Tag Archives: Prior convictions

Abstracts and Minutes, Amelioration, Appellate Principles, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 001011

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The court erred in ruling that the defendant was ineligible for resentencing under section 1172.75 because the abstract of judgment did not reflect any now-invalid prior prison term enhancements. The abstract of judgment was in error.

First Holding:

Before 2020, the Penal Code instructed criminal sentencing courts to impose a one-year term for each prior separate prison term or county jail term’ the defendant had previously served for a felony. Effective January 1, 2020, the Legislature eliminated one-year prior prison term enhancements except in cases involving prior terms for sexually violent offenses.

In 2021 the Legislature enacted section 1172.75, which “made the change retroactive. Any sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to section 667.5(b), except for any enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent offense is legally invalid.

Authority:

PEN 667.5(b)

People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050, 1053-1054

Second Holding:

In section 1172.75(b), the Legislature established a mechanism for resentencing individuals currently serving a term for a judgment that includes such an enhancement. Section 1172.75(b) requires the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitations to identify for the sentencing courts all persons currently serving a term for a judgment that includes an enhancement described in subdivision (a).

Further, if a sentencing court verifies that a defendant was sentenced under an invalid enhancement, the court shall recall the sentence and resentence the defendant.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75(b) and (c)

People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050, 1054

Third Holding:

Where section 1172.75 applies, it requires full resentencing. Section 1172.75(d)(1) states that the resentencing shall result in a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed as a result of the elimination of the repealed enhancement, unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public safety, and further, resentencing shall not result in a longer sentence than the one originally imposed.

Authority:

People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050, 1067

People v. Garcia (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 848, 855 [By its plain terms, section 1172.75 requires a full resentencing, not merely that the trial court strike the newly invalid enhancements.]

Fourth Holding:

We generally review a trial court’s decision under section 1172.75 for an abuse of discretion. Under an abuse of discretion standard, we review the trial court’s findings of fact for substantial evidence, consider whether the court’s rulings of law are correct, and determine whether the court’s application of the law to the facts is arbitrary or capricious. However, where the appeal from a resentencing order raises a question of law, our review is de novo.

Authority:

People v. Mathis (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 359, 366, review granted Aug. 13, 2025, S291628

People v. Garcia (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 848, 855-856, 857

People v. Espino (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 188, 194 [reviewing de novo whether the word imposed as used in 1172.75 applies to cases where execution of a prior prison term enhancement was stayed], affirmed (2026) 20 Cal.5th 57

Fifth Holding:

The trial court’s oral pronouncement of judgment controls over a conflicting abstract of judgment. In this instance, the prior convictions were never stricken, and thus should have been reflected in the abstract of judgment. The defendant was eligible for resentencing under section 1172.75.

Authority:

People v. Whalum (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 1, 15 [Where there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of judgment and the abstract of judgment, the oral pronouncement controls.]

People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 855 [Any discrepancy between the judgment as orally pronounced and as recorded in the clerk’s minutes or abstract of judgment is presumed to be the result of clerical error.]

Amelioration, Discretion, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 001010

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

In resentencing the defendant, the court abused its discretion in not giving proper consideration to whether to strike prior strike convictions. Remanded for proper consideration.

First Holding:

Under section 1172.1, a trial court may recall and resentence “at any time” upon the recommendation of the Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, the Board of Parole Hearings, the district attorney of the county in which the defendant was sentenced, or the Attorney General if the Department of Justice originally prosecuted the case.

Effective January 1, 2024, a trial court may recall a sentence and resentence a defendant on its own motion “at any time if the applicable sentencing laws at the time of original sentencing are subsequently changed by new statutory authority or case law.

Once a trial court decides to recall and resentence, it may either reduce the sentence by modification or vacate the conviction and impose judgment on any necessarily included lesser offense or lesser related offense, whether or not that offense was charged in the original pleading.

In resentencing the defendant in the same manner as if they had not previously been sentenced, the resentencing court shall consider if the defendant has experienced psychological, physical, or childhood trauma, including, but not limited to, abuse, neglect, exploitation, or sexual violence, and whether those circumstances were a contributing factor in the commission of the offense.

Authority:

PEN 1172.1

Second Holding:

Section 1385(c)(1) provides that, notwithstanding any other law, the court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so, except if dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited by any initiative statute.

