Tag Archives: Search and seizure

Error and/or relief

The motion to suppress evidence under should have been granted. The juvenile court’s denial of the minor’s motion to suppress is reversed. His admission to the offense is vacated. The juvenile court is directed to enter an order granting the minor’s motion to suppress the evidence found inside the vehicle, and we remand the matter for further proceedings.

[GARY NOTE: This was a very fact-intensive ruling on who knew what what and why. Essentially, an officer followed the minor’s vehicle after noticing the registration tag had expired. Through a series of events, the minor left his vehicle legally parked on the street, walked a few blocks away, was found by the officer, was asked questions that he answered truthfully, and in response to a request for the detaining officer, other officers searched the locked car that was a few blocks away (ostensibly to look for registration and identification–after identification had been already been confirmed), revealing contraband.]

First Holding:

In ruling upon a motion to suppress, the trial court judges the credibility of the witnesses, resolves any conflicts in the testimony, weighs the evidence, and draws factual inferences. The appellate court will uphold the court’s express and/or implied findings on such matters if they are supported by substantial evidence, but it independently review the application of the relevant law to the facts.

Authority:

People v. Williams (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 756, 761

Second Holding:

Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions. Under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, an officer may search a vehicle if the officer has probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime will be found inside. Probable cause means that, under the known facts and circumstances, a reasonable person would believe that evidence of a crime will be found inside the vehicle.

Authority:

People v. Lopez (2019) 8 Cal.5th 353, 359, 372

Ornelas v. U.S. (1996) 517 U.S. 690, 696

Third Holding:

The accepted practice of modern law enforcement is that an officer often conducts searches at the direction of another law enforcement officer even though the searching officer himself lacks actual, personal knowledge of the facts supporting probable cause. When that occurs, the collective knowledge doctrine applies and the knowledge of one is presumed shared by all. The rule exists because, in light of the complexity of modern police work, the searching officer cannot always be aware of every aspect of an investigation; sometimes his authority to search is based on facts known only to his superior or associates. The focus is on knowledge of the person who was the source of the information the searching officers relied on.

Authority:

U.S. v. Jensen (2005 9th Cir.) 425 F.3d 698, 704

Fourth Holding:

Once the officer confirmed the identity of the minor, there was no cause to believe the minor was lying and therefore no probably cause to search. Because officers should not have been inside the vehicle to see the firearm magazine, they could not rely on the magazine to supply probable cause for continuing to search the vehicle.

Authority:

United States v. Ngumezi (2020 9th Cir.) 980 F.3d 1285, 1290 [Because the opening of the car door and leaning into the car constituted an unlawful search, we must consider what remedy is appropriate. The exclusionary rule generally applied in Fourth Amendment cases requires courts to suppress any evidence obtained as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure, as well as evidence later discovered and found to be derivative of an illegality, the so-called fruit of the poisonous tree]

Fifth Holding:

Unquestionably, when a person is lawfully arrested, the police have the right, without a search warrant, to make a contemporaneous search of the person of the accused for weapons or for the fruits of or implements used to commit the crime. This right to search and seize without a search warrant extends to things under the accused’s immediate control, and, to an extent depending on the circumstances of the case, to the place where he is arrested. The rule allowing contemporaneous searches is justified, for example, by the need to seize weapons and other things that might be used to assault an officer or effect an escape, as well as by the need to prevent the destruction of evidence of the crime—things which might easily happen where the weapon or evidence is on the accused’s person or under his immediate control.

But these justifications are absent where a search is remote in time or place from the arrest. Once an accused is under arrest and in custody, then a search made at another place, without a warrant, is simply not incident to the arrest. When the officer searched the vehicle, the minor was over a block away from the vehicle, in handcuffs. Additionally, the minor had locked the vehicle, and one officer had taken the key away from the minor. Given the foregoing facts, the vehicle was not under the minor’s control at the time of his arrest. Therefore, there was no basis to search the vehicle incident to minor’s arrest.

Authority:

Preston v. U.S. (1964) 376 U.S. 364, 367

Sixth Holding:

When examining the propriety of an inventory search, we focus on the purpose of the impound rather than the purpose of the inventory. An inventory search conducted pursuant to an unreasonable impound is itself unreasonable. Under the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement, police officers may impound vehicles that jeopardize public safety and the efficient movement of vehicular traffic. Once a vehicle has been legally impounded, the police may conduct an inventory search, as long as it conforms to the standard procedures of the local police department. However, an inventory search must not be a ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence.

Authority:

People v. Torres (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 775, 786-787

U.S. v. Cervantes (2012 9th Cir.) 703 F.3d 1135, 1141

Seventh Holding:

The reasonableness of the impoundment depended on whether the impoundment fits within the authority of police to seize and remove from the streets vehicles impeding traffic or threatening public safety and convenience. In other words, a valid caretaking purpose is required. The minor left the vehicle locked and parallel parked on a quiet residential street where other vehicles were parked. The vehicle was not blocking a driveway or impeding traffic. The People failed to introduce evidence as to why the vehicle could not remain parked on the street until retrieved by Mother.

A vehicle with a registration that has been expired for less than six months can remain parked on a public street. The People failed to introduce evidence of when the vehicle’s registration expired. Thus, the People did not demonstrate that the vehicle could be seized due to the registration being expired for more than six months. Given the evidence, there was no reason the police could not have locked the vehicle and left it parked on the street. There is no evidence of a community caretaking function to impounding the vehicle.

