Tag Archives: Racial Justice Act

Abstracts and Minutes, Amelioration, Sentencing

Case 001144

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

On resentencing under section 1172.75, the court did not orally reimpose the $10,000 originally imposed more than 10 years earlier. The abstract of judgment, however, reflects the $10,000 fine previously entered. The abstract of judgment must be corrected.

First Holding:

A written recording of a judgment, such as a minute order or abstract of judgment, may not modify the judgment, and where there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of judgment and a written record, the oral pronouncement controls.

Authority:

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385, 389

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185-186

Second Holding:

A restitution fine older than 10 years must be vacated, and no unpaid balance may be collected.

(Gary note: I “made up” that second holding, although it is a correct statement of the law. Appellate counsel raised the argument, but the appellate court concluded that it did not need to reach the issue. For whatever reason, the trial court did not reimpose a restitution fine at all. Thus, the sole problem was the incorrect abstract of judgment. Nonetheless, I thought it might be useful to remind readers of section 1465.9.)

Authority:

PEN 1465.9(d)

Appellate Principles, Duty of the court, Evidence, Racial Justice Act, Standard of review, Statutory interpretation, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence

Case 001094

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The court erred in denying the defendant’s oral motion for relief under the Racial Justice Act (RJA).

First Holding:

It is a violation of the RJA for the judge, an attorney in the case, a law enforcement officer involved in the case, an expert witness, or a juror to exhibit bias or animus towards the defendant because of the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin or, during the defendant’s trial, in court and during the proceedings, to use racially discriminatory language about the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin, or otherwise exhibit bias or animus toward the defendant because of the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin, whether or not purposeful.

A defendant may file a motion alleging a violation of subdivision (a). If a motion is filed in the trial court and the defendant makes a prima facie showing of a violation of subdivision (a), the trial court shall hold a hearing, at which the defendant bears the burden of proving an RJA violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

Subject to exceptions inapplicable in this case, if the court finds an RJA violation by a preponderance of evidence, the court shall impose an enumerated remedy specific to the violation. If judgment has yet to be entered, one remedy is to reduce one or more charges. After judgment has been entered, the court shall vacate the conviction and sentence, find that it is legally invalid, and order new proceedings consistent with subdivision (a).

Authority:

PEN 745

Second Holding:

The defendant argues that the trial court erred to the extent it denied his RJA motion because it was brought orally rather than by written, noticed motion. Addressing this issue of statutory interpretation de novo, we conclude the RJA does not preclude the possibility of making an oral motion. Accordingly, the court erred to the extent it denied the motion for being brought orally.

Authority:

McIntosh v. Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 33, 41

Third Holding:

In interpreting a statute, our goal is to ascertain the Legislature’s intent to effectuate the statute’s purpose. We begin by examining the statute’s words, giving them a plain and commonsense meaning. If the language is unambiguous, the plain meaning controls. The words, however, must be construed in context, so we look to the entire section as well as the statutory framework as a whole in deciding what a word or provision means, and we attempt to harmonize terms where possible. We may reject a literal construction that is contrary to the legislative intent apparent in the statute or that would lead to absurd results.

Authority:

People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 961

People v. Murphy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 136, 142

Voices of the Wetlands v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 499, 519

Moyer v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1973) 10 Cal.3d 222, 230

Simpson Strong-Tie Co., Inc. v. Gore (2010) 49 Cal.4th 12, 27

Fourth Holding:

The statutory language here is ambiguous. Section 745 does not say a defendant “must file” a motion; instead, it is permissive. But nor does the statute say that a defendant “may make” an oral motion. We therefore look to legislative findings made in support of the RJA to discern the Legislature’s intent.

When statutory language is ambiguous, we look to a variety of extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be achieved, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public policy, and contemporaneous administrative construction. Because uncodified findings of legislative intent are voted upon by the entire legislative body, enrolled and signed by the Governor, they may be entitled to somewhat greater weight than traditional legislative history materials.

(Gary note: Regarding the reference to “uncodified findings” in the last sentence above, Assembly Bill 2542 (2019-2020 legislative session), which enacted the Racial Justice Act, contains a few sections in the bill that were not codified, meaning they do not appear in any of California’s codes, such as the Penal Code.

