Tag Archives: Probation Parole PRCS

Abstracts and Minutes, Jurisdiction, Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing

Case 001013

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court erred in revoking the defendant’s probation after the period of probation had expired, because it no longer had jurisdiction once the probation period expired.

First Holding:

A trial court, in the order granting probation, may suspend the imposing or the execution of the sentence and may direct that the suspension may continue for a period of time not exceeding two years.

Revocation is a two-step process. First, when presented with probable cause of a violation, a court may summarily revoke supervision and issue a bench warrant for the defendant’s arrest.

Second, the defendant is entitled to a formal hearing at which the prosecution must prove the violation and a disposition may be made. If the violation is found true, the court may, among other options, terminate supervision and order incarceration in jail, or it may reinstate supervision and modify the conditions, such as by imposing a period of jail incarceration.

Authority:

PEN 1203.1(a)

People v. Braud (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 962, 966

Second Holding:

The revocation, summary or otherwise, shall serve to toll the running of the period of supervision. However, while the trial court has the power to extend the probationary term, tolling at the summary revocation stage does not automatically extend the probationary period but rather preserves the court’s jurisdiction to proceed to the second step, a formal hearing to decide whether there has been a violation during the probation period, after the probation period has expired.

Authority:

PEN 1203.2(a)

People v. Leiva (2013) 56 Cal.4th 498, 504)

People v. Braud (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 962, 968

Third Holding:

The defendant was placed on two years probation. The parties disagree on whether probation expired in April or had been extended to a late August date. Although a minute order of a hearing held on a date in late August stated that it was revoked on a specific date a few weeks before the hearing, the court never stated that probation was revoked at a hearing.

A trial court’s oral pronouncements control over a subsequently entered minute order. Moreover, the minutes from that earlier hearing do not say probation was revoked. There was no reporter at that earlier hearing. Thus, the record does not support the assertion that probation was revoked at that early August hearing.

Instead, the record does reflect that the court purported to revoke probation two months later, in October. But whether probation was set to expire in April (as the defendant claimed) or in August (as the prosecution claimed), both dates had passed before the October hearing.

As the probation expiration date had passed (whether in April or August), the court no longer had jurisdiction to decide whether the defendant had violated probation.

Authority:

People v. Sanchez (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 907, 918–919

People v. Braud (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 962, 968


(Gary note: I recognize that this summary is inartfully worded, a product of my attempt to anonymize the participants. During the defendant’s probation, it was revoked and reinstated a number of times. At some point–whether April or August–probation expired during a period when there was no order revoking probation, summary or otherwise. Had the court timely summarily revoked probation before its term expired, it would have had jurisdiction over the case even after the term expired. By not putting the probation into a “revocation” mode, probation simply terminated when the expiration date arrived. At that point, the court lost jurisdiction to conduct revocation proceedings.)

Due process, Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 000992

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We find sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that the defendant violated the conditions of his probation. But in light of the materially inaccurate information that appears to have influenced the defendant’s sentence, we cannot conclude that the superior court exercised informed discretion in imposing his sentence. Remanded for resentencing.

First Holding:

A probation violation is provable by a preponderance of the evidence. We review factual findings in this respect for substantial evidence. Under that standard, our review is limited to the determination of whether, upon review of the entire record, there is substantial evidence of solid value, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the trial court’s decision. In conducting this inquiry, we give full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.

Authority:

People v. Rodriguez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 437, 441

People v. Butcher (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 310, 318

People v. Kurey (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 840, 848

People v. Mumin (2023) 15 Cal.5th 176, 198

Second Holding:

There may be situations in which a prisoner is entitled to a new sentencing hearing, but only where he shows that: (1) material false information was (2) relied upon by the sentencing judge, and (3) the defendant had no opportunity at the time of sentencing to correct such false information. The probation officer’s report stated that the defendant was found in violation of probation for, among other things, using illicit drugs. In fact, he was not found to have used drugs, and he was not found in violation for using drugs.

