Daily Archives: September 3, 2026

Case 000850

Error and/or relief

The abstract of judgment should be corrected to accurately reflect that the crime-bail-crime enhancements were stayed.

Holding:

The abstract of judgment does not include the crime-bail-crime enhancements, and the court did not address them at sentencing. However, the minutes from the sentencing hearing state that punishment under section 12022.1(b) was stayed.

When a trial court’s intention is clear, we need not remand for resentencing, but can modify the judgment to reflect the intent of the trial court. Here, it is clear the court intended to stay the crime-bail-crime enhancements but failed to include the stayed enhancements on the abstract of judgment. Accordingly, we modify the judgment to reflect that the crime-bail-crime enhancements were imposed and stayed.

Authority:

People v. Mendoza (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 535, 539

Case 000849

Error and/or relief

At the resentencing hearing held under section 1172.75, the resentencing court erred by (1) imposing consecutive sentences on the defendant’s attempted murder and felon in possession of a firearm counts because the court was unaware of its discretion to impose concurrent terms, (2) not recalculating custody credits, and (3) reimposing a restitution fine under section 1202.4.

First Holding:

When the Three Strikes law applies, sentences for current qualifying offenses must be ordered to run consecutively to each other if the current offenses occur on separate occasions and do not arise from the same set of operative facts.

Conversely, where a sentencing court determines that two or more current felony convictions were either committed on the same occasion or arise from the same set of operative facts, consecutive sentencing is not required under the three strikes law, but is permissible in the trial court’s sound discretion.

Authority:

PEN 667(c)(6)

People v. Henderson (2022) 14 Cal.5th 34, 45

People v. Lawrence (2000) 24 Cal.4th 219, 233

Second Holding:

When the record shows the trial court proceeded with sentencing on the erroneous assumption it lacked discretion, remand is necessary so that the court may have the opportunity to exercise its sentencing discretion at a new sentencing hearing. Defendants are entitled to sentencing decisions made in the exercise of the informed discretion of the sentencing court, and a court that is unaware of its discretionary authority cannot exercise its informed discretion.

Authority:

People v. Brown (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1213, 1228

Third Holding:

The attempted murder and felon in possession of a firearm counts were based on the defendant’s possession and use of the same firearm. There is no suggestion that the defendant possessed more than one gun when he committed the offenses.

Because the attempted murder and felon in possession of a firearm counts arose from the same set of operative facts, the resentencing court had discretion to impose concurrent sentences. Remand for resentencing is appropriate as the court was unaware of its discretion, and there is no indication that had it been aware of its discretion, it would nevertheless have imposed consecutive terms.

Authority:

People v. Garcia (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1550, 1567

People v. Deloza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 585, 600

People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391

Fourth Holding:

When a felony sentence is modified during the term of imprisonment, the trial court must recalculate and credit the actual time defendant had served on his sentence prior to the modification. Where a defendant has served any portion of his sentence under a commitment based upon a judgment which judgment is subsequently declared invalid or which is modified during the term of imprisonment, such time shall be credited upon any subsequent sentence he may receive upon a new commitment for the same criminal act or acts. On remand, the resentencing court must recalculate the defendant’s custody credits for actual time served.

Authority:

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 23

Fifth Holding:

The restitution fine imposed under section 1202.4 must be vacated under section 1465.9. Effective January 1, 2025, section 1465.9 was amended to add subdivision (d), which provides that, upon the expiration of 10 years after the date of imposition of a restitution fine pursuant to Section 1202.4, the balance, including any collection fees, shall be unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a judgment imposing those fines shall be vacated.

Because the defendant’s restitution fine was imposed more than 10 years ago, any balance is unenforceable and uncollectable by operation of law. The fine must be vacated

Authority:

PEN 1465.9

Case 000848

Error and/or relief

The trial court erred in imposing an indeterminate sentence on the attempted sodomy conviction and failed to properly calculate the defendant’s determinate sentence.

First Holding:

In evaluating claims of insufficient evidence, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence such that a reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

We presume the existence of every fact supporting the judgment that the jury reasonably could deduce from the evidence. A judgment will be reversed only if there is no substantial evidence to support the verdict under any hypothesis. We may not substitute our judgment for that of the jury, reweigh the evidence, or reevaluate the credibility of witnesses.

Authority:

People v. Elliot (2005) 37 Cal.4th 453, 466

People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206

People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331

Second Holding:

Under either simple or aggravated kidnapping, the asportation element requires that the movement be more than that which is merely incidental to the commission or attempted commission of the associated crime.

Simple kidnapping requires that the defendant moved the victim a substantial distance, but no minimum distance is required.

The aggravated kidnapping circumstance, however, also requires that the movement substantially increased the risk of harm to the victim beyond that inherent in the underlying offense. The increased risk may be of either physical or psychological harm.

Authority:

People v. Waqa (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 565, 577-578

Third Holding:

The crime of attempted sodomy is not subject to the One Strike law under section 667.61(c). Thus, it was error to impose an indeterminate sentence for that offense.

Authority:

PEN 667.61

People v. Rodriguez (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 204, 217

Fourth Holding:

Sentencing a defendant for offenses subject to determinate terms involves a three-step process:

First, the trial court is required to select a base term—either the statutory low, middle or upper term—for each of the crimes.

