Tag Archives: Upper term

Case: 000141

Error and/or relief

The court prejudicially erred by imposing the upper term without submitting aggravating factors to the jury pursuant to amended section 1170(b).

First Holding:

It was error for the court to impose the upper term on finding the defendant’s criminal history was of increasing seriousness and the convictions were numerous without submitting the aggravating factors to a jury for proof beyond a reasonable doubt or obtaining a stipulation from the defendant. With the exception of prior conviction allegations, under the Sixth Amendment, any fact that exposes a defendant to a greater potential sentence must be found by a jury and established beyond a reasonable doubt. A defendant is entitled to have a jury determine whether his prior convictions were of increasing seriousness and whether he had performed unsatisfactorily on probation, before the court could rely on those aggravating facts to find justification for an upper term sentence.

Authority:

PEN 1170

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 747

Erlinger v. United States (2024) 602 U.S. 821

Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1085

Second Holding:

Under the narrow exception under which a jury is not required for proof of the fact of a prior conviction, a judge may do no more, consistent with the Sixth Amendment, than determine what crime, with what elements, the defendant was convicted of.

Authority:

Erlinger v. United States (2024) 602 U.S. 821, 838

Third Holding:

Generally, a party’s failure to raise a sentencing issue in the trial court forfeits the issue on appeal. The purpose of this rule is to encourage parties to bring errors to the attention of the trial court, so that they may be corrected. Additionally, it is both unfair and inefficient to permit a claim of error on appeal that, if timely brought to the attention of the trial court, could have been easily corrected or avoided. The forfeiture rule ensures that the opposing party is given an opportunity to address the objection, and it prevents a party from engaging in gamesmanship by choosing not to object, awaiting the outcome, and then claiming error.

Authority:

People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 352–353

People v. McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589, 593

People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, 46

Fourth Holding:

An appellate court is generally not prohibited from reaching a question that has not been preserved for review by a party. Indeed, it has the authority to do so, and whether or not it should do so is entrusted to its discretion. Such discretionary review is typical when a forfeited claim involves an important issue of constitutional law or a substantial right. Here, the defendant initially requested a jury trial. Further research by the court and counsel led the court to erroneously believe that an exception to the jury trial applied, and determined that it would proceed by court trial rather than by jury. Under these circumstances, it is neither unfair nor inefficient to permit the defendant’s claim of error on appeal.

Authority:

People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161, fn. 6

In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 887, fn. 7

People v. McCullough, (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589, 593

Fifth Holding:

But even assuming the forfeiture rule applies, we exercise our discretion to address the issue. Where, as here, the issue on appeal implicates a constitutional right, we will not apply the rule of forfeiture.

Authority:

People v. Gonzalez (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 312, 327

People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161, fn. 6

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1082 [the Sixth Amendment requires a jury determination of the increasing seriousness of a defendant’s prior convictions]

Sixth Holding:

When a defendant is deprived of a jury trial on aggravating facts used to justify imposition of an upper term sentence, the reviewing court must apply the Chapman standard of review. Under that standard, a sentence must be reversed unless the reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury, applying that same standard, would have found true all of the aggravating facts upon which the court relied, or that those facts were otherwise proved true in compliance with the current statute. Lack of a jury trial is not harmless under Chapman if the record contains evidence that could rationally lead to a contrary finding’ with respect to the aggravating fact at issue.

Authority:

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 742–743

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1087

Case: 000134

Error and/or relief

On resentencing under section 1172.75, the court erred in imposing the upper term on factors that had not been proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.

First Holding:

A criminal judgment does not become final for purposes of Estrada when an appellate court affirms a conviction, but leaves sentencing issues pending before the trial court following remand. During the resentencing on remand, the benefits of supervening ameliorative legislation apply retroactively.

Authority:

People v. Lopez (2025) 17 Cal.5th 388, 392

In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740

Second Holding:

Absent waiver or stipulation, aggravating factors such as the increasing seriousness of a defendant’s prior convictions and unsatisfactory performance on probation must be found true beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury before those facts can be used to justify an upper term sentence.

Authority:

PEN 1170

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1082

Third Holding:

This case must be distinguished from Brannon-Thompson, which found that the plain language of section 1172.75(d)(4) indicated the Legislature intended the new burden of proof amendments to section 1170(b) to apply only if the trial court is imposing the upper term for the first time at a section 1172.75 resentencing. In this case, the defendant was not being resentenced after a prior sentence that imposed an upper term was recalled.

Instead, he was on remand from the prior appeal directive to strike prior prison term enhancements before section 1172.75 even went into effect (which the court did). As such, when the trial court proceeded to resentence defendant in 2023, his sentence already lacked any enhancements imposed pursuant to former section 667.5(b). Defendant accordingly was not eligible for resentencing under section 1172.75 in 2023, making the provision inapplicable. Instead, appearing for resentencing based on a remand in the prior appeal, the defendant was entitled to the benefits of supervening ameliorative legislation, including the new evidentiary standards of section 1170(b).

