Tag Archives: Abstract of judgment or minute order

Abstracts and Minutes, Appellate Principles, Elements of crime, Sentencing, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence

Case 000710

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

There was insufficient evidence to support the count 4 conviction. The court erred by imposing the additional 25-year-to-life terms on counts 1 through 3. Section 1170(b) requires remand and resentencing on count 8 on which the court imposed the upper term. The court must correct the error in the abstract of judgment.

First Holding:

To prove that a defendant committed attempted murder, the prosecution must demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with the intent to kill.T]he intent to kill element must be examined independently as to each alleged attempted murder victim; an intent to kill cannot be transferred from one attempted murder victim to another under the transferred intent doctrine.

As there was no evidence that the defendant had the intent to kill, there was insufficient evidence of attempted murder. We reverse the defendant’s attempted murder conviction on count 4, and double jeopardy principles bar retrial of the charge. A finding of insufficient evidence is the functional equivalent of a judgment of acquittal, upon which retrial is prohibited.

Authority:

People v. Hin (2025) 17 Cal.5th 401, 455, 456

Second Holding:

We cannot reduce the defendant’s attempted murder conviction to one for the lesser included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter or the lesser related offense of assault with a firearm. To prove the crime of attempted voluntary manslaughter, the prosecution must introduce evidence demonstrating that the defendant intended to kill—evidence absent from the record here. And we are authorized to reduce a conviction only to a lesser included offense, not a lesser related offense.

Authority:

People v. Goolsby (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1220, 1225 [when a trial or appellate court concludes that there is insufficient evidence to support a conviction of a greater offense, it can reduce the conviction to a lesser included offense that is supported by the evidence]

People v. Montes (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1543, 1545–1547

People v. Hamilton (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 673, 685

People v. Parks (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1, 5–7 [assault with a firearm is not a lesser included offense of attempted murder]

Third Holding:

Double jeopardy principles prohibit retrying the defendant on these lesser offenses.

Authority:

People v. Anderson (2009) 47 Cal.4th 92, 103–104 The double jeopardy bar protects against a second prosecution for the same offense following an acquittal and both federal and California law generally treat greater and lesser included offenses as the same offense for purposes of double jeopardy]

People v. Goolsby (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1220, 1224–1226 [double jeopardy principles prohibit retrial on a lesser related offense where, as here, the court instructs on the lesser offense and the jury is discharged without rendering a verdict on the offense]

Fourth Holding:

In addition to sentencing the defendant to LWOP on each of counts 1 through 3, the court imposed terms of 25 years to life under the Three Strikes law on each count. This was improper. The finding of a special circumstance eliminates the possibility of a 25-year-to-life sentence and leaves only the sentencing options of death or LWOP. We therefore direct the trial court on remand to strike the terms of 25 years to life imposed on each of counts 1 through 3.

Authority:

PEN 190.2(a)

People v. Rodriguez (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 157, 164

Fifth Holding:

A defendant’s citation to a silent record is insufficient to meet his burden to demonstrate an abuse of discretion.

Authority:

People v. Coleman (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 709, 725

Sixth Holding:

Once the court elected to impose the greater section 12022.53(d) enhancements on counts 1 through 7, it erred by failing to stay or strike the lesser section 12022.53(b) and (c) firearm enhancements. We therefore direct the trial court on remand to stay or strike the lesser firearm enhancements found true by the jury.

Authority:

People v. Gonzalez (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1118, 1122–1123 [after a trial court imposes punishment for the section 12022.53 firearm enhancement with the longest term of imprisonment, the remaining section 12022.53 firearm enhancements and any section 12022.5 firearm enhancements that were found true for the same crime must be imposed and then stayed]

People v. Vizcarra (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 422, 432 [failure to pronounce sentence for an enhancement represents an unauthorized sentence]

Seventh Holding:

The trial court violated section 1170(b) and ran afoul of the defendant’s constitutional due process and jury-trial rights by relying on unproven aggravating circumstances in imposing an upper term sentence on count 8. Under section 1170(b)(1), when a judgment of imprisonment is to be imposed and the statute specifies three possible terms, the court shall, in its sound discretion, order imposition of a sentence not to exceed the middle term, except as otherwise provided in paragraph (2).

Paragraph (2), in turn, provides that the court may impose a sentence exceeding the middle term only when there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term and the facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.

