Error and/or relief
We order the protective order modified to strike [person x] as a protected person. We reject the defendant’s claim that the trial erred in not sua sponte instruction on the defense of unconsciousness.
First Holding:
Unconsciousness, if not induced by voluntary intoxication, is a complete defense to a criminal charge. For purposes of the defense, unconsciousness need not rise to the level of coma or inability to walk or perform manual movements; it can exist where the subject physically acts but is not, at the time, conscious of acting. The law presumes that a person who appears to be acting in a state of consciousness is conscious. Accordingly, the burden is on a criminal defendant to produce evidence rebutting this presumption of consciousness. If a defendant produces substantial evidence that he or she was unconscious, the trial court is obligated to instruct the jury on the theory; the failure to do so is error. In this case, the defendant did not rebut the presumption of his consciousness, and it was therefore not error for the trial court to fail to instruct the jury on unconsciousness sua sponte.
Authority:
PEN 26
People v. Halvorsen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 379, 417
People v. James (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 794, 804
Second Holding:
Unconsciousness caused by voluntary intoxication may negate specific intent, but it is not a defense to a general intent crime. Assault with a deadly weapon is a general intent crime. Reckless evasion of a peace officer is a specific intent crime.
Authority:
People v. James (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 794, 805
People v. Rocha (1971) 3 Cal.3d 893, 899
People v. Williams (2001) 26 Cal.4th 779, 788
People v. Taylor (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1195, 1203-1206
Third Holding:
We review de novo whether the trial court correctly instructed the jury.
Authority:
People v. Oropeza (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 73, 78
Fourth Holding:
A case is not authority for propositions not considered.
Authority:
People v. Chavez (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 477, 480
Fifth Holding:
Where a defendant is convicted of certain defined crimes of domestic violence, the trial may issue a protective order restraining the defendant from any contact with a victim of the crime. Such orders are limited to defendants convicted of crimes that qualify as domestic violence and where the protected person qualifies as a victim of said crimes. The trial court does not have authority to restrain a defendant from contacting a person who was not present during or otherwise suffered harm from the crime.
For instance, a protective order covering children who were present but asleep during a domestic violence incident was found to be improper in Lopez. With respect to the issuance of a legally authorized criminal protective order, we imply all findings necessary to support the judgment, and our review is limited to whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support these implied findings.
The record here contains no substantial evidence from which the trial court reasonably could conclude that [person x] was a victim of the crime subject to protection under section 136.2(i)(1).
Authority:
PEN 136.2,(i)(1)
People v. Lopez (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 227, 237
People v. Pena (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 640, 648
People v. Race (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 211, 217
People v. Delarosarauda (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 205, 212 [absent evidence from which the trial court could reasonably conclude that appellant had harmed or attempted to harm two children, the court lacked authority to issue the no-contact protective order as to the children]