Authority:

VEH 22651(o)(1)(A)(i)

U.S. v. Cervantes (2012 9th Cir.) 703 F.3d 1135, 1141

Eighth Holding:

We are not examining whether the seizure of the vehicle was authorized by state law. Rather, we are examining whether the seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The statutory authorization to impound a vehicle does not, in and of itself, determine the constitutional reasonableness of the seizure. It is evidence of a community caretaking need to impound the vehicle that causes the seizure of a vehicle to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, i.e., where the impound process is aimed at securing or protecting the car and its contents.

Thus, we are not persuaded by the People’s assertion that the seizure of the vehicle was constitutionally reasonable because it was authorized by the Vehicle Code.

Authority:

Miranda v. City of Cornelius (2005 9th Cir.) 429 F.3d 858, 864-865

South Dakota v. Opperman (1976) 428 U.S. 364, 373

People v. Shafrir (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1246

People v. Williams (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 756, 762

People v. Lee (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 853, 869

U.S. v. Cervantes (2012 9th Cir.) 703 F.3d 1135, 1142

Error and/or relief

The police violated the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights by announcing an intent to frisk him without reasonable suspicion. The defendant revealed the presence of the weapon he was carrying only when the officer threatened to frisk him. The threatened frisk was unwarranted and required suppressing certain evidence.

First Holding:

On appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress, we defer to the trial court’s factual findings if supported by substantial evidence but independently apply constitutional principles to those findings.

Authority:

People v. Session (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 723, 730

Second Holding:

The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. An officer may briefly detain a person for investigation based on a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. If the officer further reasonably suspects that the person is armed and presently dangerous, the officer may also frisk him for weapons. A frisk is a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment, and it is not to be undertaken lightly.

Authority:

Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 17, 21, 30

Third Holding:

When the suspected offense is violent or otherwise serious enough, this alone may support a reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed and dangerous. But for lesser offenses, like unlawful possession of marijuana, more is needed. Some unusual circumstances—like a suspect’s admission that he is armed, visible signs of a concealed weapon, or suspicious movements—will typically be sufficient even on their own. Knowledge of a suspect’s recent, violent criminal history may also be enough.

Authority:

State v. Valentine (N.J. 1994) 636 A.2d 505, 509

4 LaFave, Search and Seizure (6th ed. 2025) sec. 9.6(a), fns. 57–64 [collecting cases]

People v. Bush (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1048, 1052

Fourth Holding:

Penal Code section 1538.5(m), allows a defendant who pleaded guilty to appeal the denial of a motion to suppress the evidence obtained through an allegedly unlawful search or seizure. This includes defendant’s attempt to exclude a statement, in addition to other kinds of evidence.

Authority:

People v. DeVaughn (1977) 18 Cal.3d 889, 896, fn. 6

Fifth Holding:

More mundane circumstances—like the time or location of the stop—may be insufficient on their own, or even in combination with other weak indications. For example, a frisk was not justified where the suspect (1) had no identification, (2) did not consent to a search, (3) was nervous and sweating, and (4) possessed baking powder (which could be used to dilute drugs) in a film canister. Nor was it justified during a late-night detention of robbery suspects, where the officers had no information that the robbery involved weapons and the suspects fully cooperated and made no furtive or unusual movements. Nor following a 1:30 a.m. traffic stop where the suspect had an old arrest for weapons possession.

Authority:

People v. Dickey (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 952, 956

In re Jeremiah S. (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 299, 306–307

People v. Pantoja (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 483, 490–491

Error and/or relief

The officer stopped the defendant’s vehicle for having a nonfunctioning rear license plate light. The detaining officer prolonged the stop without the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify detouring from the traffic stop’s mission. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment, and we remand the matter to allow the defendant to withdraw the guilty plea and with directions to the trial court to enter a new order granting his suppression motion.

First Holding:

In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we defer to that court’s factual findings, express or implied, if they are supported by substantial evidence. We exercise our independent judgment in determining whether, on the facts presented, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. In doing so we do not consider each fact in isolation. Instead, we must consider the totality of the circumstances—the whole picture.

Authority:

PEN 1538.5

People v. Flores (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1032, 1043

Second Holding:

A traffic stop that is lawful at its inception can violate the Fourth Amendment if its manner of execution unreasonably infringes interests protected by the Constitution. A police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made violates the Constitution’s shield against unreasonable seizures. A seizure for a traffic violation justifies a relatively brief encounter for police investigation of the traffic violation.

Authority:

People v. Gyorgy (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 659, 669–670

Third Holding:

The tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure’s mission—to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop and attend to related safety concerns. Because addressing the infraction is the purpose of the stop, it may last no longer than is necessary to effectuate that purpose. Authority for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed.

Authority:

People v. Gyorgy (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 659, 669–670

Fourth Holding:

Beyond determining whether to issue a traffic ticket, an officer’s mission includes ordinary inquiries incident to the traffic stop. Typically such inquiries involve checking the driver’s license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of insurance. The temporary detention may also include a criminal history check, which is done by consulting an in-car computer terminal or radioing dispatch. And although not specifically compelled by law, certain other steps customarily taken as matters of good police practice are no less intimately related to the citation process: for example, the officer will usually discuss the violation with the motorist and listen to any explanation the latter may wish to offer. These tasks are included within the officer’s mission during a traffic stop because they serve the same objective as enforcement of the traffic code: ensuring that vehicles on the road are operated safely and responsibly.

Authority:

People v. Gyorgy (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 659, 669–670

Fifth Holding:

An officer may also require a lawfully stopped driver to exit the vehicle for officer safety to complete his traffic stop mission. On-scene investigation into other crimes, however, detours from the traffic stop’s mission. So too do safety precautions taken in order to facilitate such detours. While an officer may conduct certain unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop, the officer may not do so in a way that prolongs the stop, absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an individual.

Authority:

People v. Gyorgy (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 659, 669–670