Authority:

PEN 1170(b)

People v. Lopez (2025) 17 Cal.5th 388

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1087

People v. Brannon-Thompson (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 455

Case: 000127

Error and/or relief

The defendant is entitled to a jury trial on two of the aggravating factors the trial court found to be true in the present case. He entitled to resentencing due to prejudicial error, and we remand the matter for that purpose.

First Holding:

The trial court erroneously imposed the upper term by relying on its own determination that the defendant’s two prior convictions were numerous. The defendant was entitled to have a jury decide that issue beyond a reasonable doubt.

Authority:

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 742-743

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1076

People v. Berry (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 184, 191 [two prior convictions cannot be numerous]

Second Holding:

In assessing a defendant’s ability to pay, a court may consider a defendant’s past income-earning capacity. Moreover, a court may consider whether a defendant has the ability to satisfy the fine and assessments through prison wages and future earnings after release from custody.

Authority:

People v. Johnson (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 134, 139

People v. Aviles (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 1055, 1076

Case: 000099

Error and/or relief

We find the trial court committed prejudicial error in not obtaining a personal waiver of the defendant’s right to a jury trial on the alleged aggravating factors. We vacate the sentence and remand the matter for litigation of the alleged aggravating circumstances and full resentencing. During the bench trial on the prior convictions, the trial court specifically noted that it was not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the prior convictions were true. It was therefore error for the court to rely on them.

Holding:

The trial court committed prejudicial error in not obtaining a personal waiver of the defendant’s constitutional right to a jury trial on the alleged aggravating factors.

Authority:

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1087

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 768

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18

Case 000082

Error and/or relief

The trial court prejudicially erred in imposing the upper term based on aggravating circumstances not proven in accordance with Penal Code section 1170(b). We will vacate defendant’s sentence and remand the matter to the trial court for further litigation of the aggravating circumstances and resentencing.

First Holding:

With the exception of prior conviction allegations, under the Sixth Amendment, any fact that exposes a defendant to a greater potential sentence must be found by a jury and established beyond a reasonable doubt.

Authority:

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 747

Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270, 281

Second Holding:

A Sixth Amendment violation occurs when the trial court relies on unproven aggravating facts to impose an upper term sentence, even if some other aggravating facts relied on have been properly established.

Authority:

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 768

Third Holding:

The United States Supreme Court rejected the argument that the prior conviction exception to the Sixth Amendment “permits a judge to find perhaps any fact related to a defendant’s past offenses. A judge may do no more, consistent with the Sixth Amendment, than determine what crime, with what elements, the defendant was convicted of.

Authority:

Erlinger v. United States (2024) 602 U.S. 821, 837-838

Fourth Holding:

The aggravating circumstances were not proven in accordance with section 1170(b)(2) and the prior conviction exception would not apply to them.e

Authority:

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1083-1084 [We understand Erlinger to require that any fact, beyond the bare fact of a prior conviction, that exposes a defendant to harsher punishment, must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt]

Fifth Holding:

A trial court’s reliance on aggravating circumstances not found in accordance with section 1170(b) is prejudicial unless an appellate court can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have found true all of the aggravating facts relied upon by the trial court to justify an upper term sentence, or that those facts were otherwise proved true in compliance with the current statutory requirements. If the reviewing court cannot so determine, applying the Chapman standard of review, the defendant is entitled to a remand for resentencing.

Authority:

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 768

Sixth Holding:

When assessing prejudice under Chapman, the proper inquiry is whether any rational fact finder could have come to the opposite conclusion. If a rational juror could have reached the opposite conclusion, the error is not harmless under Chapman. The People bear the burden of establishing that the federal constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Authority:

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 775-776 [To the extent a potential aggravating circumstance rests on a somewhat vague or subjective standard, it may be difficult for a reviewing court to conclude with confidence that, had the issue been submitted to the jury, the jury would have assessed the facts in the same manner as did the trial court]

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1090 [deciding it could not conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a properly instructed jury would have found the defendant’s criminal convictions were of increasing seriousness]

People v. Avalos (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 926, 953

Case 000073

Error and/or relief

The trial court improperly imposed upper term sentences on Counts 1 and 3, and the matter must therefore be remanded for resentencing. We agree that the defendant’s trial rights notwithstanding, the court’s reliance on his prior criminal history to impose aggravated terms was prejudicial error.

First Holding:

Section 1170(b) was amended to prohibit imposition of an upper term sentence unless aggravating circumstances justify that term and the facts underlying any such circumstance, other than a prior conviction, have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.

Authority:

PEN 1170(b)

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 742

Second Holding:

Allegations of prior convictions may be tried by the court alone and proven by certified records of conviction. Thus, the court may consider the defendant’s prior convictions in determining sentencing based on a certified record of conviction without submitting the prior convictions to a jury.

