Tag Archives: Gang activity

Case: 000343

Error and/or relief

The true finding on the defendant’s prior felony strike conviction must be reversed in light of changes to the gang criminal activity statute by AB 333. Defendant’s sentence, as well as the true finding that defendant’s prior conviction qualifies as prior serious felony conviction under the Three Strikes law, is vacated. The matter is remanded to the trial court for any retrial of that allegation, applying the elements of section 186.22 as amended by AB 333 and for resentencing.

First Holding:

In 2021, the Legislature amended section 186.22 with the passage of AB 333. AB 333 changed the elements of gang offenses and enhancements by narrowing the definitions of criminal street gang, pattern of criminal activity, and what it means for an offense to have commonly benefitted a street gang. AB 333 is ameliorative legislation that applies to nonfinal judgments under the rule of Estrada.

Authority:

People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576, 583

People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206-1207

In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740

Second Holding:

In Fletcher, the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether AB 333 applies to a sentencing court’s determination of whether a defendant’s conviction under the prior version of section 186.22 qualifies as a prior serious felony conviction for purposes of prior serious felony enhancements. It concluded that where a defendant has suffered a prior conviction under the earlier version of section 186.22, AB 333 applies to the determination of whether the conviction qualifies as a prior serious felony conviction under section 1192.7(c)(28) for purposes of the Three Strikes law and prior serious felony enhancements. It also held that it applies retroactively to cases in which the judgment is not yet final.

Authority:

People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576, 583

Third Holding:

That the defendant admitted the prior conviction does not forfeit the issue. Defendant’s admission cannot be construed as knowingly and/or intelligently made because it was prior to the decision in Fletcher. The true finding on defendant’s strike prior should be reversed, and the matter remanded to the trial court for any retrial of the strike allegation, applying the elements of section 186.22 as amended by AB 333. Notwithstanding the admission of the prior conviction in the trial court, we have discretion to reach the merits.

Authority:

People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161, fn. 6 [an appellate court is generally not prohibited from reaching a question that has not been preserved for review by a party]

People v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 400 [an appellate court may reach the merits of a forfeited issue in order to forestall a cognizable ineffective assistance of counsel claim]

Case: 000339

Error and/or relief

Because of insufficient evidence of the predicate offense, we reverse the juvenile court’s true finding on the gang enhancement as to count 1 pursuant to section 186.22(b)(1)(A) and remand the matter for resentencing. The prosecution did not present any evidence of predicate offenses showing the alleged gang members individually or collectively engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity. Thus, it did not prove that the robbery was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang.

First Holding:

Pursuant to section 186.22(b)(1)(A), the juvenile court may impose a sentencing enhancement for a felony committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with any criminal street gang.

Authority:

PEN 186.22(b)(1)(A)

Second Holding:

A gang is an ongoing organization, association, or group of three or more persons, whether formal or informal, having as one of its primary activities the commission of one or more enumerated offenses, having a common name or common identifying sign or symbol, and whose members individually or collectively engage in, or have engaged in, a pattern of criminal gang activity.

Authority:

PEN 186.22(f)

Third Holding:

A pattern of criminal gang activity is the commission of, attempted commission of, conspiracy to commit, or solicitation of, sustained juvenile petition for, or conviction of, two or more enumerated offenses, provided at least one of these offenses occurred after the effective date of [the criminal gang activity chapter], and the last of those offenses occurred within three years of the prior offense and within three years of the date the current offense is alleged to have been committed, the offenses were committed on separate occasions or by two or more members, the offense commonly benefited a criminal street gang, and the common benefit from the offenses is more than reputational.

Authority:

PEN 186.22(e)(1)

Fourth Holding:

The offenses comprising a pattern of criminal gang activity are referred to as predicate offenses. The term ‘commission’ includes the broader statutory inclusion of the ‘attempted commission of, conspiracy to commit, or solicitation of, sustained juvenile petition for, or conviction’ of a predicate offense.