(Depending on the wording, the uncodified language may or may not have the force of law. For example, section 7 of the bill directs that certain portions of the bill are effective only if a different specified bill is enacted and becomes effective by a specified date. Section 7 thus carries the force of law.

(But section 2 of the bill contains 10 findings made by the Legislature that led to its passage of the RJA. In roughly 1,329 words. Some of the findings relate the existence and effects of racism–intentional or otherwise–and others state something like “It is the intent of the Legislature that ….” Those findings and statements of intent probably do not technically carry the force of law, but may be considered by the courts in interpreting the statutes that were enacted.

(The trial court then discussed the various aspects of the findings that led it to conclude that “Given the expansiveness of the Legislature’s purpose in enacting the RJA, it is appropriate to construe the legislation liberally in favor of affording defendants an opportunity to raise potential RJA violations through an oral motion.” It cautioned, however, that it may not be the best practice to raise the motion orally, as it may create confusion over what, exactly, is being asserted.)

Authority:

People v. Woodhead (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1002, 1008

Young v. Superior Court (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 138, 157

Fifth Holding:

In the course of the hearing, counsel appeared to concur that the proper standard was proof by preponderance of the evidence, rather than the much lower standard at the prima facie stage. Though it is not clear what standard the court applied, it erred in excluding hearsay evidence. Hearsay is not per se excludable under the RJA. The court should have considered whether the proffered hearsay “trustworthy and reliable” before excluding it.

By concluding the evidence before it was double hearsay, the court failed to consider the totality of the proffered facts in assessing whether the defendant made a prima facie showing. On this record, we conclude the defendant made such a sufficient showing at the prima facie stage. We thus reverse and remand with instructions to hold an evidentiary hearing under the RJA.

Authority:

PEN 745(c)(1)

Hernandez v. Superior Court (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 1120, 1130

Sixth Holding:

The people argue that application of the higher standard was invited error, as counsel concurred. The doctrine of invited error is designed to prevent an accused from gaining a reversal on appeal because of an error made by the trial court at defense counsel’s behest. If defense counsel intentionally caused the trial court to err, the appellant cannot be heard to complain on appeal.

But for the doctrine to apply, it also must be clear that counsel acted for tactical reasons and not out of ignorance or mistake. In cases involving an action affirmatively taken by defense counsel, courts have found a clearly implied tactical purpose to be sufficient to invoke the doctrine.

It is not sufficiently clear on this record that counsel had a tactical purpose. It supports the conclusion that counsel simply misunderstood certain details of the RJA when he brought the oral motion. For example, he characterized the motion as a post-judgment motion. But it was prejudgment, though it was presented after the jury verdict. In a criminal case, judgment is rendered when the trial court orally pronounces sentence. Here, the sentencing had not yet happened when the RJA motion was made, so no judgment had been entered.

In light of counsel’s apparent misunderstandings, we conclude that the invited error doctrine is inapplicable. In any event, its application is discretionary, not automatic.

Authority:

People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 49

People v. Karaman (1992) 4 Cal.4th 335, 344, fn. 9

Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs (The Rutter Group 2025) para. 8:248.13

Seventh Holding:

We review de novo a determination that an RJA movant has failed to make a prima facie showing. A defendant makes a prima facie showing if the defendant produces facts that, if true, establish that there is a substantial likelihood that an RJA violation] occurred.

A substantial likelihood requires more than a mere possibility, but less than a standard of more likely than not. The court should should not make credibility determinations at the prima facie stage. It should accept the truth of the defendant’s allegations unless they are conclusory, unsupported by the evidence presented in support of the claim, or demonstrably contradicted by the court’s own records.

On this record—with these principles in mind and considering the totality of the proffered facts—we conclude that there is more than a mere possibility that an RJA violation occurred. The defendant has therefore made a prima facie showing of one or more RJA violations and is entitled to an evidentiary hearing.

Authority:

PEN 745(h)(2)

PEN 745(c)

People v. Howard (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 625, 650

Finley v. Superior Court (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 12, 23

Hernandez v. Superior Court (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 1120, 1130

Appellate Principles, Discretion, Racial Justice Act, Standard of review

Case 000916

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The defendant filed a habeas corpus petition in the superior court, alleging that his 1992 convictions for first degree murder and robbery were obtained “on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin” in violation of the California Racial Justice Act of 2020 (RJA). He also requested, pursuant to the RJA, appointment of counsel and disclosure of evidence to support his claims.