Section 1385(c)(2) further provides that, in exercising its discretion under this subdivision, the court shall consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove that any of the mitigating circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present. Proof of the presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety.

‘Endanger public safety’ means there is a likelihood that the dismissal of the enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious danger to others. Accordingly, if the court finds that dismissal of an enhancement would endanger public safety, then the court need not consider the listed mitigating circumstances.

Authority:

PEN 1385

People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 296

Third Holding:

A court’s decision not to strike a prior serious felony enhancement is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Authority:

People v. Shaw (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 582, 585

People v. Jefferson (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 235, 242–243 [a trial court’s exercise of discretion must not be disturbed on appeal except on a showing that the court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice]

Fourth Holding:

Absent a finding that dismissal would endanger public safety, a court retains the discretion to impose or dismiss enhancements provided that it assigns significant value to the enumerated mitigating circumstances when they are present.

In other words, if the court does not find that dismissal would endanger public safety, the presence of an enumerated mitigating circumstance will generally result in the dismissal of an enhancement unless the sentencing court finds substantial, credible evidence of countervailing factors that ‘may nonetheless neutralize even the great weight of the mitigating circumstance, such that dismissal of the enhancement is not in furtherance of justice.

Authority:

People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024,1029

Fifth Holding:

A trial court has discretion under the Three Strikes law to dismiss or vacate prior conviction allegations or findings in the furtherance of justice. In exercising its discretion, the court may give no weight whatsoever to factors extrinsic to the Three Strikes scheme.

Instead, preponderant weight must be accorded to factors intrinsic to the scheme, such the nature and circumstances of the defendant’s present felonies and the prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and prospects. In considering these intrinsic factors the court must determine whether the defendant may be deemed outside the scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be treated as though he had not previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or violent felonies.

While the purpose of the Three Strikes law was to ensure longer prison sentences, the “overarching consideration” and “underlying purpose” in striking prior conviction allegations is the avoidance of unjust sentences.

Authority:

PEN 1385(a)

People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 530-531

People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161

People v. Garcia (1999) 20 Cal.4th 490, 498–500

Sixth Holding:

Abuse of discretion in failing to strike a prior conviction occurs in limited circumstances: where the trial court is not aware of its discretion; where the trial court considers impermissible factors; or where applying the Three Strikes law would produce an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd result under the specific facts of a particular case.

A reviewing court’s disagreement with the trial court’s weighing of proper factors (as distinct from the trial court’s reliance on improper factors in the weighing process) does not constitute an abuse of discretion.

We conclude from this record that the trial court failed to balance the appropriate factors set forth in Williams, that is, the defendant’s personal background, character, and prospects, and the specifics of his criminal history, the characteristics of the present offense for which he was being resentenced, or if a shorter sentence would accommodate risks to public safety.

Significantly, courts have reversed the denial of dismissal of prior strikes in instances where the prior strikes were far more serious than the defendant’s.

(Gary note: I have left out the appellate court’s recitation of facts peculiar to this defendant and the facts in this case, but court determined that the lower court had not given proper consideration of those factors. It remanded for a proper consideration.)

Authority:

People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 378-379

People v. Dryden (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 1007, 1029

People v. Avila (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 1134, 1140–1141 [defendant’s three previous strikes were two robberies and assault with a knife]

Amelioration, Elements of crime, Retroactivity, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 001006

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The matter is remanded for a new hearing on the defendant’s resentencing under section 1172.75, in light of new case law regarding examination of prior serious felonies and strikes depending on criminal gang activity. Further, the restitution fine must vacated, as it is more than 10 years old.

First Holding:

The Three Strikes law is a sentencing scheme that requires a court to double or sometimes triple the punishment for a felony offense if the defendant was previously convicted of a crime that qualifies as a serious or violent felony. The serious or violent felonies that trigger this sentencing scheme, commonly referred to as strikes or strike priors, are enumerated by statute. The list of serious felonies includes any felony offense that would also constitute a felony violation of section 186.22. Section 186.22 defines substantive gang offenses and gang enhancements.

Authority:

PEN 667(e)

PEN 1170.12(c)

PEN 1192.7(c)(28)

PEN 667.5(c)

People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576, 582

Second Holding:

The Legislature enacted AB 333 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), which among other things, changed the elements of gang offenses and enhancements by narrowing the definitions of criminal street gang, pattern of criminal activity, and what it means for an offense to have commonly benefitted a street gang. Fletcher held that prior convictions premised on section 186.22 must be examined under currently law in determining whether they qualify as prior serious felony convictions or strikes.

