Category Archives: Standard of review

Abstracts and Minutes, Elements of crime, Fines and fees, Sentencing, Standard of review, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence

Case 000606

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The jury found the defendant guilty of two felonies (maintaining a place for the purpose of using, selling, or giving away a controlled substance and felon in position of ammunition) and several misdemeanors (possession of cocaine, cultivating more than six marijuana plants, and possession of marijuana).

We conclude that two felony convictions must be reversed, the fee and assessment imposed for the possession of more than 28.5 grams of marijuana conviction must be reversed, either the possession of marijuana misdemeanor or the cultivating more than six marijuana plants misdemeanor must be stayed pursuant to section 654, and the four clerical errors in the judgment must be corrected.

First Holding:

When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Substantial evidence includes circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence.

Appellate courts presume in support of the judgment every fact that the trier of fact could reasonably deduce from the evidence. Appellate courts also properly consider erroneously admitted evidence, notwithstanding the erroneous admission. Appellate courts do not resolve credibility issues or evidentiary conflicts. A judgment will not be reversed for insufficiency of the evidence merely because the circumstances may also be reasonably reconciled with a conclusion contrary to the judgment.

Authority:

People v. Cardenas (2025) 18 Cal.5th 797, 821

People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 57

People v. Oyler (2025) 17 Cal.5th 756, 820

People v. Jackson (2014) 58 Cal.4th 724, 749

Second Holding:

Every person who opens or maintains any place for the purpose of unlawfully selling, giving away, or using any controlled substance as identified in particular sections of the Health and Safety Code shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for a period of not more than one year or the state prison. Because of the disjunctive “or,” section 11366 does not require that the place be maintained for the purpose of selling; it can be violated without selling, merely by providing a place for drug abusers to gather and share their experience.

Section 11366 proscribes continuously selling, giving away, or using a controlled substance; a single or isolated instance of this forbidden conduct is insufficient. Further, section 11366 is violated by selling or giving away to others, or allowing others to use, a controlled substance in a place maintained or opened for that purpose; it is not violated by an individual’s repeated personal use of a controlled substance at his home.

Authority:

HSC 11366

People v. Franco (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 713, 716, 718

People v. Vera (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1100, 1102-1103 and fn. 2

People v. Green (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 538, 544

People v. Shoals (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 475, 490, 492

Third Holding:

In determining whether a place is opened or maintained for the purpose of selling, giving away, or using a controlled substance, the trier of fact should consider the surrounding circumstances, including: the quantity of any controlled substance discovered; the character of the place opened or maintained; how the place is fitted up; whether other individuals visited the place in unusual numbers or at unusual times; whether other individuals who were under the influence of a controlled substance were found at the place; whether lookouts were posted near or at the place; whether a password or passcode was needed for entry into the place; any pertinent statements by the defendant or those found at the premises; and whether any drug paraphernalia or drug residue was found in the place.

However, the quantity of controlled substance discovered at a place is alone insufficient to show that the place was maintained or opened for the purpose of continuously selling, giving away, or using a controlled substance.

Authority:

People v. Franco (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 713, 726

People v. Hawkins (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 675, 683

People v. Shoals (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 475, 491-492

People v. Cannon (1957) 148 Cal.App.2d 163, 168

Fourth Holding:

Health and Safety Code section 11366 prohibits opening or maintaining a place for the purpose of selling, using, or giving away a controlled substance; it does not prohibit opening or maintaining a place for the purpose of growing or cultivating a controlled substance/marijuana. (Cf. sec. 11366 with 11358 [prohibiting the cultivation of marijuana]; 11366.5 [prohibiting individuals from making available a premises for the manufacture of a controlled substance]; cf. also Dowl [describing separate criminal provisions that are exempt from prosecution pursuant to the Medical Marijuana Program of sec. 11362.7 et seq.]

Authority:

People v. Dowl (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1079, 1086

Fifth Holding:

Section 11366 requires that a controlled substance be sold, used, or given away at the place maintained for such a purpose. Section 11366 simply does not address controlled substances that are sold, used, or given away at a location other than the place, even if the controlled substance is produced at the place. Accordingly, Shoals and related considerations do not support the conclusion that the instant property was used for the purpose of continuously selling, using, or giving away marijuana to others.

Authority:

HSC 11366

People v. Shoals (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 475, 491 [The prosecution must prove that appellant opened or maintained the hotel room for the purpose of selling the cocaine base.]

People v. Holland (1958) 158 Cal.App.2d 583, 588 [There is no evidence that this barbecue stand was opened for the prohibited purpose.]

Sixth Holding:

A conviction cannot be constitutionally sustained on the basis of a theory that was not actually presented to the jury. Here, the instructions informed the jury that the controlled substance at issue was cannabis; cocaine was not mentioned. Therefore, the defendant’s conviction cannot be sustained based on the cocaine discovered at the property. In sum, the evidence shows the property was used to grow, cultivate, and process marijuana, but that is all. Substantial evidence does not support the section 11366 conviction because there is insufficient evidence that the defendant maintained the property for the purpose of continuously selling, using, or giving away marijuana at the property.

Authority:

Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 314

Cole v. Arkansas (1948) 333 U.S. 196, 202

People v. Kunkin (1973) 9 Cal.3d 245, 251

People v. Zemek (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 313, 340

People v. Garcia (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 519, 525

Seventh Holding:

Substantial evidence does not support the defendant’s conviction for felon in possession of ammunition. His prior felony under section 11359 was reduced to a misdemeanor and sealed. As a result of the resentencing and sealing, the prior felony is no longer a felony and cannot be used to support the defendant’s conviction. Because he has no other prior felony convictions, conviction on that count is unsupported and must be reversed.

