The abstract of judgment contains errors in conflict with the oral pronouncement of judgment, and it must be corrected.
We direct the trial court to correct the errors in the abstract of judgment.
People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185
The juvenile court erred by holding the minor jointly and severally liable for victim restitution.
Restitution orders are subject to review on appeal for an abuse of discretion. The ‘court abuses its discretion when it acts contrary to law.
In re Travis J. (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 187, 202
Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.6 governs restitution in cases where a minor is adjudicated a ward of the court pursuant to section 602. Under this statute, a victim of conduct for which a minor is found to be a person described in section 602 who incurs an economic loss as a result of the minor’s conduct shall receive restitution directly from that minor.
For the purposes of victim restitution, each minor shall be held severally liable, and shall not be held jointly and severally liable as co-offenders. The court shall apportion liability based on each minor’s percentage of responsibility or fault for all economic losses included in the order of restitution. The aggregate amount of apportioned liability for all minors involved shall not exceed 100 percent in total.
WIC 730.6
WIC 602
In re M.W. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 1, 4
The error has not been waived, as the failure to object to a restitution order that exceeds the court’s statutory authority does not waive the claim of error.
In re Paul R. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1582, 1590
We reverse the juvenile court’s finding that the minor committed murder as an aider and abettor with implied malice.
An aider and abettor of murder must actually aid and abet the lethal act in order to be convicted of murder.
People v. Morris (2026) 19 Cal.5th 671, 678
The trial court announced its finding that, to be liable for an implied malice murder, a direct aider and abettor must, by words or conduct, aid the commission of the life endangering act, not the result of that act. The court treated the robbery as the life-endangering act that resulted in the victim’s death.
The court went on to state that the People have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the minor was an aider and abettor to the robbery with knowledge that his compatriots intended to commit the robbery; did, in fact, intend to aid the perpetrators in the commission of the robbery or attempted robbery, and had knowledge that the act was dangerous to human life.
The opinion in Morris was issued long after the juvenile court sustained the petition, and under Morris, the court’s reasoning was in error.
People v. Morris (2026) 19 Cal.5th 671
When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
We determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In so doing, a reviewing court presumes in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.
The same standard of review governs our review of the sufficiency of evidence in juvenile delinquency cases.
People v. Edwards (2013) 57 Cal.4th 658, 715
In re Roderick P. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 801, 809
In re A.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 647, 653
In re Matthew A. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 537, 540
Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought. An unlawful killing during the commission of a felony is also murder. Second degree implied malice murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought but without the additional elements, such as willfulness, premeditation, and deliberation, that would support a conviction of first degree murder. Malice may be express or implied.
PEN 187(a)
PEN 189(a),(e)
People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 151
Malice is implied when the killing is proximately caused by an act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed by a person who knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and who acts with conscious disregard for life. In short, implied malice requires a defendant’s awareness of engaging in conduct that endangers the life of another—no more, and no less. This definition is referred to as “simple implied malice murder.”
People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 143
People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 988
To suffice for implied malice murder, the defendant’s act must not merely be dangerous to life in some vague or speculative sense; it must involve a high degree of probability that it will result in death. Implied malice requires a defendant’s awareness of the risk of death to another.
People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 152
People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 989
To be considered the proximate cause of the victim’s death, the defendant’s act must have been a substantial factor contributing to the result, rather than insignificant or merely theoretical. The question of implied malice is to be decided in light of all the circumstances.
People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 988
People v. Moore (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 937, 942
Under Penal Code section 187, the mens rea required for murder is malice aforethought. Regarding aiders and abettors, in order to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime shall act with malice aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.
In the context of implied malice murder, the aider and abettor must know the perpetrator intends to commit a life-endangering act, intend to aid the perpetrator in the commission of that act, know the act is dangerous to human life, and act in conscious disregard for human life.
PEN 187
PEN 188(a)(3)
People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1118
People v. Harris (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 623, 631
People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 468
People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 991
Murder also requires an actus reus. In the context of implied malice, the actus reus required of the perpetrator is the commission of a life-endangering act. For the direct aider and abettor, the actus reus includes whatever acts constitute aiding the commission of the life-endangering act.
Thus, to be liable for an implied malice murder, the direct aider and abettor must, by words or conduct, aid the commission of the life-endangering act, not the result of that act.
People v. Concha (2009) 47 Cal.4th 653, 660
People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 991
As relevant to this aider or abettor theory of liability in a felony-murder, the amended felony-murder rule now states that when a person was not the actual killer, that person must have, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree. Section 189(e)(2) requires a nonkiller to aid the actual killer in the lethal act.
While the language of Penal Code section 188(a)(3), differs from section 189(e), pursuant to section 188(a)(3), a direct aider and abettor must act with malice aforethought, and act with intent to aid the life-endangering act of the direct perpetrator that proximately causes the death.