The trial court denied the discovery request and the habeas petition, concluding that the defendant failed to establish a prima facie case for relief under the RJA.

The court erred. We grant the petition and issue a writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order denying the habeas petition, appoint counsel for the defendant, and conduct a new hearing to reconsider his discovery request in a manner consistent with this opinion.

(Gary note: The court outlined in several paragraphs the specific allegations the defendant set forth in his petition that, if true, arguably demonstrated that his arrest and prosecution were affected by factors disallowed by the RJA. As these summaries are designed to highlight principles and the cases or statutes supporting the principles, I am not going to include the facts of the case on which the appellate court concluded that the defendant had demonstrated a sufficient showing to warrant appointment of counsel and discovery.)

First Holding:

Ordinarily, mandate does not lie to correct judicial errors by the superior court in habeas corpus proceedings.

However, where, as here, the trial court failed to perform its required duty to conduct an independent assessment of whether the petitioner was entitled to have counsel appointed under newly adopted procedures enacted by the Legislature, then mandate may be used to compel the performance of that duty.

Authority:

McIntosh v. Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 33, 46-47

Second Holding:

Several have concluded that writ review of the trial court’s discovery rulings in RJA cases is appropriate because such rulings involve novel legal issues of widespread interest.

The RJA is a recent legislation that has been amended multiple times since its inception, and although its command is simple, its implementation is somewhat complex.

We therefore agree with the court in Young that exercising our discretion to review discovery rulings under the RJA is appropriate to provide general guidelines for future cases.

(Gary note:  I find that last sentence regarding guidelines for future cases a bit amusing, because this is an unpublished opinion, and the only “future case” it will ever affect is THIS particular defendant’s instant case.  But hey.  Maybe the “to publish or not to publish” colloquy occurred after the opinion was written.)

Authority:

Young v. Superior Court (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 138, 147, 156

Gonzales v. Superior Court (2024) 108 Cal.App.5th Supp. 36, 53-54

McDaniel v. Superior Court (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 228, 238

Third Holding:

Because management of discovery lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, we review discovery rulings for abuse of discretion. We review the factual underpinnings of a discretionary determination for substantial evidence, but where such a determination rests on incorrect legal premises, our review is de novo.

A discretionary order based on an application of improper criteria or incorrect legal assumptions is not an exercise of informed discretion and is subject to reversal.

Authority:

Young v. Superior Court (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 138, 156

Gonzales v. Superior Court (2024) 108 Cal.App.5th Supp. 36, 55

Fourth Holding:

Effective January 1, 2021, the Legislature enacted the RJA (AB 2542 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.)) to eliminate racial bias from California’s criminal justice system; to ensure that race plays no role at all in seeking or obtaining convictions or in sentencing; and to ensure that individuals have access to all relevant evidence, including statistical evidence, regarding potential discrimination in seeking or obtaining convictions or imposing sentences.

To achieve these objectives, the RJA added and amended Penal Code sections to allow defendants whose judgments are final or who are no longer in custody, respectively, to seek relief for RJA violations.

Authority:

PEN 745

PEN 1473

PEN 1473.7

In re Lynex (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 756, 767

People v. Wilson (2024) 16 Cal.5th 874, 945

Fifth Holding:

The RJA provides that the state shall not seek or obtain a criminal conviction or seek, obtain, or impose a sentence on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin. The statute further sets forth four categories of conduct, any of which, if proved, is enough to establish a violation of the RJA.

Authority:

PEN 745(a)

Sixth Holding:

The court shall appoint counsel if the petitioner cannot afford counsel and the petition alleges facts that would establish a violation of section 745(a). In AB 1071, the Legislature reaffirmed that this threshold is extremely low. (Stats. 2025, ch. 721, sec. 1, subd. (b).)

AB 1071 states that courts have imposed on RJA petitioners higher burdens than the Legislature intended to meet the threshold to secure counsel and denied counsel to litigants raising RJA claims far more than they have appointed counsel.

