Tag Archives: Racial Justice Act

Appellate Principles, Racial Justice Act, Standard of review

Case 000770

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

In 2023, the defendant filed a motion in the trial court for postjudgment discovery pursuant to Penal Code section 1054.9, in advance of filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus. The defendant alleged he was arrested, charged, and convicted as a result of racial bias by the police department and the district attorney, and that his defense counsel was prejudicially ineffective. He appealed from the court’s denial of a portion of his motion. It was not an appealable order. We treat this as a petition for writ of mandate.

(Gary note: The court denied the petition, but I have included the “gold”–its principles–for educational reasons. Which is really the point of this entire blog, of course.)

First Holding:

A party must seek review of the trial court’s denial of a section 1054.9 motion for postconviction discovery by filing a petition for writ of mandate rather than an appeal.

Authority:

In re Steele (2004) 32 Cal.4th 682, 688

People v. Serrano (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 276, 292

Second Holding:

Given the procedural background of this case, rather than dismiss the appeal, we exercise our discretion to treat it as a petition for writ of mandate in the interests of judicial economy.

Authority:

People v. Payne (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 933, 937

People v. Picklesimer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 330, 335

Third Holding:

A motion for postjudgment discovery filed pursuant to section 1054.9 may be made in anticipation of filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus but before the petition is actually filed. However, the statute provides only limited discovery. It does not allow free-floating discovery asking for virtually anything the prosecution possesses.

Authority:

In re Steele (2004) 32 Cal.4th 682, 691

Barnett v. Superior Court (2010) 50 Cal.4th 890, 894

Fourth Holding:

The trial court’s ruling on a motion under section 1054.9 is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

Authority:

Kennedy v. Superior Court (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 359, 366

Gary Note:

(Gary note: I wrote a Gary Musings on the code section at issue here, focusing on the statutory duty it imposes on counsel to retain a copy of [insert appropriate adjective, depending on how YOU read the subdivision, but for lack of a better term at the moment, “certain” will do] clients’ files in a digital format in color. It went up on the blog on June 21, 2026, under the category “Gary Musings.” The article’s title is “To Save, Or Not To Save (the client’s file).”)

Appellate Principles, Discretion, Racial Justice Act, Standard of review

Case 000720

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The defendant’s petition for writ of mandate is granted. Filed as a habeas corpus petition, the People aver that the instant petition should be treated as a petition for writ of mandate from the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s discovery motion and concede that the defendant established a plausible factual foundation for discovery.

The People assert, and the defendant agrees, the matter should be remanded for development of the record on the relevant factors governing Racial Justice Act [RJA] discovery and for the trial court to consider those factors in the first instance.

We conclude the trial court misapplied the applicable legal standards and erred by denying the defendant’s motion. We therefore grant the petition, direct the trial court to vacate its denial of the defendant’s discovery motion, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

First Holding:

We have the discretion to treat a petition for writ of habeas corpus as a petition for writ of mandate. Writ review is appropriate where a petition raises novel legal issues of widespread interest. The RJA remains fairly new legislation and has been amended several times since its inception. Though laudable in its purposes, the Act has proven challenging to the courts in its implementation. Given there are few appellate decisions interpreting the Act thus far, several appellate courts have found writ review appropriate in addressing issues raised under the RJA.

Authority:

People v. Picklesimer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 330, 340

Escamilla v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 498, 509

Lipton v. Superior Court (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1599, 1612

Brandt v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 813, 816

Young v. Superior Court (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 138, 147, 156 [the RJA’s command is simple, but the implementation is somewhat complex; writ review appropriate to address questions of first impression including how to interpret the RJA’s discovery provision]]

Jackson v. Superior Court (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 372, 382

McIntosh v. Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 33, 46 [writ of mandate issued and matter remanded for the trial court to determine if the defendant was entitled to the appointment of counsel]

Mosby v. Superior Court (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 106, 133 [writ of mandate issued, and the trial court’s order denying the petitioner a hearing vacated after the appellate court determined the petitioner met his burden and could proceed to an evidentiary hearing]

Second Holding:

Here, the parties agree without objection that the defendant’s petition for writ of habeas corpus should be treated as a petition for writ of mandate. We therefore exercise our discretion to construe the petition as a petition for writ of mandate of the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s RJA discovery motion and address the court’s order on the merits.