Authority:

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 742, 748

Third Holding:

Except for properly proven prior convictions or a defense stipulation, a jury finding is now required for all facts actually relied on to impose an upper term. In Erlinger, the United States Supreme Court rejected an argument that the jury trial exception to prior convictions permits a judge to find perhaps any fact related to a defendant’s past offenses, including whether he committed them on different occasions, within the meaning of the federal sentencing statute at issue. Instead, a judge may do no more, consistent with the Sixth Amendment, than determine what crime, with what elements, the defendant was convicted of. In doing so, the court reaffirmed the basic rationale of Apprendi and rejected the arguments made by the dissent and amicus curiae that, historically, when exercising their sentencing authority, judges were also presumed to have the power to find and consider nearly any fact deemed relevant to the penalty.

Authority:

Erlinger v. United States (2024) 602 U.S. 821, 843

Mathis v. United States (2016) 579 U.S. 500, 511–512

Fourth Holding:

Since Erlinger, the California Supreme Court has gone further to make it clear that Erlinger requires that any fact, beyond the bare fact of a prior conviction, that exposes a defendant to harsher punishment, must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, unless the defendant stipulates to its truth or waives a jury trial. This jury trial guarantee retains its vitality even if the inquiry is straightforward. There is no efficiency exception to the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Only when aggravating facts have been proven as the Constitution requires may the court then rely on them to conclude, in its discretion, that those facts justify an upper term.

Authority:

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1083–1084 [absent an admission or a jury trial waiver, a trial court cannot determine whether a defendant’s prior convictions were of increasing seriousness or that his probation or parole performance was poor]

Case 000018

Error and/or relief

The trial court violated the Sixth Amendment by imposing upper term sentences; the issue was not forfeited, and as the People concede, the court erred and the error was not harmless.

First Holding:

The Sixth Amendment right to jury trial applies to any factor that may increase the sentence or range of sentence. In Wiley, our Supreme Court addressed section 1170(b)(3)’s prior conviction exception in light of the holding in Erlinger. To avoid any application that would set section 1170(b)(3) at odds with the high court’s constitutional interpretation, the court interpreted] section 1170(b)(3)’s procedure in a manner that is coextensive with high court dictates. Thus, in accordance with Erlinger, a defendant is entitled to a jury trial on all aggravating facts, other than the bare fact of a prior conviction and its elements, that expose the defendant to imposition of a sentence more serious than the statutorily provided midterm.

Authority:

PEN 1170

Erlinger v. United States (2024) 602 U.S. 821

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1086

Second Holding:

Failure to object generally results in forfeiture and can apply to constitutional claims.

Authority:

People v. Stowell (2003) 31 Cal. 4th 1107, 1114 [The forfeiture doctrine is a well-established procedural principle that, with certain exceptions, an appellate court will not consider claims of error that could have been—but were not—raised in the trial court]

People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, 406 [A party in a criminal case may not, on appeal, raise claims involving the trial court’s failure to properly make or articulate its discretionary sentencing choices if the party did not object to the sentence at trial]

People v. McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589, 593 [a constitutional right may be forfeited by failure to assert the right before the tribunal with jurisdiction to determine it]

People v. Achane (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 1037

Third Holding:

A claim of violation of Sixth Amendment right to trial is not forfeited by lack of objection as it requires express consent in open court by both the defendant and the defense attorney.

Authority:

People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, 46

Fourth Holding:

An appellate court can exercise discretion to address a forfeited issue.

Authority:

People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161, fn. 6 [An appellate court is generally not prohibited from reaching a question that has not been preserved for review by a party]

Fifth Holding:

Unless stipulated to by the defendant, before the factors in aggravation may be used to justify imposition of the upper term, the defendant has the right to a jury trial to determine whether the factors have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant has engaged in violent conduct that indicates a serious danger to society or that defendant’s prior convictions as an adult or sustained petitions in juvenile delinquency proceedings are numerous or of increasing seriousness. A defendant is entitled to a jury trial on all aggravating facts, other than the bare fact of a prior conviction and its elements, that expose the defendant to imposition of a sentence more serious than the statutorily provided midterm.

Authority:

PEN 1170

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1086

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 776

Case 000011

Error and/or relief

The trial court prejudicially committed constitutional and statutory error in imposing the upper term sentence based on aggravating factors not tried to the jury. The factors relied on were: the victim’s particular vulnerability; the offense was carried out with planning, sophistication, and professionalism; the defendant engaged in violent conduct which indicated a serious danger to society; the defendant had numerous prior convictions and they were of increasing seriousness.

First Holding:

The defendant is entitled to a jury trial on aggravating factors, which must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt before they can be relied on to impose the upper term (unless they are stipulated to by the defendant).

Authority:

PEN 1170

Second Holding:

The standard of review for evaluating the improper use of untried aggravating fact is whether error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Authority:

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18

Erlinger v. United States (2024) 602 U.S. 821

Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730

Third Holding:

The parties agree the court erred in relying on those circumstances to impose the upper term on the principal count. Their disagreement centers around whether such error was prejudicial under the circumstances. On the record before us, we conclude it was.

Authority:

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1078

People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, 47