Daily Archives: June 16, 2026

Amelioration, Sentencing

Case 000074

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

As in Patton, we grant appellant’s request to remand the matter for the opportunity to file a supplemental petition under Penal Code section 1172.6.

First Holding:

When the court makes the prima facie determination, it may rely on unchallenged, relief-foreclosing facts within a preliminary hearing transcript to refute conclusory, checkbox allegations made in a form section 1172.6 petition.

Authority:

People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549

Second Holding:

Petitioners confronting a record of conviction that demonstrates relief is unavailable have the burden of coming forward with nonconclusory allegations to alert the prosecution and the court to what issues an evidentiary hearing would entail. It follows from what we have said already that should a trial court encounter a material fact dispute, the court may not resolve that dispute at the prima facie stage and should instead grant petitioner an evidentiary hearing, assuming relief is not otherwise foreclosed.

Authority:

People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 566-567

Third Holding:

While it may be that a record can refute the allegations made in the petition, it would be somewhat imprecise to say that evidence in a preliminary hearing transcript, offered at the prima facie stage, irrefutably establishes any particular fact to any particular standard of proof. A conclusion that a record refutes an allegation at the prima facie stage is not, moreover, a conclusion about the strength of evidence in the record.

Authority:

People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 567, fn. 10

Amelioration, Sentencing, Sixth Amendment

Case 000073

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court improperly imposed upper term sentences on Counts 1 and 3, and the matter must therefore be remanded for resentencing. We agree that the defendant’s trial rights notwithstanding, the court’s reliance on his prior criminal history to impose aggravated terms was prejudicial error.

First Holding:

Section 1170(b) was amended to prohibit imposition of an upper term sentence unless aggravating circumstances justify that term and the facts underlying any such circumstance, other than a prior conviction, have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.

Authority:

PEN 1170(b)

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 742

Second Holding:

Allegations of prior convictions may be tried by the court alone and proven by certified records of conviction. Thus, the court may consider the defendant’s prior convictions in determining sentencing based on a certified record of conviction without submitting the prior convictions to a jury.

Authority:

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 742, 748

Third Holding:

Except for properly proven prior convictions or a defense stipulation, a jury finding is now required for all facts actually relied on to impose an upper term. In Erlinger, the United States Supreme Court rejected an argument that the jury trial exception to prior convictions permits a judge to find perhaps any fact related to a defendant’s past offenses, including whether he committed them on different occasions, within the meaning of the federal sentencing statute at issue. Instead, a judge may do no more, consistent with the Sixth Amendment, than determine what crime, with what elements, the defendant was convicted of. In doing so, the court reaffirmed the basic rationale of Apprendi and rejected the arguments made by the dissent and amicus curiae that, historically, when exercising their sentencing authority, judges were also presumed to have the power to find and consider nearly any fact deemed relevant to the penalty.

Authority:

Erlinger v. United States (2024) 602 U.S. 821, 843

Mathis v. United States (2016) 579 U.S. 500, 511–512

Fourth Holding:

Since Erlinger, the California Supreme Court has gone further to make it clear that Erlinger requires that any fact, beyond the bare fact of a prior conviction, that exposes a defendant to harsher punishment, must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, unless the defendant stipulates to its truth or waives a jury trial. This jury trial guarantee retains its vitality even if the inquiry is straightforward. There is no efficiency exception to the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Only when aggravating facts have been proven as the Constitution requires may the court then rely on them to conclude, in its discretion, that those facts justify an upper term.

Authority:

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1083–1084 [absent an admission or a jury trial waiver, a trial court cannot determine whether a defendant’s prior convictions were of increasing seriousness or that his probation or parole performance was poor]

Abstracts and Minutes, Discretion, Duty of the court, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 00072

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court erred in imposing the great bodily injury enhancement on count 2 because it did not afford great weight to the mitigating circumstance of the defendant’s prior victimization. The trial court applied the wrong legal standard in declining to dismiss the great bodily injury enhancement. We therefore vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing. Also, the abstract of judgment incorrectly shows murder as in the first degree and must be corrected to show that the conviction was for murder in the second degree.

First Holding:

The trial court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so. In exercising its discretion in this regard, the court shall consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove certain enumerated mitigating circumstances, and proof of the presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety. One of the listed mitigating circumstances is the current offense is connected to prior victimization or childhood trauma.

Authority:

PEN 1385

Second Holding:

Absent a finding that dismissal would endanger public safety, a court must assign significant value to the enumerated mitigating circumstances when they are present. In practice, the presence of an enumerated mitigating circumstance will generally result in the dismissal of an enhancement unless the sentencing court finds substantial, credible evidence of countervailing factors that may nonetheless neutralize even the great weight of the mitigating circumstance, such that dismissal of the enhancement is not in furtherance of justice.

