Error and/or relief
The court erred in concluding that, because the defendant had been released on parole, he was not eligible for resentencing under section 1172.75.
First Holding:
In 2019, in an effort to reduce the societal and fiscal burdens of incarceration, the Legislature passed SB 136, which amended section 667.5(b) to eliminate prior-prison-term enhancements for all prior crimes except for sexually violent offenses as defined in section 6600(b) of the Welfare and Institutions Code.
In 2021, SB 483 made this change retroactive. It enacted was is now section 1172.75, which declares that any sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to section 667.5(b), except for any enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent offense as defined in section 6600(b) of the Welfare and Institutions Code is legally invalid.
(Gary Musings, nearly a verbatim copy and paste from my summary of Case 001135: The above language “to eliminate prior-prison-term enhancements for all prior crimes except for sexually violent offenses” is a bit looser maybe than it should be. Subdivision (b) was indeed amended, and the subdivision (b) now applies only if the offense was a sexually violent offense as defined in Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600(b).
(Keep your eyes on the prize here, though. SB 136 did not eliminate prior-prison-term enhancements for “all prior crimes except for sexually violent offenses” as stated in the opinion. It eliminated only those specified in subdivision (b), except for the specified sexually violent offenses.
(But SB 136 did NOT eliminate the three-year enhancement specified in section 667.5(a) for any qualifying prior prison terms served for the violent felonies listed in subdivision (c), which itemizes at least 24 crimes and circumstances that give rise to the status as “violent felony.”
(I have seen that “to eliminate” (or “by eliminating”) “prior-prison-term enhancements for all prior crimes except for sexually violent offenses” language in other unpublished opinions, and it is a direct quotation from Rhodius itself, at p. 1054. I understand the context because section 1172.75 pertains only to enhancements under subdivision (b). But I fear that maybe an attorney new to the field might read too much into that phrase. Hence, this Gary Musings to help such quick readers from straying. Though Rhodius does use the phrase “all prior crimes” in its fourth paragraph, it more specifically describes the effect of SB 136 in its first paragraph, where it says, “Effective January 1, 2020, the Legislature eliminated these one-year prior-prison-term enhancements except in cases involving prior terms for sexually violent offenses.” (I.e., referring only to the 667.5(b) enhancements.)
(The Legislative Counsel’s Digest characterizes the amendment as follows:
(“Existing law imposes an additional 3-year sentence for each prior separate prison term served by a defendant where the prior and current offense was a violent felony, as defined. For other felonies, existing law imposes an additional one-year term for each prior separate prison term or county jail felony term, except under specified circumstances.
(“This bill would instead impose that additional one-year term served for each prior separate prison term served for a conviction of a sexually violent offense, as defined.”
(The second paragraph of the Leg Counsel’s digest makes it clear by using “that additional one-year term served ….” From its “Existing law” paragraph, in which it describes both the 3-year sentence and the one-year term, the “This bill” paragraph pertains only to the “one-year term” portion of section 667.5. The phrase “all prior crimes except for sexually violent offenses” appears nowhere in SB 136.
(So with eyes wide open, recognize that enhancements for prior prison terms for violent felonies described in section 667.5(c) are alive and well.)
Authority:
PEN 667.5(b)
PEN 1172.75
People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050, 1054
Second Holding:
A defendant serving a term for a judgment that includes a now-invalid enhancement is entitled to resentencing. To facilitate the process, the statute directs the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) to identify those persons in their custody currently serving a term for a judgment that includes an enhancement described in subdivision (a).
Upon receiving that information, the sentencing court must review the judgment and verify that the current judgment includes a sentencing enhancement described in subdivision (a). If the court determines that the current judgment includes an enhancement described in subdivision (a), the court shall recall the sentence and resentence the defendant. The statute provides separate deadlines for identification, review, and resentencing of individuals currently serving a sentence based on the enhancement and all other individuals.
Authority:
People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050, 1055
Third Holding:
Section 1172.75(d) sets forth detailed instructions for resentencing once a sentence has been recalled. It specifies that resentencing pursuant to this section shall result in a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed as a result of the elimination of the repealed enhancement, unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public safety. The resentencing shall not result in a longer sentence than the one originally imposed.
The trial court must apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council as well as any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.
In addition, the court may consider postconviction factors, including, but not limited to, the disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation of the defendant while incarcerated, evidence that reflects whether age, time served, and diminished physical condition, if any, have reduced the defendant’s risk for future violence, and evidence that reflects that circumstances have changed since the original sentencing so that continued incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice.
Authority:
People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050, 1055
Fourth Holding:
Section 1172.75 entitles a defendant to resentencing if the underlying judgment includes a prior-prison-term enhancement that was imposed before January 1, 2020, regardless of whether the enhancement was then executed or instead stayed.
Authority:
People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050, 1054
Fifth Holding:
Section 1172.75 requires that the defendant be incarcerated at the beginning of the process, when correctional officials identify those persons in their custody currently serving a term for a judgment that includes’ a one-year prior prison term enhancement imposed under section 667.5, former subdivision (b). It does not require the defendant thereafter remain incarcerated until the time of resentencing to maintain his or her eligibility for relief. Nor is resentencing such a subsequently released defendant an empty exercise, as it can afford practical relief that includes shortening the applicable parole term.
Thus, a person who has been released on parole prior to the resentencing hearing remains eligible and should still be resentenced.
Authority:
People v. Washington (2026) 117 Cal.App.5th 1057, 1061
Sixth Holding:
Here, defendant’s judgment included a prior prison term enhancement that was imposed and executed before January 1, 2020. The prior prison term enhancement was not for a sexually violent offense. Defendant was still incarcerated on July 31, 2023, when CDCR identified him as a person eligible for relief pursuant to section 1172.75.
However, he had been released on parole in the two plus years in which his resentencing hearing was pending. Thus, the matter must be reversed and remanded, the court to recall defendant’s sentence and conduct a full resentencing hearing.
Authority:
People v. Washington (2026) 117 Cal.App.5th 1057