Authority:

AB 333

PEN 186.22

People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576, 585, 587

Third Holding:

When the applicable law governing the defendant’s sentence has substantively changed after sentencing, it is almost always speculative for a reviewing court to say what the sentencing court would have done if it had known the scope of its discretionary powers at the time of sentencing. The Salazar court accordingly held that when a sentencing court was not fully aware of the scope of its discretionary powers, the appropriate remedy is to remand for resentencing unless the record clearly indicates that the trial court would have reached the same conclusion even if it had been aware that it had such discretion.

Though the Salazar decision is premised on the trial court’s scope of discretion being changed during pendency of appeal, whereas here the trial court’s discretion has remained the same but a material fact about defendant’s past record has been modified since the time of sentencing. We nevertheless find the test set forth in Salazar to be applicable here, because the Salazar court itself observed the similarity between the two scenarios: A court that is unaware of the scope of its discretionary powers can no more exercise informed discretion than one whose sentence is or may have been based on misinformation regarding a material aspect of a defendant’s record

Authority:

People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 424-425

Fourth Holding:

Retrial of the strike under the current law would be appropriate, should the prosecutor so choose.

Authority:

People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576, 608

Fifth Holding:

The restitution fine was imposed in 2011. Section 1465.9(d) has been added since then, to provide that any restitution fine is unenforceable and uncollectible upon the expiration of 10 years after date of imposition.

Authority:

PEN 1465.9

Amelioration, Retroactivity, Sentencing

Case 000946

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The true findings on the two prior strike allegations must be vacated because of changes under AB 333. The matter is remanded for retrial on those allegations to determine whether the prior convictions still qualify as strikes or serious felonies under the current law.

First Holding:

AB 333 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) amended section 186.22 by narrowing the definitions of criminal street gang, pattern of criminal activity, and what it means for an offense to have commonly benefitted a street gang.

After appellant filed his opening brief in this appeal, Fletcher resolved a conflict of authority regarding whether prior convictions with gang allegations are affected by these amendments. The court concluded that, with regard to prior convictions that are premised on violations of section 186.22, current law applies in determining whether they qualify as prior serious felony convictions under section 1192.7(c)(28).

Authority:

People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206

People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576, 58

Second Holding:

The record here shows defendant’s two pre-2018 convictions included gang enhancements, but provides no information regarding the evidence used to obtain the convictions or the defendant’s underlying conduct. Neither conviction is considered a serious felony within the meaning of section 1192.7 if not for the gang enhancement.

The current law applicable to this nonfinal proceeding includes AB 333’s redefinition of the elements of gang offenses and enhancements under section 186.22. There is no indication that the prior conviction was obtained under AB 333’s more stringent requirements, and the abstract of judgment does not alone prove the elements of the alleged prior serious felony and strike prior enhancements beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appropriate remedy is reversal of the findings on these enhancements for retrial under the correct law.

Authority:

People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576, 606-607

Third Holding:

The true findings on the strike and the prior serious felony enhancement are reversed pursuant to Fletcher. Appellant’s sentence is vacated. The matter is remanded for retrial on the prior serious felony and strike convictions. If appellant is not timely retried regarding the prior strikes or one or both of the prior strikes are not proven, the trial court shall resentence appellant without the strikes. We also remand the matter for a full resentencing.

Authority:

PEN 1382(a)(2)

People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576, 607-608

People v. Watts (2006) 131 Cal.App.4th 589, 597-598

Amelioration, Retroactivity, Sentencing

Case 000945

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court erred by finding the defendant’s prior conviction for gang participation constituted a prior strike conviction within the meaning of the Three Strikes law. The true findings on the prior strike conviction and prior serious felony conviction are vacated and the case is remanded.

First Holding:

The trial court agreed with the prosecution that AB 333 was not before the court for consideration at the trial on whether the defendant suffered a prior strike conviction and a serious felony conviction. he court declined to consider the effect of AB 333 on the prior conviction and found true that the defendant had suffered a prior strike conviction and a prior serious felony conviction.

