Error and/or relief
Defendant, age 23 at the time of the offense, was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP). He sought a Franklin hearing to be able to present evidence that could be considered as mitigating factors related to his youth at the time of the crime in the event there is ever a parole hearing. The trial court denied the motion to conduct the hearing, on the basis that LWOP inmates will never be considered for parole. Reversed. We cannot determine whether the basis of his conviction would render him eligible even if the reasoning in Briscoe regarding a violated of equal protection is sound. We remand the matter to allow defendant to establish he is entitled to a Franklin hearing.
First Holding:
A Franklin hearing permits parties to preserve evidence relevant to a future youthful offender parole hearing under section 3051. Certain persons are, however, categorically ineligible for youth offender parole hearings, including cases in which an individual is sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for a controlling offense that was committed after the person had attained 18 years of age.
Authority:
In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439, 458-459
People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261
People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834, 843
Second Holding:
California’s youth offender parole statute offers opportunities for early release to certain persons who are incarcerated for crimes they committed at a young age. To this end, section 3051 requires the Board of Parole Hearings to hold a parole hearing for the purpose of reviewing the parole suitability of any prisoner who was 25 years of age or younger at the time of the controlling offense. The minimum number of years of incarceration before eligibility was 15, 20, or 25 years, depending on the length and nature of the sentence imposed.
Authority:
PEN 3051
People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834, 843
Third Holding:
The court in Briscoe concluded, notwithstanding Hardin, section 3051 violates equal protection as applied to youth offenders who were convicted as a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life. Defendant may have been so convicted and therefore might be entitled to relief under section 3051. The trial court consequently erred in summarily denying defendant’s motion. Without taking a position on the correctness of Briscoe, we remand with directions to allow defendant the opportunity to demonstrate his eligibility for a Franklin hearing.
Authority:
People v. Briscoe (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 479, 485, 494
Fourth Holding:
As a result of changes in the law regarding the liability of persons who were not the actual killer, a person may now be found guilty of murder if the person was a major participant in the felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life as described in section 190.2(d). Section 190.2(d) is the section describing a special circumstance under which a person may be punished by death or LWOP.
Thus, a person may be convicted simply of first degree murder as a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life and be sentenced to either 25 years to life (the sentence for first degree murder without special circumstances) or LWOP (the sentence for the same act but in which the special circumstance was alleged that the defendant was a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life).
Briscoe concluded that section 3051 purports to include the defendants convicted of the same behavior and received a sentence of 25 years to life, but to exclude those for whom the special circumstance describing the same behavior was alleged and found true and an LWOP sentence was imposed.
Briscoe concluded that section 3051 improperly denied equal protection under those circumstances, and that such individual should be eligible for consideration under section 3051 even if the sentence was LWOP.
Authority:
People v. Briscoe (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 479, 494
Fifth Holding:
The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no state may deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. At core, the requirement of equal protection ensures that the government does not treat a group of people unequally without some justification.
The degree of justification required to satisfy equal protection depends on the type of unequal treatment at issue. For the classification at stake here, based on a person’s criminal sentence, the general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.
A court applying this standard finds a denial of equal protection only if there is no rational relationship between a disparity in treatment and some legitimate government purpose.
We analyze equal protection claims de novo
Authority:
People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834, 847
People v. Briscoe (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 479, 487
Sixth Holding:
Hardin considered that it does not violate equal protection for section 3051 to apply to those sentenced to LWOP who committed the offense before they were 18 years old but not apply to those sentenced to LWOP for crimes committed as an adult.
The defendant Hardin did not demonstrate that the Legislature acted irrationally in declining to grant the possibility of parole to young adult offenders convicted of special circumstance murder, even as it has granted youth offender hearings to young adults convicted of other offenses.
But the court made this conclusion without foreclosing the possibility of other as-applied challenges to the statute.
Authority:
People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834, 838-839