Error and/or relief
The trial court prejudicially erred when it found the aggravating factors true and sentenced him to the upper term without first obtaining an express waiver of his right to a jury trial or a stipulation to the aggravating factors.
First Holding:
We review questions about whether a defendant’s constitutional rights were violated de novo. If we determine that a defendant’s right to a jury trial has been violated, we apply the harmless error standard in Chapman. Under the Chapman standard, we must reverse and remand a sentence imposed under section 1170(b), unless we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have found true all of the aggravating facts relied upon by the trial court to justify an upper term sentence, or that those facts were otherwise proved true in compliance with the current statutory requirements.
Authority:
People v. Palmer (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 268, 280
People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 768
Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18
People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1087
Second Holding:
Any fact that exposes a defendant to a greater potential sentence must be found by a jury, not a judge, and established beyond a reasonable doubt, not merely by a preponderance of the evidence.
Authority:
Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270, 281
Third Holding:
In 2022, the Legislature amended section 1170(b) to limit a court’s discretion to impose the upper term of a sentencing triad. Under the current version of section 1170, trial courts may impose a sentence that exceeds the middle term only when there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term and the facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.
Authority:
PEN 1170(b)(2)
People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 757, 773
People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1078
Fourth Holding:
Section 1170(b)(3) provides that the court may consider the defendant’s prior convictions in determining sentencing based on a certified record of conviction without submitting the prior convictions to a jury. This provision is considered the state counterpart to the exception the United States Supreme Court recognized in Almendarez-Torres for findings regarding a defendant’s prior convictions. Recently, the United States Supreme Court clarified in Erlinger that the Almendarez-Torres exception to the jury trial requirement permits a judge to make findings regarding the fact of a defendant’s prior conviction and the elements of the offense alone, nothing else.
Authority:
Almendarez-Torres v. United States (1998) 523 U.S. 224
People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1085-1086
Erlinger v. United States (2024) 602 U.S. 821, 837
Fifth Holding:
Virtually any fact that increases a defendant’s exposure to punishment must be submitted to a jury and found unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt. This jury trial guarantee retains its vitality even if the inquiry is straightforward. Therefore, unless a defendant waives the right to a jury trial or stipulates that the aggravating factors are true, under section 1170(b), the People must prove to a jury the facts relied on to justify an upper term sentence beyond a reasonable doubt.
Authority:
People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 761-762
People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1084, 1086
Erlinger v. United States (2024) 602 U.S. 821, 842
Sixth Holding:
A defendant is entitled to have a jury determine whether his prior convictions were of increasing seriousness and whether he had performed unsatisfactorily on probation, before the court could rely on those aggravating facts to find justification for an upper term sentence. The inquiry into whether defendant’s prior convictions were extensive or numerous is a comparative and qualitative one. The qualitative and comparative nature of the inquiry, which could allow a jury to focus on different aspects of defendant’s history than the trial court did, makes it difficult to conclude with confidence that the jury would have assessed the facts in the same manner as did the trial court. Thus, we find the error to be not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Authority:
People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1085, 1090