In 2016, voters approved Proposition 64, which, among other things, generally reduced marijuana-related crimes from felonies to misdemeanors, including the offense of possession under section 11359. Proposition 64 also added section 11361.8, which provides a mechanism to obtain relief for those currently serving a sentence, or for those who had completed a sentence, for a marijuana offense affected by Proposition 64. For those qualifying defendants who have completed a sentence, the court shall redesignate the conviction as a misdemeanor or infraction or dismiss and seal the conviction as legally invalid.

Further, the Legislature has provided that a conviction that has been ordered sealed pursuant to section 11361.8 is deemed never to have occurred, and the person may reply accordingly to any inquiry about the events. The parties agree that, because the defendant had his prior felony conviction reduced to a misdemeanor under Proposition 64 and sealed, he was no longer a felon in possession of ammunition, and the count must be reversed.

Authority:

HSC 11361.8

HSC 11361.9

People v. Smit (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 596, 599, 600

People v. Jessup (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 83, 88

People v. Saelee (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 744, 751

People v. Taylor (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 115, 120, fn. 3.

Eighth Holding:

Penal Code section 654 provides in part that an act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one provision.

Section 654 may apply to an indivisible course of criminal conduct involving violations of different statutes, where the defendant commits the violations with a single intent and objective. It has been held that section 654 applies to prevent a defendant from being punished for both possession of marijuana and cultivation of marijuana where the possession was merely incidental to the cultivation.

A court’s implicit or express finding that a defendant harbored different intents and objectives for purposes of section 654 is reviewed for substantial evidence. The parties agree, and we concur, that substantial evidence does not support the trial court’s implicit finding that the defendant harbored different intents and objectives with respect to counts 6 and 7, cultivation of marijuana and possession of marijuana. The court must stay the sentence on one of the two counts.

Authority:

PEN 654

People v. Brents (2012) 53 Cal.4th 599, 618

People v. Rodriguez (2009) 47 Cal.4th 501, 507

People v. Vasquez (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 732, 736–737

People v. McDaniel (1957) 154 Cal.App.2d 475, 485–486

People v. Richardson (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 1203, 1214

Ninth Holding:

Health and Safety Code section 11372.7–which imposes a drug program fee for violation of its chapter–expressly excludes section 11357(b), possession of more than an ounce of marijuna, from its application. Thus, the trial court erred in imposing the fee under that that section, and it must be stricken, along with other fees that came into play based on that improperly imposed assessment.

Authority:

HSC 11372.7(e)

Tenth Holding:

The minute order contains several errors that must be corrected: (1) with respect to count 2 at page 3, the minute order lists the basis for fines and penalties as section 11372.5 instead of 11372.7; (2) with respect to count 2 at page 4, the minute order identifies the amount of penalty assessments as $3,210 instead of $310; (3) with respect to count 1 at page 5, the minute order lists the basis for fines and penalties as section 11372.5 instead of 11372.7; (4) with respect to count 5 at pages 5 and 6, all fees and penalties are improper because they were not imposed as part of the oral pronouncement of sentence.

A trial court’s oral pronouncement of sentence constitutes the judgment in a criminal case, and to the extent there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement and a minute order or abstract of judgment, the oral pronouncement will control. Reviewing courts on appeal may correct any discrepancy that exists between a trial court’s oral pronouncement of sentence and a minute order or abstract of judgment.

Authority:

People v. Gobert (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 676, 689

People v. Scott (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1324

Amelioration, Elements of crime, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 000604

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court denied the defendant’s motion under section 1172.6 to recall his sentence on his 1999 murder convictions (he had hired someone to kill his father, and that person also killed the defendant’s mother in the process, all while the defendant was away from the home in which they were killed). We conclude the defendant’s acquittal on first degree murder of his mother precluded a finding that he had intended to kill her. We remand for the court to consider whether he remains guilty of his mother’s murder under a theory of implied malice. In doing so, the court should consider his youth at the time of the offense.

First Holding:

The defendant hired a person to kill the defendant’s father. The hiree did so, but also killed the defendant’s mother. The jury convicted the defendant of first degree murder of the father, but of only second degree murder of his mother. In our view, the defendant’s acquittal of first degree murder as to the mother precluded a finding that he intended to kill her. First degree murder generally requires a premeditated and deliberate intent to kill. Second degree murder requires either an intent to kill without premeditation and deliberation or implied malice—conscious disregard for human life.

Authority:

People v. Whisenhunt (2008) 44 Cal.4th 174, 201

People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 151–152

Second Holding:

After the defendant’s trial, the Legislature amended the law of murder to eliminate liability based on imputed malice, including the natural and probable consequences doctrine. Section 1172.6 provides retroactive relief to defendants convicted under those now-invalid theories. Under principles of collateral estoppel, a jury’s finding at trial precludes a contrary finding in a section 1172.6 hearing.

Authority:

People v. Antonelli (2025) 17 Cal.5th 719, 723–724

People v. Arnold (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 376, 385-386 [discussing collateral estoppel]

Third Holding:

We review the trial court’s factual findings in denying a section 1172.6 petition for substantial evidence. But the preclusive effect of a defendant’s partial acquittal is a legal issue we review de novo.

Authority:

People v. Arnold (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 376, 383

Fourth Holding:

We presume the jury meticulously followed the trial court’s instructions. We thus conclude the jury found that that the defendant lacked an intent to kill the mother, precluding the trial court’s contrary finding.

Authority:

People v. Cruz (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 69, 73

Fifth Holding:

The erroneous finding was not harmless. Although the record could have supported liability under a theory of implied malice, the trial court did not evaluate that theory and we cannot conclude it would have reached the same result if it had. The defendant was 19 years old at the time of the crimes—still on the lower end of the young adult age range. Recent decisions have emphasized that youths may be less able to appreciate risks and consequences and thus that courts must consider defendants’ youth in deciding if they acted with implied malice or reckless indifference.