The record here reflects that the court relied on that materially false information. When defense counsel attempted to bring it to the court’s attention that the statement was untrue, the court gave no feedback or acknowledgement and simply proceeded with sentencing, in contrast to an earlier correction on a different misunderstanding brought to the court’s attention by the prosecutor, whom the court thanked for bringing the correction to the court’s attention.

Defendants are entitled to sentencing decisions made in the exercise of the informed discretion of the sentencing court. On this record, which appears to show that the sentencing court believed that the drug-use allegations had been proven, we cannot be confident that the court exercised informed discretion.

Authority:

In re Beal (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 94, 99–100

People v. Belmontes (1983) 34 Cal.3d 335, 348, fn. 8

Third Holding:

A court’s alleged reliance on inaccurate information that appears to have contributed to the defendant’s sentence implicates the federal constitutional guarantee of due process. We evaluate such claims under the standard set forth in Chapman. This stricter standard of review requires reversal unless the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Authority:

People v. Eckley (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1072, 1080

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24

People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237, 251

Fourth Holding:

In revoking and terminating probation, trial court is entitled to consider defendant’s performance on probation from the time it was originally granted until it was reinstated for the final time.

Authority:

People v. Black (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 145, 151

Appellate Principles, Jurisdiction, Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing, Statutory interpretation

Case 000977

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The defendant appeals the no-contact and stay-away orders imposed by the trial court as part of his prison sentence and as a condition of his parole following his conviction for petty theft and making criminal threats.

The Attorney General argues the defendant forfeited this issue by failing to object to the orders in the trial court.

We disagree and strike the no-contact and stay-away orders because the trial court lacked authority to issue them and otherwise affirm the judgment.

First Holding:

Normally, only claims properly raised and preserved by the parties are reviewable on appeal. In the sentencing context, we have applied the rule to claims of error asserted by both the People and the defendant.

We have, however, created a narrow exception to the waiver rule for unauthorized sentences or sentences entered in excess of jurisdiction.

Authority:

People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354

People v. Smith (2001) 24 Cal.4th 849, 852

Second Holding:

A claim that a sentence is unauthorized may be raised for the first time on appeal, and is subject to judicial correction whenever the error comes to the attention of the reviewing court. A sentence is generally unauthorized where it could not lawfully be imposed under any circumstance in the particular case. Such error is clear and correctable independent of any factual issues presented by the record at sentencing.

Authority:

People v. Dotson (1997) 16 Cal.4th 547, 554, fn. 6

People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354

Third Holding:

The trial court did not have statutory authority to impose no-contact or stay-away orders in these circumstances. While there are statutory provisions that allow a trial court to impose no-contact and stay-away orders in other circumstances, for example, domestic violence cases, cases involving sexual assault of a minor, stalking cases, as a condition of probation, or during active criminal proceedings, there are no statutes specifically authorizing the trial court here to impose no-contact and stay-away orders as part of the defendant’s prison sentence or as a condition of his parole.

Authority:

PEN 1203.097

PEN 1202.05(a)

PEN 646.9(k)

PEN 1203.1(j)

PEN 136.2

Fourth Holding:

Ponce rejected the argument that that trial courts, independent of statutes, have inherent authority to protect trial participants, citing both California and federal cases. It held that even if the trial court had relied on inherent judicial authority to issue its order, the result would not change.

An existing body of statutory law regulates restraining orders. Inherent powers should never be exercised in such a manner as to nullify existing legislation. Where the Legislature authorizes a specific variety of available procedures, the courts should use them and should normally refrain from exercising their inherent powers to invent alternatives.

The trial court here should have refrained from acting because there is an existing body of statutory law regulating no-contact and stay-away orders.

Authority:

People v. Ponce (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 378, 383-384

Fifth Holding:

The Legislature has adopted specific statutory provisions authorizing parole boards to impose no-contact and stay-away orders as a condition of parole. Under this statutory scheme, the victims here can request the parole board to include no-contact and stay-away orders as a condition of the defendant’s parole.

Additionally, Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6(a) authorizes trial courts to issue orders to protect against any threats or harassment after notice and hearing.

Therefore, because the Legislature already authorizes available procedures for no-contact and stay-away orders for the victims in this case, the trial court was not authorized to impose them under its inherent authority.