Authority:

People v. Valencia (2021) 11 Cal.5th 818, 82

Fifth Holding:

Section 186.22(e) does not state that a predicate offense must be committed by a gang member. However, that requirement derives from the definition of a criminal street gang, which includes proof that the gang’s members individually or collectively engage in, or have engaged in, a pattern of criminal gang activity. It follows, then, that the proof of a predicate offense must establish that a member of a defendant’s alleged gang was involved in its commission. Taken together the statutory scheme requires proof that gang members committed at least two predicate offenses within the statutory timeframe. Such proof will generally require evidence of who committed the crime and when they did so, as well as evidence of their gang membership and the nature of the crimes.

Authority:

People v. Valencia (2021) 11 Cal.5th 818, 829–830

Sixth Holding:

When assessing a claim of sufficiency of evidence of a gang enhancement under section 186.22, we review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. While substantial evidence may consist of inferences, such inferences must be a product of logic and reason and must rest on the evidence’; inferences that are the result of mere speculation or conjecture cannot support a finding.

Authority:

People v. Shively (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 460, 468

Kuhn v. Department of General Services (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1627, 1633

Case: 000323

Error and/or relief

Remanded for retrial of the strike prior allegation. The amended version of section 186.22 must be applied in determining whether prior convictions with a gang enhancement qualify as serious felonies under the Three Strikes law.

First Holding:

In 2021, the Legislature passed AB 333, which amended section 186.22. This legislation narrowed the definition of a criminal street gang, the definition of a pattern of criminal activity, and what it means for an offense to have commonly benefitted a street gang. Moreover, because these changes are ameliorative in nature, they apply to nonfinal judgments on appeal.

Authority:

People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206-1207

Second Holding:

In Fletcher, relying in part on the present conditional phrasing of section 1192.7(c)(28)—which applies to any felony offense that would also constitute a felony violation of section 186.22–the Supreme Court held that current law (i.e., AB 333) applies to the determination of whether a prior conviction qualifies as a prior serious felony conviction under section 1192.7(c)(28). The Supreme Court also concluded that there was insufficient evidence in that case that the defendants’ convictions were obtained under AB 333’s more stringent requirements because the only evidence presented were the abstracts of judgment, which merely showed the offenses and gang enhancements. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the strike prior findings and directed the Court of Appeal to remand with instructions to retry the gang allegations under AB 333’s amendments to section 186.22.

Authority:

PEN 1192.7(c)(28)

People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576, 603-604

Case: 000315

Error and/or relief

The defendant appeals the denial of his motion to strike a strike that was based on gang activity under the definition existing prior to the changes to section 186.22 enacted by AB 333. The motion should have been granted, and we vacate the defendant’s admission of that strike. It is undisputed that the trial court did not evaluate whether the conduct underlying the defendant’s prior convictions would violate section 186.22 as amended by AB 333, and nothing in the record would have afforded it a basis to do so. We will reverse the judgment and remand the matter for the trial court to apply the elements of section 186.22 as amended. On remand, the People must decide whether to prosecute the prior strike allegations under the law as amended by AB 333 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.). The trial court must resentence the defendant.

Holding:

When determining whether a prior serious felony conviction qualifies as a strike based on gang criminal activity, sentencing courts must consider whether the conduct underlying a prior conviction that by operation of section 186.22 is alleged to be a serious or violent felony still satisfies section 186.22 as amended.

Authority:

People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576, 608

Case: 000312

Error and/or relief

The defendant appeals the denial of his motion to strike a strike that was based on gang activity under the definition existing prior to the changes to PC 186.22 enacted by AB 333. The motion should have been granted, and we vacate the defendant’s admission of that strike.

First Holding:

The Three Strikes law doubles a felony sentence if the defendant has a prior conviction for a serious felony, which includes any felony offense, which would also constitute a felony violation of section 186.22. The prior firearm conviction constitutes a strike if committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang pursuant to section 186.22(b)(1).