Authority:

People v. Jimenez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 994, 1001-1004, 1007

People v. Pittman (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 400, 416–418

Jurisdiction, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 000602

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Although the trial court had the jurisdiction to correct clerical errors, it had no jurisdiction after the judgment was final to correct judicial errors. Thus, it had no jurisdiction to set aside the credit for time served that it had awarded years earlier. The order eliminating the credits must be vacated.

(Because the new offenses were committed in prison while serving an earlier commitment, the new sentence was required to run consecutively, and he was not entitled to credit for time while serving his term on the original offense to be applied against the new consecutive sentence. Nonetheless, the court originally awarded him nearly two years credit for time served.)

First Holding:

The question whether the trial court had jurisdiction to eliminate custody credits after a final judgment is a pure question of law we review de novo.

Authority:

People v. Camp (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 461, 467

Second Holding:

Under the general common law rule, a trial court loses jurisdiction to resentence a criminal defendant once execution of the sentence has begun. While there are some exceptions to that rule, none justifies the court’s elimination of the defendant’s custody credits.

Authority:

People v. Karaman (1992) 4 Cal.4th 335, 344

Third Holding:

A court has inherent power to correct a clerical error at any time. Clerical error, however, is to be distinguished from judicial error which cannot be corrected by amendment. The distinction between clerical error and judicial error is whether the error was made in rendering the judgment, or in recording the judgment rendered. Here, the trial court’s orders imposing the custodial credits in 2010, 2021, and again in 2024 were plainly judicial—not clerical—errors.

Authority:

In re Candelario (1970) 3 Cal.3d 702, 705

People v. Boyd (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 56, 63

In re Rojas (1979) 23 Cal.3d 152, 154

Fourth Holding:

Section 1172.1(a)(1) does not apply here, because (1) it was not the Caliofrnia Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation secretary who sent the letter pointing out the errors, but a records analyst who sent the letter; (2) the sentencing was not within 120 days of the date of commitment; and (3) the request did not relate to a change of sentencing laws since the original sentencing. Moreover, the sentence was in fact greater than the original sentence.

Authority:

People v. Codinha (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 976, 987 [letter came from a case records manager, not the secretary and did not reference section 1172.1 or use the terms recall or resentencing]

People v. Singleton (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 783, 791–792

Fifth Holding:

Regarding jurisdiction to correct an unauthorized sentence, we find King to be a better reasoned case than Codinha. King reasoned that the “venerable notion” that an unauthorized sentence may be corrected at any time had been rejected by the Supreme Court in In re G.C.. The unauthorized sentence doctrine is an exception to the waiver doctrine, in that a party does not forfeit the right to argue that a sentence is unlawful by failing to object in the trial court. It is not, however, an exception to the requirement of jurisdiction. Rather, in order to invoke the unauthorized sentence doctrine to remedy a judgment of conviction, the trial court must still have jurisdiction over the judgment.

Authority:

People v. King (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 629, 635

In re G.C. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 1119, 1129

People v. Boyd (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 56, 66

People v. Garcia (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 139, 145–146

People v. Hernandez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 1111, 1123

Sixth Holding:

Add holding blurb here

Authority:

ADD AUTHORITIES HERE

Amelioration, Evidence, Fifth Amendment, Sentencing, Standard of review, Statutory interpretation, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence

Case 000601

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

This is an appeal from the denial of a petition for recall of sentence under section 1172.6. We conclude there is substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding the defendant is guilty of murder, beyond a reasonable doubt, under a still-valid theory, and reversal for resentencing is unwarranted. As for the defendant’s evidentiary challenges, however, we hold the trial court prejudicially erred in admitting and relying on the grand jury transcript and police reports. As a result, we vacate the trial court’s order, and remand the matter for a new evidentiary hearing.

First Holding:

SB 1437 was enacted to amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life. It amended section 188, which defines malice, and section 189, which defines the degrees of murder to address felony-murder liability. Through section 1172.6, it provided a means of relief for those whose convictions would no longer be considered murder under the revised law.

Authority:

SB 1437

PEN 1172.6

Second Holding:

In the context of an appeal from a criminal conviction where substantial evidence does not support a conviction, the remedy is generally not a new trial. The sufficiency of the evidence is considered by examining the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment and deciding whether it discloses substantial evidence such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Evidence erroneously admitted is properly considered in weighing the sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction, notwithstanding its erroneous admission.

Authority:

People v. Hatch (2000) 22 Cal.4th 260, 271–272 [the federal and California Constitutions preclude retrial if a court determines the evidence at trial was insufficient to support a conviction as a matter of law]

People v. Jasso (2025) 17 Cal.5th 646, 684,

People v. Navarro (2021) 12 Cal.5th 285, 311

Third Holding:

The reason for this is that a reversal based solely on evidentiary insufficiency has fundamentally different implications, for double jeopardy purposes, than a reversal based on such ordinary trial errors as the incorrect receipt or rejection of evidence. While the former is in effect a finding that the government has failed to prove its case against the defendant, the latter implies nothing with respect to the guilt or innocence of the defendant, but is simply a determination that he has been convicted through a judicial process which is defective in some fundamental respect.

Thus, as a general rule, it is well established that if the defendant secures on appeal a reversal of his conviction based on trial errors other than insufficiency of evidence, he is subject to retrial.

Authority:

People v. Jasso (2025) 17 Cal.5th 646, 684,

People v. Hernandez (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1, 6

Fourth Holding:

Although principles of double jeopardy are not implicated in the voluntary section 1172.6 petition process, an insufficient evidence claim, coupled with additional challenges to the admission of evidence, may give rise to an issue of remedy.