Authority:

People v. Picklesimer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 330, 335

People v. Payne (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 933, 937 [appeal from nonappealable order treated as application for writ of mandate and addressed on the merits]

Third Holding:

Two courts of appeal have concluded, albeit with different reasoning, that a trial court’s order denying a request for discovery under the RJA is not appealable. Both courts recognized, however, that such an order may be challenged by a petition for writ of mandate.

Authority:

In re Montgomery (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 1062, 1071–1072, 1076 review dism. Dec. 30, 2025, S287339

People v. Serrano (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 276, 292, 293, review dism. Dec. 30, 2025, S288202

In re Steele (2004) 32 Cal.4th 682, 692 [denial of a sec. 1054.9 discovery motion may be challenged by a petition for writ of mandate]

Fourth Holding:

A discovery order is generally reviewed for abuse of discretion because management of discovery lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. We review the factual underpinnings of a discretionary determination for substantial evidence, but where such a determination rests on incorrect legal premises, our review is de novo.

The scope of discretion always resides in the particular law being applied. If the court’s decision is influenced by an erroneous understanding of applicable law or reflects an unawareness of the full scope of its discretion, the court has not properly exercised its discretion under the law. Therefore, a discretionary order based on an application of improper criteria or incorrect legal assumptions is not an exercise of informed discretion and is subject to reversal.

Authority:

Young v. Superior Court (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 138, 156

City of Sacramento v. Drew (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1287, 1297

Gonzales v. Superior Court (2024) 108 Cal.App.5th Supp. 36, 55

Sargon Enterprises Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 773

Fifth Holding:

Effective January 1, 2021, the Legislature enacted the RJA (Assembly Bill No. 2542 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) to eliminate racial bias from California’s criminal justice system; to ensure that race plays no role at all in seeking or obtaining convictions or in sentencing; and to ensure that individuals have access to all relevant evidence, including statistical evidence, regarding potential discrimination in seeking or obtaining convictions or imposing sentences. To achieve these objectives, the RJA added section 745 to the Penal Code and amended sections 1473 and 1473.7.

Authority:

AB 2542

PEN 745

PEN 1473

PEN 1473.7

Sixth Holding:

Section 745(a) proclaims that the state shall not seek or obtain a criminal conviction or seek, obtain, or impose a sentence on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin. It specifies four categories which, if proven by a preponderance of the evidence, constitute a violation of the RJA.

As relevant here, a violation occurs under section 745 (a)(3) where the defendant was charged or convicted of a more serious offense than defendants of other races, ethnicities, or national origins who have engaged in similar conduct and are similarly situated, and the evidence establishes that the prosecution more frequently sought or obtained convictions for more serious offenses against people who share the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin in the county where the convictions were sought or obtained.

Also relevant here, a violation occurs under section 745(a)(4)(A) where a longer or more severe sentence was imposed on the defendant than was imposed on other similarly situated individuals convicted of the same offense, and longer or more severe sentences were more frequently imposed for that offense on people that share the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin than on defendants of other races, ethnicities, or national origins in the county where the sentence was imposed.

Authority:

PEN 745

Seventh Holding:

A defendant in custody may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging a violation of the RJA. Specifically, section 745(b) provides that a defendant may file a motion pursuant to this section, or a petition for writ of habeas corpus or a motion under Section 1473.7, in a court of competent jurisdiction, alleging a violation of subdivision (a). The RJA also amended section 1473, which identifies bases for prosecuting a petition for writ of habeas corpus, to add a subdivision governing the litigation of RJA claims.

Authority:

People v. Wilson (2024) 16 Cal.5th 874, 945

Eighth Holding:

If a habeas petition makes a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief under the RJA, the trial court must issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing. If, after a hearing, the court finds a violation of section 745(a) by a preponderance of the evidence, the court shall impose a remedy specific to the violation pursuant to section 745(e).

Authority:

PEN 1473(e)

Ninth Holding:

If a court finds after judgment has been entered that a conviction was sought or obtained in violation of section 745(a), the court shall vacate the conviction and sentence, find that it is legally invalid, and order new proceedings consistent with section 745(a). If the court finds that the only violation of section 745(a) that occurred is based on paragraph (3) of section 745(a), the court may modify the judgment to a lesser included or lesser related offense.

If a court finds after judgment has been entered that only the sentence was sought, obtained, or imposed in violation of section 745(a), the court shall vacate the sentence, find that it is legally invalid, and impose a new sentence. On resentencing, the court shall not impose a new sentence greater than that previously imposed.