Authority:

AB 333

PEN 1192.7(c)(28)

PEN 667

People v. Briceno (2004) 34 Cal.4th 451, 456

Second Holding:

AB 333, effective January 1, 2022, amended section 186.22 to narrow the definition of benefit to mean to provide a common benefit to members of a gang where the common benefit is more than reputational. Examples of a common benefit that are more than reputational may include, but are not limited to, financial gain or motivation, retaliation, targeting a perceived or actual gang rival, or intimidation or silencing of a potential current or previous witness or informant. This provision applies retroactively to cases that are not final on appeal to determine whether a prior violation of section 186.22 constitutes a strike. With regard to prior convictions that are premised on violations of section 186.22, current law applies in determining whether they qualify as prior serious felony convictions.

Authority:

PEN 186.22(g)

People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576, 586-587

Case: 000311

Error and/or relief

For a prior felony conviction based on gang criminal activity to qualify as a serious felony or a strike, it must have met the elements of section 186.22 as amended by AB 333. In this People’s appeal from the dismissal of that strike, we affirm the trial court’s order.

First Holding:

The Three Strikes law doubles a felony sentence if the defendant has a prior conviction for a serious felony, which includes any felony offense that would also constitute a felony violation of Section 186.22. The prior firearm conviction constitutes a strike if committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang pursuant to section 186.22(b)(1).

Authority:

PEN 1192.7(c)(28)

PEN 667

People v. Briceno (2004) 34 Cal.4th 451, 456

Second Holding:

AB 333, effective January 1, 2022, amended section 186.22 to narrow the definition of benefit to mean to provide a common benefit to members of a gang where the common benefit is more than reputational. Examples of a common benefit that are more than reputational may include, but are not limited to, financial gain or motivation, retaliation, targeting a perceived or actual gang rival, or intimidation or silencing of a potential current or previous witness or informant. This provision applies retroactively to cases that are not final on appeal to determine whether a prior violation of section 186.22 constitutes a strike. With regard to prior convictions that are premised on violations of section 186.22, current law applies in determining whether they qualify as prior serious felony convictions.

Authority:

PEN 186.22(g)

People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576, 586-587

Case: 000310

Error and/or relief

The evidence is insufficient to support an enhancement based on a finding that the crimes were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang. Imposition of a restitution fine is now precluded by subsequent legislation. We modify the judgment to strike the gang enhancement and vacate the restitution fine.

First Holding:

Effective January 1, 2022, section 186.22 was amended by AB 333, significantly narrowing the circumstances in which the enhancement would apply. As amended, the statute now requires, among other things, that the two predicate offenses necessary to establish a pattern of criminal gang activity must each have been committed within a specified date range by two or more gang members for the common benefit of the gang, and this benefit must have been more than reputational. Here, the evidence of predicate offenses offered by the prosecution showed three possible crimes, two of which were committed by a single gang member without anything to indicate a value to the gang that was more than reputational. This is insufficient to establish a basis for the gang enhancement as amended by AB 333

Authority:

People v. Clark (2024) 15 Cal.5th 743, 752–753

Second Holding:

Effective January 1, 2025, Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.6 now prohibits imposition of restitution fines on juvenile offenders. This provision is retroactive. We therefore vacate the $100 restitution fine.

Authority:

In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740

People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, 308

Case: 000303

Error and/or relief

It was error for the trial court to determine that one of the prior serious felony convictions qualified as a strike under the Three Strikes law and for enhancement as a prior serious felony, because AB 333 amended the elements of the crime under section 186.22, and the acts constituting the crime were tried under the former version. The matter is remanded to the trial court with directions that the People be allowed to elect whether to retry appellant, under current law, on the strike and the prior serious felony enhancement. We also remand the matter for a full resentencing.

First Holding:

Current law governs whether defendants prior convictions would also constitute a felony violation of section 186.22 for purposes of the Three Strikes law and prior serious felony enhancements. The current law includes Assembly Bill 333’s redefinition of the elements of gang offenses and enhancements under section 186.22. Thus, Assembly Bill 333 applies to the determination of whether a prior conviction qualifies as a serious or violent felony under section 192.7(c)(28) for purposes of the Three Strikes law and prior serious felony enhancements. There is no indication that defendants’ prior convictions were obtained under Assembly Bill 333’s more stringent requirements. The appropriate remedy is reversal of the findings on these enhancements for retrial under the correct law.