If, considering the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment, there is no substantial evidence to support the trial court’s denial of the section 1172.6 petition after an evidentiary hearing, it signals a substantive failure of proof by the government much like it does in the context of a direct appeal from a criminal conviction, suggesting reversal for resentencing is the appropriate remedy. Under 1172.6(d)(3) if the prosecution fails to sustain its burden of proof, the petitioner shall be resentenced.

Authority:

People v. Hill (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1055, 1068

People v. Emanuel (2025) 17 Cal.5th 867, 875, 896 [directing resentencing be granted on remand where insufficient evidence supported denial of sec. 1172.6 petition after an evidentiary hearing]

Fifth Holding:

On the other hand, a prejudicial procedural error (such as an evidentiary error), on its own, typically signals nothing about whether the petitioner is or is not guilty of murder under the law as amended by SB 1437, but points only to a flawed judicial process. In cases involving only this latter situation, remand for a new evidentiary hearing is ordinarily the appropriate remedy. This remedy is especially apt in the context of section 1172.6, which was created by the Legislature as an act of lenity.

Authority:

People v. Dixon (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 116, 137 & fn. 3 [in the absence of a substantial evidence challenge, prejudicial evidentiary errors warrant remand for a new evidentiary hearing rather than remand for resentencing]

People v. Lopez-Barraza (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 1227, 1255 [remanding for a new evidentiary hearing where trial court impermissibly relied on evidence admitted at the petitioner’s trial that contradicted jury findings]

People v. Nuno (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 1030, 1062–1063 [conditionally reversing denial of sec. 1172.6 petition after evidentiary hearing to permit the trial court to reconsider discovery motion, and to order a new evidentiary hearing if additional evidence disclosure was warranted]

People v. Hill (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1055, 1067–1068 [sentence modification procedure under sec. 1172.6 is an entirely voluntary process and constitutes an act of legislative lenity, not a new criminal prosecution]

Sixth Holding:

The grand jury transcript is not admissible under section 1172.6(d)(3)’s exception for evidence previously admitted at a prior hearing or trial.

Authority:

People v. Dixon (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 116

Seventh Holding:

Since Davenport and Cody, appellate courts have considered whether section 1172.6(d)(3)’s hearsay exception extends to transcripts from grand jury proceedings. In Ocobachi, the court held it did not. The court explained the existing hearsay exception for former testimony found in Evidence Code section 1291 requires a showing of witness unavailability) and that the party against whom the former testimony was offered had been given the right and opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.

Unlike former testimony given during a petitioner’s preliminary hearing or original trial, Ocobachi pointed out the person investigated at a grand jury proceeding is not a party but a target who has no right to appear or offer evidence at grand jury proceedings. Thus, unlike in Davenport and Cody, admitting a transcript of grand jury testimony under section 1172.6(d)(3) would require ignoring both provisions of Evidence Code section 1291, creating an overbroad hearsay exception. In contrast, Robinson [review granted] concluded that the grand jury transcript may be considered at the section 1172.6 hearing.

Authority:

People v. Davenport (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1158–1159

People v. Cody (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 87, 103

People v. Ocobachi (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 1174, 1183

People v. Robinson (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 854, 872, review granted Feb. 26, 2025, S288606

Eighth Holding:

The proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law we review de novo. We consider portions of a statute in the context of the entire statute and the statutory scheme of which it is a part, giving significance to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of an act in pursuance of the legislative purpose

Authority:

People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 961

People v. Reynoza (2024) 15 Cal.5th 982, 989–990

Ninth Holding:

Grand jury proceedings are not adjudicative, unlike hearings and trials in a criminal proceeding, nor are they adversarial. Rather, they are investigatory proceedings: a judicial officer does not typically preside over grand jury proceedings; a defendant does not receive notice of grand jury proceedings; and a defendant has no right to appear, offer evidence, or cross-examine witnesses. Despite similarities in their function, unlike preliminary hearings, grand jury proceedings are one-sided investigatory proceedings.

Authority:

Cummiskey v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1018, 1026

People v. Petrilli (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 814, 824

People v. Arroyo (2016) 62 Cal.4th 589, 595

Tenth Holding:

It would be anomalous for the Legislature to have amended the statute under SB 775 to tighten the evidentiary rules by excluding preliminary hearing testimony under section 872(b) [which allows a magistrate to find probable cause at a preliminary hearing based on the testimony of a qualified law enforcement officer that would otherwise be excluded as inadmissible hearsay], which is subject to cross-examination, but not exclude similar section 939.6(c), testimony received at a grand jury proceeding, which is untested by cross-examination.

Authority:

People v. Ledesma (1997) 16 Cal.4th 90, 101 [in construing statutes, courts should strive to avoid anomalous results]

Eleventh Holding:

We agree with the parties that the police reports and related witness statements collected by the police are hearsay because they were created out of court and were offered (and considered) for the truth of the matter asserted. These documents also contain out-of-court statements of witnesses that constitute another layer of hearsay when offered for the truth of the matter asserted.

While there may be an applicable exception for some of the information contained in the police reports, there must also be a hearsay exception for out-of-court witness statements recorded in the documents that were considered for the truth of the matter asserted. Many of the findings taken from the police reports involved nonparty witness statements recorded by the police that were considered for the truth of the matter asserted, but no hearsay exception was identified

Authority:

EVID 1200(a)[hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove that its assertion is true]

People v. Hall (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 831, 844–845 [arrest report admissible under official records exception to hearsay rule to the extent it reported an act, condition, or event observed by law enforcement pursuant to Evid. Code sec. 1280]

Walker v. Superior Court (2021) 12 Cal.5th 177, 192 [observing the general rule that each level of out-of-court statements in documents such as probation and police reports must fall under a hearsay exception to be admitted into evidence]

Twelfth Holding:

Judicial notice extends only to notice of the document’s existence, not necessarily to the truth of the facts contained within a document. Judicial notice of a document is not a vehicle for the admission of hearsay contained within the document.