Authority:

PEN 3053.2(a) [the parole board must impose a no-contact order as a condition of parole if requested by the victim]

PEN 3053(a) [the parole board may also impose on the parole any conditions that it may deem proper]

CCP 527.6(a)

Appellate Principles, Juveniles, Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 000941

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The minor challenges several conditions of probation. We modify two of them.

First Holding:

The juvenile court has wide discretion to select appropriate probation conditions and may impose any reasonable condition that is fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced. The juvenile court’s discretion, while broad, is not unlimited.

A probation condition is invalid if it: (1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality.

In order to invalidate a condition of probation under this Lent test, all three factors must be found to be present. A condition of probation that would be unconstitutional or otherwise improper for an adult probationer may be permissible for a minor under the supervision of the juvenile court.

Authority:

In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 889

In re J.B. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 749, 754

People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486

Second Holding:

We review a juvenile court’s imposition of a probation condition for an abuse of discretion.

Authority:

In re Daniel R. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1, 6

Third Holding:

Hearsay can at least sometimes be considered at dispositional hearings, and courts may base probation conditions upon information in probation reports.

Authority:

In re Vincent G. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 238, 243–244

In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113, 1122

Fourth Holding:

Probation conditions are to be given the meaning that would appear to a reasonable reader. We modify the probation condition that the minor not be around anyone known to him to be in possession of any dangerous or deadly weapons by inserting “known to him to be unlawfully in possession of the same.”

Authority:

People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 382

(Gary note: Olguin supports the first sentence of that summary of the holding. The court did not cite any specific authority in the paragraphs in which it modified the language of that condition itself. However, In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 889, authorizes an appellate court to modify conditions of probation to render them constitutional.)

Fifth Holding:

A probation condition that imposes limitations on a person’s constitutional rights must closely tailor those limitations to the purpose of the condition to avoid being invalidated as unconstitutionally overbroad. The essential question in an overbreadth challenge is the closeness of the fit between the legitimate purpose of the restriction and the burden it imposes on the defendant’s constitutional rights.

People have a constitutional right to self-defense. The condition that “The minor shall not commit any act of violence against anyone” must be tailored to, “The minor shall not commit any act of violence against anyone, except for acts of lawful self-defense.”

Authority:

Cal. Const., art. I, sec. 1

In re Carlos C. (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 997, 1002, 1004

People v. McDonnell (1917) 32 Cal.App. 694, 704

Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing

Case 000907

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court is directed to prepare and send a certified copy of an amended abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, noting that the defendant’s [more than 500] days of excess presentence custody credit are to be applied to his parole period.

First Holding:

Any excess presentence custody credits that a defendant accrues must be applied to his parole period.

Authority:

PEN 2900.5(a) and (c)

People v. Morales (2016) 63 Cal.4th 399, 405

Second Holding:

The Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and the Board of Parole Hearings determine when a defendant is discharged from parole, and any excess credits are taken into account. In an abundance of caution, we will direct the trial court to amend the abstract of judgment to note that the defendant’s excess credits shall be applied to his parole period.

Authority:

PEN 3000(b)

PEN 3001

Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, secs. 2515, 2345, 2535–2537

Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing

Case 000901

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

A condition of probation must be modified, as it is not sufficiently clear on what exact conduct is proscribed.

First Holding:

Probation condition number 48 provides: “You shall not associate with any person known to you as a gang member, and you shall not frequent any area where gang members are known to congregate, or areas known for gang-related activity.” The defendant argues the terms frequent and areas known for gang-related activity are unconstitutionally vague.

Authority:

In re H.C. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1067, 1072 [probation condition that the minor not frequent any areas of gang related activity was objectionable because the verb ‘frequent’ would be especially challenging to understand; ‘frequent’ should be replaced with “visit”]

In re Victor L. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902, 913–914 [probation condition prohibiting minor from being in areas known for gang-related activity was impermissibly vague in that it does not provide notice of what areas the minor may not frequent or what types of activities he must shun]

Second Holding:

Under the void for vagueness doctrine, based on the due process concept of fair warning, an order must be sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is required of him, and for the court to determine whether the condition has been violated. The doctrine invalidates a condition of probation so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.