Authority:

PEN 745(e)

Tenth Holding:

The RJA contains a discovery provision in section 745(d). If a defendant believes a violation of the RJA has occurred, he or she may file a motion requesting disclosure to the defense of all evidence relevant to a potential violation of subdivision (a) in the possession or control of the state. Upon a showing of good cause, the court shall order the records to be released.

Authority:

PEN 745(d)

Eleventh Holding:

In Young, the Court of Appeal addressed what constitutes good cause for purposes of discovery under section 745(d). The court conducted a comprehensive analysis of the RJA’s enactment, as well as general provisions governing discovery in criminal cases.

Drawing on the Pitchess standard for discovery of law enforcement personnel records, the Young court held that in order to establish good cause for discovery under the RJA, a defendant is required only to advance a plausible factual foundation, based on specific facts, that a violation of the RJA could or might have occurred in his case.

This standard for discovery under section 745(d) is even more relaxed than the Pitchess standard in two respects. First, while a Pitchess motion must be accompanied by an affidavit setting forth a reasonable belief that the requested discovery is material to the subject matter of the case, there is no comparable affidavit requirement for discovery under the RJA. Second, unlike in a Pitchess motion, an RJA discovery motion has no materiality requirement, at least not in the sense that the defendant must show a logical link between some defense and a pending charge.

Authority:

Young v. Superior Court (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 138, 149-160

Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531

Twelfth Holding:

The RJA’s counterpart to Pitchess materiality is relevance to a potential violation of section 745(a). Since a section 745(a) violation may be proved up in several different ways based on a variety of direct or circumstantial evidence of discrimination under subdivision (a)(1)–(4), the threshold showing for good cause must be commensurately broad and flexible.

The limiting factor is relevance in the discovery sense—that is, each request for disclosure must be reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of admissible evidence probative of a section 745(a) violation. This subject matter limitation on the scope of discoverable material creates an outer boundary that, if crossed, may justify an order narrowing or otherwise limiting the obligation to respond. And as always in the context of discovery, the trial court has ample discretion to manage where the discovery-relevance boundary lies.

Authority:

Young v. Superior Court (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 138, 160

Thirteenth Holding:

The Young court found support for its articulated good cause standard for discovery in the escalating burdens of proof within section 745. The burden at the discovery stage is a good cause showing, the burden at the prima facie stage is higher, and the burden at the evidentiary hearing is higher still—proof of an RJA violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

As the least onerous of the statute’s burdens of proof, the plausible justification standard should not be difficult to meet. Accordingly, where the defendant makes a showing of plausible justification that there was or could have been a violation of the RJA, thus triggering access to all relevant evidence concerning a potential violation of section 745(a), it will likely be an abuse of discretion to totally foreclose discovery.

Authority:

Young v. Superior Court (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 138, 160-161, 168-169

Gonzales v. Superior Court (2024) 108 Cal.App.5th Supp. 36, 61

Racial Justice Act, Standard of review

Case 000609

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court applied improper legal standards in denying the defendant’s renewed new trial motion under the Racial Justice Act (RJA) and his request for RJA discovery.

First Holding:

In enacting Penal Code section 745, effective 1/1/2021, the Legislature sought to eliminate racial bias from California’s criminal justice system, declaring that racism—whether intentional or implicit—at any stage of a criminal case undermines fairness and constitutes a miscarriage of justice under the state Constitution. The statute is designed not to punish bias but to remedy its impact on defendants and the judicial process, ensuring that race plays no role in obtaining convictions or imposing sentences and rejecting the premise that racial disparities in the system are unavoidable. The following year, the Legislature amended subdivision (j) to provide the RJA applies to all cases where the judgment is not final.

Authority:

PEN 745

Second Holding:

The RJA identifies four categories of conduct, any one of which, if proved, is sufficient to establish a violation of Penal Code section 745, subdivision (a). In the renewed motion, the defendant relied on section 745(a)(1) and (2), which permit a defendant to establish a RJA violation by a preponderance of the evidence where:

(1) The judge, an attorney in the case, a law enforcement officer involved in the case, an expert witness, or juror exhibited bias or animus towards the defendant because of the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin; or

(2) During the defendant’s trial, in court and during the proceedings, the judge, an attorney in the case, a law enforcement officer involved in the case, an expert witness, or juror, used racially discriminatory language about the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin, or otherwise exhibited bias or animus towards the defendant because of the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin, whether or not purposeful.

(Paragraph (2) does not apply if the person speaking is relating language used by another that is relevant to the case or if the person speaking is giving a racially neutral and unbiased physical description of the suspect.)