PEN 189(e)(2)
People v. Morris (2026) 19 Cal.5th 671, 678
People v. Pittman (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 400, 415
People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 991-992
Implied malice murder requires attention to the aider and abettor’s mental state concerning the life endangering act committed by the direct perpetrator, such as shooting at the victim, or, as in this case, stabbing him. In other words, the aider and abettor must know the perpetrator intends to commit a life-endangering act, intend to aid the perpetrator in the commission of that act, know the act is dangerous to human life, and act in conscious disregard for human life. Even if the act results in a death that is accidental, the circumstances surrounding the act may evince implied malice.
People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 992
People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 468
People v. Nieto Benitez (1992) 4 Cal.4th 91, 110
SB 1437 abolished the natural and probable consequences doctrine in cases of murder, amending section 188 to require that, when the felony-murder rule does not apply, a principal in the crime of murder shall act with malice aforethought, and that malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime. As a result, the natural and probable consequences doctrine can no longer support a murder conviction.
PEN 188
In re R.G. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 141, 144
People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 847-848
Instead, with the exception of section 189(e), a conviction for murder requires that a person act with malice aforethought and that a person’s culpability for murder must be premised upon that person’s own actions and subjective mens rea.
We conclude the legislative language of Penal Code section 188(a)(3) requires a finding that the accused actually aided the perpetrator in the commission of the life-endangering act, and that the accused’s participation in a dangerous felony as an aider and abettor cannot form the basis for finding implied malice.
Only in this way will a finding that the accused aided and abetted in the commission of implied malice murder reflect a determination of the person’s guilt based on his own actions and subjective intent.
People v. Lopez (2026) 19 Cal.5th 639, 660-661
In light of Kopp, which was decided while this appeal was pending, we will remand for reconsideration of the restitution and parole revocation fines.
We note that the abstract of judgment indicates that the restitution and parole revocation fines were $300 each, yet the trial court in its oral pronouncement imposed restitution and parole revocation fines of $1,800 each. Ordinarily, the oral pronouncement of judgment controls.
People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185
Here, however, the trial court imposed a restitution fine (and corresponding parole revocation fine) exceeding the statutory minimum before the recent guidance issued by the Supreme Court in Kopp. Because the record is silent as to whether the trial court considered the defendant’s ability to pay or any other excessive fine factor, we will vacate those fines and remand for further proceedings in light of Kopp.
People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1
The trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury regarding specific intent for count 2, and the trial court abused its discretion when it imposed the registration requirement, We reverse count 2 and strike the registration requirement, and in all other respects affirm.
Trial courts have a sua sponte duty to instruct on every element of charged offenses. Instructions completely removing the issue of intent from the jury’s consideration may constitute a denial of federal due process principles. We review independently the legal adequacy of a jury instruction.
People v. Mil (2012) 53 Cal.4th 400, 409
People v. Lee (1987) 43 Cal.3d 666, 673,
People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1211
The court instructed the jury that count 2 required “general criminal intent,” which is established when the defendant intentionally does a prohibited act.
This instruction was erroneous. The crime in count 2 is a specific intent crime because it requires the act to be done with the intent to accomplish a separate objective.
In addition, the instruction given on the crime was incomplete, because it included the statutory language for the prohibited conduct, but it omitted the requirement that the physical act be performed for a separate reason.
Specific intent is not presumed from the doing of the unlawful act.
EVID 668
People v. ZarateCastillo (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1161, 1167 [construing equivalent language of a similar section]
We assess the prejudicial effect of the failure to instruct regarding the required element of mental state pursuant to Chapman. We must reverse unless it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the jury’s verdict.
Instructional error is harmless where a reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the omitted element was uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence, but not where the record contains evidence that could rationally lead to a contrary finding with respect to the omitted element.
In our view, the instructional error is not harmless because the record contains evidence that could rationally lead to a contrary finding with respect to the omitted element.
Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24
People v. Mil (2012) 53 Cal.4th 400, 409
Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1, 19
Substantial evidence did not support the trial court’s order that the defendant register as a sex offender. Section 290.006 requires a defendant to register as a sex offender if the court finds at the time of conviction or sentencing that the person committed the offense as a result of sexual compulsion or for purposes of sexual gratification. Section 290.006 does not include sexual abuse as a basis for registration.
PEN 290.006
We review imposition of a registration requirement pursuant to section 290.006 for abuse of discretion. The trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, and its application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.
A trial court abuses its discretion when its factual findings are not supported by the evidence. Here, there was no evidence that the murder (count 1) was committed for sexual gratification. The registration requirement must be stricken.
If the defendant is retried on the reversed count by a properly instructed jury, the court may reconsider the registration requirement based on the evidence presented at that trial.
People v. Picklesimer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 330, 335
People v. Thai (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 427, 433
Because sufficient evidence was presented that could support a guilty verdict if the jury were properly instructed, the People may retry the defendant for count 2 on remand.
People v. Hatch (2000) 22 Cal.4th 260, 271–272