Authority:

In re Victor L. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902, 910

Third Holding:

In Victor L., we considered a similar probation condition that required the minor to stay away from areas known by him for gang-related activity. We found the condition as written, without further specificity, was not sufficiently clear to put the minor on notice of the prohibited conduct.

However, we declined to remand the matter to the trial court to reform the probation condition, observing, that to require the judge in each probation order to specify exactly which areas are forbidden to the individual gang member would impose an undue burden on the judiciary.

Instead, we elected to modify the condition of probation to provide for the probation officer to notify the minor of the areas he must avoid, as this approach was implied in law in order to avoid a claim of unconstitutional vagueness. We modified the probation term to read in relevant part, “The Minor shall not be in areas known by Minor for gang-related activity (or specified by his probation officer as involving gang-related activity).

Similarly here, we will modify the condition to read: “You shall not associate with any person known to you as a gang member, and you shall not visit any area where gang members are known by you to congregate or any area known by you for gang-related activity (or as designated by your probation officer), unless you have prior authorization from your probation officer.”

Authority:

In re Victor L. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902, 913, 916-918, 931-932

In re H.C. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1067

Discretion, Juveniles, Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 000899

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The electronic-data conditions are unreasonable under People v. Lent. We therefore strike them and remand for the juvenile court to consider whether to impose revised conditions. We also agree with the parties that the association condition should be modified to include a knowledge requirement.

First Holding:

When a ward of the juvenile court is placed on probation, the court may make any and all reasonable orders for the conduct of the ward, including conditions of probation that (1) are individually tailored, developmentally appropriate, and reasonable; (2) impose a burden that is proportional to the legitimate interests served by the conditions; and (3) are determined by the court to be fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced. A condition of probation that is impermissible for an adult criminal defendant is not necessarily unreasonable for a juvenile receiving guidance and supervision from the juvenile court.

Authority:

WIC 730(b)

In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113, 1118

Second Holding:

We review conditions of probation for an abuse of discretion, which occurs only if the condition is arbitrary or capricious or otherwise exceeds the bounds of reason under the circumstances. To determine whether a probation condition is reasonable, we apply a three-part test under Lent.

A condition cannot be held invalid under Lent unless it meets all three of the following prongs: it (1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not related to future criminality.

Authority:

In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113, 1118-1119

People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486

Third Holding:

In addition to being reasonable, a probation condition must be sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is required and for the court to determine whether the condition has been violated, or else it is void for vagueness. And when a probation condition imposes limitations on a probationer’s constitutional rights, it must closely tailor those limitations to the purpose of the condition—the person’s reformation and rehabilitation—to avoid being invalidated as unconstitutionally overbroad.

Authority:

In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890

Fourth Holding:

Whether a term of probation is unconstitutionally vague or overbroad presents a question of law, which we review de novo.

Authority:

In re David C. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 657, 661

Fifth Holding:

We conclude that the conditions are invalid under Lent. As to the first prong of Lent, there is no question that restricting the use of electronics The minor’s conduct involved asking the victim for her phone number, and asked the victim to put his number in her phone contacts list–which she did, but later deleted it. These acts do not establish the requisite relationship between the challenged probation conditions and the minor’s offense (sexual battery by restraint). Generally, decisions finding a sufficient connection between electronics search conditions and an offense rely on the probationer’s use of electronic devices to facilitate the offense.

In Appleton, the defendant met the minor victim online and later sexually assaulted him. The Court of Appeal held that the nexus between the offense and the probation condition at issue was sufficient even though it was somewhat attenuated. In Flores, the Court held that there was a reasonable relationship between the condition at issue and the defendant’s drug offense because the defendant used a website and an online program to arrange drug sales through a disguised phone number. Here, in contrast, there is no evidence that electronic devices played any role in facilitating the offense.

Here, in contrast, there is no indication that the minor ever actually contacted the victim through an electronic device. Indeed, he did not even have the ability to do so, as he never obtained her contact information. Nor is there any evidence that the victim attempted to communicate with the minor after the offense. The first two prongs of Lent have been met–the condition has no relation to the criminal conduct, and it restrains otherwise lawful conduct.