Section 745 defines racially discriminatory language.

Authority:

PEN 745

Young v. Superior Court (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 138, 147

Third Holding:

A defendant alleging an RJA violation must first make a prima facie showing in the trial court—i.e., present facts that, if true, demonstrate a substantial likelihood of a violation. This standard falls between a mere possibility and a preponderance of the evidence. At this stage, the court must accept the defendant’s factual allegations as true, including expert and statistical evidence, unless they are conclusory, unsupported, or contradicted by the record.

The trial court may not weigh competing evidence or make credibility determinations, except in the rare circumstances where the record irrefutably establishes the allegations are false. If the trial court determines a defendant has made a prima facie showing, it must conduct an evidentiary hearing where it may consider evidence and arguments submitted by the People, make credibility determinations, and weigh the evidence.

Authority:

Finley v. Superior Court (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 12, 22-23, 25

Fourth Holding:

We review de novo the trial court’s legal conclusion that appellants failed to make a prima facie showing.

Authority:

People v. Howard (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 625, 650

Fifth Holding:

The trial court concluded that the defendant failed to make a prima facie showing. The court did not find the defendant’s testimony conclusory, irrelevant, or unsupported; rather, it discounted the testimony as uncorroborated and not credible. This was error. At the prima facie stage, the defendant was not required to prove the truth of his account; he was required only to show that, if true, the facts alleged would establish a violation.

The court further erred by proceeding with a prejudice analysis—reasoning that, even if the jury heard the introduction of the rap lyrics, the verdicts would not have changed and no miscarriage of justice occurred. But prejudice is not part of the prima facie inquiry. The question is solely whether the defendant satisfied his initial minimal burden to produce facts that, if true, establish that there is more than a mere possibility of an RJA violation. Applying de novo review, we conclude that the defendant met his minimal burden to allege facts that, if true, establish more than a mere possibility of an RJA violation.

Authority:

People v. Howard (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 625, 656

Sixth Holding:

The court erred in denying the defendant’s motion for RJA discovery. He provided some data in support of his motion. The showing required to establish a plausible factual foundation for discovery under the RJA is minimal. At the request for discovery stage a court need not determine whether a violation under Penal Code section 745(a) may ultimately be established or ruled out. The dispositive question is whether a defendant demonstrated a plausible factual foundation for any potential RJA violation sufficient to show good cause.

Authority:

Gonzales v. Superior Court (2024) 108 Cal.App.5th Supp. 36

McDaniel v. Superior Court (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 228, 244

Young v. Superior Court (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 138

Seventh Holding:

We review the trial court’s discovery order for abuse of discretion, because management of discovery lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. The RJA was designed to facilitate the exposure and evaluation of potential racial bias, not to erect insurmountable barriers at the discovery stage. By requiring more than a plausible factual showing and prematurely invoking additional discovery constraints, the trial court applied a framework that unduly restricted access to potentially probative evidence. Because the trial court’s ruling rested on erroneous legal premises, its denial of discovery constitutes an abuse of discretion.

Authority:

Young v. Superior Court (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 138, 156

Racial Justice Act

Case 000579

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The defendant challenges the trial court’s summary denial of his motion for relief pursuant to the California Racial Justice Act of 2020. We agree he made a prima facie showing of an RJA violation. We conditionally reverse and remand for an evidentiary hearing.

First Holding:

The Racial Justice Act (RJA) provides: The state shall not seek or obtain a criminal conviction on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin. One way to show an RJA violation is by proving a law enforcement officer involved in the case exhibited bias or animus towards the defendant because of the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin. If the defendant makes a prima facie showing of a violation, the trial court must hold an evidentiary hearing.

Authority:

PEN 745

Second Holding:

The trial court erred in concluding that an officer whose comments may have indicated improper racial consideration was not involved in the case. The statute does not require the officer to be integral to the investigation, just somehow involved. The officer’s action in interviewing the victim constitutes involvement. A prima facie showing means that the defendant produces facts that, if true, establish that there is a substantial likelihood that a violation of subdivision (a) occurred. A substantial likelihood requires more than a mere possibility, but less than a standard of more likely than not.

Authority:

PEN 745

Third Holding:

The trial court acted too soon by concluding that the officer was just “chatting about child molesters” and not directing his statements against the defendant’s heritage. The proper construction of the officer’s comments needed to be resolved at an evidentiary hearing. That is where the court can determine, as the trial court here aptly phrased it, whether a statement that may have some race or culturally related context actually showed bias or animus. A conditional reversal is warranted for the court to hold an evidentiary hearing.