Thus, section 1170(b), by its terms, governs sentences imposed pursuant to a statutory triad. It does not apply to indeterminate terms. But it does apply to count 8. The court failed to comply with section 1170(b)(5)’s requirement that it set forth on the record the facts and reasons for choosing the sentence imposed on count 8. Without any statement of reasons, we cannot properly review the propriety of the court’s selection of the upper term.

Accordingly, we direct the trial court on remand to resentence the defendant on count 8, consistent with section 1170(b). We express no opinion concerning how the court should exercise its sentencing discretion on remand, apart from requiring that it set forth the facts and reasons for choosing the sentence imposed.

Authority:

PEN 1170(b)(1) and (b)(5)

People v. Mitchell (2026) 19 Cal.5th 729

People v. May (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 836, 838 [the absence of a statement of reasons for a sentencing decision may impede appellate review]

Eighth Holding:

Although the trial court orally awarded the defendant [more than 1300] days of actual custody credit, the last page of the written abstract of judgment reflects only [less than 300] such credits. Accordingly, we direct the court on remand to recalculate the defendant’s actual custody credits and to prepare an amended abstract of judgment that accurately reflects the court’s award of such credits.

[Gary note: the court did not separately list any citations for its order regarding the abstract of judgment. The opinion characterized the error as a clerical error in the abstract, and does not actually claim that the trial court did not adequately calculate the credits. So for your convenience, I have added below Buckhalter some additional authorities not cited by the court for its power to order the correction of abstracts of judgment.]

Authority:

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 23 When an appellate remand results in modification of a felony sentence during the term of imprisonment, the trial court must calculate the actual time the defendant has already served and credit that time against the subsequent sentence]

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1070

People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 855

In re Black (1967) 66 Cal.2d 881, 890

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2

Abstracts and Minutes

Case 000707

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The abstract of judgment must be corrected to reflect the correct section the defendant was convicted of.

Holding:

The abstract of judgment erroneously lists count 11 as subdivision (b)(2) rather than subdivision (a)(2) of section 136.1. We direct the clerk of the superior court to issue a corrected abstract.

(Gary note: The court did not cite any authority for the principle that the appellate court may order correction of the abstract of judgment, but there are many cases the court could have cited. I have set forth some for your convenience.)

Authority:

People v. Scott (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1324

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 387–388

People v. Gobert (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 676, 689

People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2

Abstracts and Minutes

Case 000695

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The abstract of judgment must be corrected in two respects: First, the abstract of judgment states the trial court imposed a five-year sentence for the section 12022(a)(1) firearm enhancement. But the jury was not asked to, and did not, find that the defendant was armed with a firearm in the commission of the robbery. Second, the abstract of judgment states the trial court imposed a five-year sentence for the count 2 robbery conviction. But at the oral pronouncement of sentence, the court doubled that term to 10 years because of the prior strike.

First Holding:

An appellate court has inherent power to correct clerical errors in its records to reflect the true facts, including the oral judgments of judicial officers. We agree such correction of the record is appropriate. The abstract of judgment must be amended to reflect a firearm enhancement was never imposed on the count 2 robbery and the sentence on that count is 10 years.

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 186–187

Abstracts and Minutes

Case 000693

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The sentencing minutes must be corrected to reflect the orally pronounced sentence.

First Holding:

The court imposed the middle term, to be served in the local jail. The trial court did not orally pronounce any restrictions on the defendant’s custodial sentence. On the trial court’s sentencing minutes, a box is checked next to the phrase “no early release of any type authorized,” and there are handwritten notations stating, “NO CPAC/NO WORK FURLOUGH.” [CPAC refers to the “County Parole and Alternative Custody Unit.”] The abstract of judgment does not reflect these restrictions.

In a criminal case, it is the oral pronouncement of sentence that constitutes the judgment. The clerk cannot supplement the judgment the court actually pronounced by adding a provision to the minute order and the abstract of judgment. In the event of a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of judgment and a minute order or an abstract of judgment, the oral pronouncement controls.

Authority:

People v. Scott (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1324

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 387–388

People v. Gobert (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 676, 689

People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2 [The record of the oral pronouncement of the court controls over the clerk’s minute order]

Second Holding:

The reporter’s transcript of the sentencing hearing includes no explicit indication that the trial court was foreclosing the possibility of custody-alternative programs or early release. The clerk’s sentencing minutes imposing such restrictions therefore conflict with the trial court’s oral pronouncement of sentence. It follows that we must correct the discrepancy by ordering the trial court to modify the minute order.