Authority:

People v. Appleton (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 717, 719-720

People v. Flores (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 563, 565-566, 573

People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486

Sixth Holding:

The third prong contemplates a degree of proportionality between the burden imposed by a probation condition and the legitimate interests served by the condition. Thus, the mere fact that monitoring a probationer’s electronic devices and social media might deter or prevent future criminal conduct is insufficient to justify a broad electronics search condition. The electronic-data conditions burden the minor’s privacy in a manner substantially disproportionate to the claimed purposes of ensuring compliance with two of his other probation conditions (a no-contact order and prohibition from possessing sexual materials).

Authority:

In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113, 1122

In re David C. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 657, 665 and fn 4

In re Amber K. (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 559, 567-568

Seventh Holding:

The court ordered the following probation condition: “The Minor shall not associate with minors under the age of 14, unless it is his own child, unless in the presence of a responsible adult, or associated person is approved by the Probation Department.”

A probation condition is unconstitutionally overbroad if it (1) impinges on constitutional rights, and (2) is not tailored carefully and reasonably related to the compelling state interest in reformation and rehabilitation. The essential question in an overbreadth challenge is the closeness of the fit between the legitimate purpose of the restriction and the burden it imposes on the probationer’s constitutional rights—bearing in mind, of course, that perfection in such matters is impossible, and that practical necessity will justify some infringement.

The restriction is not unreasonable, but it must be tailored to require the minor’s express knowledge that the minor is under the age of 14. Generally speaking, if a probation condition prohibits a probationer from associating with a certain group of people, the condition is unconstitutionally vague unless it also requires that the probationer know a given person is in that group. Here, the minor may not reasonably know that an individual is under 14 years of age.

Thus, we modify the association condition to read: “The Minor shall not associate with minors whom he knows or reasonably should know are under the age of 14, unless it is his own child, unless he is in the presence of a responsible adult, or unless the associated person is approved by the Probation Department.”

Authority:

People v. Gonsalves (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 1, 8–9

People v. Bray (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 494, 503

People v. Turner (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1432, 1436 [modifying condition prohibiting association with people under age 18].

Appellate Principles, Fines and fees, Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 000876

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We modify the order of probation to eliminate the provision that the defendant pay the costs of mental health treatment as a condition of probation and otherwise affirm the judgment.

First Holding:

We review such constitutional challenges to conditions of probation de novo.

Authority:

People v. Smith (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 897, 902

Second Holding:

A court may impose reasonable conditions that deprive the offender of some freedoms enjoyed by law-abiding citizens. In imposing such conditions, a court may require a defendant to complete a residential treatment program. A probation officer, however, may only oversee and enforce the trial court’s orders. A probation officer may not create conditions not expressly authorized by the court.

Authority:

People v. Pirali (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1341, 1350

People v. Smith (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 897, 903

People v. O’Neil (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1358

Third Holding:

The defendant raises an argument for the first time in the reply brief. The issue is forfeited for not raising it earlier.

Authority:

People v. Hart (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 1099, 1106

Fourth Holding:

A trial court may order a defendant who is granted probation to pay the reasonable associated costs. To do so, the court must make an inquiry and determination regarding the defendant’s ability to pay, and issue a separate order for the payment of such costs.

But the payment of such costs cannot be made a condition of probation. The record before us does not show the court inquired into the defendant’s ability to pay before including the provision that she pay these costs, or that it issued a separate order for payment of these costs. Accordingly, condition 7 must be modified to eliminate the requirement that the defenrant pay the costs of treatment associated with this condition.

Authority:

People v. Hall (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 889, 892

Brown v. Superior Court (2002) 101Cal.App.4th 313, 321-322

People v. Hart (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 902, 907

Juveniles, Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing, Statutory interpretation

Case 000862

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The court imposed an incorrect maximum term for the juvenile, and one of the probation conditions was overbroad.

First Holding:

The court declared that the maximum confinement time for the minor was 16 years, when it fact the maximum was 10 years.