Authority:

AB 333

PEN 186.22

PEN 1192.7(c)(28)

PEN 667

People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576, 607-608

Second Holding:

When part of a sentence is stricken on review, on remand for resentencing a full resentencing as to all counts is appropriate, so the trial court can exercise its sentencing discretion in light of the changed circumstances.

Authority:

People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893

Case: 000302

Error and/or relief

The defendants are entitled to retrial on the counts for active participation in a criminal street gang in light of AB 333’s retroactive changes to section 186.22. It was error to order Defendant’s 2 and 3 to be jointly responsible for the funeral expenses of the victim killed by Defendant 1. In addition there were several errors in Defendant 1’s consolidated abstract of judgment that need correction.

First Holding:

During the appeal, the Legislature amended section 186.22’s defendant of a criminal street gang. It narrowed the definition of a criminal street gang to require that any gang be an ongoing, organized association or group of three or more persons; it requires that the pattern of criminal activity foundational to a criminal street gang have been collectively engaged in by members of the gang; it also imposed further requirements limiting the offenses on which a pattern of criminal gang activity could be predicated; and it required that for an offense to have commonly benefitted a street gang, any common benefit be more than reputational.

Authority:

AB 333

PEN 186.22

People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206

Second Holding:

The ameliorative amendments apply retroactively to all cases not yet final as of its effective date.

Authority:

People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206-1207

In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740

Third Holding:

The trial court instructed the jury on the then-applicable definition of a criminal street gang, omitting several of the requirements that have now been imposed by AB 333. The jury instruction thus relieved the prosecution of its burden to prove all elements of the crime as now defined.

Authority:

People v. Cooper (2023) 14 Cal.5th 735, 742

Fourth Holding:

We apply the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard articulated in Chapman. When a jury instruction has omitted an element of an offense, our task is to determine whether the record contains evidence that could rationally lead to a contrary finding with respect to the omitted element. The question is not whether there is evidence in the record that would support a jury finding of the missing element, but whether we can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury verdict would have been the same had the jury been instructed on the missing element.

Authority:

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18

People v. Cooper (2023) 14 Cal.5th 735, 742-743

People v. Lamb (2024) 16 Cal.5th 400, 449

Fifth Holding:

All three defendants will be entitled to a full resentencing upon remand, independent of the prosecution’s election whether to pursue the gang charge or enhancements on remand. The full resentencing rule allows a court to revisit all prior sentencing decisions when resentencing a defendant.

Authority:

People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893

People v. Valenzuela (2019) 7 Cal.5th 415, 424–425

Sixth Holding:

We observe, however, that neither Defendant 2 nor Defendant 3 can be ordered to pay restitution for any losses attributable to Defendant 1’s murder of the deceased. Neither of them were charged with any offense involving the deceased, and nothing in the evidence before the jury or the court at sentencing implicated them in his murder. It was accordingly error to make them jointly and severally liable for the deceased’s funeral expenses.

Authority:

PEN 1202.4(f) [authorizing restitution where a victim has suffered economic loss as a result of the defendant’s conduct]

People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354 [unauthorized sentence cannot be lawfully imposed]

Seventh Holding:

Defendant 1’s consolidated abstract of judgment requires correction. First, in case number A, the abstract of judgment erroneously lists as stayed count 2’s multiple-murder special circumstance when the trial court vacated this finding. In case number B, Defendant 1’s conviction for assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury in violation of section 245(a)(4) is described on the abstract as “Asslt w/deadly wpn/force likely to prod GBI.” We agree that an amended abstract should be reworded to avoid confusion between assault with a deadly weapon (sec. 245(a)(1), (2), or (3))—a serious felony under section 1192.7—and assault by force likely to produce great bodily injury (sec. 245(a)(4)).