The new legislation clarifies that the court shall appoint counsel to all indigent postconviction litigants who allege a plausible claim of an RJA violation, which does not require a prima facie showing and should be construed as a minimal pleading requirement.

Authority:

PEN 1473(e)(5)

McIntosh v. Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 33

Seventh Holding:

The RJA defines a prima facie showing to mean that the defendant produces facts that, if true, establish that there is a substantial likelihood that a violation of the RJA occurred.

By contrast, to be entitled to counsel in RJA habeas proceedings, petitioners are required only to allege facts that would establish a violation of the RJA.

Authority:

PEN 745(h)(2)

McIntosh v. Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 33, 45

Eighth Holding:

Regarding the showing necessary for discovery, a defendant is required only to advance a plausible factual foundation, based on specific facts, that a violation of the RJA could or might have occurred in his case.

The burden at the discovery stage is a good cause showing, the burden at the prima facie stage is higher, and the burden at the evidentiary hearing is higher still—proof of an RJA violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

As the least onerous of the statute’s burdens of proof, the plausible justification standard should not be difficult to meet. Where the defendant makes a showing of plausible justification that there was or could have been a violation of the RJA, thus triggering access to all relevant evidence concerning a potential violation of section 745(a), it will likely be an abuse of discretion to totally foreclose discovery.

Authority:

PEN 745(c), (d), and (e)

Young v. Superior Court (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 138, 159, 168-169

Gonzales v. Superior Court (2024) 108 Cal.App.5th Supp. 36, 61

Ninth Holding:

At the discovery stage, as at the prima facie stage, the court should not weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations, except in the rare case where the record irrefutably establishes that the allegations are false.

Authority:

Finley v. Superior Court (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 12, 23–24

McDaniel v. Superior Court (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 228, 246, fn. 8 [A trial court’s review of supporting evidence at the discovery stage, which imposes even a lower burden of proof on defendants than the prima facie stage, must be more lenient]

Tenth Holding:

Although the defendant has offered sufficient evidence to demonstrate a plausible factual foundation for discovery under the RJA, a question remains regarding the appropriate scope of his request.

When determining if a petitioner is entitled to the requested discovery, the court must still consider and balance the so-called Alhambra factors:

(1) whether the material requested is adequately described;

(2) whether the requested material is reasonably available to the governmental entity from which it is sought (and not readily available to the defendant from other sources);

(3) whether production of the records containing the requested information would violate (i) third party confidentiality or privacy rights or (ii) any protected governmental interest;

(4) whether the defendant has acted in a timely manner;

(5) whether the time required to produce the requested information will necessitate an unreasonable delay of the defendant’s trial; and

(6) whether the production of the records containing the requested information would place an unreasonable burden on the governmental entity involved.

Authority:

City of Alhambra v. Superior Court (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1118, 1134

Eleventh Holding:

In addition, the court must consider whether the requests for disclosure may give rise to relevant evidence, meaning that the court must determine whether they are reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of admissible evidence probative of a section 745(a) violation.

The trial courts in exercising their discretion should keep in mind that the Legislature has suggested that, where possible, the courts should impose partial limitations rather than outright denial of discovery.

Authority:

McDaniel v. Superior Court (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 228, 248

Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 559

Abstracts and Minutes, Appellate Principles, Effective assistance of counsel, Racial Justice Act, Sentencing

Case 000913

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Because the defendant failed to obtain a certificate of probable cause, we conclude that his claim under the Racial Justice Act (RJA) is not cognizable on appeal.

We agree, however, that the abstract of judgment requires correction. So we will direct the clerk of the superior court to correct the abstract of judgment and affirm.

First Holding:

The Legislature enacted the RJA in 2020, effective January 1, 2021—more than a year before the preliminary hearing in this case. Under the RJA, the state shall not seek or obtain a criminal conviction or seek, obtain, or impose a sentence on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin.

The defendant argues that expert testimony at the preliminary hearing exhibited bias or animus towards the defendant because of the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin. Alternatively, if his RJA claim is forfeited due to counsel’s failure to object below, he argues that counsel rendered ineffective assistance. Although an RJA claim may be raised on direct appeal, the gravamen of the defendant’s RJA claim is that he should be relieved of his otherwise knowing, intelligent, and voluntary plea agreement as it was obtained in violation of the RJA.