Welfare and Institutions Code section 726(d)(1) provides that if the minor is removed from the physical custody of the minor’s parent or guardian as the result of an order of wardship made pursuant to section 602, the order shall specify that the minor may not be held in physical confinement for a period in excess of the middle term of imprisonment that could be imposed upon an adult convicted of the offense or offenses which brought or continued the minor under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.

Authority:

WIC 726(d)(1)

Second Holding:

Section 726 defines the maximum term of imprisonment as the middle of the three time periods set forth in section 1170(a)(3) of the Penal Code, plus enhancements.

To the extent section 726 is ambiguous, we think it logical that the method for selecting the term for the underlying offense should apply in selecting the term for an enhancement.

Here, the middle term for the underlying offense is six years, and the middle term for the enhancement is four years, for a total of ten years.

Authority:

WIC 726(d)(2)

In re George M. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 376, 381 [interpreting prior version of section 726]

Third Holding:

The juvenile court ordered a total commitment of in terms of a number of days that exceed even the 16-year maximum confinement time in the court’s minute order. Rather than expressing the commitment in days, we will modify the disposition order such that appellant’s total commitment is for the maximum confinement period of 10 years.

Authority:

People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 896, fn. 15 [remand unnecessary where maximum sentence had been imposed]

Fourth Holding:

Appellant’s probation conditions included the following: (1) “You shall not possess, nor shall you knowingly associate with anyone who possesses, any weapon, including, but not limited to firearms, pellet or BB guns, chemical weapons, a replica of any weapon, ammunition, or C02 canisters. You shall not remain in any vehicle where you know anyone has such a weapon or ammunition”; and (2) “You shall not associate with any person who is using or trafficking in any controlled substance, including marijuana.”

The juvenile court has wide discretion to select appropriate conditions, but a probation condition that imposes limitations on a person’s constitutional rights must closely tailor those limitations to the purpose of the condition to avoid being invalidated as unconstitutionally overbroad. While we generally review the imposition of probation conditions for abuse of discretion, we review constitutional challenges to probation conditions de novo.

The two conditions at issue are overbroad because they encompass people who legally possess weapons and use controlled substances. We will modify these conditions to specify that they apply only to illegal possession or use. While the word “trafficking” seems to imply illegal conduct, to remove any doubt, we will also specify that the trafficking must be illegal. The condition prohibiting association with those using or trafficking in controlled substances lacks a knowledge requirement. Modification to impose an explicit knowledge requirement is necessary to render the condition constitutional.

Authority:

In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113, 1118

People v. Appleton (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 717, 723

In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 892

People v. Garcia (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 97, 101-102

Discretion, Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 000815

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

It was error to impose a condition of probation that the defendant must submit to chemical testing for the use of alcohol at any time as directed by probation officer or other law enforcement officer.

First Holding:

As an initial matter, we address and reject the Attorney General’s argument that the defendant’s failure to object to the alcohol testing condition forfeited the issue on appeal. Neither forfeiture nor application of the forfeiture rule is automatic, and appellate courts have discretion to review otherwise forfeited challenges. Here, we exercise our right to decide the appeal on its merits, in order to eliminate the need to address the defendant’s alternative ineffective assistance of counsel claim. We now turn to the reasonableness of condition

Authority:

People v. McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589, 593

In re Victor L. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902, 928

Second Holding:

The defendant challenges the imposition of probation condition 13, which required him to submit to alcohol testing, as unreasonable under Lent. He contends the condition does not make sense because the trial court struck condition 12 that prohibited him from consuming or possessing alcohol.

Authority:

People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481

Third Holding:

We review conditions of probation for abuse of discretion. That is, a reviewing court will disturb the trial court’s decision to impose a particular condition of probation only if, under all the circumstances, that choice is arbitrary and capricious and is wholly unreasonable.

Authority:

People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379

People v. Moran (2016) 1 Cal.5th 398, 403

Fourth Holding:

A condition of probation will not be held invalid unless it ‘(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality. The Lent test is conjunctive—all three prongs must be satisfied before a reviewing court will invalidate a probation term.