Authority:

People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1038

Third Holding:

We review a trial court’s decisions under section 1385 for abuse of discretion. As relevant here, an abuse of discretion arises if the trial court based its decision on an incorrect legal standard.

Authority:

People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 298

People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215, 225

Fourth Holding:

When, as here, a sentencing court was not fully aware of the scope of its discretionary powers, the appropriate remedy is to remand for resentencing unless the record clearly indicates that the trial court would have reached the same conclusion even if it had been aware that it had such discretion.

Authority:

People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 425

Fifth Holding:

The abstract of judgment incorrectly states that the defendant was convicted of first degree murder in count 1. When issuing a new abstract of judgment after resentencing, the trial court shall correctly identify the crime in count 1 as second degree murder. [Gary note: the court did not cite any authority for its order to correct the abstract of judgment, likely because it seems so obvious. But there is authority that the court could have cited, some of which I have listed below, even though not cited in the opinion.]

Authority:

People v. Scott (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1324

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 387–388

People v. Gobert (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 676, 689

People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2

Fifth Amendment, Standard of review

Case 000071

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court should have granted the defendant’s motion to suppress his interrogation statements because he invoked his right to counsel under Miranda. His statements were involuntary and coerced. We conclude the admission of the interrogation was prejudicial. We therefore reverse his convictions and remand for retrial.

First Holding:

A custodial interrogation can come in various forms and does not require questions. The term interrogation under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. The Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent.

Authority:

Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436

Rhode Island v. Innis (1980) 446 U.S. 291, 301

Second Holding:

Miranda’s safeguards do not apply when police ask a suspect routine booking questions to secure the biographical data necessary to complete booking or pretrial services. But there is an exception to that exception: courts have recognized the potential for abuse by law enforcement officers who might, under the guise of seeking objective or neutral information, deliberately elicit an incriminating statement from a suspect.

Authority:

Pennsylvania v. Muniz (1990) 496 U.S. 582, 601

United States v. Zapien (9th Cir. 2017) 861 F.3d 971, 975

E

Third Holding:

When a police officer has reason to know that a suspect’s answer may incriminate him even routine questioning may amount to interrogation.

Authority:

United States v. Williams (9th Cir. 2016) 842 F.3d 1143, 1147

Fourth Holding:

Once a suspect states he wishes to consult with an attorney, the interrogation must stop until an attorney is present or the suspect reinitiates contact. This is a bright-line rule: it requires all questioning cease after a suspect requests counsel. This is a prophylactic rule designed to prevent police from badgering a defendant into waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights. In the absence of such a bright-line prohibition, the authorities through badgering or overreaching—explicit or subtle, deliberate or unintentional—might otherwise wear down the accused and persuade him to incriminate himself notwithstanding his earlier request for counsel’s assistance. Once a suspect invokes the right to counsel, everything changes; that is, the police can no longer engage in efforts to convince the suspect to speak to them.

Authority:

Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477, 484–485

People v. Johnson (2022) 12 Cal.5th 544, 580

Michigan v. Harvey (1990) 494 U.S. 344, 350

People v. Henderson (2020) 9 Cal.5th 1013, 1022

People v. Avalos (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 926, 932

Fifth Holding:

The error requires reversal unless it is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Authority:

People v. Elizalde (2015) 61 Cal.4th 523

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18

Sixth Holding:

We review Miranda claims under federal constitutional standards. We accept the trial court’s determination of disputed facts if supported by substantial evidence, but we independently decide whether the challenged statements were obtained in violation of Miranda. When an interview is recorded, the facts surrounding the admission or confession are undisputed and we may apply independent review.

Authority:

People v. Johnson (2022) 12 Cal.5th 544, 578

People v. Henderson (2020) 9 Cal.5th 1013, 1023

People v. Suarez (2020) 10 Cal.5th 116, 158

Abstracts and Minutes

Case 000070

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The abstract of judgment must be corrected to reflect that the court orally waived all fines and fees at resentencing.

First Holding:

Because the trial court expressly stated its intent to waive all discretionary fines and fees, which includes restitution fines, we conclude the court did not impose restitution fines under section 1202.4 or parole revocation fines under section 1202.45. The abstract of judgment must be corrected to reflect the judgment orally imposed.

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185 [courts may order correction of abstracts of judgment that do not reflect the oral judgments of sentencing courts]

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385 [Where there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of judgment and the abstract of judgment, the oral pronouncement controls]

Second Holding:

The restitution fine, although including a minimum fine, is discretionary in that it permits the trial court to decline to impose it for compelling and extraordinary reasons.

Authority:

PEN 1202.4(b)

People v. Tillman (2000) 22 Cal.4th 300, 303