Because his claim thus goes to the validity of his plea, it is not cognizable on appeal absent a certificate of probable cause.

When the judgment appealed from was obtained by the defendant’s plea of guilty or no contest, the sole exceptions to the requirement of a certificate are for appeals solely on noncertificate grounds postplea matters not challenging his plea’s validity and/or matters involving a search or seizure whose lawfulness was contested pursuant to section 1538.5.

Authority:

PEN 745

PEN 1237.5

Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b)

People v. Stamps (2020) 9 Cal.5th 685, 694

Second Holding:

Section 1237.5’s requirement of a certificate of probable cause should be applied in a strict manner, as it lays down a condition precedent to the taking of an appeal within its scope. Its assumption is that, as a general matter, a judgment of conviction entered on a defendant’s plea of guilty or nolo contendere does not present any issue warranting relief on appeal, and hence should not be reviewed thereon.

Authority:

People v. Mendez (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1084, 1097-1098

Third Holding:

The defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance arises from counsel’s performance before entry of the plea, and courts have consistently held that claims of ineffective assistance deriving from counsel’s preplea acts require a certificate.

Authority:

People v. Mendez (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1084, 1092 [deeming counsel’s failure to request a hearing on competency a certificate issue]

People v. Moore (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 90, 94 [claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to request pretrial mental health diversion requires certificate of probable cause]

People v. Stubbs (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 243, 244–245 [challenge that counsel’s preplea performance was deficient requires a certificate of probable cause]

Fourth Holding:

Nor can we find any suggestion that the Legislature intended to exempt RJA claims from the requirements of section 1237.5.

Had the Legislature intended for RJA claims to be decided on their merits whenever raised, it would not have required RJA motions to be made as soon as practicable and would have exempted such motions from the traditional rules of appellate forfeiture.

Requiring a defendant to obtain a certificate of probable cause to challenge grounds going to the legality of the proceedings after a plea is neither novel nor new, and the Legislature is deemed to be aware of existing laws and judicial constructions in effect at the time legislation is enacted.

Authority:

People v. Midell (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 1060, 1076

People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 634

Fifth Holding:

The purpose for requiring a certificate of probable cause is to discourage and weed out frivolous or vexatious appeals challenging convictions following guilty and nolo contendere pleas.

Thus, a trial court must issue the certificate if the defendant’s statement under section 1237.5 presents any cognizable issue for appeal which is not clearly frivolous and vexatious. If a court refuses to issue a certificate of probable cause, the defendant may seek a writ of mandate from the appellate court.

This low bar for issuance of a certificate would not hinder defendants from validly challenging their convictions based on alleged RJA violations.

Authority:

People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 75

People v. Johnson (2009) 47 Cal.4th 668, 676

Sixth Holding:

Because the defendant did not obtain a certificate of probable cause, our review of his claims is thus limited to those issues that do not require a certificate.

Authority:

Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b)(3)

Seventh Holding:

The abstract of judgment contains a clerical error. Although the defendant admitted a firearm enhancement under section 12022.53(c), the trial court ultimately elected to impose a lesser enhancement under section 12022.53(d), as permitted in Tirado. The abstract of judgment, however, erroneously lists a section 12022.53(c) enhancement. We therefore direct the clerk of the superior court to correct the abstract of judgment.

Authority:

People v. Tirado (2022) 12 Cal.5th 688

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185 [a reviewing court may correct a clerical error in an abstract of judgment at any time]

Racial Justice Act

Case 000817

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Though brought as an appeal, the appellate court exercised its discreation and treated the matter as a petition for writ of mandate, the proper vehicle to challenge an order denying the defendant’s motion for discovery under the Racial Justice Act [RJA], as the order was an interlocutory, nonappealable order. We grant the petition.

First Holding:

The petitioner is only authorized to bring an RJA claim by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus because he is incarcerated and his judgment is already final. Petitioner has not filed such a petition.