(GARY NOTE–the appellate court did not cite case authority for the correction of the abstract, but it is abundantly clear the court has that authority. I have set forth some below)

Authority:

PEN 1192.7(c) [listing serious felonies]

People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1065

[on correction of abstracts]

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1070

People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 855

In re Black (1967) 66 Cal.2d 881, 890

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2

Case: 000296

Error and/or relief

The evidence is insufficient to support the defendant’s conviction on count 2 for attempted voluntary manslaughter, and that conviction must be reversed. We also conclude the court’s use of the pre-AB 333 pattern jury instruction was prejudicial. This requires reversal of the gang enhancements, the substantive gang offense (count 7), and the related section 12022.53(d) and (e)(1) gang related firearm use enhancements.

First Holding:

Attempted voluntary manslaughter requires proof that the defendant specifically intended to kill the named victim, although the intent is mitigated by heat of passion or imperfect self-defense.

Authority:

People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 583

Second Holding:

The jury must agree unanimously the defendant is guilty of a specific crime. When the evidence suggests more than one discrete crime under a single count, either the prosecution must elect the act relied upon or the court must instruct the jury to agree on the same criminal act. The unanimity instruction exists to prevent jurors from convicting a defendant based on different instances of conduct, thereby ensuring all 12 jurors are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the same act constituted the offense. A unanimity instruction is required when the record shows evidence of more than one crime that could support conviction under a single count. But if the evidence shows only a single discrete crime, no instruction is necessary.

Authority:

People v. McDaniel (2021) 12 Cal.5th 97, 142

People v. Russo (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1132

People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 877

People v. Hernandez (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 559, 569

People v. Grimes (2016) 1 Cal.5th 698, 727

People v. Diedrich (1982) 31 Cal.3d 263, 281

Third Holding:

Determining whether a particular instruction was required presents a predominantly legal mixed question of law and fact. We therefore review claims of instructional error de novo.

Authority:

People v. Hernandez (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 559, 568

People v. Mitchell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 561, 579

People v. Guiuan (1998) 18 Cal.4th 558, 569

Fourth Holding:

In a criminal case, the trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence and necessary to the jury’s understanding of the case. The correctness of jury instructions is determined by considering the charge as a whole, not by viewing individual instructions in isolation.

Authority:

People v. Martinez (2010) 47 Cal.4th 911, 953

People v. Carrington (2009) 47 Cal.4th 145, 192

Fifth Holding:

To determine whether the trial court properly instructed on the kill zone theory, we apply the substantial evidence standard of review. Under this standard, the question is whether the record contains evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that the defendant intended to kill everyone within the zone of harm as a means of killing the primary target.

Authority:

People v. Mumin (2023) 15 Cal.5th 176, 193, 203 [Without substantial evidence showing the defendant acted with intent to kill a primary target, the essential basis for a concurrent intent analysis is not satisfied]

Sixth Holding:

The standard for assessing a sufficiency of the evidence claim is highly deferential. We examine the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence; that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In conducting our review, we must presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trial court could reasonably deduce from the evidence. We also accept all logical inferences the trial court could have drawn from circumstantial evidence. The question is not whether the evidence proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but whether substantial evidence supports the trier of fact’s finding. The judgment must be upheld unless it appears that, under no hypothesis whatsoever, is there sufficient substantial evidence to support it.

Authority:

People v. Cravens (2012) 53 Cal.4th 500, 507-508

People v. Kurey (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 840, 848–849 [we resolve all inferences and intendments in favor of the judgment, and all conflicting evidence will be resolved in favor of the decision]

People v. Medina (2009) 46 Cal.4th 913, 919, superseded by statute on other grounds

People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371, 411

People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 139

People v. Sanchez (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 325, 329

Seventh Holding:

The jury was instructed on the gang participation law as it existed at the time of trial. Because subsequent amendments under AB 333 changed the elements considerably and the defendant’s judgment is not final, the gang-related convictions must be retried under the new law.

