Error and/or relief
Under Mitchell, the defendant is entitled to the retroactive provisions of SB 567 that limits the sentence to the middle term unless factors in aggravation are admitted or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, even though he had stipulated to the upper term at the time of his plea.
First Holding:
SB 567’s amendments to the statute apply retroactively to sentences imposed pursuant to stipulated plea agreements in cases that were not final on appeal. The defendant had stipulated to a suspended upper term in 2020 when he pleaded guilty. He violated probation and appeared for sentencing in 2024. He requested that the court sentence him to no more than the middle term, in light of the subsequent passage of SB 567 (which amended section 1170 to require that the middle term be imposed unless factors in aggravation were admitted or proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt).
Under Mitchell, the amendments to section 1170(b) also apply retroactively to stipulated upper term sentences imposed pursuant to plea agreements in cases not final on appeal.
Authority:
People v. Mitchell (2026) 19 Cal.5th 729, 735
Second Holding:
On remand, the defendant may either waive or invoke section 1170(b)’s requirements. If he reaffirms his acceptance of the plea bargain and waives the rights now conferred under section 1170(b), the court shall reinstate the original sentence as negotiated by the parties. If he declines to enter that waiver, in lieu of further proceedings the parties may agree to modify the existing plea bargain then seek the court’s approval of a downward departure.
Absent a modified agreement and approval, defendant’s remedy is to withdraw his assent to the bargain, in which case defendant’s plea will be set aside and the parties returned to a pre-plea posture. At that point they would remain free to renegotiate further if they choose or to proceed to trial.
Authority:
People v. Mitchell (2026) 19 Cal.5th 729, 735-736
Gary note and musings:
The opinion does not discuss footnote 9 in Mitchell, regarding the possible impact of section 1171, effective January 1, 2025. Here is the footnote:
FOOTNOTE 9. Shortly before oral argument, counsel for Mitchell filed a letter with this court identifying section 1171 as a new authority. Section 1171, effective January 1, 2025 (Stats. 2024, ch. 964, sec. 2) sets forth procedures governing a “ ‘postconviction proceeding,’ ” which the statute defines as “a proceeding to modify a sentence or conviction pursuant to an ameliorative statute. Ameliorative statutes include, but are not limited to, Sections 1170.18, 1172.1, 1172.6, 1172.7, and 1172.75.” (sec. 1171, subd. (a).) At oral argument, counsel for Mitchell urged that this statutory definition broadly encompasses a remand to the trial court in the context of a direct appeal under the authority of section 1170(b) and Estrada. We decline to consider this argument because we have concluded that Mitchell is entitled to a remand under our established precedent in Stamps. We express no view on the applicability of section 1171 to this case or how it might affect the options described above. Mitchell may raise this issue in the Court of Appeal or the trial court in the first instance.
Back to Gary: Why might this be significant? Because section 1171, if it applies, states, at subdivision (c)(3), “Any changes to a sentence shall not be a basis for a prosecutor or court to rescind a plea agreement.” Note that Mitchell involved a direct appeal from the sentencing, as did the case in this summary. Section 1171 may pertain only to postconviction proceedings, which it defines as “a proceeding to modify a sentence or conviction pursuant to an ameliorative statute. Ameliorative statutes include, but are not limited to, Sections 1170.18, 1172.1, 1172.6, 1172.7, and 1172.75.”
Mitchell left open the question facing the defendant in this summary–whether 1171 would prohibit requiring the defendant to withdraw his plea if the parties cannot come to agreement. In this case the defendant was sentenced prior to the changes requiring a jury trial on upper term factors in aggravation. Is that ameliorative legislation that comes under section 1171 (which says “include, but are not limited to”)? Or does section 1171 contemplate only the “recalled sentences” under which a new sentence is to be imposed?
When Mitchell went back to the Court of Appeal, the Court of Appeal remanded the case to the trial court and indicated the parties could battle it out in the superior court (my characterization, not the court’s) over the impact of section 1171.