Authority:

PEN 745

PEN 1473

People v. Hodge (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 985, 999–1000

People v. Serrano (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 276, 292–293

In re Montgomery (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 1062, 1070–1072, review granted Dec. 11, 2024, S287339

Second Holding:

Until recently, appellate courts were divided over whether courts have jurisdiction to rule on a postjudgment RJA discovery motion unattached to a petition for writ of habeas corpus. This dispute, however, was resolved when the Legislature enacted AB 1071 (2025–2026 Reg. Sess.), effective January 1, 2026, which added Penal Code section 1473,(e)(2).

This new provision expressly authorizes a petitioner, or their counsel, to file a discovery motion under section 745(d), upon the prosecution of a petition under this subdivision, or in preparation to file a petition.

Authority:

PEN 745(d)

PEN 1473(e)(2)

People v. Serrano (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 276, 291

Third Holding:

The trial court’s erroneous denial of petitioner’s discovery motion, as an interlocutory order, is not appealable and is challengeable only by petition for writ of mandate. We exercise our discretion to treat the appeal as a petition for writ of mandate, as both parties have thoroughly briefed the merits of the petitioner’s claim of right to discovery under the RJA.

Authority:

People v. Serrano (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 276, 292-293

Gonzales v. Superior Court (2024) 108 Cal.App.5th Supp. 36, 53–54 [Writ review is appropriate in discovery matters where, as here, it is necessary to address questions of first impression that are of general importance to the trial courts and to the legal profession, and where general guidelines can be laid down for future cases.]

Olson v. Cory (1983) 35 Cal.3d 390, 401 [treating an appeal as a writ petition is appropriate when an issue under review has been thoroughly briefed and argued, such that dismissing the appeal would be unnecessarily dilatory and circuitous]

Fourth Holding:

A petitioner seeking to pursue an RJA claim must show good cause to obtain discovery in anticipation of filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus. This good cause standard is more lenient than the prima facie showing required for obtaining relief under section 745(a). Nonetheless, the statute’s good cause language serves a gatekeeping function.

Authority:

PEN 745(d)

Young v. Superior Court (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 138, 166 [whether the allegations underscoring [the petitioner’s racial profiling theory are enough to support a plausible justification that a violation of section 745(a) could or might have occurred in his or her case is an issue for the trial court to assess, exercising its discretion upon an application of the correct legal standard governing good cause]

In re Montgomery (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 1062, 1075 [review granted Dec. 11, 2024, S287339] (conc. opn. of Kelety, J.) [Nor would an interpretation of section 745(d) that allows habeas corpus petitioners to obtain such discovery trigger a right to unlimited discovery]

People v. Serrano (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 276, 293

Fifth Holding:

In Young, the appellate court concluded that the good cause standard for discovery under the RJA is akin to the good cause standard for Pitchess motions [pertaining to discovery of police personnel records in criminal cases]. It observed that the Pitchess good cause standard includes the requirement for a defendant to establish a plausible factual foundation for officer misconduct.

The Young court concluded that the same standard applies in RJA cases. In order to establish good cause for discovery under the RJA, a defendant is required only to advance a plausible factual foundation, based on specific facts, that a violation of the RJA could or might have occurred in his case.

Authority:

Young v. Superior Court (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 138, 158-159

People v. Superior Court (Lalo) (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 707, 712

McDaniel v. Superior Court (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 228, 244

Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531

Sixth Holding:

Based on the evidence presented by the petitioner in his motion, we conclude that he met the foundational requirement of presenting a plausible justification for discovery under section 745(d).

Authority:

Young v. Superior Court (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 138, 144-145

Seventh Holding:

It has long been the law that a criminal defendant who has established his indigent status is constitutionally entitled to those defense services for which he demonstrates a need, which services may include discovery costs, investigative costs, transcript costs, expert fees, etc.

In this matter, petitioner did not assert in the superior court a right to free copies of discovery materials with a demonstration of his indigent status. Unless or until petitioner does so, he is not entitled to free copies of any material discoverable under the RJA. [it does not offend the Constitution to require a nonindigent defendant to pay reasonable fees for duplicating discovery materials disclosed by the district attorney pursuant to section 1054.1]

Authority:

Schaffer v. Superior Court (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1235, 1245 [it does not offend the Constitution to require a nonindigent defendant to pay reasonable fees for duplicating discovery materials disclosed by the district attorney pursuant to section 1054.1]