Monthly Archives: August 2026

Appellate Principles, Elements of crime, Jury trial, Pleading, Standard of review, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence

Case: 000389

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Consolidation and cross-admission of unrelated charges was improper and prejudicial under the circumstances of this case, and we will therefore reverse the judgment for possible retrial. Due to insufficient evidence of defendant’s guilt under certain murder theories presented to the jury, we will bar the prosecution from pursuing those theories in any retrial.

First Holding:

In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We presume the existence of every fact that the trier of fact could reasonably deduce from the evidence to support the judgment. To overturn a jury’s finding, it must clearly appear that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support it.

Authority:

People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331

People v. Medina (2009) 46 Cal.4th 913, 919

People v. Redmond (1969) 71 Cal.2d 745, 755

Second Holding:

First degree willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder must be committed with express malice—i.e., willfully. The remaining elements of premeditation and deliberation are generally established through the following types of evidence: (1) facts about how and what defendant did prior to the actual killing which show that the defendant was engaged in activity directed toward, and explicable as intended to result in, the killing—what may be characterized as planning activity; (2) facts about the defendant’s prior relationship and/or conduct with the victim from which the jury could reasonably infer a motive to kill the victim, and (3) facts about the nature of the killing from which the jury could infer that the manner of killing was so particular and exacting that the defendant must have intentionally killed according to a preconceived design to take his victim’s life in a particular way for a reason which the jury can reasonably infer from facts of type (1) or (2).

The evidence of premeditation and deliberation is generally sufficient when there is evidence of all three types or at least extremely strong evidence of (1) or evidence of (2) in conjunction with either (1) or (3). These factors discussed in Anderson, while helpful for purposes of review, are not a sine qua non to finding first degree premeditated murder, nor are they exclusive.

Authority:

PEN 188(a)(1)

People v. Concha (2009) 47 Cal.4th 653, 662

People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 26–27

People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1125

Third Holding:

Where, as here, offenses in separate cases meet a statutory basis for consolidation, a defendant bears the burden to make a clear showing of prejudice to establish that the trial court abused its discretion in consolidating the cases. In our review, we examine the record before the trial court when it denied defendant’s severance motion and consider: (1) the cross-admissibility of the evidence in separate trials; (2) whether some of the charges are likely to unusually inflame the jury against the defendant; (3) whether a weak case has been joined with a strong case or another weak case so that the total evidence may alter the outcome of some or all of the charges; and (4) whether one of the charges is a capital offense, or the joinder of the charges converts the matter into a capital case.

Authority:

PEN 954

People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 160-161

Fourth Holding:

We first address the charges’ cross-admissibility, because a finding of cross-admissibility generally negates the possibility of prejudice. Evidence of other crimes can be admitted to prove the offender acted according to a certain plan, or acted with a particular motive, if a degree of similarity exists between the past and present crimes so as to permit a reasonable inference that the offender must have entertained the same intent in both instances

Authority:

People v. Merriman (2014) 60 Cal.4th 1, 38

People v. Jones (2013) 57 Cal.4th 899, 926

Fifth Holding:

There exists a hierarchy, or continuum, with respect to the degree of similarity that is needed for cross-admissibility, depending upon the purpose for which introduction of the evidence is sought. To be admissible to demonstrate a distinctive modus operandi, the evidence must disclose common marks or identifiers, that, considered singly or in combination, support a strong inference that the defendant committed the crimes. To be admissible to show intent, however, the prior conduct and the charged offense need only be sufficiently similar to support the inference that defendant probably harbored the same intent in each instance. To be cross-admissible to establish motive, the offenses need not necessarily be factually similar but must share a direct logical nexus.

Authority:

Alcala v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1205, 1222

People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 392

People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 121

People v. Demetrulias (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1, 15

People v. Scheer (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1018 [the motive for the charged crime arises simply from the commission of the prior offense]

Sixth Holding:

Disputed identity is a factor to be considered in weighing the probative value of allegedly cross-admissible evidence of intent against the likelihood of undue prejudice due to its admission.

Authority:

People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 394, fn. 2

People v. Earle (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 372, 390–391

People v. King (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1301–1303

People v. Thompson (1988) 45 Cal.3d 86, 109 [to be admitted, evidence of other crimes must not contravene other policies limiting admission, such as those contained in Evidence Code section 352]

Amelioration, Elements of crime, Retroactivity, Sentencing

Case: 000388

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

On resentencing under section 1172.75, the court erred in not reevaluating the conviction for gang criminal activity under the provisions of AB 333, enacted after the original sentencing.

First Holding:

When any aspect of a case is on appeal from sentencing, the case or prosecution has not been reduced to final judgment for Estrada retroactivity purposes.

Authority:

People v. Lopez (2025) 17 Cal.5th 388, 397

In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740

Second Holding:

AB 333’s changes to section 186.22 apply retroactively under Estrada.

Authority:

People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1207

Third Holding:

AB 333 essentially adds new elements to the substantive offense and enhancements in section 186.22. AB 333 made the following changes to the law on gang enhancements: First, it narrowed the definition of a criminal street gang to require that any gang be an ongoing, organized association or group of three or more persons.

