Error and/or relief
The court erred in denying the defendant’s petition for resentencing under section 1170(d), because (a) it incorrectly concluded that section 1171 barred resentencing where the original sentence was agreed on by the parties, and (b) it incorrectly believed that the parties had originally agreed to the sentence imposed. Reversed and remanded.
Because the trial court did not consider whether, despite the availability of youthful offender parole, the defendant’s determinate sentence is a de facto LWOP sentence, we leave that issue for the trial court to consider in the first instance.
First Holding:
Penal Code section 1171 [effective 1/1/2025] does not bar modification of plea agreements in resentencing. To the contrary, the section expressly authorizes modification after a plea. It states that, absent a more specific statutory rule, in a postconviction proceeding to modify a sentence pursuant to an ameliorative statute the court has jurisdiction to modify every aspect of the defendant’s sentence, including if it was imposed after a guilty plea.
The statute then provides that a plea bargain may not be rescinded based upon such modification: Any change to a sentence shall not be basis for a prosecutor or court to rescind a plea agreement. Thus, section 1171 expressly authorizes trial courts to modify sentences imposed after a plea bargain and prohibits rescission of bargains based on such modification. The trial court erred in ruling that section 1171 barred resentencing because of the defendant’s plea agreement
Authority:
PEN 1171(a), (c)(2) and (c)(3)
Second Holding:
Section 1170(d), under certain circumstances, provides for the recall and resentencing of juvenile offenders [who were tried as adults] with LWOP sentences.
(Gary note: without citation to published authority directly discussing this point, the unpublished opinion concludes that the use of the term “life without the possibility of parole” in section 1170(d) does not mention any specific statutes imposing LWOP sentences, such as section 190.5.
(This court infers from that lack of specificity that the Legislature must have intended that section 1170(d) apply whenever a candidate has received a sentence that, effectively, precludes parole in his or her lifetime. In other words, this unpublished opinion’s reasoning on this point is that section 1170(d), by its very terms, contemplates both express LWOP sentences and de facto LWOP sentences (sentences whose terms cannot be completed within a reasonable lifetime).
(The court states, “Thus, the Legislature appears to have intended section 1170(d) to be interpreted in a practical rather than technical manner to apply not only to formal LWOP sentences but also to de facto LWOP sentences that effectively render a juvenile offender ineligible for parole before they are expected to die.”
(Keep in mind that my description of this part of the holding is placed in a bracketed “Gary note,” and I may be oversimplifying and even misstating the court’s reasoning on this point. I simply thought it was an interesting approach that may prove useful.
(Also, the county’s District Attorney “invited” the Supreme Court to grant review on its own motion. I suspect it is because the Attorney General actually represented the People in this appeal, and the DA would have had no standing to file a petition for review. The Supreme Court has granted itself to a date in October 2026 to decide whether to grant review on its own motion.
(UPDATE OCTOBER 21, 2026: The Supreme Court granted and held review on this case in September 2026. “The court ordered briefing deferred pending decision in [another Supreme Court case already granted review], which presents the following issue: Is a juvenile homicide offender sentenced to 50 years to life in prison entitled to recall and resentencing under Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) on the ground that the sentence is the functional equivalent of life imprisonment without parole?”
(I will try to follow that lead case and this case, and update when there is resolution. I have signed up for notification on both the Court of Appeal case and the Supreme Court case once they are resolved.
(The issue on review in that other case pertains solely to functional equivalence of life without parole, and does not seem to address any impact of section 1170.1.)
Authority:
PEN 1170(d)(5)
Third Holding:
A practical interpretation of section 1170(d) is also supported by constitutional considerations. At least four Court of Appeal decisions have held that restricting resentencing under Section 1170(d) to juvenile offenders with formal LWOP sentences is irrational and violates equal protection, though others have disagreed.
Authority:
People v. Cabrera (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 650, 653
People v. Sorto (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 435, 450-454
People v. Bagsby (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1040, 1054-1061
People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608, 631-634
Contra: People v. Baldwin (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 978, 1002-1006
Contra: People v. Thompson (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 1058, 1075-1081, review granted Sept. 24, 2025, S292540
Fourth Holding:
Nonetheless, interpreting section 1170(d) to be limited to formal LWOP sentences plainly raises a serious constitutional question, and it is well-established that statutes should be construed to avoid constitutional questions where they are reasonably susceptible to a reasonable alternative interpretation that do not raise such questions. Accordingly, we conclude that section 1170(d) should be interpreted to apply to de facto as well as formal LWOP sentences.
Authority:
People v. Superior Court (Guevara) (2025) 18 Cal.5th 838, 862 [If a statute is susceptible of two constructions, one of which will raise serious and doubtful constitutional questions, the court will adopt the construction which, without doing violence to the reasonable meaning of the language used, will render it free from doubt as to its constitutionality.]
People v. Miracle (2018) 6 Cal.5th 318, 339 [A statute must be construed, if reasonably possible, in a manner that avoids a serious constitutional question.]
Fifth Holding:
The trial court held that the defendant was not serving a de facto LWOP sentence because he is eligible for youthful offender parole under section 3051 and, in fact, already has received a youthful offender parole hearing. We disagree. Youthful offender parole is available to all juvenile offenders with LWOP sentences, whether formal or not.
Moreover, the Legislature extended youthful offender parole hearings to juvenile offenders with LWOP sentences in 2017, five years after enacting section 1170(d). In so doing, the Legislature did not indicate that it intended to end resentencing for juvenile offenders with LWOP sentences under section 1170(d), and, as the Supreme Court has long recognized, absent an express declaration of legislative intent, we will find an implied repeal only when there is no rational basis for harmonizing the two potentially conflicting statutes.
Accordingly, in determining whether an individual was sentenced to imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole under section 1170(d), youthful offender parole should be disregarded.
Authority:
PEN 3051(b)(4)
People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834, 845
Garris v. McCutchen (1997) 16 Cal.4th 469, 477
People v. Sorto (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 435, 447-448
People v. Bagsby (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1040, 1061
People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608, 628-629