The conditions of probation aimed at rehabilitating the offender need not be so strictly tied to the offender’s precise crime as long as they are reasonably directed at curbing an offender’s future criminality. But there must be a strong connection between the burdens imposed by the challenged condition and a probationer’s criminal conduct or personal history.

Authority:

People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486

People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379

In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113, 1120

Fifth Holding:

Notably, when asked to strike the condition requiring the defendant to abstain from drinking alcohol, the sentencing court freely did so without any apparent reservation. This striking shows the court was not concerned that the defendant’s alcohol consumption had the potential for abuse or was likely to lead to future criminality.

As such, because the defendant was allowed to possess and consume alcohol, there was no rational need to test the defendant for alcohol consumption as a condition of probation. Therefore, we conclude the testing condition here has no deterrent effect on the defendant’s future criminality and is unreasonable.

Authority:

People v. Kiddoo (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 922, 928, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 236–237 [court struck a probation condition that appellant not possess or consume alcohol or frequent places where alcohol was sold because there was no factual indication in the record that the proscribed behavior is reasonably related to future criminal behavior]

Sixth Holding:

Because the court’s imposition of condition 13 was therefore an abuse of discretion, we order it stricken.

Authority:

In re Malik J. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 896, 901 [In an appropriate case, a probation condition that is not sufficiently precise or narrowly drawn may be modified in this court and affirmed as modified]

Discretion, Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing, Statutory interpretation

Case 000801

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The court erred in believing that the defendant was presumptively ineligible for probation. Remanded for resentencing.

First Holding:

All defendants are eligible for probation, in the discretion of the sentencing court, unless a statute provides otherwise. Some statutes bar probation absolutely, while others provide that a defendant is ineligible except in unusual cases where the interests of justice would be served. Here, the trial court apparently relied on the probation report and defense counsel to conclude section 1203(e)(3) rendered the defendant ineligible for probation.

Authority:

People v. Aubrey (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 279, 282

Second Holding:

Section 1203(e), provides in relevant part, that except in unusual cases in which the interests of justice would best be served if the person is granted probation, probation shall not be granted to any person who willfully inflicted great bodily injury or torture in the perpetration of the crime of which that person has been convicted. By its terms, section 1203(e)(3) renders a defendant conditionally ineligible for probation only when there has been a finding the injury was willful, i.e., intentional.

Here, there was no such finding, and the People concede that the defendant’s no contest plea does not establish that she admitted to willfully inflicting great bodily injury on the victim. Thus, absent any additional findings by the trial court, section 1203(e) did not render her presumptively ineligible for probation, and the trial court erred in applying that presumption.

Authority:

PEN 1203(e)(3)

People v. Lewis (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 837, 854

Third Holding:

Where the sentencing court bases its determination to deny probation in significant part upon an erroneous impression of the defendant’s legal status, fundamental fairness requires that the defendant be afforded a new hearing and an informed, intelligent and just decision on the basis of the facts. Here, the record demonstrates the trial court misunderstood the scope of its discretion and may have relied upon the error to deny probation. A new sentencing hearing is therefore necessary for the trial court to consider the defendant’s probation request under the appropriate legal standard.

Authority:

People v. Ruiz (1975) 14 Cal.3d 163, 168

People v. Manriquez (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1614, 1620

People v. Downey (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 899, 912 [where a sentence choice is based on an erroneous understanding of the law, the matter must be remanded for an informed determination]

Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing

Case 000790

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The court erred by setting the length of probation at four years instead of two years.

Holding:

Effective January 1, 2021, AB 1950 amended Penal Code section 1203.1 to limit the maximum probation period for felony offenses. Under prior law, the length of felony probation could not exceed five years or the maximum possible sentence of imprisonment, whichever was longer. Now, the statute provides that, with certain exceptions not applicable here, felony probation may continue for a period of time not exceeding two years. Because the trial court imposed a term of probation in excess of section 1203.1’s normal two-year limit, we will reduce the term to comply with that limit.

Authority:

PEN 1203.1(a)

People v. Kite (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 986, 992

People v. Shelly (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 181, 185

People v. Prudholme (2023) 14 Cal.5th 961, 979 [reducing probationary term to two years to comply with AB 1950, without remand to trial court]