This was error. AB 333 applies to the determination of whether a prior conviction qualifies as a serious or violent felony. The true findings that the defendant suffered a prior strike conviction and a prior serious felony conviction are vacated and the matter is remanded.

Authority:

People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576, 608

Second Holding:

On remand, if the People decide not to retry the enhancements, or at the conclusion of such a retrial, Jones will be entitled to a full resentencing. The court has a duty to ensure that all components of a sentence are authorized by the law and the facts at the time any new sentence is imposed.

Authority:

People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893 [When part of a sentence is stricken on review, on remand for resentencing a full resentencing as to all counts is appropriate, so the trial court can exercise its sentencing discretion in light of the changed circumstances.]

People v. Walker (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 198, 206

 

Amelioration, Sentencing

Case 000943

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The defendant is entitled to a remand for the trial court to determine whether his strike prior is valid under current law, in light of the AB 333 changes to the gang activity law since the convictions of the purported strike offenses.

First Holding:

The defendant is entitled to a remand for the trial court to determine whether one of his strike priors satisfies the current requirements of the gang statute.

Authority:

AB 333

People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576, 583

Second Holding:

AB 333 amended section 186.22 to provide, among other things, that an offense committed on behalf of a gang may support a substantive gang offense, gang enhancement, or, by definition, a gang special circumstance finding, only if the common benefit to members of a gang is more than reputational. AB 333 applies retroactively to cases pending on appeal

Authority:

PEN 186.22

People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206-1207

Third Holding:

Where a defendant has suffered a conviction under the prior version of section 186.22, AB 333 applies to the determination of whether the conviction qualifies as a prior serious felony conviction under section 1192.7(c)(28) for purposes of the Three Strikes law and prior serious felony enhancements.

If the record contains no indication that the defendant’s prior conviction was obtained under AB 333’s more stringent requirements, and the evidence used to prove the existence of the strike prior does not alone prove the elements of the alleged prior serious felony and strike prior enhancements beyond a reasonable doubt, the remedy is to provide the People an opportunity to retry the strike allegation under the current law.

And, if the People elect not to retry the strike prior or fail to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that it satisfies the requirements of AB 333, the trial court must dismiss the allegation and conduct a full resentencing.

Authority:

People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576, 583, 607

People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893

Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case 000887

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

In this appeal from denial of resentencing under section 1172.75, we find that the court erred in concluding that he was not entitled to resentencing because the prior prison term enhancement had not been imposed.

First Holding:

In Rhodius, the court held that section 1172.75(a) applies to enhancements that were imposed as part of the defendant’s original judgment, regardless of whether the enhancement was stayed or executed.

If the enhancement is no longer authorized under the current version of section 667.5(b), section 1172.75(a) renders the enhancement invalid. And the retroactive invalidation of the previously imposed enhancements in turn mandates resentencing under section 1172.75, according to the procedures set forth therein.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75

People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050, 1068

Second Holding:

In Espino, the court expanded on Rhodius to hold that an enhancement is imposed for purposes of section 1172.75 where the sentencing court strikes the punishment for the enhancement but not the allegation itself. The court explained that imposing a sentence on a criminal defendant has legal effect, and a true finding on a prior prison term allegation is a part of the sentencing order, even when the associated punishment is stricken.

It follows that, as a matter of ordinary usage, an enhancement included in the sentence in a criminal case may be imposed even if the punishment for that enhancement is stricken.

Here, because the jury’s true finding was neither stricken nor dismissed, it remained imposed within the meaning of section 1172.75. The order denying the defendant’s motion for resentencing is reversed and the matter is remanded for a full resentencing under section 1172.75(d), as well as for proceedings on any motion for relief under section 1465.9(d), which states that restitution fines greater than 10 years old must be vacated.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75

PEN 1465.9(d)

People v. Espino (2026) 20 Cal.5th 57

People v. Fuentes (2016) 1 Cal.5th 218, 225, [striking the punishment for an enhancement merely serves to prohibit a certain purpose for which the allegation may be used; it does not operate to defeat the factual finding of the truth of the allegation]

Abstracts and Minutes, Amelioration, Appellate Principles, Sentencing

Case 000841

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The Court of Appeal treated this appeal as a petition for writ of habeas corpus, and struck the enhancement for the now-invalid prison term enhancement.

