkbox allegations, regardless of whether the defendant stipulated to the transcript as the factual basis of a plea.

Authority:

People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, at pp. 564, 569, fn. 12

Fourth Holding:

Upon conviction it is the duty of the court to pass sentence on the defendant and impose the punishment prescribed. Pursuant to this duty the court must either sentence the defendant or grant probation in a lawful manner; it has no other discretion. A sentence must be imposed on each count, otherwise if the nonstayed sentence is vacated, either on appeal or in a collateral attack on the judgment, no valid sentence will remain. Where the trial court fails to pronounce sentence on all counts, the appellate court may remand the matter to correct the unauthorized sentence on the defendant’s appeal, even if the People did not appeal.

Authority:

People v. Alford (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1468–1469

People v. Irvin (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 180, 192

Amelioration, Retroactivity, Sentencing

Case 000068

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The matter must be remanded again, this time for retrial of the section 667(a) enhancement in light of Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (AB 333), which narrowed liability for gang-related crimes.

First Holding:

Effective January 1, 2022, AB 333 amended section 186.22 to change the elements of gang offenses and enhancements by narrowing the definitions of criminal street gang, pattern of criminal activity, and what it means for an offense to have commonly benefitted a street gang.

Authority:

People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576, 583

People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206

Second Holding:

AB 333 applies to a sentencing court’s determination of whether a defendant’s conviction under the prior version of section 186.22 qualifies as a prior serious felony conviction for purposes of prior serious felony enhancements under section 667(a). Whether a prior conviction was for an offense that constitutes a felony violation of Section 186.22 is determined by applying the current version of section 186.22.

Authority:

People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576, 582-583, 607

Third Holding:

Assembly Bill No. 333 is retroactive under Estrada, meaning it applies to cases like this one where the judgment is not yet final.

Authority:

In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740

People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206-1207

Fourth Holding:

In this instance, the appellate court filed a memorandum opinion under California Standards of Judicial Administration, section 8.1(1). The Courts of Appeal should dispose of causes that raise no substantial issues of law or fact by memorandum or other abbreviated form of opinion. Such causes could include: (1) An appeal that is determined by a controlling statute which is not challenged for unconstitutionality and does not present any substantial question of interpretation or application; (2) An appeal that is determined by a controlling decision which does not require a reexamination or restatement of its principles or rules; or (3) An appeal raising factual issues that are determined by the substantial evidence rule. [Gary note: I included this tidbit simply to raise awareness of a Court of Appeals options in how opinions may be crafted.]

Authority:

California Standards of Judicial Administration, section 8.1(1)