Authority:

People v. Moore (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 168, 178

People v. Woodell (1998) 17 Cal.4th 448, 458–459 [the fact that a document may be judicially noticed under Evid. Code sec. 452 does not mean all the hearsay statements within the document are admissible or noticeable]

Thirteenth Holding:

Prejudice is shown where it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.

Authority:

People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836

Fourteenth Holding:

On other questions the defendant has asked us to address, we decline to do so in light of the remand and reversal. As a general rule, we do not issue advisory opinions indicating what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.

Authority:

People v. Slayton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1076, 1084

Sentencing, Standard of review, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence

Case 000600

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The matter is remanded for the court to sentence the defendant on one count and stay punishment under section 654 on the two other counts.

First Holding:

Penal Code Section 654 prohibits a trial court from imposing multiple punishments when a defendant commits multiple offenses during an indivisible course of conduct directed toward a single objective.

Authority:

PEN 654

Neal v. State of California (1960) 55 Cal.2d 11, 19 [If all of the offenses were incident to one objective, the defendant may be punished for any one of such offenses but not for more than one]

Second Holding:

An act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one provision.

Authority:

PEN 654

Third Holding:

The purpose of section 654 is to ensure a defendant’s punishment is commensurate with his or her culpability. That is, a jury can convict a defendant of multiple crimes arising from a single act, but a court can only punish the defendant for one of those crimes. If a court imposes concurrent sentences, then that sentence constitutes double punishment within the meaning of section 654. A course of criminal conduct is a single “act” for purposes of section 654 if all of the offenses committed during the course of conduct were incident to one objective.

Authority:

People v. Latimer (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1203, 1211

People v. Miller (1977) 18 Cal.3d 873, 887

Neal v. State of California (1960) 55 Cal.2d 11, 19

Fourth Holding:

It is defendant’s intent and objective, not the temporal proximity of his offenses, which determine whether the transaction is indivisible. If all of the offenses were merely incidental to, or were the means of accomplishing or facilitating one objective, defendant may be found to have harbored a single intent and therefore may be punished only once.

Authority:

People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 335

Fifth Holding:

When a trial court sentences a defendant to separate terms without making an express finding the defendant entertained separate objectives, the trial court is deemed to have made an implied finding each offense had a separate objective.

Authority:

People v. Islas (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 116, 129

Sixth Holding:

We review for substantial evidence a trial court’s implied finding that a defendant had separate intents and objectives for different offenses. Substantial evidence means that evidence which, when viewed in light of the entire record, is of solid probative value, maintains its credibility and inspires confidence that the ultimate fact it addresses has been justly determined.

Authority:

People v. Dowdell (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1388, 1414

People v. Lehman (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 795, 804

Seventh Holding:

Under section 654, a defendant cannot be punished for both a robbery, and a kidnapping for the purpose of that same robbery.

Authority:

People v. Beamon (1973) 8 Cal.3d 625, 639

Eighth Holding:

There is not substantial evidence to support the trial court’s implied (unstated) finding that the defendant formed (1) a separate intent and objective to commit a kidnapping for the purpose of robbery, and then (2) formed a separate intent and objective to commit a carjacking, and then (3) formed a separate intent and objective to commit a robbery of the pharmaceuticals.

Authority:

People v. Green (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1085 [there must be evidence to support a finding the defendant formed a separate intent and objective for each offense for which he was sentenced]

Ninth Holding:

On remand, the trial court is directed to impose a sentence for only one of the three convictions, and then stay the sentence on the other two crimes under section 654.

Authority:

People v. Alford (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1469 [to implement section 654, the trial court must impose sentence on all counts, but stay execution of sentence as necessary to prevent multiple punishment]

Elements of crime, Jury instructions, Standard of review, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence

Case 000595

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Defendant was convicted of multiple counts of a sexual nature against children. There was insufficient evidence to support one of the counts. Six other counts are reversed because of a prejudicial error on their verdict forms for those counts (listing the descriptions of the crimes but incorrectly identifying the section number, thus possibly confusing the jury because there was another count that correctly bore that section number and the jury was instructed on its elements, which it may have incorrectly relied on for its verdicts in the erroneous verdict forms).

First Holding:

A conviction must be supported by substantial evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value such that a reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

Authority:

People v. Medina (2009) 46 Cal.4th 913, 919

Second Holding:

We review the trial court’s denial of the new trial motion for abuse of discretion. The California Constitution provides that no judgment shall be set aside, or new trial granted, in any cause, on the ground of misdirection of the jury, or of the improper admission or rejection of evidence, or for any error as to any matter of pleading, or for any error as to any matter of procedure, unless, after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice. The effect of this provision is to eliminate any presumption of injury from error and to require that the appellate court examine the evidence to determine whether the error did in fact prejudice the defendant.

Authority:

Cal. Const., art. VI, sec. 13

People v. Delgado (1993) 5 Cal.4th 312, 328

People v. Jacobs (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1337, 1346

Third Holding:

Under the applicable prejudice standard, an erroneous verdict form is harmless if it is unmistakably clear under the totality of the circumstances that the jury intended to convict the defendant of the crime charged.

Authority:

People v. Camacho (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1272

Fourth Holding:

A prosecutor’s statement of facts not in evidence constitutes misconduct.

Authority:

People v. Bolton (1979) 23 Cal.3d 208, 212

Amelioration, Elements of crime, Sentencing, Standard of review, Vicarious liability

Case 000590

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court erred in summarily denying the defendant’s Penal Code section 1172.6 petition for resentencing at the prima facie stage.