Habeas was necessary because the defendant’s name did not appear on a list prepared and maintained by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), so the defendant was not eligible to apply for resentencing under section 1172.75.

The court granted the writ, directing that the prior prison term enhancement be stricken, and also ordered correction of an error contained in the abstract of judgment.

First Holding:

Section 1172.75, effective in 2022, provides that any sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant section 667.5(b), except for any enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent offense as defined in section 6600(b) of the Welfare and Institutions Code is legally invalid.

The statute also establishes a process for recalling sentences that include now-invalid prior prison term enhancements and resentencing affected defendants. It requires the Secretary of the CDCR and the county correctional administrator of each county to identify those persons in their custody currently serving a term for a judgment that includes an enhancement described in section 1172.75(a) and to provide the name of each person, along with the person’s date of birth and the relevant case number or docket number, to the sentencing court that imposed the enhancement.

Upon receiving this information, the court shall review the judgment and verify that the current judgment includes a sentencing enhancement described in section 1172.75(a). If the judgment includes such an enhancement, the court shall recall the sentence and resentence the defendant.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75

Second Holding:

Any review and verification by the court in advance of resentencing is only triggered by receipt of the necessary information from the CDCR Secretary or a county correctional administrator, not by any individual defendant.

Section 1172.75 does not contemplate resentencing relief initiated by any individual defendant’s petition or motion.

While defendant’s petition is not sufficient to authorize the trial court to act pursuant to section 1172.75, jurisdiction can be found if the CDCR provided the court with a list identifying defendant while his petition was pending.

In this case, the CDCR never identified defendant to the trial court as someone eligibile for section 1172.75 resentencing, and the trial court did not have jurisdiction to resentence the defendant under section 1172.75. Therefore, the trial court’s resentencing and related abstract of judgment and minute order are void.

Authority:

People v. Burgess (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 375, 384

People v. Cota (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 318, 332 [trial court is statutorily authorized to act once trial court receives defendant’s identification information from CDCR]

People v. Escobedo (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 440, 447–448

People v. Newell (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 265, 268

People v. Chavez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 771, 780

Third Holding:

On appeal from a void judgment or order, we must reverse the trial court’s void acts because simply dismissing the appeal would leave intact the void judgment.

Authority:

People v. Gray (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 148, 170

People v. Alanis (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1467, 1477, fn. 5

Fourth Holding:

Where, as here, execution of sentence has commenced and the judgment is final, the trial court is generally deprived of jurisdiction to resentence a criminal defendant.  To obtain resentencing on a final judgment, a defendant generally must file a petition for writ of habeas corpus (see ) or proceed by way of a special statutory procedure (e.g., §§ 1170.18, 1170.91, 1172.1, 1172.2, 1172.6, 1172.7, 1172.75). 

Authority:

People v. Picklesimer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 330, 339

People v. Karaman (1992) 4 Cal.4th 335, 344

Dix v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 442, 455

People v. Hernandez (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 323, 326

People v. Hernandez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 1111, 1118

Fifth Holding:

A trial court may recall and resentence a defendant on its own motion, within 120 days of the date of commitment or at any time if the applicable sentencing laws at the time of original sentencing are subsequently changed by new statutory authority or case law, provided the new sentence, if any, is no greater than the initial sentence.

A defendant is not entitled to file a petition seeking relief from the court under this section. If a defendant requests consideration for relief under this section, the court is not required to respond.

Authority:

PEN 1172.1(a)(1)

Sixth Holding:

A defendant may, however, invite the court to exercise its discretion under section 1172.1.

However, appellate courts have uniformly held that a trial court’s summary decision not to take up a defendant’s invitation under section 1172.1 is not an appealable order and that any such appeal fails to confer jurisdiction to the Court of Appeal.

There is no indication in the record that the trial court intended to grant defendant’s invitation to recall and resentence him pursuant to section 1172.1.

Authority:

People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 375

People v. Brinson (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 1040, 1047

People v. Roy (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 991, 1001

People v. Faustinos (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 687, 695–696

People v. Hodge (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 985, 996

Seventh Holding:

The record does reflect that a prior prison term enhancement was imposed illegally (because it was imposed AFTER the statute was amended declaring such prior prison term enhancements to be invalid).

Both parties have requested that we treat defendant’s appeal as a petition for writ of habeas corpus with respect to the sentence he is still serving, and we exercise that discretion.

