Error and/or relief
The trial court erred by instructing the jury that a person may lose the right to self-defense if he was the initial aggressor or a mutual combatant (CALCRIM No. 3471), or if he contrived the claim as a pretext to assault the victim (CALCRIM No. 3472). Given the evidence in this case, no reasonable jury could find these instructions applicable.
Although the error was harmless as to the instructions on mutual combat and contrived self-defense—as the jury was readily able to see the irrelevance of these instructions—the record reveals a reasonable likelihood that the jury was misled by the initial aggressor instruction. We therefore reverse the defendant’s murder conviction and remand for retrial.
First Holding:
The prosecution argues that the claim was forfeited by lack of objection. The defendant argues the issue is reviewable insofar as the challenged instructions directly undermined his self-defense claim and thus impaired his substantial rights.
Alternatively, he claims defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to fully object to both instructions.
We must address the defendant’s contention on its merits to determine whether there was an impairment of his substantial rights or ineffective assistance of counsel.
Authority:
PEN 1259
People v. Anderson (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 919, 927
Second Holding:
It is settled that in criminal cases, even in the absence of a request, the trial court must instruct on the general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence.
The general principles of law governing the case are those principles closely and openly connected with the facts before the court, and which are necessary for the jury’s understanding of the case.
The corollary to this mandate is equally well-established: a trial court is not obligated to give an instruction if the evidence presented at trial is such as to preclude a reasonable jury from finding the instruction applicable. Indeed, it is error to give a jury instruction that is legally correct but has no application to the facts of the case.
Authority:
People v. St. Martin (1970) 1 Cal.3d 524, 531
People v. Schultz (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 535, 539
People v. Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116, 1129
Third Holding:
Giving an inapplicable instruction is subject to the traditional Watson test for prejudice, under which reversal is required if it is reasonably probable the result would have been more favorable to the defendant had the error not occurred.
Such an error is generally only a technical error that does not constitute ground for reversal because juries are fully capable of analyzing the evidence, determining the facts, and realizing that an instruction does not apply. Juries are routinely told that some of the instructions may not apply, depending on their findings about the facts of the case and are directed to follow the instructions that do apply to the facts as they find them.
That being said, in some cases, the presence of an extraneous instruction may be confusing enough to become prejudicial.
Authority:
People v. Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116, 1130
People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836
People v. Cross (2008) 45 Cal.4th 58, 67
People v. Schultz (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 535, 539-540
Fourth Holding:
Regarding the instruction on initial aggressor, there are two problems. First, the paragraph the jury received on sudden escalation was written in terms of a defendant initiating an altercation with nondeadly force, the victim responding with deadly force, and then the defendant using deadly force in return.
But the evidence here suggested a different scenario, in which (arguably) the victim initiated with nondeadly force, the defendant responded with deadly force, the victim subsequently used deadly force, and then the defendant used deadly force in return. In other words, the standard language did not quite fit the facts here.
Second, and more to the point, we agree with the defendant that no reasonable jury could find the initial aggressor concept applicable—even with tailored sudden escalation language—given the timelapse between the two encounters. The reason that a defendant forfeits his claim to self-defense when he initiates a deadly attack is because the victim is then legally justified in using deadly force against the defendant. But no one is justified in using deadly force absent fear of imminent death or great bodily injury.
(Gary note: The appellate court describes the facts as the defendant initially pointing a gun, then the altercation is over, but an hour later the victim shows up and starts throwing rocks at the defendant, who responds with deadly force. “Accordingly, the defendant’s conduct during the first encounter did not limit his self-defense claim; he did not have a duty to withdraw during the second encounter.”)
On this record, we discern a reasonable likelihood that at least one juror would have accepted that the defendant actually believed he needed to defend himself from imminent death or great bodily injury, but was misled into thinking the defendant lost his right to make that claim since he pulled the gun on the victim an hour earlier, and he did not communicate an intent to stop fighting during the second, fatal encounter.
We therefore conclude that giving the initial aggressor instruction was prejudicial, and accordingly reverse the murder conviction.
Authority:
In re Christian S. (2015) 7 Cal.4th 768, 773, fn. 1 [self-defense and imperfect self-defense may not be invoked by a defendant who, through his own wrongful conduct (e.g., the initiation of a physical assault or the commission of a felony), has created circumstances under which his adversary’s attack or pursuit is legally justified]
People v. Vasquez (2005) 136 Cal.App.4th 1176, 1179–1180 [imperfect self-defense is available when the victim’s use of force against the defendant is unlawful, even when the defendant set in motion the chain of events that led the victim to attack the defendant]
People v. Humphrey (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073, 1082 [for either perfect or imperfect self-defense, the fear must be of imminent harm]
Fifth Holding:
To the extent the prosecution contends that any error in instructing the jury on the limits of self-defense was harmless since the jury found the defendant guilty of first degree murder, we note that killing in self-defense is not necessarily inconsistent with premeditation and deliberation.
Authority:
People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237, 265 (conc. opn. of Liu, J.)