First Holding:

Effective January 2019, the Legislature amended the law to eliminate liability for murder based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine or theories of imputed malice predicated solely on one’s participation in a crime. As relevant here, section 1172.6 applies to those who pled guilty to manslaughter after being charged with murder and who would have been subject to prosecution for murder under a felony-murder theory, the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or any other theory of imputed malice.

Authority:

PEN 1172.6

People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959

People v. Gaillard (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1206, 121

Second Holding:

A trial court considering a section 1172.6 petition must first determine whether the petitioner made a prima facie showing he or she could not presently be convicted under the amended laws. In doing so, the court accepts the petitioner’s factual allegations as true. The court may deny the petition at the prima facie stage only if the record of conviction—which includes facts admitted in a guilty plea—conclusively establishes that the petitioner is ineligible for relief as a matter of law.

Here, as the People concede, the record did not foreclose the possibility that the defendant was convicted under the invalid natural and probable consequences theory. His admissions and factual basis for the guilty plea were generic and did not establish the specific theory of aiding and abetting under which the defendant admitted guilt. Accordingly, they do not establish that he is ineligible for section 1172.6 relief as a matter of law. He pled that he aided and abetted a murder, but the natural and probable consequences doctrine is one theory of aiding and abetting.

Authority:

People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971

People v. Gaillard (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1206, 1211. 1212

Third Holding:

We review de novo the trial court’s resentencing denial at the prima facie stage.

Authority:

People v. Gaillard (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1206, 1211

Duty of the court, Jury instructions, Sentencing, Sixth Amendment, Standard of review

Case 000589

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We affirm the judgment of conviction, but vacate the defendant’s sentence and remand for a new trial on the aggravating factors because it was prejudicial error for the court to impose an upper term sentence based on uninstructed and unproven aggravating factors.

First Holding:

The Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial and the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of due process entitle a criminal defendant to a jury determination that the defendant is guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt. Where enumerated aggravating factors operate as the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense, the Sixth Amendment requires that they be found by a jury.

Authority:

Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 476-477

Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, 609

Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270, 288-289 [under Apprendi, aggravating circumstances supporting upper term sentence must be found by a jury]

Second Holding:

The trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on the essential elements of the charged offense. It is, indeed, very serious constitutional error because it threatens the right to a jury trial that both the United States and California Constitutions guarantee. It is well settled that no objection is required to preserve a claim for appellate review that the jury instructions omitted an essential element of the charge.

Authority:

People v. Merritt (2017) 2 Cal.5th 819, 824

Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 477

People v. Mil (2012) 53 Cal.4th 400, 409 [trial court erred by omitting essential elements of a special circumstance allegation]

Third Holding:

We review constitutional claims and claims of instructional error de novo. We must consider the claim of instructional error in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record. An instructional error that improperly describes or omits an element of an offense generally is not a structural defect in the trial mechanism that defies harmless error review and automatically requires reversal under the federal Constitution, unless the instructional error or omission amounts to the total deprivation of a jury trial.

Rather, where the trial court fails to instruct on necessary elements, generally this error is subject to harmless-error analysis under the test of Chapman, that is, whether it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained. Overwhelming evidence, other properly given jury instructions, or a defendant’s concession of elements for which an instruction was omitted may render an error harmless.

Authority:

People v. Rivera (2019) 7 Cal.5th 306, 326 [instructional error]

In re Taylor (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1019, 1035 [constitutional claims]

People v. Salazar (2016) 63 Cal.4th 214, 248 [The correctness of jury instructions is to be determined from the entire charge of the court]

People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 502-503

People v. Merritt (2017) 2 Cal.5th 819, 830

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18

Neder v. U.S. (1999) 527 U.S. 1, 15

People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 689, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22

Fourth Holding:

Forfeiture does not bar the defendant’s claim because the trial court had a sua sponte duty to instruct on all essential elements of the charge. Further, the failure to instruct the jury on all essential elements is not a matter of discretion but raises a legal claim under the federal constitution subject to de novo review.

Authority:

People v. Mil (2012) 53 Cal.4th 400, 409

People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, 46 [a defendant’s failure to object does not preclude his asserting on appeal that he was denied his constitutional right to a jury trial]

People v. Saunders (1993) 5 Cal.4th 580, 589, fn. 5

People v. Serrano (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 902, 908-909

People v. Lua (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1004, 1013

Fifth Holding:

The trial court failed to instruct properly on essential elements of the aggravating factor under rule 4.421(a)(1) that, to find the aggravating factor true, it must determine that the defendant’s conduct was distinctively worse than what was necessary to commit the crime, an element necessary to a true finding under the rule. The jury instructions omitted any definition of cruelty, viciousness, or callousness within the meaning of rule 4.421(a)(1).

This element of the aggravating factor may not be necessary in every case because “great bodily injury” alone may satisfy the requirements of rule 4.421(a)(1). But here, the defendant was also subject to a sentencing enhancement for inflicting great bodily injury under section 12022.7(a), and the trial court could not aggravate the defendant’s sentence on the same factual basis under section 1170(b)(5).

Authority:

People v. Sengpadychith (2001) 26 Cal.4th 316, 320

People v. Harvey (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 90, 116-117 [In imposing the upper term . under rule 421(a)(1) [now rule 4.421(a)(1)] the factfinder must convince itself that, when compared to other ways in which such a crime could be committed, the manner of this crime’s commission indicated viciousness and callousness]

People v. Webber (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1146, 1169

People v. Nevill (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 198, 206

People v. Gutierrez (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1729, 1735 [aggravating factor satisfied by finding of “great bodily injury”]

People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 350 [a court generally cannot use a single fact both to aggravate the base term and to impose an enhancement]

People v. Castaneda (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 611, 614-615

People v. Hill (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1566, 1575

People v. La Fargue (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 878, 898

Sixth Holding:

It is the court’s duty to see to it that the jury are adequately informed on the law governing all elements of the case submitted to them to an extent necessary to enable them to perform their function in conformity with the applicable law. Accordingly, the trial court erred by omitting jury instructions on necessary elements of the aggravating factor allegation.