Accordingly, for the sake of judicial economy, we shall deem defendant’s appeal, in part, a petition for writ of habeas corpus and order that the abstract of judgment be modified to strike defendant’s former section 667.5 enhancement.

Authority:

People v. Segura (2008) 44 Cal.4th 921, 928, fn. 4

Eighth Holding:

The abstract of judgment erroneously reflects that the firearm enhancement is attached to count II instead of count I, which it was actually attached to. Having reviewed the record on appeal, we shall order the abstract of judgment corrected.

Authority:

People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1, 89

Amelioration, Elements of crime, Sentencing, Standard of review, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence

Case 000833

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court’s true findings on three of the four strike priors and three of the four prior serious felony enhancements must be vacated and the matter remanded to the court for any retrial of these allegations, because there is insufficient evidence to support the finding defendant’s three 2016 convictions qualify as serious or violent felonies for purposes of three of the four strike priors and three of the four prior serious felony enhancements under the 2022 amendments to section 186.22 enacted by AB 333.

First Holding:

Under the Three Strikes law, defendants previously convicted of serious or violent felonies are subject to increased prison terms: if a defendant has one prior conviction for a serious or violent felony, the defendant’s term of imprisonment is doubled, and if a defendant has two or more such strike priors, the defendant may receive life imprisonment.

The Three Strikes law defines “serious or violent” felony to include any offense defined as a serious felony under section 1192.7(a). Section 1192.7 defines “serious felony” to include, among other things, any felony offense that would also constitute a felony violation of section 186.22.

Authority:

PEN 1170.12

PEN 1192.7(c)(28)

Second Holding:

Section 186.22(a) makes it unlawful to actively participate in a criminal street gang with knowledge that its members engage in, or have engaged in, a pattern of criminal gang activity, and to willfully promote, further, or assist in felonious criminal conduct by members of that gang.

Section 186.22(b) provides for enhancements if a person commits a felony for the benefit of such a gang. Section 186.22 also defines the terms criminal street gang and pattern of criminal gang activity as well as benefitting a gang.

Authority:

PEN 186.22

Third Holding:

Effective January 1, 2022, AB 333 narrowed the definition of a criminal street gang, the definition of a pattern of criminal activity, and what it means for an offense to have commonly benefitted a street gang.

First, it narrowed the definition of a criminal street gang to require that any gang be an ongoing, organized association or group of three or more persons.

Second, whereas former section 186.22(f) required only that a gang’s members individually or collectively engage in a pattern of criminal activity in order to constitute a ‘criminal street gang, AB 333 requires that any such pattern that have been collectively engaged in by members of the gang.

Third, AB 333 also narrowed the definition of a pattern of criminal activity by requiring that (1) the last offense used to show a pattern of criminal gang activity occurred within three years of the date that the currently charged offense is alleged to have been committed; (2) the offenses were committed by two or more gang members, as opposed to just persons; (3) the offense commonly benefitted a criminal street gang and (4) the offenses establishing a pattern of gang activity must be ones other than the currently charged offense.

Fourth, AB 333 narrowed what it means for an offense to have commonly benefitted a street gang, requiring that any common benefit be more than reputational. Moreover, because these changes are ameliorative in nature, they apply to nonfinal judgments on appeal.

Authority:

PEN 186.22

People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206

Fourth Holding:

Fletcher held that, where a defendant has suffered a conviction under the prior version of section 186.22, AB 333 applies to the determination of whether the conviction qualifies as a prior serious felony conviction under section 1192.7(c)(28) for purposes of the Three Strikes law and prior serious felony enhancements.

Whether a prior conviction was for an offense that constitutes a felony violation of section 186.22 is determined by applying the current version of section 186.22.

Authority:

People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576, 583, 607

Fifth Holding:

On appeal, a reviewing court must examine the record in the light most favorable to the judgment to ascertain whether it is supported by substantial evidence. In other words, the reviewing court determines whether a rational trier of fact could have found the prosecution sustained its burden of proving the elements of the sentence enhancement beyond a reasonable doubt.

The People must prove all elements of an alleged sentence enhancement beyond a reasonable doubt. Where the mere fact of conviction under a particular statute does not prove the offense was a serious felony, otherwise admissible evidence from the entire record of the conviction may be examined to resolve the issue.