Authority:

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 388 [striking sentencing conditions included in the clerk’s minutes that were not orally pronounced]

People v. Gobert (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 676, 689

Abstracts and Minutes, Fines and fees

Case 000689

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The restitution fine is more than 10 years old and must be vacated. The abstract of judgment does not correctly reflect the trial court’s oral pronouncement of judgment and must be corrected.

First Holding:

The abstract of judgment does not correctly reflect the trial court’s oral pronouncement of judgment. At resentencing, the trial court found defendant indigent and waived any non-mandatory fines and fees. Once the trial court found defendant indigent, the court operations and conviction assessments were no longer mandatory. They were, therefore, waived by the court.

The abstract of judgment nevertheless includes a court operations assessment (sec. 1465.8) totaling $560 and a conviction assessment (Gov. Code, sec. 70373) totaling $420. Because the abstract of judgment does not accurately reflect the court’s oral pronouncement of judgment, we will order it corrected.

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 14-15

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

Second Holding:

The restitution fine was imposed more than 10 years ago and must be vacated.

Authority:

PEN 1465.9

Abstracts and Minutes

Case 000687

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

At the sentencing hearing, the trial court found that the defendant did not have the ability to pay the Court Security Fee of $40 or the Criminal Conviction Fee of $30. But the court’s minute order and abstract of judgment both reflect that the trial court imposed a $40 court operations assessment (Pen. Code, sec. 1465.8) and a $30 criminal conviction assessment (Gov. Code, sec. 70373). The minute order and abstract of judgment must be amended to reflect the actual judgment.

Holding:

Where there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of judgment and the minute order or the abstract of judgment, the oral pronouncement controls. We have the authority to correct such clerical errors.

Authority:

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 387–389

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185–186

Abstracts and Minutes

Case 000683

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The abstract of judgment misidentifies the statute under which the court sentenced the defendant on count four. The sentence of six years, eight months was pursuant to Penal Code section 12022.53(c), but the abstract of judgment states the sentence was pursuant to subdivision (d) of that section. We will direct the trial court to correct these clerical errors.

Holding:

Appellate courts may order corrections when an abstract of judgment does not accurately reflect the oral judgment of the trial court.

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

Abstracts and Minutes

Case 000676

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The abstract of judgment contains errors that must be corrected.

Holding:

The abstract of judgment does not reflect the additional custody credits [more than 2600 days or the fines ($300 restitution and parole revocation restitution) ordered by the court. Instead, the abstract of judgment incorrectly reflects a $5,000 restitution fine and a $5,000 parole revocation restitution fine. It also incorrectly reflects defendant’s total credits as [less than 750] days.

[Gary note: The court did not list any authorities in support of its order for the correction of the abstract of judgment, but there is plenty available had it seen the need. I set forth some below:]

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1070

People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 855

In re Black (1967) 66 Cal.2d 881, 890

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2

Abstracts and Minutes, Sentencing

Case 000670

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The defendant was convicted of one count of felony vandalism and one count of misdemeanor vandalism. The court purported to sentence the defendant to a total of three years, with appellant ordered to serve 270 days in county jail and the balance of the three years time on mandatory supervision (a “split sentence”). This was error, because the concept of split sentence applies to felonies only, and the misdemeanor was not subject to mandatory supervision.

First Holding:

Under the Realignment Act, qualifying low-level felony offenders no longer serve their sentences in state prison. Instead, such offenders serve their sentences either entirely in county jail or partly in county jail and partly under the mandatory supervision of the county probation officer. Pursuant to section 1170(h)(5)(B), the court has discretion to impose a hybrid sentence consisting of county jail followed by a period of mandatory supervision. This option is only available for felony convictions.

Authority:

PEN 1170(h)

People v. Scott (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1415, 1418-1419

People v. Catalan (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 173, 178

Second Holding:

As reflected in the court’s oral pronouncement and the corresponding minute order, the court “split” the total three-year sentence for both counts, imposing 270 days of jail time and the balance as mandatory supervision.

While respondent points to the subsequent nunc pro tunc order purporting to place appellant on two years of formal probation, a nunc pro tunc order is generally limited to correcting clerical errors and cannot declare that something was done that was not done.

