AppellateAdvisor Law Library Background

Case 000666

Error and/or relief

Imposition of the upper term based on judge-found facts, without the defendant’s express waiver of his jury trial right, violated the Sixth Amendment and California law, and the error was not harmless. Accordingly, we reverse.

First Holding:

The court found true the rule 4.421(b)(2) aggravating factor regarding numerous or increasingly serious prior convictions or adjudications, explaining only that the defendant has not only the prior strike, he has a substantial amount of convictions on his RAP sheet.

The trial court may impose an upper term sentence only when there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term and the facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.

The record does not reflect that the defendant ever waived his right to a jury trial on the aggravating factors.

Authority:

PEN 1170(b)(2)

Second Holding:

The right to a jury trial on all aggravating facts, other than a prior conviction, relied upon to justify an upper term sentence is not merely a state law entitlement, but is constitutionally required by the Sixth Amendment. Any waiver of this right must be express. Absent waiver or stipulation, a jury must determine whether the particular details of a defendant’s criminal history demonstrate convictions of increasing seriousness, before a trial court can rely on that fact to justify an upper term sentence.

Authority:

Rules of Court rule 4.421(b)(2)

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1078, 1082-1084

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 768

People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, 47–48

Third Holding:

When such an error occurs, we determine whether it was prejudicial under the Chapman standard of review, under which we must reverse and remand unless we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury, applying that same standard, would have found the aggravating factor true.

Authority:

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18

Case 000665

Error and/or relief

On remand for resentencing in the earlier appeal, the court erred in refusing to conduct a full resentencing. It was also error for the court to impose the upper term on the gun use enhancement where the aggravating circumstances were not stipulated to or found true by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. And the abstract of judgment must be amended to show that he was convicted of false imprisonment, not of kidnapping.

First Holding:

We consider a trial court’s sentencing decisions under an abuse of discretion standard. A court abuses its discretion when it makes an arbitrary or capricious decision by applying the wrong legal standard or bases its decision on express or implied factual findings not supported by substantial evidence.

Authority:

People v. Moseley (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 870, 874

People v. Qualkinbush (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 879, 887

Second Holding:

When part of a sentence is stricken on review, on remand for resentencing a full resentencing as to all counts is appropriate, so the trial court can exercise its sentencing discretion in light of the changed circumstances. That the appellate court gave specific directions on remand does not preclude a full resentencing hearing as required by Buycks. Because the judgment is no longer final, new statutes imposing new lighter penalties are deemed to be sufficient to apply upon resentencing.

Authority:

People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893

People v. Walker (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 198, 204

People v. Padilla (2022) 13 Cal.5th 152, 160, 163 [once a court has determined that a defendant is entitled to resentencing, the result is vacatur of the original sentence whereupon the trial court may impose any appropriate sentence]

Third Holding:

Where, as here, a statute specifies three possible terms, the presumptive sentence is the middle term unless there are aggravating circumstances justifying imposition of the high term. The aggravating circumstance must be stipulated to by the defendant or found true beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury or, if jury is waived, by the court in a court trial.

The trial court acknowledged that a bifurcated trial would be necessary to find the aggravating circumstances true. Nevertheless it relied on our “very specific instructions” in declining to hold such a trial.

Where, as here, the record reflects no jury finding, no waiver thereof, and no admission by the defendant of the aggravating circumstances, the trial court’s reliance on unproven aggravating factors to impose an upper term sentence violates the Sixth Amendment.

Authority:

PEN 1170

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 767–769

Fourth Holding:

The error is harmless only if a reviewing court can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have found true all the aggravating facts relied upon by the sentencing court to justify the upper term. On this record we agree with the parties that we cannot draw such a conclusion.

Authority:

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 761, 775

Fifth Holding:

We direct the trial court to issue a corrected abstract of judgment. The defendant was convicted of the offense of false imprisonment, a violation of Penal Code section 237, not kidnapping, a violation of Penal Code section 207.

(GARY Note: The court listed no authority for correction of erroneous abstracts, likely because the error and remedy are so obvious. But I have listed several cases that the court could have relied on.)

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1070

People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 855

In re Black (1967) 66 Cal.2d 881, 890

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2

Case 000664

Error and/or relief

We order the trial court to correct its minute order to accurately reflect the court’s oral pronouncement of the travel ban probation condition.

First Holding:

At the sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a condition of probation that defendant was not to leave the state of California without the consent of the probation officer. However, the corresponding minute order lists the condition as “Do not leave California.” As such, the minute order does not accurately reflect the oral pronouncement of the court.

A court has inherent power to correct clerical errors in its records so as to make these records reflect the true facts. Where there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of judgment and the minute order or the abstract of judgment, the oral pronouncement controls. Errors in the court’s minute orders are clerical errors that may be corrected at any time.

Authority:

In re Candelario (1970) 3 Cal.3d 702, 705

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185–186

Case 000663

Error and/or relief

Substantial evidence does not support the defendant’s conviction for exhibiting harmful matter to a minor.

First Holding:

The law governing sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges is well established. In reviewing a claim for sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. We review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses sufficient evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—supporting the decision, and not whether the evidence proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

We neither reweigh the evidence nor reevaluate the credibility of witnesses. We presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the jury reasonably could deduce from the evidence. If the circumstances reasonably justify the findings made by the trier of fact, reversal of the judgment is not warranted simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding. A reversal for insufficient evidence is unwarranted unless it appears that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support the jury’s verdict.

Authority:

People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 638-639

People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357

Second Holding:

Under section 288.2(c), “harmful matter” is defined in section 313. Section 313(a) states that harmful matter means matter, taken as a whole, which to the average person, applying contemporary statewide standards, appeals to the prurient interest, and is matter which, taken as a whole, depicts or describes in a patently offensive way sexual conduct and which, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors.

This definition is virtually identical to the constitutional standard of obscenity set forth in Miller. We conclude the record does not contain evidence from which a jury could reasonably find the video the defendant showed them minor was harmful matter within the meaning of section 288.2(a)(2) and section 313. Therefore, substantial evidence does not support the defendant’s conviction, and we will reverse the judgment and remand for resentencing.

Authority:

Miller v. California (1973) 413 U.S. 15, 24

People v. Dyke (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1377, 1383

Third Holding:

Nudity or depictions of sexual intercourse or other sexual activity do not, by themselves, make a movie obscene.

Authority:

People v. Powell (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1268, 1291

Fourth Holding:

The defendant may not be retried on this count.

Authority:

United States v. DiFrancesco (1980) 449 U.S. 117, 131

Case 000662

Error and/or relief

We direct the court to correct the abstract of judgment to indicate the sentence was ordered to be served consecutively.

Holding:

The parties agree the trial court imposed one-third the middle term (i.e., one year) on count 4 for securities fraud but did not mark the appropriate box on the abstract of judgment with an “X.” We agree and will direct the clerk to correct the error.

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185 [courts may correct clerical errors at any time]