Authority:

People v. Miles (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1074, 1082, 1083

People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1067

Sixth Holding:

The inquiry concerning whether a prior conviction qualifies as a serious felony is a determination regarding the nature or basis of the defendant’s prior conviction—specifically, whether that conviction qualified as a conviction of a serious felony.

If the prior conviction was for an offense that can be committed in multiple ways, and the record of the conviction does not disclose how the offense was committed, a court must presume the conviction was for the least serious form of the offense.

In such a case, if the statute under which the prior conviction occurred could be violated in a way that does not qualify for the alleged enhancement, the evidence is thus insufficient, and the People have failed in their burden.

Authority:

People v. McGee (2006) 38 Cal.4th 682, 706

People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1065 (superseded by statute on another ground, as stated in People v. Frahs (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 784, 795)

Abstracts and Minutes, Defenses, Sentencing, Sixth Amendment

Case 000827

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The Three Strikes sentence is unauthorized because the prior strike allegation was never admitted or found true by the jury or court.

First Holding:

A defendant has a statutory right to a jury trial on the issue of whether he suffered an alleged prior conviction. He may waive that right and submit to a court trial or admit the truth of the prior conviction allegation. Here, there is nothing in the record showing there was any trial on the prior strike. After returning their verdicts on the substantive offenses, the jurors were discharged without considering the strike.

Authority:

PEN 1025(b)

PEN 1158

People v. Epps (2001) 25 Cal.4th 19, 25

Second Holding:

Had the matter been brought to the attention of the court, the court could have convened a new jury to try the prior conviction allegation.

Authority:

People v. Saunders (1993) 5 Cal.4th 580, 595–596 [when the court improvidently discharged the jurors before they decided prior conviction allegations, and the defense failed to timely object, double jeopardy did not bar trial of the allegations before a new jury]

Third Holding:

There are cases in which the reviewing court has determined the trial court impliedly found true an enhancement allegation by imposing the enhancement at sentencing. But in such cases, the trial court was at least presented evidence supporting the allegation.

The same is not true here. While the prosecutor at one point represented that he had the certified 969b packet for the prior, there is no indication he presented those documents, or any other evidence, to the court.

And although the minute order of sentencing reflects a true finding by the court on the prior strike, we cannot rely on those entries because there is no oral record of the court making those findings.

Authority:

People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 691, fn. 17

People v. Chambers (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1047

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385–386

Fourth Holding:

There is no constitutional or procedural bar precluding the prosecution from retrying a prior strike allegation following appellate reversal for insufficient evidence.

Authority:

People v. Barragan (2004) 32 Cal.4th 236, 239 [constitutional requirement of fundamental fairness, equitable principles of res judicata and law of the case, and relevant statutory provisions do not bar retrial of prior strike allegation]

People v. Monge (1997) 16 Cal.4th 826, 829 [state and federal prohibitions against double jeopardy do not bar retrial of a prior conviction allegation in a noncapital case]

Monge v. California (1998) 524 U.S. 721

Sentencing

Case 000823

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

It was error to stay the sentence on the use of firearm enhancement and the prior serious felony in an effort to show leniency. The proper procedure requires the court to strike them, not stay them.

Holding:

The trial court imposed and stayed both the remaining section 12022.53(b) and (c) firearm enhancements as to counts 1 and 2, and the serious felony prior enhancement as to count 2. This was an unauthorized sentence. The record indicates that the trial court did not intend to punish the defendant for these additional enhancements. Because a trial court has no authority to stay an enhancement based on its discretion, the court imposed a legally unauthorized sentence. We exercise our authority under section 1260 to modify the judgment by striking this unauthorized sentence.

Authority:

PEN 1260

People v. Bay (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 126, 139 [The trial court has no authority to stay an enhancement, rather than strike it—not, at least, when the only basis for doing either is its own discretionary sense of justice.]

Amelioration, Sentencing

Case 000822

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

On the defendant’s resentencing hearing under section 1172.75, the court erroneously denied the defendant’s petition, concluding that he was not eligible because the now-invalid enhancement for a prior prison term had been imposed but stayed.

Holding:

While this appeal was pending, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Rhodius, in which it held that a person whose sentence included a now-invalid enhancement for a prior prison term is eligible for resentencing under section 1172.75, even if the enhancement was stayed at the initial sentencing.

Authority:

People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050