Authority:

People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206–1207

People v. Lopez (2025) 17 Cal.5th 388, 394

People v. Hallock (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 595, 610

Case: 000295

Error and/or relief

There are two defendants, both convicted of murder and other matters. We reverse all counts of the conviction of Defendant A because of instructional error. It is therefore not necessary for us to consider the other errors urged by Defendant A. As to Defendant B, we reverse the conviction on the firearm offenses because of instructional error, and agree that the jury’s true findings on gang enhancements and related gang-related firearm enhancements must be vacatedand remanded because of changes in the law of gang criminal activity.

[GARY NOTE: The opinion is 70 pages long and goes into extensive discussion of the elements of murder. The reversals were based on the absence of proper jury instructions. I have chosen to summarize only a few of the pronouncements in the opinion rather than present a treatise on the elements of murder. I will, however, send the opinion to attorneys on request.]

First Holding:

Due to the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on the meanings of “willfully,” “deliberately,” and “with premeditation,” or with the instructions describing aider and abettor liability for murder, Defendant A’s conviction for first degree murder requires reversal.

To be guilty of first degree murder as an aider and abettor, the jury must be instructed that a person aids and abets the commission of a crime when he or she, acting with (1) knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator; and (2) the intent or purpose of committing, encouraging, or facilitating the commission of the offense, (3) by act or advice aids, promotes, encourages or instigates, the commission of the crime.

Authority:

People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 561

Second Holding:

We evaluate the failure to instruct the jury on an element of an offense for prejudice under Chapman. Under this standard, we must reverse the conviction unless after examining the entire cause, including the evidence, and considering all relevant circumstances, it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.

Authority:

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24

People v. Beck and Cruz (2019) 8 Cal.5th 548, 642

People v. Swain (1996) 12 Cal.4th 593, 607

Third Holding:

We review a claim of instructional error de novo. Review of the adequacy of instructions is based on whether the trial court fully and fairly instructed on the applicable law. Generally, the trial court is required to instruct the jury on the general principles of law that are closely and openly connected with the evidence and that are necessary to the jury’s understanding of the case. It also has a duty to refrain from giving incorrect instructions or instructions on principles of law that are irrelevant and that would have the effect of confusing the jury or relieving it from making findings on the relevant issues. The trial court’s duty in this regard extends to lesser included offenses that find substantial support in the evidence. In determining the correctness of jury instructions, we consider the entire charge of the court, in light of the trial record.

Authority:

People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 581, 584

People v. Barber (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 787, 798-799

People v. Thomas (2023) 14 Cal.5th 327, 388–389

People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 162

People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 926

Fourth Holding:

An erroneous failure to instruct on a lesser included offense requires reversal of a conviction if, taking into account the entire record, it appears reasonably probable the defendant would have obtained a more favorable outcome had the error not occurred. In a noncapital case, a failure to instruct sua sponte on a lesser necessarily included offense that is supported by the evidence is state law error that we review for prejudice under Watson. Under Watson, a defendant must show it is reasonably probable a more favorable result would have been obtained absent the error. We also consider the instructions as a whole, the jury’s findings, and the closing arguments of counsel.

Authority:

People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 169, 178

People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836

People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 716

People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818

People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935, 955

People v. Larsen (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 810, 831

Fifth Holding:

We determine whether a jury instruction correctly states the law under the independent or de novo standard of review. When we review a purportedly erroneous instruction, we consider whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that violates the Constitution.

Authority:

People v. Ramos (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1082, 1088

People v. Richardson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 959, 1028

Sixth Holding:

AB 333 amended section 186.22, by, among other things, modifying the definitions of “pattern of criminal activity” and “criminal street gang,” as well as clarifying what is required to establish that an offense benefits, promotes, furthers, or assists a criminal street gang. Section 186.22 now requires proof of the following additional requirements with respect to predicate offenses: (1) the offenses must have commonly benefited a criminal street gang where the common benefit is more than reputational; (2) the last predicate offense must have occurred within three years of the date of the currently charged offense; (3) the predicate offenses must be committed on separate occasions or by two or more gang members, as opposed to persons; and (4) the charged offense cannot be used as a predicate offense.