The record indicates that at least some portion of the court’s order imposing mandatory supervision applied to the misdemeanor conviction. As mandatory supervision under section 1170(h)(5)(B) is only applicable to felony convictions, we must remand for resentencing.

Authority:

PEN 1170(h)

People v. Borja (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 481, 485

Johnson & Johnson v. Superior Court (1985) 38 Cal.3d 243, 256

Abstracts and Minutes, Appellate Principles, Discretion, Sentencing

Case 000668

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

It is unclear whether the court intended to impose as the base term the low term of 16 months or the middle term of two years, we remand for the court to clarify its intended sentence, as well as to correct a clerical error in the abstract of judgment.

First Holding:

At the sentencing hearing, the court stated it was imposing the low term, two years in prison. It doubled that term as it was a two-strikes sentence, and added three years for an injury enhancement, and stated the total sentence was seven years. The low term for the crime, however, carries a triad of 16 months, 2 years, or 3 years. Thus, the low term is 16 months, and two years is the middle term.

The matter must be remanded for the court to clarify whether it intended to impose the low term (in which case the sentence must be recalculated) or the middle term (in which case the sentence will remain the same as orally pronounced as two years doubled plus three years for the enhancement for a total of seven years).

We stress that, if the court indeed intended to impose the seven-year total sentence based on the middle term of two years, doing so was not an abuse of the court’s discretion considering the relevant sentencing factors considered by the court on the record. A sentence based on the low term of 16 months would also not be an abuse of the court’s sentencing discretion.

Authority:

People v. Sarmiento-Zuniga (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 1216, 1226 [trial court does not abuse its discretion by imposing the presumptive middle term rather than the low term where the court sets forth on the record the facts and reasons for choosing the sentence imposed at time of sentencing, and that decision does not fall outside the bounds of reason under applicable law and relevant facts]

Second Holding:

Though the conviction was by plea, no certificate of cause is required for the defendant to raise his challenges to the sentence in this case. Section 1237.5 provides a defendant may not appeal from a guilty or no contest plea without a certificate of probable cause for an appeal based on reasonable constitutional, jurisdictional, or other grounds going to the legality of the proceedings. Even without a certificate of probable cause, a defendant may nonetheless appeal issues related to post-plea matters, such as the sentence, that do not challenge the plea’s validity.

Authority:

People v. Stamps (2020) 9 Cal.5th 685, 694

Third Holding:

However, even when a defendant purports to challenge only the sentence imposed, a certificate is required if the challenge goes to an aspect of the sentence to which the defendant agreed as an integral part of a plea agreement, as such a claim is, in substance, a challenge to the validity of the plea. Thus, where a defendant enters a negotiated plea in which the parties agree the court will impose a specific, agreed-upon sentence, any challenge to that sentence is a challenge to the validity of the plea and requires a certificate of probable cause.

(Gary note: This is a direct appeal from the original sentencing. It should not be confused with an appeal from a resentencing under one of the recent ameliorative provisions, such as 1172.75. Where it is an appeal from such a resentencing, it is important to review section 1171, effective 1/1/2025, which states in subdivision (c)(3) that “Any changes to a sentence shall not be a basis for a prosecutor or court to rescind a plea agreement.” I have not seen any instances in which there was discussion of the need for a certificate of probable cause in appeals from decisions in the ameliorative provisions context, but section 1171(c)(3) seems to me to specifically address (and countermand) those aspects of the Stamps decision regarding setting aside the plea.

(I would argue that Stamps also would not be authority to require a certificate of probable cause to appeal a ruling on the application of ameliorative provisions where there was a stipulated sentence, given the legislation that, in essence, not only doesn’t challenge the plea agreement, it specifically states that application of the ameliorative provisions will not result in the setting aside of the plea itself. As I said, I have not noticed the question of certificates of probable cause in appeals from hearings involving ameliorative sections such as–but not limited to–1170.18, 1172.1, 1172.6, 1172.7, and 1172.75. See my comment in case 000532 for a more extensive discussion on section 1171, including the observation that the Supreme Court transferred a case with a Stamps issue back to the Court of Appeal with instructions to consider the impact of the then-recently added section 1171.)

Authority:

People v. Stamps (2020) 9 Cal.5th 685, 694

People v. Hurlic (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 50, 55

People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 79

Fourth Holding:

By contrast, a certificate of probable cause is not required to challenge the exercise of individualized sentencing discretion within an agreed maximum sentence, absent contrary provisions in the plea agreement, as long as the defendant is not challenging the trial court’s authority to impose a sentence within a negotiated lid or maximum.

