Tag Archives: Sentencing

Sentencing

Case 000058

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The fines and fees not mentioned in the trial court’s oral imposition of sentence are improper and must be stricken.

First Holding:

Where there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of judgment and the minute order or the abstract of judgment, the oral pronouncement controls.

Authority:

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

[Cf.] People v. Cleveland (2004) 32 Cal.4th 704, 768

Second Holding:

When a trial court does not orally impose discretionary restitution and parole revocation fines under sections 1202.4 and 1202.45 and the prosecution does not object, as here, the prosecution forfeits any objection on appeal and the fines or fees must be stricken.

Authority:

People v. Tillman (2000) 22 Cal.4th 300, 302–303

Third Holding:

When a defendant has been convicted of certain listed offenses, including any crime that requires sex offender registration pursuant to section 290(c) at the time of sentencing the trial court shall consider issuing an order restraining the defendant from any contact with a victim of the crime. It was error to include Jane Doe in the protective order because she was not a victim of the crime, and even as a witness there was no indication that the defendant had made threats toward her within the meaning of section 136.2(i)(2).

Authority:

PEN 136.2(i)(1)

PEN 136.2(i)(2)

People v. Walts (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 127, 143 [The amendment to section 136.2(i)(1) reflects that the Legislature intended that protective orders should only be available for any person who is a victim of any one of the specifically enumerated crimes under section 136.2(i)(1) for which the defendant has been convicted]

Fourth Holding:

The defendant should have objected to the protective order in trial court, thus forfeiting the issue, but we will nonetheless consider his argument to the extent that it raises a question of law.

Authority:

People v. Walts (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 127, 140

Fifth Holding:

We review the trial court’s result, not its rationale.

Authority:

People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 976

Amelioration, Sentencing

Case 000057

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Rhodius resolved a split of authority among the Courts of Appeal regarding resentencing eligibility when a defendant’s sentence for a prior prison enhancement was stayed and never executed. Rhodius held that defendants whose enhanced prison prior term or terms were stayed at sentencing are eligible for resentencing under section 1172.75. Pursuant to Rhodius, the court therefore reversed the trial court’s order denying defendant a resentencing hearing, and remanded for the trial court to hold that hearing.

Holding:

Defendants whose enhanced prison prior term or terms were stayed at sentencing are eligible for resentencing under section 1172.75.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75

People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050

 

Amelioration, Duty of the court, Retroactivity, Sentencing

Case 000056

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The defendant appeals an order partially denying his request for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.75. We reverse the order because the defendant was entitled to have the court consider his eligibility for relief under Assembly Bill No. 333.

First Holding:

Section 1172.75 requires a full resentencing, not merely that the trial court strike the newly invalid enhancements for prior prison terms.

Authority:

People v. Saldana (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 1270, 1276

People v. Lopez (2025) 17 Cal.5th 388

Second Holding:

Assembly Bill 333 (revising the elements that must be proven to support gang crimes and enhancement allegations) applies to cases where a defendant is resentenced pursuant to section 1172.75, even where there was a negotiated plea agreement.

Authority:

People v. Lopez (2025) 17 Cal.5th 388, 400

Third Holding:

Assembly Bill 333 took effect on January 1, 2022 and is considered ameliorative legislation.

Authority:

People v. Lopez (2025) 17 Cal.5th 388, 397

People v. E.H. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 467, 477

Fourth Holding:

The trial court should have considered the applicability of Assembly Bill 333 in the context of the defendant’s resentencing under section 1172.75, whether or not his counsel brought the issue to the attention of the court. By its express language, section 1172.75 itself puts the onus on the trial court to apply any other changes in law that reduce sentences. Assembly Bill 333 is such a law and should have been addressed by the trial court.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75(d)(2

Fifth Holding:

In the criminal law context, when ameliorative legislation goes into effect, we generally presume the Legislature intends the benefits of the new enactment to apply as broadly as constitutionally permissible to all non-final cases.

Authority:

In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 745

Sixth Holding:

For purposes of Estrada, the test for finality is whether the criminal prosecution or proceeding as a whole is complete.

Authority:

People v. Esquivel (2021) 11 Cal.5th 671, 679 [The meaning of finality in the Estrada context is distinct from the issue of whether a judgment is final for purposes of appealability]

Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case 000055

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

There can be no parole restitution fine on sentences of life without the possibility of parole. We will strike the fine and direct the trial court to issue a new abstract of judgment.

Holding:

Because defendant was sentenced to prison for life without the possibility of parole, her parole revocation fine should be stricken.

Authority:

PEN 1202.45(a)

People v. Coleman (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 709, 725

Sentencing

Case 000054

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We find there was insufficient evidence to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant’s prior strikes were based on separate criminal acts, and we remand for resentencing on that basis. There was insufficient evidence to impose his federal conviction for bank robbery as a prior strike because it could not be shown that the conviction was based on a different criminal act than either of his two state robbery convictions.

First Holding:

If two strike offenses are based on a single act, the court must dismiss one of the strikes.

Authority:

People v. Vargas (2014) 59 Cal.4th 635, 638

Second Holding:

Prior convictions for multiple criminal acts committed in a single course of conduct may be treated as separate strikes, so long as the convictions are not so closely connected that treating them as separate strikes would be contrary to the spirit of the Three Strikes law.

Authority:

People v. Benson (1998) 18 Cal.4th 24, 35

People v. Vargas (2014) 59 Cal.4th 635, 648

[GARY NOTE: The California Supreme Court issued its opinion–published, of course, but hey!–in People v. Shaw (2025) 18 Cal.5th 1089 on December 15, 2025. It concluded that only one strike can be based on the single act of vehicular manslaughter that resulted in the death of two occupants of the car his vehicle struck. One justice wrote a concurring opinion in which he questioned the continuing validity of People v. Benson (1998) 18 Cal.4th 24 (holding that two prior offenses committed seconds apart against a single victim may be treated as separate strikes) and People v. Fuhrman (1997) 16 Cal.4th 930 (holding that two offenses committed in quick succession against two separate victims qualify as separate strikes). Two other justices agreed with the concurring opinion. It may be that the majority believed that Shaw did not present the precise question raised in Benson and Furhman and therefore decided not to venture beyond the facts before it at this time. That’s pure speculation by me, of course. But there may be an audience in our high court willing to closely examine exactly what can constitute separate strikes where the crimes are closely related in time and nature.]

Third Holding:

Penal Code section 654 does not apply to successive federal and state prosecutions.

Authority:

People v. Belcher (1974) 11 Cal.3d 91, 98

People v. Fielder (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1221, 1234 [Retrial of prior conviction findings is not barred by the state or federal prohibitions on double jeopardy even when a prior conviction finding is reversed on appeal for lack of substantial evidence]