Error and/or relief
The defendant filed a habeas corpus petition in the superior court, alleging that his 1992 convictions for first degree murder and robbery were obtained “on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin” in violation of the California Racial Justice Act of 2020 (RJA). He also requested, pursuant to the RJA, appointment of counsel and disclosure of evidence to support his claims.
The trial court denied the discovery request and the habeas petition, concluding that the defendant failed to establish a prima facie case for relief under the RJA.
The court erred. We grant the petition and issue a writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order denying the habeas petition, appoint counsel for the defendant, and conduct a new hearing to reconsider his discovery request in a manner consistent with this opinion.
(Gary note: The court outlined in several paragraphs the specific allegations the defendant set forth in his petition that, if true, arguably demonstrated that his arrest and prosecution were affected by factors disallowed by the RJA. As these summaries are designed to highlight principles and the cases or statutes supporting the principles, I am not going to include the facts of the case on which the appellate court concluded that the defendant had demonstrated a sufficient showing to warrant appointment of counsel and discovery.)
First Holding:
Ordinarily, mandate does not lie to correct judicial errors by the superior court in habeas corpus proceedings.
However, where, as here, the trial court failed to perform its required duty to conduct an independent assessment of whether the petitioner was entitled to have counsel appointed under newly adopted procedures enacted by the Legislature, then mandate may be used to compel the performance of that duty.
Authority:
McIntosh v. Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 33, 46-47
Second Holding:
Several have concluded that writ review of the trial court’s discovery rulings in RJA cases is appropriate because such rulings involve novel legal issues of widespread interest.
The RJA is a recent legislation that has been amended multiple times since its inception, and although its command is simple, its implementation is somewhat complex.
We therefore agree with the court in Young that exercising our discretion to review discovery rulings under the RJA is appropriate to provide general guidelines for future cases.
(Gary note: I find that last sentence regarding guidelines for future cases a bit amusing, because this is an unpublished opinion, and the only “future case” it will ever affect is THIS particular defendant’s instant case. But hey. Maybe the “to publish or not to publish” colloquy occurred after the opinion was written.)
Authority:
Young v. Superior Court (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 138, 147, 156
Gonzales v. Superior Court (2024) 108 Cal.App.5th Supp. 36, 53-54
McDaniel v. Superior Court (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 228, 238
Third Holding:
Because management of discovery lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, we review discovery rulings for abuse of discretion. We review the factual underpinnings of a discretionary determination for substantial evidence, but where such a determination rests on incorrect legal premises, our review is de novo.
A discretionary order based on an application of improper criteria or incorrect legal assumptions is not an exercise of informed discretion and is subject to reversal.
Authority:
Young v. Superior Court (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 138, 156
Gonzales v. Superior Court (2024) 108 Cal.App.5th Supp. 36, 55
Fourth Holding:
Effective January 1, 2021, the Legislature enacted the RJA (AB 2542 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.)) to eliminate racial bias from California’s criminal justice system; to ensure that race plays no role at all in seeking or obtaining convictions or in sentencing; and to ensure that individuals have access to all relevant evidence, including statistical evidence, regarding potential discrimination in seeking or obtaining convictions or imposing sentences.
To achieve these objectives, the RJA added and amended Penal Code sections to allow defendants whose judgments are final or who are no longer in custody, respectively, to seek relief for RJA violations.
Authority:
PEN 745
PEN 1473
PEN 1473.7
In re Lynex (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 756, 767
People v. Wilson (2024) 16 Cal.5th 874, 945
Fifth Holding:
The RJA provides that the state shall not seek or obtain a criminal conviction or seek, obtain, or impose a sentence on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin. The statute further sets forth four categories of conduct, any of which, if proved, is enough to establish a violation of the RJA.
Authority:
PEN 745(a)
Sixth Holding:
The court shall appoint counsel if the petitioner cannot afford counsel and the petition alleges facts that would establish a violation of section 745(a). In AB 1071, the Legislature reaffirmed that this threshold is extremely low. (Stats. 2025, ch. 721, sec. 1, subd. (b).)
AB 1071 states that courts have imposed on RJA petitioners higher burdens than the Legislature intended to meet the threshold to secure counsel and denied counsel to litigants raising RJA claims far more than they have appointed counsel.
The new legislation clarifies that the court shall appoint counsel to all indigent postconviction litigants who allege a plausible claim of an RJA violation, which does not require a prima facie showing and should be construed as a minimal pleading requirement.
Authority:
PEN 1473(e)(5)
McIntosh v. Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 33
Seventh Holding:
The RJA defines a prima facie showing to mean that the defendant produces facts that, if true, establish that there is a substantial likelihood that a violation of the RJA occurred.
By contrast, to be entitled to counsel in RJA habeas proceedings, petitioners are required only to allege facts that would establish a violation of the RJA.
Authority:
PEN 745(h)(2)
McIntosh v. Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 33, 45
Eighth Holding:
Regarding the showing necessary for discovery, a defendant is required only to advance a plausible factual foundation, based on specific facts, that a violation of the RJA could or might have occurred in his case.
The burden at the discovery stage is a good cause showing, the burden at the prima facie stage is higher, and the burden at the evidentiary hearing is higher still—proof of an RJA violation by a preponderance of the evidence.
As the least onerous of the statute’s burdens of proof, the plausible justification standard should not be difficult to meet. Where the defendant makes a showing of plausible justification that there was or could have been a violation of the RJA, thus triggering access to all relevant evidence concerning a potential violation of section 745(a), it will likely be an abuse of discretion to totally foreclose discovery.
Authority:
PEN 745(c), (d), and (e)
Young v. Superior Court (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 138, 159, 168-169
Gonzales v. Superior Court (2024) 108 Cal.App.5th Supp. 36, 61
Ninth Holding:
At the discovery stage, as at the prima facie stage, the court should not weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations, except in the rare case where the record irrefutably establishes that the allegations are false.
Authority:
Finley v. Superior Court (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 12, 23–24
McDaniel v. Superior Court (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 228, 246, fn. 8 [A trial court’s review of supporting evidence at the discovery stage, which imposes even a lower burden of proof on defendants than the prima facie stage, must be more lenient]
Tenth Holding:
Although the defendant has offered sufficient evidence to demonstrate a plausible factual foundation for discovery under the RJA, a question remains regarding the appropriate scope of his request.
When determining if a petitioner is entitled to the requested discovery, the court must still consider and balance the so-called Alhambra factors:
(1) whether the material requested is adequately described;
(2) whether the requested material is reasonably available to the governmental entity from which it is sought (and not readily available to the defendant from other sources);
(3) whether production of the records containing the requested information would violate (i) third party confidentiality or privacy rights or (ii) any protected governmental interest;
(4) whether the defendant has acted in a timely manner;
(5) whether the time required to produce the requested information will necessitate an unreasonable delay of the defendant’s trial; and
(6) whether the production of the records containing the requested information would place an unreasonable burden on the governmental entity involved.
Authority:
City of Alhambra v. Superior Court (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1118, 1134
Eleventh Holding:
In addition, the court must consider whether the requests for disclosure may give rise to relevant evidence, meaning that the court must determine whether they are reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of admissible evidence probative of a section 745(a) violation.
The trial courts in exercising their discretion should keep in mind that the Legislature has suggested that, where possible, the courts should impose partial limitations rather than outright denial of discovery.
Authority:
McDaniel v. Superior Court (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 228, 248
Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 559