Tag Archives: Upper term

Case 000073

Error and/or relief

The trial court improperly imposed upper term sentences on Counts 1 and 3, and the matter must therefore be remanded for resentencing. We agree that the defendant’s trial rights notwithstanding, the court’s reliance on his prior criminal history to impose aggravated terms was prejudicial error.

First Holding:

Section 1170(b) was amended to prohibit imposition of an upper term sentence unless aggravating circumstances justify that term and the facts underlying any such circumstance, other than a prior conviction, have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.

Authority:

PEN 1170(b)

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 742

Second Holding:

Allegations of prior convictions may be tried by the court alone and proven by certified records of conviction. Thus, the court may consider the defendant’s prior convictions in determining sentencing based on a certified record of conviction without submitting the prior convictions to a jury.

Authority:

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 742, 748

Third Holding:

Except for properly proven prior convictions or a defense stipulation, a jury finding is now required for all facts actually relied on to impose an upper term. In Erlinger, the United States Supreme Court rejected an argument that the jury trial exception to prior convictions permits a judge to find perhaps any fact related to a defendant’s past offenses, including whether he committed them on different occasions, within the meaning of the federal sentencing statute at issue. Instead, a judge may do no more, consistent with the Sixth Amendment, than determine what crime, with what elements, the defendant was convicted of. In doing so, the court reaffirmed the basic rationale of Apprendi and rejected the arguments made by the dissent and amicus curiae that, historically, when exercising their sentencing authority, judges were also presumed to have the power to find and consider nearly any fact deemed relevant to the penalty.

Authority:

Erlinger v. United States (2024) 602 U.S. 821, 843

Mathis v. United States (2016) 579 U.S. 500, 511–512

Fourth Holding:

Since Erlinger, the California Supreme Court has gone further to make it clear that Erlinger requires that any fact, beyond the bare fact of a prior conviction, that exposes a defendant to harsher punishment, must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, unless the defendant stipulates to its truth or waives a jury trial. This jury trial guarantee retains its vitality even if the inquiry is straightforward. There is no efficiency exception to the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Only when aggravating facts have been proven as the Constitution requires may the court then rely on them to conclude, in its discretion, that those facts justify an upper term.

Authority:

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1083–1084 [absent an admission or a jury trial waiver, a trial court cannot determine whether a defendant’s prior convictions were of increasing seriousness or that his probation or parole performance was poor]

Case 000018

Error and/or relief

The trial court violated the Sixth Amendment by imposing upper term sentences; the issue was not forfeited, and as the People concede, the court erred and the error was not harmless.

First Holding:

The Sixth Amendment right to jury trial applies to any factor that may increase the sentence or range of sentence. In Wiley, our Supreme Court addressed section 1170(b)(3)’s prior conviction exception in light of the holding in Erlinger. To avoid any application that would set section 1170(b)(3) at odds with the high court’s constitutional interpretation, the court interpreted] section 1170(b)(3)’s procedure in a manner that is coextensive with high court dictates. Thus, in accordance with Erlinger, a defendant is entitled to a jury trial on all aggravating facts, other than the bare fact of a prior conviction and its elements, that expose the defendant to imposition of a sentence more serious than the statutorily provided midterm.

Authority:

PEN 1170

Erlinger v. United States (2024) 602 U.S. 821

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1086

Second Holding:

Failure to object generally results in forfeiture and can apply to constitutional claims.

Authority:

People v. Stowell (2003) 31 Cal. 4th 1107, 1114 [The forfeiture doctrine is a well-established procedural principle that, with certain exceptions, an appellate court will not consider claims of error that could have been—but were not—raised in the trial court]

People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, 406 [A party in a criminal case may not, on appeal, raise claims involving the trial court’s failure to properly make or articulate its discretionary sentencing choices if the party did not object to the sentence at trial]

People v. McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589, 593 [a constitutional right may be forfeited by failure to assert the right before the tribunal with jurisdiction to determine it]

People v. Achane (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 1037

Third Holding:

A claim of violation of Sixth Amendment right to trial is not forfeited by lack of objection as it requires express consent in open court by both the defendant and the defense attorney.

Authority:

People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, 46

Fourth Holding:

An appellate court can exercise discretion to address a forfeited issue.

Authority:

People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161, fn. 6 [An appellate court is generally not prohibited from reaching a question that has not been preserved for review by a party]

Fifth Holding:

Unless stipulated to by the defendant, before the factors in aggravation may be used to justify imposition of the upper term, the defendant has the right to a jury trial to determine whether the factors have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant has engaged in violent conduct that indicates a serious danger to society or that defendant’s prior convictions as an adult or sustained petitions in juvenile delinquency proceedings are numerous or of increasing seriousness. A defendant is entitled to a jury trial on all aggravating facts, other than the bare fact of a prior conviction and its elements, that expose the defendant to imposition of a sentence more serious than the statutorily provided midterm.

Authority:

PEN 1170

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1086

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 776

Case 000011

Error and/or relief

The trial court prejudicially committed constitutional and statutory error in imposing the upper term sentence based on aggravating factors not tried to the jury. The factors relied on were: the victim’s particular vulnerability; the offense was carried out with planning, sophistication, and professionalism; the defendant engaged in violent conduct which indicated a serious danger to society; the defendant had numerous prior convictions and they were of increasing seriousness.

First Holding:

The defendant is entitled to a jury trial on aggravating factors, which must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt before they can be relied on to impose the upper term (unless they are stipulated to by the defendant).

Authority:

PEN 1170

Second Holding:

The standard of review for evaluating the improper use of untried aggravating fact is whether error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Authority:

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18

Erlinger v. United States (2024) 602 U.S. 821

Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730

Third Holding:

The parties agree the court erred in relying on those circumstances to impose the upper term on the principal count. Their disagreement centers around whether such error was prejudicial under the circumstances. On the record before us, we conclude it was.

Authority:

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1078

People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, 47