Authority:

People v. Buttram (2003) 30 Cal.4th 773, 790

People v. Shelton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 759, 763

Fifth Holding:

No certificate of probable cause is needed to challenge a court’s failure to strike a prior strike where striking a strike would still result in a sentence that falls within the range contemplated by the plea.

Authority:

People v. Cole (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 850, 872

People v. Buttram (2003) 30 Cal.4th 773, 790-791, 777, 786-787

Sixth Holding:

The abstract must also be corrected to remove the notation “YTL” (for “years to life”), as no indeterminate life term was imposed in this case.

(Gary note: The court listed no authority for that correction, but there is plenty it could have relied on, some of which I list below.)

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1070

People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 855

In re Black (1967) 66 Cal.2d 881, 890

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2

Abstracts and Minutes, Amelioration, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 000665

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

On remand for resentencing in the earlier appeal, the court erred in refusing to conduct a full resentencing. It was also error for the court to impose the upper term on the gun use enhancement where the aggravating circumstances were not stipulated to or found true by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. And the abstract of judgment must be amended to show that he was convicted of false imprisonment, not of kidnapping.

First Holding:

We consider a trial court’s sentencing decisions under an abuse of discretion standard. A court abuses its discretion when it makes an arbitrary or capricious decision by applying the wrong legal standard or bases its decision on express or implied factual findings not supported by substantial evidence.

Authority:

People v. Moseley (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 870, 874

People v. Qualkinbush (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 879, 887

Second Holding:

When part of a sentence is stricken on review, on remand for resentencing a full resentencing as to all counts is appropriate, so the trial court can exercise its sentencing discretion in light of the changed circumstances. That the appellate court gave specific directions on remand does not preclude a full resentencing hearing as required by Buycks. Because the judgment is no longer final, new statutes imposing new lighter penalties are deemed to be sufficient to apply upon resentencing.

Authority:

People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893

People v. Walker (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 198, 204

People v. Padilla (2022) 13 Cal.5th 152, 160, 163 [once a court has determined that a defendant is entitled to resentencing, the result is vacatur of the original sentence whereupon the trial court may impose any appropriate sentence]

Third Holding:

Where, as here, a statute specifies three possible terms, the presumptive sentence is the middle term unless there are aggravating circumstances justifying imposition of the high term. The aggravating circumstance must be stipulated to by the defendant or found true beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury or, if jury is waived, by the court in a court trial.

The trial court acknowledged that a bifurcated trial would be necessary to find the aggravating circumstances true. Nevertheless it relied on our “very specific instructions” in declining to hold such a trial.

Where, as here, the record reflects no jury finding, no waiver thereof, and no admission by the defendant of the aggravating circumstances, the trial court’s reliance on unproven aggravating factors to impose an upper term sentence violates the Sixth Amendment.

Authority:

PEN 1170

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 767–769

Fourth Holding:

The error is harmless only if a reviewing court can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have found true all the aggravating facts relied upon by the sentencing court to justify the upper term. On this record we agree with the parties that we cannot draw such a conclusion.

Authority:

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 761, 775

Fifth Holding:

We direct the trial court to issue a corrected abstract of judgment. The defendant was convicted of the offense of false imprisonment, a violation of Penal Code section 237, not kidnapping, a violation of Penal Code section 207.

(GARY Note: The court listed no authority for correction of erroneous abstracts, likely because the error and remedy are so obvious. But I have listed several cases that the court could have relied on.)

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1070

People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 855

In re Black (1967) 66 Cal.2d 881, 890

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2

Abstracts and Minutes, Appellate Principles, Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing

Case 000664

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We order the trial court to correct its minute order to accurately reflect the court’s oral pronouncement of the travel ban probation condition.

First Holding:

At the sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a condition of probation that defendant was not to leave the state of California without the consent of the probation officer. However, the corresponding minute order lists the condition as “Do not leave California.” As such, the minute order does not accurately reflect the oral pronouncement of the court.

A court has inherent power to correct clerical errors in its records so as to make these records reflect the true facts. Where there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of judgment and the minute order or the abstract of judgment, the oral pronouncement controls. Errors in the court’s minute orders are clerical errors that may be corrected at any time.

Authority:

In re Candelario (1970) 3 Cal.3d 702, 705

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185–186