Second, if the court determines that a consecutive sentence is merited, it must designate the crime with the greatest selected base term as the principal term and the other crimes as subordinate terms.

Third, the court sentences the defendant to the full base term it selected for the principal term crime and one-third of the middle term for any crimes for which the sentence is ordered to run consecutively.

A subordinate term is one-third of the middle term even if the trial court had initially selected the lower or upper term as the base term. The court did not follow this procedure on three of the counts, and resentencing is required.

Authority:

PEN 1170.1

People v. Rodriguez (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 204, 211-212

Fifth Holding:

Generally, when a defendant successfully appeals a criminal conviction, California’s constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy precludes the imposition of more severe punishment on resentencing.

This rule does not apply, however, when a trial court imposes an unauthorized sentence. In such cases, courts may impose the proper judgment on remand even though it is more severe than the original unauthorized pronouncement.

Authority:

People v. Vizcarra (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 422, 431

People v. Burhop (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 808, 814 [An unauthorized sentence renders the unlawful part of a judgment of conviction and sentence void and correctable at any time.]

People v. Govan (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 1015, 1036, fn. 21 [We must correct an unauthorized sentence even where the corrected sentence results in a longer term.]

Sixth Holding:

Here, the trial court’s sentence on count 4 of an indeterminate term of 25 years to life was unauthorized and must be corrected. Likewise, the court’s failure to designate a principal term among counts 6 through 8 amounted to an unauthorized sentence. Accordingly, the trial court is not constrained by the length of the original determinative sentence for purposes of resentencing.

Authority:

People v. Neely (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 787, 797–798 [court erroneously applied principal term/subordinate term methodology set forth in sec. 1170.1 to all the offenses when it imposed one-third of the middle term sentences for the determinate term offenses]

Case 000847

Error and/or relief

On resentencing the defendant under section 1172.75, the court failed to award credit for the time the defendant served in custody. The court imposed a restitution fine that should have been vacated. The court imposed repealed fees. Remanded for the trial court to correct these errors, along with errors in the abstract of judgment.

First Holding:

Where a defendant has served any portion of his sentence under a commitment based upon a judgment which judgment is subsequently declared invalid or which is modified during the term of imprisonment, such time shall be credited upon any subsequent sentence he may receive upon a new commitment for the same criminal act or acts.

A court resentencing a defendant must credit the defendant with all actual days he had spent in custody, whether in jail or prison, up to that time. The updated total of credit must then be added to the abstract of judgment.

Here, the most recently amended abstract reflects no credit for time served. On remand, the trial court will need to recalculate the number of days the defendant spent in custody from the initial sentencing through the date of the resentencing and prepare an updated abstract of judgment.

The abstract of judgment must be corrected to reflect the correct date that the new sentence was pronounced at the resentencing hearing, not the date of the original sentencing.

Authority:

PEN 2900.1

PEN 2900.5

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 37

People v. Phoenix (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1125, 1129-1130

Second Holding:

The restitution fine imposed under section 1202.4 at the original sentencing in 2011 must be vacated. Section 1465.9(d) provides that upon the expiration of 10 years after the date of imposition of a restitution fine pursuant to Section 1202.4, the balance, including any collection fees, shall be unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a judgment imposing those fines shall be vacated.

Authority:

PEN 1465.9(d)

Third Holding:

The trial court was not authorized to impose fees under former Government Code section 29550.2. The Legislature repealed that statute effective July 1, 2021. (Stats. 2020, ch. 92, sec. 25.) Even if Government Code section 29550.2 were still in effect, the Legislature has declared such fees unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a judgment imposing those costs shall be vacated. Accordingly, we vacate the main jail booking fee and the main jail classification fee imposed by the trial court.

Authority:

GOV 6111(a)

Fourth Holding:

We note a clerical error in the most recently amended abstract of judgment. The abstract includes a solitary numeral “1” in section 3 of the enhancements section. The numeral is listed without an identifying label and is not included in the aggregate sentence. Presumably, this numeral is left over from the prior prison term enhancement that was stricken by the trial court at resentencing and should be deleted. We will direct the trial court to correct the amended abstract of judgment by deleting this errant numeral.

(Gary note: The court did not cite any authority for its order directing correction of the abstract of judgment, but the law is clear that it has that authority. I have listed below some cases the court could have cited as authority.)

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1070

People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 855

In re Black (1967) 66 Cal.2d 881, 890

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2

Case 000846

Error and/or relief

At the resentencing under section 1172.75, the court erred in failing to update the credit for time served. Remanded for the court to calculate the correct number of days and to correct the abstract of judgment that reflected the credit as of only the original sentence date.

First Holding:

The trial court incorrectly calculated his custody credit, and the abstract of judgment following the resentencing hearing does not reflect the actual days of custody credit as of the date of resentencing. We therefore remand the matter so the court may recalculate Smith’s actual days of custody credit and prepare an amended abstract of judgment.

Authority:

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 23

Second Holding:

(Gary note: The appellate court otherwise affirmed the sentence imposed on resentencing, but announced principles worthy of mention here, though they did not support any relief on appeal for this defendant.)

We review the trial court’s sentencing decisions for an abuse of discretion. We interpret relevant statutes and review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel de novo.

Authority:

People v. Moseley (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 870, 874

People v. Mayfield (1993) 5 Cal.4th 142, 199

People v. Terwilligar (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 585, 595