Authority:

People v. Sanchez (1950) 35 Cal.2d 522, 528

Seventh Holding:

In addition, the court imposed an upper term sentence based on untried aggravating facts, discussing aspects purportedly related to public safety. An upper term sentence may be imposed only when circumstances in aggravation justify that term, and only when the facts underlying those justifying circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or found true beyond a reasonable doubt at a jury or court trial.

Here, the court erred by imposing an upper term sentence based on facts not found by the jury or stipulated to by the defendant, including that the defendant used a knife, that the assault occurred in a busy public area, and that his conduct endangered public safety. It was error for the court to consider these additional uncharged and unproven aggravating circumstances to impose an upper term sentence. We are unable to determine with a requisite degree of confidence that a jury would have found those facts to be factors in aggravation. We thus reverse the sentence and remand for resentencing.

Authority:

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 759

People v. Whitten (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1761, 1767 [examination of aggravating factors necessarily involves subjective determinations based upon objectively demonstrated facts]

Discretion, Standard of review

Case 000586

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court abused its discretion in finding the defendant unsuitable for mental health diversion, citing an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.

First Holding:

The primary goal of section 1001.36 is to increase diversion of individuals with mental disorders to mitigate the individuals’ entry and reentry into the criminal justice system while protecting public safety. Advances in psychology and neuroscience inform this goal.

Authority:

Sarmiento v. Superior Ct. (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 898

Second Holding:

Section 1001.36 narrowly defines an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety as requiring an unreasonable risk that the defendant will commit one of several statutorily enumerated violent felonies colloquially known as super strikes.

Authority:

PEN 1001.36(c)(4)

People v. Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440, 449

Third Holding:

We review a trial court’s decision on whether to grant section 1001.36 diversion for abuse of discretion. In this context, a court abuses its discretion when it applies the wrong legal standard or bases its decision on express or implied factual findings that are not supported by substantial evidence.

Authority:

People v. Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440, 448-449

Fourth Holding:

In concluding that the defendant posed such a danger, the court found she was likely to continue selling fentanyl, that the fentanyl she sold was likely to kill someone, and that she could be prosecuted for such a death on a theory of implied malice murder. According to the court, this established an unreasonable risk that the defendant would commit a super strike—murder—and the court denied diversion.

The court’s reasoning rests on purely speculative factual findings unsupported by any evidence. Speculation is not evidence, less still substantial evidence. The court did not cite any other basis for denying diversion, nor do the People cite an alternative basis for affirming the court’s order. The court abused its discretion in denying diversion on this basis. Accordingly, we reverse.

Authority:

Wise v. DLA Piper LLP (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1180, 1188

People v. Ramon (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 843, 851

Abstracts and Minutes, Elements of crime, Jury instructions, Standard of review, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence

Case 000583

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Though the trial court erred in failing to instruct that mere presence at the scene is insufficient to prove guilt, the error was harmless in light of the other evidence presented. The abstract of judgment is premature. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed the defendant on probation for two years. The abstract of judgment, however, indicates that the defendant was sentenced to state prison for two years. It must be corrected.

First Holding:

The abstract of judgment is premature. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed the defendant on probation for two years. The abstract of judgment, however, indicates that the defendant was sentenced to state prison for two years. it must be corrected.

(GARY note: The court cited no authority for its directive that the abstract of judgment be corrected. Likely because the error and cure seem so obvious. But there is plenty of authority for the court’s order, and I have set out some below.)

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1070

People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 855

In re Black (1967) 66 Cal.2d 881, 890

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2

Second Holding:

We review questions of instructional error de novo. In so doing, we consider the jury instructions as a whole, as well as the charges and entire record.

Authority:

People v. Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 218

People v. Serrano (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 902, 909

Third Holding:

In determining a sufficiency of the evidence challenge, we review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The focus of the substantial evidence test is on the whole record of evidence presented to the trier of fact, rather than on isolated bits of evidence.Reversal on this ground is unwarranted unless it appears that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support the conviction.

In other words, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The standard is the same in cases in which the People rely primarily on circumstantial evidence. If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also be reasonably reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment.

Authority:

People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578

People v. Cuevas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 252, 261

People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331

People v. Nguyen (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1015, 1055

People v. Bean (1988) 46 Cal.3d 919, 932

Fourth Holding:

A person aids and abets the commission of a crime when he or she, acting with (1) knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator; and (2) the intent or purpose of committing, encouraging, or facilitating the commission of the offense, and (3) by act or advice aids, promotes, encourages or instigates the commission of the crime. Whether a person has aided and abetted a crime is a question of fact for which the trier of fact may consider presence at the scene of the crime, companionship, and conduct before and after the offense. The requisite state of mind may be proven with circumstantial evidence.

Authority:

People v. Nguyen (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1015, 1054-1055

Fifth Holding:

Although defendant’s mere presence at the scene cannot alone establish aiding and abetting, her presence may be considered along with other evidence to establish that she aided and abetted the burglary. Further, possession of recently stolen property cannot alone establish burglary, but such possession is highly incriminating and need only be slightly corroborated.

Authority:

People v. Pettie (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 23, 57

People v. Nguyen (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1015, 1055

People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 176

People v. McFarland (1962) 58 Cal.2d 748, 754-755

Sixth Holding:

It is settled that in criminal cases, even in the absence of a request, the trial court must instruct on the general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence. The general principles of law governing the case are those principles closely and openly connected with the facts before the court, and which are necessary for the jury’s understanding of the case. The trial court has a sua sponte duty to give the mere presence portion of the aiding and abetting instructions where there is substantial evidence supporting its consideration.