Second, whereas section 186.22, former subdivision (f) required only that a gang’s members individually or collectively engage in a pattern of criminal activity in order to constitute a criminal street gang, AB 333 requires that any such pattern have been collectively engaged in by members of the gang.

Third, AB 333 also narrowed the definition of a pattern of criminal activity by requiring that (1) the last offense used to show a pattern of criminal gang activity occurred within three years of the date that the currently charged offense is alleged to have been committed; (2) the offenses were committed by two or more gang members, as opposed to just persons; (3) the offenses commonly benefitted a criminal street gang; and (4) the offenses establishing a pattern of gang activity must be ones other than the currently charged offense.

Fourth, AB 333 narrowed what it means for an offense to have commonly benefitted a street gang, requiring that any common benefit be more than reputational. These changes also apply to the crime of active participation in a criminal street gang.

Authority:

PEN 186.22

People v. E.H. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 467, 479

People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206

People v. Rojas (2023) 15 Cal.5th 561, 565

Sentencing, Sixth Amendment

Case: 000387

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court erred in using aggravating factors that were neither found true beyond a reasonable doubt by a trier of fact nor admitted by the defendant.

First Holding:

Section 1170(b)(1) through (3) provides the court may impose the upper term only when there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term. As amended, section 1170(b) altered the trial court’s sentencing discretion and created a presumption against the upper term, which may be overcome only if the required facts are properly proven and the trial court concludes the term is justified. Unless a defendant stipulates to the facts, or waives his or her jury trial right, that aggravating factfinding role now resides solely with the jury The trial court may also consider the defendant’s prior convictions in determining sentencing based on a certified record of conviction. A Sixth Amendment violation occurs when the trial court relies on unproven aggravating facts to impose an upper term sentence, even if some other aggravating facts relied on have been properly established.

Authority:

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 760, 768, 773

Second Holding:

A violation is prejudicial unless an appellate court can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have found true all of the aggravating facts relied upon by the trial court to justify an upper term sentence, or that those facts were otherwise proved true in compliance with the current statutory requirements. Accordingly, a defendant is entitled to reversal and remand unless we can conclude that the omission of a jury trial was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under Chapman as to every aggravating fact the trial court used to justify an upper term sentence. Lack of a jury trial is not harmless under Chapman if the record contains evidence that could rationally lead to a contrary finding’ with respect to the aggravating fact at issue.

Authority:

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 768, 775

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18

People v. Wiley (2025)17 Cal.5th 1069, 1087

Eighth Amendment, Sentencing

Case: 000386

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

A court must consider a defendant’s inability to pay before imposing a court operations assessment and a court facilities assessment. We therefore remand to the trial court to conduct an inability to pay hearing as to those assessments.

First Holding:

Under Kopp, a court must consider a defendant’s inability to pay before imposing a court operations assessment and a court facilities assessment.

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1

Second Holding:

Restitution fines and parole revocation fines under sections 1202.4 and 1202.45a), respectively, are punitive fines. Court operations assessments and court facilities assessments, under section 1465.8(a)(1) and Government Code section 70373(a)(1), respectively, are ancillary costs and not punishment. As to punitive fines, subject to the Eighth Amendment, a court may impose a nonexcessive fine as punishment. therwise, an excessive fines analysis applies to punitive fines imposed in excess of the minimum. Because the trial court here imposed punitive fines in the minimum amounts of $300 and stayed the parole revocation fine, they are not subject to an inability to pay hearing, as the defendant concedes.

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 13-15

Third Holding:

However, ancillary costs do implicate equal protection principles. The court operations and facilities assessments are ancillary costs intended to raise funds for the courts. A criminal defendant cannot avoid the imposition of these costs regardless of indigency. By contrast, an indigent civil litigant may have similar fees waived entirely. Where the Legislature has already determined that both criminal defendants and civil litigants should be charged similar amounts for the same reasons, there appears no rational basis to deny only indigent criminal defendants the ability to avoid those costs. Accordingly, equal protection principles require a court, upon request, to consider a defendant’s inability to pay before imposing a court operations assessment under section 1465.8(a)(1) or a court facilities assessment under Government Code section 70373(a)(1). Therefore, the trial court here should have considered the defendants’s inability to pay before imposing the $40 court operations assessment under section 1465.8(a)(1) and the $30 criminal conviction assessment fee under Government Code section 70373(a)(1).

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 18, 28-29, 30

Abstracts and Minutes, Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case: 000385

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The minute order and abstract of judgment erroneously indicates that the court imposed the parole revocation fine (PEN 1202.45) on the defendant, who was sentenced to a term of life without the possibility of parole. Because the parole revocation fine cannot be imposed on person sentence to LWOP, it must be stricken.

First Holding:

The trial court should not have imposed the challenged fines and respectfully request the court modify the judgment by striking them. The abstract must be corrected.

Authority:

PEN 1202.45

People v. Oganesyan (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1178, 1181–1182, 1185 [Section 1202.45 indicates that it is applicable to a person .whose sentence includes a period of parole]

Second Holding:

The defendant contends he is entitled to an additional day of actual presentence custody credit. The People concede he is correct. Although the defendant did not object at trial, forfeiture of sentencing only occurs when the alleged error involved an exercise of discretion. Because the calculation of credits is purely mathematical, his failure to object at trial does not preclude this court from correcting the error.

Authority:

People v. Aguirre (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1139