Authority:

Finley v. Superior Court (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 12, 23

People v. Howard (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 625, 656

Discretion, Racial Justice Act, Standard of review, Statutory interpretation

Case: 000271

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The petition for writ of habeas corpus, construed as a petition for mandate, is granted. The defendant filed a petition under the Racial Justice Act (RJA) to challenge his conviction of 25 years earlier. He petition contained statistical data showing that the prosecution charged far more Black defendants for specified offenses than White defendants in that same three-year period. He sought counsel in his petition. The trial court denied it in its entirety.

The trial court erred in ruling that the defendant had to make a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief to secure appointment of counsel. Rather, to obtain counsel, the Racial Justice Act requires habeas petitioners to plead a plausible allegation of a violation of the Act. Second, the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s request for counsel was erroneous because regardless of whether he satisfied the minimal pleading standard governing that request, the court was unaware of its discretion to grant him leave to amend the petition to plead a plausible allegation of a Racial Justice Act violation. Lastly, the trial court erred in invoking the prohibition on successive habeas petitions because the defendant was not required to address procedural bars to relief at this initial stage of the proceedings.

First Holding:

When the issue on review is purely legal, such as the proper interpretation and application of a statute or constitutional provision, our review is de novo. Our fundamental task in interpreting a statute is to ascertain the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate its purpose. We begin with the text of the statute and give the words their usual meaning while construing them in light of the statutory framework as a whole. If the statutory language is unambiguous, then its plain meaning controls. If the language permits more than one reasonable interpretation, courts may consider other aids, such as the statute’s purpose, legislative history, and public policy. Discretionary decisions by the trial court are generally subject to appellate review under the abuse of discretion standard to determine if they were within the bounds of some applicable legal criteria.

Authority:

In re Lugo (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1535

People v. Carter (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 960, 967

People v. Hodge (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 985, 998

Second Holding:

In 2020, the Legislature enacted the Racial Justice Act. The purpose of the Act is to purge racial discrimination from our criminal justice system, and to ensure that race plays no role at all in seeking or obtaining convictions or in sentencing’. In passing the Act, the Legislature recognized that racial bias persists in our criminal justice system because courts generally only address racial bias in its most extreme and blatant forms. The Act acknowledges that all persons possess implicit biases that impact the criminal justice system, and these biases tend to disfavor people of color. The RJA added section 745, which sets forth legal standards governing a claim for relief under the Act. The Act also amended section 1473, which identifies bases for prosecuting a petition for writ of habeas corpus, to add a subdivision governing the litigation of RJA claims.

Authority:

PEN 745

PEN 1473

McIntosh v. Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 33, 39, 43

People v. Lawson (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 990, 993

Third Holding:

In the legislation amending section 1473(e) effective January 1, 2026, the Legislature emphasized the extremely low showing a petitioner must make to obtain counsel:  “The Act’s threshold to secure counsel is extremely low, and yet courts have denied counsel to litigants raising Racial Justice Act claims far more than they have appointed counsel The Legislature reaffirms that the threshold showing for appointment of counsel does not require a prima facie showing, as correctly held by McIntosh v. Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 33, and should be construed as a minimal pleading requirement.”

Authority:

McIntosh v. Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 33

Fourth Holding:

If the Legislature amends or reenacts the statute without changing the interpretation placed on that statute by the courts, the Legislature is presumed to have been aware of, and acquiesced in, the courts’ construction of that statute.

Authority:

People v. Brown (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1430, 1436

Fifth Holding:

The statute now requires the appointment of counsel for an indigent habeas petitioner if the petition pleads a plausible allegation of a violation of RJA, and obligates the court to determine if the petitioner has made a prima facie showing, instead of a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief.

Authority:

McIntosh v. Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 33, 39, 44

Sixth Holding:

The trial court’s denial of the defendant’s request for appointment of counsel was erroneous because the court was unaware of its discretion to permit him to amend his petition to satisfy the minimal pleading burden governing his request for counsel. If the court’s decision is influenced by an erroneous understanding of applicable law or reflects an unawareness of the full scope of its discretion, the court has not properly exercised its discretion under the law. Therefore, a discretionary order based on an application of improper criteria or incorrect legal assumptions is not an exercise of informed discretion and is subject to reversal. Simply stated, an abuse of discretion arises if the trial court based its decision on impermissible factors or on an incorrect legal standard.

Authority:

People v. K.D. (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 1, 19