To benefit, promote, further, or assist means to provide a common benefit to members of a gang where the common benefit is more than reputational. Examples of a common benefit that are more than reputational may include, but are not limited to, financial gain or motivation, retaliation, targeting a perceived or actual gang rival, or intimidation or silencing of a potential current or previous witness or informant.

Authority:

People v. Perez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 192, 206

People v. Lopez (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 327, 345

Seventh Holding:

Because the changes to the criminal street gang statute in AB 333 are ameliorative,those changes apply retroactively to defendants whose convictions are not yet final.

Authority:

People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206–1207

Case: 000291

Error and/or relief

This was a People’s appeal from the trial court’s grant of a motion under section 995 to set aside counts and enhancements in the information that the magistrate found insufficient evidence to support at the preliminary hearing. Grant of section 995 motion affirmed.

[GARY NOTE: This opinion went into depth analyzing the sufficiency of evidence on the question of gang common benefit and whether the members collectively engaged in the pattern of criminal gang activity that the statute requires. It discussed several published cases as example that guided its decision. I have not included the discussion or the cases cited, as that depth is beyond the scope of this blog. I’m happy to provide the full opinion to any attorney who asks me for it.]

First Holding:

Under section 995, an information will be set aside if the defendant was committed without reasonable or probable cause. To establish probable cause sufficient to withstand a section 995 motion to dismiss, the People must make some showing as to the existence of each element of the charged offense. Reasonable or probable cause’ means such a state of facts as would lead a [person] of ordinary caution or prudence to believe, and conscientiously entertain a strong suspicion of the guilt of the accused. Probable cause signifies a level of proof below that of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, or even proof by a preponderance of the evidence. The showing required at this stage is exceedingly low, and an information should be set aside only when there is a total absence of evidence to support a necessary element of the offense charged.

Authority:

Hale v. Superior Court (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 268, 271 [a defendant may utilize section 995 to strike invalid enhancement allegations]

People v. Chapple (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 540, 545

People v. Mower (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 473

People v. Superior Court (Mendez) (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 268, 276

People v. Garcia (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 864, 870–871

Second Holding:

When we review a section 995 motion, we disregard the ruling of the superior court and directly review the determination of the magistrate. We must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the information and decide whether there is probable cause to hold the defendants to answer, i.e., whether the evidence is such that a reasonable person could harbor a strong suspicion of the defendant’s guilt.

Authority:

People v. San Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 654 [reviewing denial of sec. 995 motion made after magistrate struck special circumstance allegation]

Lexin v. Superior Court (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1050, 1072

Third Holding:

As here with respect to the gang evidence presented by the prosecution, where the facts are undisputed, the determination of probable cause constitutes a legal conclusion which is subject to independent review on appeal.

Authority:

People v. Superior Court (Farley) (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 315, 326

People v. Scully (2021) 11 Cal.5th 542, 582 [independent standard of review applies when magistrate determines that the People did not put forth sufficient evidence to support the charges]

Fourth Holding:

Not every crime committed by gang members is related to a gang. Concerned with lax interpretations of the prior gang law that allowed for overly expansive application of gang enhancements, the Legislature amended section 186.22 effective January 1, 2022. The amendments to section 186.22 narrowed the definition of a criminal street gang and increased the prosecution’s burden of proof by altering the definition of a criminal street gang and instituting new requirements to prove that a criminal street gang engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity.

Authority:

People v. Albillar (2010) 51 Cal.4th 47, 60

People v. Cooper (2023) 14 Cal.5th 735, 744

People v. Renteria (2022) 13 Cal.5th 951, 961, fn. 6

Fifth Holding:

For the reasons stated in this opinion, we conclude that there was insufficient evidence that a reasonable person could harbor a strong suspicion that gang’s predicate offenses were either committed for the gang’s common benefit or that the gang members collectively engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity as defined under section 186.22. Finding insufficient evidence that the gang meets the definition of a criminal street gang under section 186.22, we discern no error in the trial court’s partial grant of the section 995 motion as to the gang enhancements and gang related firearm enhancements as to all defendants.

Authority:

Lexin v. Superior Court (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1050, 1072