Authority:

People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 422

People v. Boyd (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 541, 557

Seventh Holding:

We conclude that the defendant’s testimony was sufficient to trigger the trial court’s sua sponte duty to give the mere presence portion of the aiding and abetting instruction. However, whether prejudice is to be measured under the Watson standard or the more rigorous Chapman standard, we find beyond a reasonable doubt that the failure to instruct was harmless, in light of our review of the entire record, including the arguments of the parties.

Authority:

People v. Boyd (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 541, 557

People v. Perry (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 251, 260

People v. Powell (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 689, 715

People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18

Discretion, Standard of review, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence

Case 000578

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

There was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that placing the defendant on mental health diversion would present an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. The denial of the request for diversion under section 1001.36 is reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

First Holding:

Section 1001.36 gives trial courts the discretion to grant pretrial diversion for individuals suffering from certain mental health disorders. The statute defines pretrial diversion as the postponement of prosecution, either temporarily or permanently, at any point in the judicial process from the point at which the accused is charged until adjudication, to allow the defendant to undergo mental health treatment.

The maximum period of diversion is two years. If the defendant performs satisfactorily in diversion, then at the end of the period of diversion, the court shall dismiss the defendant’s criminal charges that were the subject of the criminal proceedings at the time of the initial diversion, and the arrest upon which the diversion was based shall be deemed never to have occurred.

Authority:

PEN 1001.36

People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 626

Second Holding:

Mental health diversion requires trial court findings that the defendant is both eligible for diversion and suitable for the program. The criteria for each are specified in the statute. Defendants are eligible if they have been diagnosed with a recognized mental disorder that was a significant factor in the commission of the criminal offense with which they are charged.

They are suitable if:

(1) in the opinion of a qualified mental health expert, the defendant’s mental disorder would respond to treatment; (

2) the defendant agrees to waive their speedy trial rights;

(3) the defendant agrees to comply with treatment requirements; and

(4) the defendant will not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety as defined in sections 1170.18 and 667(e)(2)(C)(iv).

Only the public safety suitability requirement necessitates a trial court finding.

Authority:

PEN 1001.36(b) and (c)

Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 891-892

Third Holding:

As used throughout the Penal Code, “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” means an unreasonable risk that the petitioner will commit a new violent felony within the meaning of section 667(e)(2)(C)(iv), which numerates particularly serious or violent felonies, known colloquially as “super strikes.”

Super strikes include any homicide offense, solicitation to commit murder, assault with a machine gun on a police officer or firefighter, possession of a weapon of mass destruction, or any serious or violent felony punishable by life imprisonment or death.

Authority:

PEN 1172.18

People v. Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347, 351

Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 892, fn. 4

Fourth Holding:

Assuming the defendant is both eligible and suitable, the trial court must also be satisfied that the recommended inpatient or outpatient program of mental health treatment will meet the specialized mental health treatment needs of the defendant. This is not an additional eligibility or suitability requirement the defendant must meet. Rather, section 1001.36(f)(1) read as a whole appears to contemplate an ongoing assessment to assure that defendants will receive appropriate treatment for their particular conditions as part of the diversion program.

Authority:

People v. Gerson (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1067, 1079

Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 892

Fifth Holding:

Even where defendants make a prima facie showing that they meet all the express statutory requirements, the court may still exercise its discretion to deny diversion. But this residual discretion must be exercised consistent with the principles and purpose of the governing law.

Authority:

People v. Gerson (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1067, 1079

People v. Qualkinbush (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 879, 888, 891

Wade v. Superior Court (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 694, 710

People v. Williams (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 990, 1001 [scope of discretion always resides in the particular law being applied]

Sixth Holding:

A trial court’s ruling on a motion for mental health diversion is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, and factual findings are reviewed for substantial evidence. A trial court has broad discretion to determine whether a given defendant is a good candidate for mental health diversion. A court abuses its discretion when it makes an arbitrary or capricious decision by applying the wrong legal standard, or bases its decision on express or implied factual findings that are not supported by substantial evidence.

Authority:

People v. Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440, 449

People v. Oneal (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 581, 588

People v. Curry (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 314, 324

People v. Bunas (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 840, 848–849

People v. Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1147

Seventh Holding:

Section 1001.36(e) provides that the hearing on a defendant’s eligibility and suitability shall be informal and may proceed on offers of proof, reliable hearsay, and argument of counsel. In general, the court will find hearsay evidence trustworthy when there are sufficient indicia of reliability. The court, however, may not rely on unsubstantiated or unreliable evidence.

Authority:

People v. Buell (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 682, 689 [hearsay that bears a substantial guarantee of trustworthiness is admissible in probation revocation proceedings]

Elements of crime, Equal protection, Standard of review, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence

Case 000577

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The conviction of section 270 must be reduced from a felony to a misdemeanor.

First Holding:

When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence — that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value — from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

We determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. This determination presumes in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence. In considering a sufficiency challenge, we do not reweigh evidence or reevaluate a witness’s credibility.

Authority:

People v. Cardenas (2025) 18 Cal.5th 797, 821

People v. Oyler (2025) 17 Cal.5th 756, 820

Second Holding:

Section 270 (failure to provide necessities to a minor child) states that violation is a misdemeanor unless a court of competent jurisdiction has made a final adjudication in either a civil or a criminal action that a person is the parent of a minor child and the person has notice of such adjudication. While felony punishment can be imposed constitutionally on persons previously found guilty of a violation of section 270, the statute violates equal protection to the extent felony punishment is grounded solely on an earlier legal determination of paternity.

Authority:

PEN 270

People v. Gregori (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 353, 356